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To Ashley,
Charlotte,
and Mom & Dad

Δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν
διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
-Romans 5:1

“Thou that ‘ere while didst such strong Reasons frame,
As yet, great Willet, art the Popelings Shame:
Now by thy Sickness, and by Death hast made
Strong Arguments to prove that Man’s a Shade:
Thy Life did shew thy deep Divinity,
Death only taught us thy Humanity.”
-inscription from Andrew Willet’s gravestone
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ABSTRACT
Andrew Willet, a Cambridge-educated minister, began his writing career as a popular
anti-Catholic polemicist (best known for the influential Synopsis Papismi) during
Elizabeth I’s reign. Early in the seventeenth century he shifted genres, writing a series of
biblical commentaries using a distinctive six-fold method and earning a reputation as one
of the country’s best textual scholars. Willet suggested that the change to exegesis was a
move from religious controversy to more irenic waters, and many scholars have taken
him at his word, writing of his abandonment of polemics. An analysis of his 1611
hexapla commentary on Romans, however, reveals a distinct polemical lens, indicating
that he did not so much abandon religious controversy as transfer it to a different genre.
Interpreting Romans using this polemical hermeneutic served to sharpen Willet’s
distinctions and clarify his presentation of Reformed doctrine against a negative Roman
Catholic relief. While many English Protestants of his day similarly read Scripture
through an anti-Catholic framework, Willet’s background in polemics, his textual skill,
and his encyclopedic knowledge of the history of exegesis set him apart as an exemplar
of this interpretive approach to the biblical text.
Contrary to some depictions of early Stuart anti-Catholicism as being primarily
politically motivated, Willet’s appears firmly rooted in a doctrinal concern to magnify
God’s grace and eliminate all suggestion of human merit in salvation. This exegeticallyderived concern, combined with his set of finely-honed humanist and scholastic
interpretive tools, ensured that his hermeneutic does not impose alien concepts upon the
text. His hermeneutic, rather, focuses his exposition and guides his collation of different
scriptures, providing a structure for eliciting the epistle’s central lessons. Additionally,

xii

we see how polemical context shapes the formulation of doctrine. Willet’s Reformed
theology is similar to that of the continental Reformed, but different responses are
required to the different challenges posed in each setting.
This study of Willet’s Romans hexapla focuses on his criticism of the Vulgate,
grammatical and rhetorical analysis, causality-based arguments, and appropriation of
ancient heretics and Church Fathers, showing how these serve to sharpen his
interpretation and support his aim of presenting Protestantism as the true and “catholic”
church.

xiii

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION:
ANDREW WILLET, ROMANS, AND POST-REFORMATION POLEMICS
1. Purpose and Scope of this Study
Church of England divine and polymath Andrew Willet (1561/2-1621) began his
prolific writing career as one of the Protestant world’s preeminent anti-Catholic
polemicists. His magisterial and influential Synopsis Papismi, which went through four
editions in his lifetime and extended to well over a thousand pages, critiqued every
element of Roman Catholic dogma in painstaking detail. Also one of England’s most
skilled textual critics, he shifted genres and engaged in biblical commentary work for the
latter decades of his life. Willet’s exegetical work has not received adequate attention,
and I intend in this dissertation to contribute to that discussion, looking particularly at
how Willet’s background as a leading religious controversialist informed and directed his
later efforts in biblical commentary. I will argue that Willet’s turn to biblical exposition
represented not an abandonment of polemics, but the application of a polemical
hermeneutic to a different genre.
I am focusing my attention on Willet’s 1611 Romans hexapla.1 This epistle was at
the heart of the theological tension between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Willet held
that it taught “the two chiefe points of Christian religion,” which also happened to be two
major points of contention with the “Roman foe”: justification and election.2 He later
uses these same doctrines to articulate marks of “true religion”:
This is a true marke and touchstone whereby to discerne true religion from false:
for that religion, which onely giveth honour unto God, and denieth all power unto
1

Andrew Willet, Hexapla: That is, A Six-fold Commentarie upon the most Divine Epistle of the
holy Apostle S. Paul to the Romanes: wherein according to the Authors former method sixe things are
observed in every Chapter (Cambridge: Leonard Greene, 1611).
2

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 8.

1

2

man, to helpe toward salvation, and so stoppeth mans mouth, and taketh from him
all ostentation and vaine glorie, that is the true religion: whereas on the contrarie,
that which giveth unto man matter of ostentation and rejoycing, is to be suspected
of falshood, and hypocrisie: such is the doctrine of Poperie, which ascribeth much
unto mans freewill and merits.3
We see in this brief passage both the importance of Romans to Willet (and to postReformation religious controversy generally), and a glimpse at how Willet’s polemical
hermeneutic focuses and frames his interpretation of the epistle. Indeed, he is drawn to
Romans largely because of these themes, but his opposition to “papism” also directs the
way that he elicits and frames this Doctrine; had he viewed Socinianism, for instance, as
the greatest threat to the Church of England, surely he would not have defined “true
religion” without reference to Christ. But since Rome’s Christology and trinitarian views
were not particularly problematic, Willet can assume orthodoxy on these doctrines and
focus his interpretation on the more contested matters.
Two decades ago Anthony Milton observed that “the greater proportion of printed
religious literature [from England] of the period 1600-40 remains wholly unstudied,” and,
particularly, “the vast majority of anti-papal controversial works composed during this
period have been almost entirely neglected by historians.”4 While the situation is better
today than it was twenty years ago, there remains much work to be done in early Stuart
polemics. And while a Romans commentary does not strictly belong to the controversial
genre, it can be particularly instructive to consider how the polemical needs of the period
informed other genres. Thus, I hope to contribute to the developing body of scholarly
literature on the history of exegesis, early seventeenth-century anti-papism, and the

3
4

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 177 (eliciting a Doctrine from v. 3:19).

Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English
Protestant Thought, 1600-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6-7.

3

hermeneutical function of polemics.
Considering the extensive body of work produced by the prolific Willet and the
relative lack of scholarly focus that he has received, I will necessarily have to limit my
scope primarily to issues pertaining to the Romans hexapla (which itself has material
enough for several dissertations!). Thus, I will refer to the rest of his work only as it
serves to clarify an issue from his interpretation of Romans, and I cannot dwell long on
many of the interesting ancillary questions and debates about Willet (e.g. whether he
wrote the 1599 A Christian Letter,5 the degree to which he allowed political resistance,
why he was not included among the King James Bible translators, the circumstances
surrounding his imprisonment for opposing the Spanish Match, whether his poetry has
any literary merit, and so forth).

2. State of the Question
2.1 Scholarship on Willet
The widely varying designations of Andrew Willet in modern secondary literature
give testimony to the diversity of his abilities and the value of further examination of his
work and its impact on seventeenth-century thought. He has been described in recent
years both as a “noted moderate puritan divine” and as a “radical Protestant,”6 as “a wellknown English Calvinist clergyman and writer,” a “Jacobean textual scholar,” and a

5
6

An anonymous tract critical of Richard Hooker; see footnotes 15-16 in this chapter.

J. F. Merritt, “Puritans, Laudians, and the Phenomenon of Church-Building in Jacobean
London,” The Historical Journal 41, no. 4 (December 1998): 954; Neil D. Graves, “Pedagogy or
Gerontagogy: The Education of the Miltonic Deity,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 50, no. 4
(Winter 2008): 358.

4

“Calvinist controversialist.”7 His vast literary output has led him to be entitled “a prodigy
of learning and industry” and “that tireless commentator Andrew Willet,”8 and in other
fields he has been designated as the author of “the first book on the conversion of Jews to
be printed in England,”9 “one of the very few explicit resistance theorists to be found in
Jacobean England,” “England’s first religious emblem writer,” and even—through a
curiously-myopic focus on those few emblems—as “the English poet Andrew Willet.”10

7

Lee Piepho, “Making the Impossible Dream: Latin, Print, and the Marriage of Frederick V and
the Princess Elizabeth,” Reformation 14 (2009): 134; Joseph Marshall, “Recycling and Originality in the
Pamphlet Wars: Republishing Jacobean Texts in the 1640s,” Transactions of the Cambridge
Bibliographical Society 12, no. 1 (2000): 73; J. Sears McGee, “A ‘Carkass’ of ‘Mere Dead Paper’: The
Polemical Career of Francis Rous, Puritan MP,” Huntington Library Quarterly 72, no. 3 (September 2009):
355.
8

Rosemary Freeman, “George Herbert and the Emblem Books,” The Review of English Studies
17, no. 66 (April 1941): 151; Eugene D. Hill, “The First Elizabethan Tragedy: A Contextual Reading of
‘Cambises’,” Studies in Philology 89, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 420. Other modern writers who describe Willet
as among the most learned scholars of his day include: James Brodrick, St. Robert Bellarmine: Saint &
Scholar (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1961), 81; Patrick Collinson, Elizabethans (London:
Hambleton and London, 2003), 201; and Philip B. Secor, Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism (Kent,
UK: Burns and Oates, 1999), 317. Other recent writers who have made reference to Willet’s industry and
prolific literary output include: Robert H. West, Milton and the Angels (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1955), 49; C. A. Patrides, “The ‘Protevangelium’ in Renaissance Theology and Paradise Lost,”
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 3, no. 1 (Winter 1963): 22; Heather Hirschfeld, The End of
Satisfaction: Drama and Repentance in the Age of Shakespeare (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2014), 34; Kevin Killeen, Biblical Scholarship, Science and Politics in Early Modern England: Thomas
Browne and the Thorny Place of Knowledge (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009), 77; James Shapiro,
Shakespeare and the Jews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 167; and David McKitterick, A
History of Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, Printing and the Book Trade in Cambridge, 1534-1698
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 124. McKitterick notes that his remarkable productivity
stands out even within his era, describing him as “one of the more prolific theological authors of a
generation not noticeable for its reticence.” Patrides quips, borrowing a phrase from Arthur Dent, that
Willet’s “prolixity might have given us cause to complain were it not that his output is often ‘the plainemans [path]-way to Heaven.’”
9

Shapiro, Shakespeare and the Jews, 143; so also The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill, vol.
2, Religion and Politics in 17th Century England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 272.
10

Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1996), 10; Peter M. Daly and Paola Valeri-Tomaszuk, “Andrew Willet, England's First
Religious Emblem Writer,” Renaissance and Reformation 10, no. 2 (1986): 181; Anne Lake Prescott, “The
2011 Josephine Waters Bennett Lecture: From the Sheephook to the Scepter: The Ambiguities of David's
Rise to the Throne,” Renaissance Quarterly 65, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 8. McKitterick explains why Willet
achieved notoriety as a theologian and not as a poet, describing the verses in his emblem book as “an
inauspicious beginning to the printing of English poetry in Cambridge” (McKitterick, History of
Cambridge University Press, 124).

5

While Willet is frequently cast in a supporting role in a wide range of secondary
literature, currently the only extended, monograph treatment of his thought is a 1998
master’s thesis by Peter Van Kleeck, which presents a basic overview of his
hermeneutical approach. Randall Pederson’s 2009 essay on the Synopsis Papismi mainly
summarizes Willet’s arguments, generally clearly and accurately, focusing on the
doctrines of Scripture and predestination. Pederson’s own commentary is fairly minimal,
though he contextualizes Willet’s thought well in his footnotes. Anthony Milton, who
wrote the Willet entry in the most recent edition of the Dictionary of National Biography,
employs him as his primary window into the state of the late Tudor to early Stuart era
Church of England in his excellent 1995 book Catholic and Reformed. Milton recounts
Willet’s efforts to spur further church reforms in the early years of the Jacobean period
by constantly warning of the papist threat, diverting attention away from the more radical
Reformed voices, and supporting the episcopacy sufficiently to demonstrate his loyalty to
the crown, yet not so strongly as to alienate his presbyterian continental Reformed
brethren. Viewing the same conflict from the Roman Catholic side, Stefania Tutino
likewise has Willet as her representative anti-Catholic Protestant, calling his Synopsis
Papismi “a book of great importance in English religious history between the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries,” in her 2007 book Law and Conscience.11
It is a testament to his polemical acumen (and perhaps, as one of Bellarmine’s

11

Van Kleeck, “Hermeneutics and Theology in the Seventeenth Century”; Pederson, “Andrew
Willet and the Synopsis Papismi”; Milton, Catholic and Reformed; Tutino, Law and Conscience :
Catholicism in Early Modern England, 1570-1625 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 92. Cf. also Tutino’s
earlier essay, “‘Makynge Recusancy Deathe Outrighte’? Thomas Pounde, Andrew Willet and the Catholic
Question in Early Jacobean England,” Recusant History 27, no. 1 (May 2004): 31-50. Anthony Milton,
“Andrew Willet,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

6

biographers has put it, his “rather pompous” nature12) that Willet has been identified as
an arch opponent of both Roman Catholic and Protestant foes. Conal Condren names
Willet as the famous Church of England divine Richard Hooker’s “principal enemy,” and
Diarmaid MacCulloch adds that, despite Hooker’s much greater renown today, Willet
was in their age the more popular author.13 Willet was openly critical of Hooker—
accusing him of a variety of heterodox opinions ranging from weakening Christ’s divinity
and challenging the sola Scriptura principle, to causing schism, treating Rome as a true
Christian church, and introducing elements of works-righteousness into his theology14—
but his most common link to Hooker is his disputed, though widely assumed, authorship
of A Christian Letter,15 an anonymous 1599 open letter to Hooker.16 Turning to Catholic
12

Brodrick, St. Robert Bellarmine, 81-82. I will mention one example to show that Brodrick’s
description is not (at least entirely) motivated by a partisan distaste for one of Bellarmine’s sharper critics.
In the “Directions to the Reader” prefacing the Genesis hexapla, where one might expect a self-effacing
statement in which the author takes responsibility for any errors, Willet writes: “In the reading of this
booke I would premonish the Reader to take these directions, that he would first with his penne mende the
faults, which are very many, escaped in my absense, through the oversight of the Printer” (Andrew Willet,
Hexapla in Genesin, that is a Sixfold Commentarie Upon Genesis [Cambridge: John Legat, 1605], sig.¶4r).
The printer, John Legat, for his part noted in the errata that “some places [in Willet’s manuscript] were not
very legible” (sig.Tt1r). Cf. McKitterick, History of Cambridge University Press, 124.
13

Conal Condren, The Language of Politics in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1994), 163; Diarmaid MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” in A Companion to
Richard Hooker, ed. Torrance Kirby (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2008), 574. MacCulloch notes that there were
forty-eight pre-1640 editions of Willet’s works, to Hooker’s twenty (p. 574n38). An observation by
Stanford Lehmberg illustrates how radical the shift in the respective popularity of Willet and Hooker has
been since that time. Describing the works found in the Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England,
Scotland, and Ireland, 1475-1640, Lehmberg writes: “A number of famous books are found alongside
many lesser, ephemeral works. The theological writings include the monumental Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity by Richard Hooker, who was a prebendary at Salisbury, together with such things as obscure
Biblical commentaries by Andrew Willet, a scholarly prebendary of Ely” (Stanford E. Lehmberg, The
Reformation of Cathedrals: Cathedrals in English Society, 1485-1603 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1988], 242-243). How backwards this assessment would have seemed four hundred years ago!
14

See John E. Booty, introduction to Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Attack and Response, by
Richard Hooker, ed. John E. Booty, vol. 4 of The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker,
ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982), xxii; cf.
Andrew Willet, Ecclesia Triumphans: that is, the Joy of the English Church, for the happie Coronation of
the most vertuous and pious Prince, James (Cambridge: John Legat, 1603), 25-26.
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[Andrew Willet?], A Christian Letter of certain English Protestants, unfained favourers of the
present state of Religion, authorised and professed in England: unto that Reverend and learned man, Mr.
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foes, Gregory Dodds puts Willet first in a list of writers “associating Erasmus with
heretical belief,” and presents him as the “most direct refutation” of Erasmian soteriology
in early modern England.17 Several other modern authors also make use of Willet as a
representative early seventeenth-century anti-Catholic polemicist, with most attention,
naturally, given to his Synopsis Papismi.18 Peter Marshall makes frequent reference to
Willet in the context of the protestantization of England and the gradual acceptance of the
term “Protestant.” S. J. Barnett cites Willet as one for whom antipopery was the “main

R.Hoo. requiring resolution in certaine matters of doctrine (which seeme to overthrow the foundation of
Christian Religion, and of the church among us) expreslie contained in his five books of Ecclesiasticall
Pollicie (n.p., 1599).
16

Booty calls Willet the “most persistent and intriguing” suggestion as the letter’s author (p. xix)
and devotes a section of his introduction to the Letter in the collected works of Hooker to developing the
Willet theory (Booty, introduction to Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, xix-xxv). MacCulloch states that
“we can be reasonably certain that it was either exclusively or mainly the work of Andrew Willett.” W.
Brown Patterson considers Willet “most likely” the principal author, Secor names Willet as “a prime
candidate,” and Anthony Milton writes that the anonymous authors “may well have included Willet
himself.” Milton, however, seems not quite as convinced as some others, writing elsewhere that Willet in
Ecclesia Triumphans and Antilogie “had joined the authors of A Christian Letter” in condemning Hooker.
MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” 574; W. Brown Patterson, “Elizabethan Theological
Polemics,” in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. Torrance Kirby (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2008), 116-117;
Secor, Richard Hooker, 317-318; Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 17, 128. Peter White is among those who
are more skeptical, questioning whether “the man who wrote the scholarly Synopsis Papismi…could have
written A Christian Letter.” Peter White, Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and consensus in the
English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
129n26.
17

Gregory D. Dodds, Exploiting Erasmus: the Erasmian Legacy and Religious Change in Early
Modern England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 91, 117. On Erasmian theology and
exegesis of Romans, see also John B. Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” Sixteenth Century Essays
and Studies 2 (January 1971): 1-35; Albert Rabil, Jr., Erasmus and the New Testament: the Mind of a
Christian Humanist (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1972), 115-182; Greta Grace Kroeker,
Erasmus in the Footsteps of Paul: A Pauline Theologian (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 2940; Christine Christ-von Wedel, Erasmus of Rotterdam: Advocate of a New Christianity (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2013), 145-154; Laurel Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings of Romans 3,4, and
5,” in Reformation Readings of Romans, ed. Kathy Ehrensperger and R. Ward Holder (New York: T&T
Clark, 2008), 10-20; Mark Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle: A History of Interpretation (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 49-50.
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Andrew Willet, Synopsis Papismi, That is, A Generall View of Papistrie: Wherein the Whole
Mysterie of Iniquitie, and Summe of Anti-Christian Doctrine is set downe, which is maintained this day by
the Synagogue of Rome, against the Church of Christ (London: Thomas Orwin for Thomas Man, 1592; the
Widdow Orwin for Thomas Man, 1594; Felix Kyngston for Thomas Man, 1600; fourth edition, 1613; John
Haviland, 1634).
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vocation of the Church of England,” and Felicity Heal mentions him in an essay on the
use of history in early modern religious polemics in England.19 Daniel Swift, Gillian
Woods, Jason Rosenblatt, John Curran, Heather Hirschfeld, and James Shapiro each draw
on Willet’s polemics in order to contextualize anti-Catholic themes in Shakespeare’s
plays.20 J. F. Merritt, Ian Archer, and J. Sears McGee all more narrowly cite Willet’s list
of Protestant charitable giving in London as his response to Roman Catholic charges of
lax Protestant philanthropy.21
Willet served as a chaplain and tutor to Prince Henry and penned treatises to
celebrate James’s ascension to the throne and Elizabeth Stuart’s marriage to Frederick V,
Elector Palatine.22 This association with the Jacobean court has made him a fitting source
also for those writing about early seventeenth-century English politics. Nevada Levi
DeLapp’s well-argued study of the Reformed use of King David in a variety of sixteenth19

Peter Marshall, “The Naming of Protestant England,” Past and Present, no. 214 (2002): 87-128;
S. J. Barnett, “Where Was Your Church before Luther? Claims for the Antiquity of Protestantism
Examined,” Church History 68, no. 1 (March 1999): 14-41; Felicity Heal, “Appropriating History: Catholic
and Protestant Polemics and the National Past,” Huntington Library Quarterly 68, no. 1-2 (March 2005):
109-132.
20

Daniel Swift, Shakespeare’s Common Prayers: The Book of Common Prayer and the
Elizabethan Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Gillian Woods, Shakespeare’s Unreformed
Fictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jason P. Rosenblatt, “Aspects of the Incest Problem in
Hamlet,” Shakespeare Quarterly 29, no. 3 (Summer 1978): 349-364; John E. Curran, Jr., Hamlet,
Protestantism, and the Mourning of Contingency: Not to Be (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006); Hirschfeld,
The End of Satisfaction; Shapiro, Shakespeare and the Jews. Additionally, Elizabeth Heale uses Willet in
an essay on Spenser’s Faerie Queene as anti-Catholic polemic. Elizabeth Heale, “Spenser's Malengine,
Missionary Priests, and the Means of Justice,” The Review of English Studies, n.s., 41, no. 162 (May 1990):
171-184.
21

Merritt, “Church-Building in Jacobean London”; Ian W. Archer, “The Charity of Early Modern
Londoners,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 12 (2002): 223-244; McGee, “The Polemical
Career of Francis Rous.” N.B. J. F. (Julia) Merritt is the wife of Anthony Milton. He honors her in the
acknowledgments to Catholic and Reformed with a delightful pun: “My old Roman Catholic
schoolteachers may take heart from the reflection of this most unrepentant of lapsed Catholics that the
salvation of this book and of its author has been achieved by Merritt of Good Works” (Milton, Catholic and
Reformed, xv).
22

Willet, Ecclesia Triumphans; Andrew Willet, A Treatise of Salomons Mariage (London: F. K.
for Thomas Man, 1613; Latin version in 1612).

9

and seventeenth-century political contexts engages ably with Willet’s political theory.
DeLapp devotes a full chapter to Willet’s exegesis of the David and Saul narrative in the
First and Second Samuel hexaplas, showing how his connection between David and King
James served both to ingratiate himself to James and to use the idealized model of David
as a way to urge James to pursue further reforms.23 Arthur Williamson and Lee Piepho
each describe Willet’s advocacy of unions between northern European Protestant
nations.24 Stephen Bondos-Greene, recounting the 1609 election of the new master of
Christ’s College, mentions Willet as one of King James’s final four candidates for
leading the school, and Joseph Marshall writes of the continued political impact that
Willet had in the 1640s (two decades after his death) through the republication of some of
his anti-papal pamphlets.25 Two essays, both from 1986, describe Willet’s importance to
the history of English emblem writing. Peter Daly and Paola Valeri-Tomaszuk’s essay on
Willet portrays him as the creator of effective—if not particularly literary—emblems,
while Huston Diehl focuses specifically on their anti-Catholic emphasis. Daly has also
produced an annotated version of Willet’s emblems.26
23

Nevada Levi DeLapp, The Reformed David(s) and the Question of Resistance to Tyranny:
Reading the Bible in the 16th and 17th Centuries (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). Cf. also James Doelman,
King James I and the Religious Culture of England (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2000), 75; Jane Rickard,
Writing the Monarch in Jacobean England: Jonson, Donne, Shakespeare and the Works of King James
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 33.
24

Arthur H. Williamson, “An Empire to End Empire: The Dynamic of Early Modern British
Expansion,” Huntington Library Quarterly 68, no. 1-2 (March 2005): 227-256; Piepho, “Making the
Impossible Dream.”
25

Stephen A. Bondos-Greene, “The End of an Era: Cambridge Puritanism and the Christ's College
Election of 1609,” The Historical Journal 25, no. 1 (March 1982): 203; Marshall, “Republishing Jacobean
Texts in the 1640s,” 72-76.
26

Daly and Valeri-Tomaszuk, “Andrew Willet”; Huston Diehl, “Graven Images: Protestant
Emblem Books in England,” Renaissance Quarterly 39, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 49-66; Peter M. Daly, ed.,
The English Emblem Tradition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 245-323, 463-499. Other
authors who have addressed Willet’s emblem writing include: Irma Tramer, “Studien zu den Anfängen der
puritanischen Emblemliteratur in England: Andrew Willet-George Wither,” (inaugural-dissertation,
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If Willet’s emblem writing wanted for poetic polish, his commentary work has
been cited frequently in connection with many of the great poets of his day. Since a 1939
essay by Grant McColley, it has become quite common for John Milton scholars to make
use of Willet’s Genesis hexapla as an interpretive aid for reading Paradise Lost.27 While
it is uncertain whether Willet’s exegetical work directly influenced Milton,28 Willet has
proven valuable as a near-contemporary (dying five days before Milton entered his teen
years) for contextualizing Milton’s biblical references. Additionally, a lengthy section on
angels in Synopsis Papismi29 has aided the interpretation of Milton’s angelology. Of these
Milton scholars, Joad Raymond provides the most extensive treatment, assigning to
Willet a full chapter, which he structures around Willet’s threefold division of Roman
Catholic angelology errors.30 Alastair Fowler, in the introduction to his edition of

University of Basel, 1934); Josef Lederer, “John Donne and the Emblematic Practice,” The Review of
English Studies 22, no. 87 (July 1946): 182-200; Prescott, “The Ambiguities of David's Rise to the
Throne”; Freeman, “George Herbert and the Emblem Books.”
27

Grant McColley, “Paradise Lost,” The Harvard Theological Review 32, no. 3 (July 1939): 181235. McColley expanded these references in his book from the following year, Grant McColley, Paradise
Lost: An Account of Its Growth and Major Origins, with a Discussion of Milton’s Use of Sources and
Literary Patterns (Chicago: Packard and Company, 1940).
28

We do know that they had at least one common acquaintance. Henry Yelverton (1566-1629),
counsel to Christ’s College and a friend of the Milton family, is praised in the epistle dedicatory of the
second printing of the 1 Samuel hexapla (Harris Francis Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John
Milton, vol. 2, The Cambridge University Period 1625-32 [Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961], 6;
Andrew Willet, An Harmonie Upon the First Booke of Samuel, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cantrell Legge, 1614],
¶3v).
Neil Graves suggests that Milton drew on Willet as a source, listing him (along with Diodati and
Rivetus) as Protestants “whom Milton is known to have acknowledged and drawn from in his prose
writing,” (Graves, “The Education of the Miltonic Deity,” 358). Rosenblatt expresses doubt that Willet
influenced Milton, at least with regard to one key element of Paradise Lost: “Willet is hardly likely to have
influenced Milton, since, aside from rejecting this interpretation, he confuses the function of each angel,
failing to connect Raphael with Abraham” (Jason P. Rosenblatt, “Celestial Entertainment in Eden: Book V
of Paradise Lost,” The Harvard Theological Review 62, no. 4 [October 1969]: 417).
29
30

See Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 385-397.

That being: the hierarchies and degrees of angels, their ministry and office, and worship and
invocation directed to them (Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The Early-Modern Imagination [Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010] ).
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Paradise Lost, writes that for the notes he has drawn “extensively on Calvin’s
Commentary upon Genesis and on Willet, Hexapla (1608)—the latter not for its
originality but precisely because it “invaluably summarizes a range of contemporary and
earlier interpretations.”31 The evidence is stronger that John Donne drew on Willet as a
source for his own sermons. One modern editor, Peter McCullough, has concluded that
Donne “definitely or very probably” made unattributed use of “Andrew Willet’s several
variorum commentaries on Old Testament books,” in addition to commentaries by
Vermigli and Calvin. Another of Donne’s recent editors, David Colclough, highlights
Donne’s use of Pererius and Willet. Anthony Raspa lists Willet and Thomas Tymme
(who translated Calvin’s Genesis commentary from Latin) as the two English divines
“prominent in the immediate background” of Donne’s Essayes in Divinity, even claiming
that Essayes bears such a resemblance to Willet’s method that they “might have more
aptly borne the title of Hexapla in Genesim et Exodum.”32
Willet’s Old Testament exegesis has received (limited) attention also from
biblical scholars studying the history of Genesis interpretation. The Hexapla in Genesin,
which Raymond calls “one of the weightiest commentaries produced in English,” and

31

Alastair Fowler, ed., Paradise Lost, 2nd ed., ed. (London: Longman, 1998), 10-11. Other
instances of Willet’s Genesis hexapla informing Milton scholarship include: Robert H. West, “Milton's
Angelological Heresies,” Journal of the History of Ideas 14, no. 1 (January 1953): 116-123; Robert H.
West, Milton and the Angels; Patrides, “The ‘Protevangelium’ in Renaissance Theology,” 19-30; J. M.
Evans, Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968); Rosenblatt,
“Celestial Entertainment in Eden”; John Leonard, Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1990); David Gay, “Milton’s Samson and the Figure of the Old Testament Giant,”
Literature and Theology 9, no. 4 (December 1995): 355-369; Graves, “The Education of the Miltonic
Deity.”
32

The Oxford Edition of the Sermons of John Donne 1: Sermons Preached at the Jacobean
Courts, 1615-1619, ed. Peter McCullough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), xl; The Oxford Edition
of the Sermons of John Donne 3: Sermons Preached at the Court of Charles I, ed. David Colclough
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xliv; John Donne, Essayes in Divinity, ed. Anthony Raspa
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), xxiii-xxiv.
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which David Daiches lauds as “the most impressive work on the purely textual side that
any scholar had yet produced,”33 features prominently in books by Arnold Williams and
Philip Almond. Williams’s The Common Expositor (a title borrowed from Milton’s
Tetrachordon) surveys Genesis commentaries published between 1527 and 1633, citing
Willet’s work regularly as one of only a few Genesis commentaries composed in English
during that span. Almond narrows his focus to seventeenth-century perspectives on Adam
and Eve, also turning to Willet as one of his main sources.34 Additionally, Mark Elliott’s
study of Leviticus interpretation from the patristic period to the modern day engages
throughout with Willet’s posthumously-published Leviticus hexapla.35
As Willet was as prolific a father as he was an author (siring eighteen children),
and because he was devoted to parish ministry in addition to his writing efforts, he is also
cited frequently in essays dealing with the more localized issues of seventeenth-century
family and church life. Describing the “ideal parish minister” in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century England, Neal Enssle draws on the account from Thomas Fuller
(who in turn had taken most of his material from Peter Smith) of the rigid discipline of
Willet’s daily life. Leonard Grant and Alexandra Walsham have cited Willet as an
example of, respectively, an early modern pastor who stressed the importance of
33

Raymond, Milton’s Angels, 317; David Daiches, The King James Version of the English Bible:
An Account of the Development and Sources of the English Bible of 1611 with Special Reference to the
Hebrew Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), 157. Killeen seems less enamored
with Willet’s exegesis of Genesis, pointing out a variety of “digressions [that] take their place within the
annotations on the flimsiest of pretexts, [and] extensive marginalia motivated by only the thinnest threads
of relevance…[and] far in excess of any direct exegetical relevance” (Killeen, Biblical Scholarship, 77-78).
34

Arnold Williams, The Common Expositor: An Account of the Commentaries on Genesis, 15271633 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1948); Philip C. Almond, Adam and Eve in
Seventeenth-Century Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
35

Mark W. Elliott, Engaging Leviticus: Reading Leviticus Theologically with Its Past Interpreters
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012); Andrew Willet, Hexapla in Leviticum, finished by Peter Smith
(London: by Aug. Matthewes for Robert Milbourne, 1631).
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catechesis with his congregation, and one in a hereditary dynasty of ministers.36 With
regard to family life, Robert Schnucker has used Willet’s prodigious progeny as a case
study of a pastor who clearly lived out the opposition to birth control common among
Puritan clergy, and Rosenblatt and Robert Hole have drawn from Willet’s Leviticus
hexapla in essays about early modern views on incestuous marriages.37
Despite the rudiments of a Willet renaissance—twenty-one of the sources I have
cited thus far, including DeLapp, Raymond, Tutino, Dodds, and Pederson, are from the
last decade—insufficient attention has been given to Willet’s impressive exegetical
efforts that he engaged in over his final decades; treatment of his New Testament
interpretation and of his general methodological approach are especially sparse. Richard
Muller cites Willet’s exegetical work periodically throughout the “Holy Scripture”
volume of Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, noting the comprehensive nature of
his commentaries in drawing together a variety of genres (from locus method to vestigial
tropology), but the scope of that work necessarily limits the attention that can be given
specifically to Willet. Muller also offers a brief, but instructive, insight into Willet’s
method by way of his investigation in the Genesis hexapla into the identity of

36

Neal Enssle, “Patterns of Godly Life: The Ideal Parish Minister in Sixteenth- and SeventeenthCentury English Thought,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 28, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 3-28; Thomas Fuller,
ed. Abel Redevivus: or The dead yet speaking. The Lives and Deaths of the Moderne Divines (London: by
Tho. Brudenell for John Stafford, 1651), 565-577; Peter Smith, “The Life and Death of Andrew Willet,
Doctor of Divinitie,” prefaced to Andrew Willet, Synopsis Papismi, 5th ed. (London: John Haviland, 1634);
Leonard T. Grant, “Puritan Catechizing,” Journal of Presbyterian History (1962-1985) 46, no. 2 (June
1968): 107-127; Alexandra Walsham, “The Reformation of the Generations: Youth, Age, and Religious
Change in England, c. 1500-1700,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 21 (2011): 93-121.
37

Robert V. Schnucker, “Elizabethan Birth Control and Puritan Attitudes,” The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 5, no. 4 (Spring 1975): 655-667; Rosenblatt, “Incest Problem in Hamlet”; Robert
Hole, “Incest, Consanguinity and a Monstrous Birth in Rural England, January 1600,” Social History 25,
no. 2 (May 2000): 183-199.
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Melchizedek.38 Van Kleeck’s thesis provides a useful summary of Willet’s hermeneutical
approach and some commentary on Willet’s work on Romans, though with limited
interpretation.39

2.2 Scholarship on Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Romans Interpretation
Considering the history of Romans interpretation more broadly, a good deal of
literature explores sixteenth-century perspectives, while little has been written about
seventeenth-century commentary.40 Mark Reasoner’s Romans in Full Circle provides a
helpful overview of certain periods, though his circle is not large enough to contain
anyone between Calvin and Barth. The collection of essays in Reading Romans Through
the Centuries likewise skips over the seventeenth century, though with smaller leaps that
visit Wesley, Hodge, and the excommunicated nineteenth-century South African
Anglican bishop John William Colenso en route from Calvin to Barth. The essays in this
volume on Chrysostom, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin are useful for our purposes,
given the influence of each of these theologians on Willet’s interpretation of Romans.
The collection Reformation Readings of Romans and T. H. L. Parker’s Commentaries on
Romans 1532-1542 both narrow their scope so as to end prior to the seventeenth

38

Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the
Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 169-174.
39

Van Kleeck, “Hermeneutics and Theology in the Seventeenth Century.” Van Kleeck addresses
Willet’s exegesis of Romans 1:32, 5:12, 8:3, 10:21, 11:6, 11:31, chapter 13, and 16:25-27.
40

A brief overview of the history of the exegesis of Romans can be found in C. E. B. Cranfield, A
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975),
30-44. Cranfield, however, skips from Calvin to the eighteenth century. On sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury exegesis broadly considered, see Richard A. Muller, “Biblical Interpretation in the 16th & 17th
Centuries,” in Historical Handbook of Major Biblical Interpreters, ed. Donald K. McKim (Downer’s
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 123-152. Muller cites Willet’s work as an example of “the more
technical commentaries of the early seventeenth century” (p. 144).
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century.41 Charles Raith II’s recent book compares Thomas’s and Calvin’s readings of
the first half of Romans,42 and a wide range of essays (many also focusing on Calvin)
have considered sixteenth century exegesis of pericopes in Romans.43 David H.
Kranendonk’s brief Teaching Predestination devotes a chapter to Elnathan Parr’s 1618

41

Mark Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle; Jeffrey P. Greenman and Timothy Larsen, eds.,
Reading Romans Through the Centuries: From the Early Church to Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
Press, 2005); Kathy Ehrensperger and R. Ward Holder, eds., Reformation Readings of Romans (New York:
T&T Clark, 2008); T. H. L. Parker, Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans 1532-1542 (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1986).
Other essays treating sixteenth century Romans commentaries include Akira
Demura, “Two Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans: Calvin and Oecolampadius,” in Calvinus
Sincerioris Religionis Vindex: Calvin as Protector of the Purer Religion, ed. Wilhelm H. Neuser and Brian
G. Armstrong (Kirksville, Mo.: Truman State University Press, 1997), 165-188; Annie Noblesse-Rocher,
“Jacques Sadolet et Jean Calvin, Commentateurs de l'Épître aux Romains,” in Calvinus sacrarum literarum
interpres: Papers of the International Congress on Calvin Research, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen,
Ger.: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 190-208; Timothy J. Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon’s 1522
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Era of the Reformation, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1996), 118-140; Joel Kok, “The Influence of Martin Bucer on John Calvin’s Interpretation of Romans: A
Comparative Case Study” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1993); Joe Mock, “Bullinger and Romans,”
Reformed Theological Review 69, no. 1 (April 2010): 34-47; Frank A. James III, “Romans Commentary:
Justification and Sanctification,” in A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli, ed. Torrance Kirby, Emidio
Campi, and Frank A. James III (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2009), 304-317; Marvin W. Anderson, “Peter Martyr
on Romans,” Scottish Journal of Theology 26, no. 4 (Nov. 1973): 401-420.
42

Charles Raith II, Aquinas and Calvin on Romans: God’s Justification and Our Participation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
43

See, for example, Charles D. Raith II, “Abraham and the Reformation: Romans 4 and the
Theological Interpretation of Aquinas and Calvin,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 5, no. 2 (Fall
2011): 283-300; David C. Steinmetz, “Calvin and the Divided Self of Romans 7,” in Augustine, the
Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650): Essays dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman, ed. Kenneth Hagen
(Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 1990), 300-313; Richard A. Muller, “‘Scimus enim quod lex spiritualis est’:
Melanchthon and Calvin on the Interpretation of Romans 7:14-23,” in Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560)
and the Commentary, ed. Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick Graham (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic
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Daniel Shute, “And All Israel Shall Be Saved: Peter Martyr and John Calvin on the Jews According to
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Calvin,” The Reformed Theological Review 72 no. 1 (April 2013): 5-19; Richard A. Muller, “Calvin, Beza,
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exposition of Romans 8-11, which includes some comments on Parr’s use of Willet.44
Additionally, John Duff’s recent dissertation on seventeenth-century English
interpretations of the new heavens and earth engages helpfully with Willet’s exegesis of
Romans 8.45

2.3 Scholarship on Post-Reformation Polemics
A growing body of strong scholarship addresses the polemics of the later
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially within the English context. Milton’s
Catholic and Reformed, besides giving Willet the spotlight he deserves, is the standard
survey of Protestant-Catholic relations in England from 1600 to the Civil War. Tutino’s
Law and Conscience is, if less comprehensive in scope, equal in quality. Walsham and
Tavard, like Tutino, focus on the experience of Roman Catholics living in Protestant
England. Dewey Wallace’s essay in The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism, while
brief, provides a helpful overview of Puritan polemics and acknowledges that these
polemics frequently overlapped with other genres, as commentary, catechesis, and
devotional literature. Frances Dolan considers seventeenth-century anti-Catholic polemic
with special attention given to its use of misogynistic rhetoric. The role of printing
technologies in religious polemics is explored by Jesse Lander. Nicholas Tyacke and Lori
Anne Ferrell each consider intra-Protestant polemics, with Tyacke recounting the rise of
English Arminianism through the early seventeenth century and Ferrell focusing on the
rhetoric of anti-Calvinist preachers against conforming Puritans in the battle for the
44

David H. Kranendonk, Teaching Predestination: Elnathan Parr and Pastoral Ministry in Early
Stuart England (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011).
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John H. Duff, “‘A Knot Worth Unloosing’: The Interpretation of the New Heavens and Earth in
Seventeenth-Century England” (PhD diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2014).
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English church’s via media position.46

2.4 Statement of the Problem
At the close of the preface to the 1607 Loidoromastix, his second treatise against
fellow Church of England divine Richard Parkes on the issue of Limbo, the great
controversialist Andrew Willet suggests that he intends to shift genres and focus on
biblical commentary. This reflection comes at the end of a response (which Willet was
able to append to the introduction of Loidoromastix due to a printer’s delay) to a recent
anti-Protestant polemical work by the Roman Catholic Richard Broughton.47 In his
project of using Protestants to refute Protestants, Broughton had exploited some of the
internecine debates that Willet had engaged in when not writing his anti-papist works.
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Recognizing through this the great potential damage wrought by Protestant infighting,
Willet remarks: “I wish, if it may bee, and if mine enemies would permit, to write rather
commentaries of Scripture (which course I am now entred into) then Demosthenes or
Tullies Philippices.”48 Willet suggests in a dedicatory epistle to Archbishop of
Canterbury Richard Bancroft in the Exodus hexapla (1608) that it was Bancroft himself
who had suggested this shift to biblical commentary, and it is possible that the
archbishop—given his many Roman Catholic friends49—had hoped that Willet would
ease up on the anti-papist focus of his writings.50 Willet’s own intention at this point,
however, seems to have been to set aside open contention with other Church of England
divines (thus ending the stream of ammunition such debates provided to the Roman
enemy) and to shift the genre of his anti-papist work from “polemics” proper to
polemically-focused biblical exegesis. In the dedicatory epistle to Prince Henry preceding
the second half of his 1610 Daniel hexapla, however, Willet expands his claim of leaving
behind polemics in a way that seems to include an intention to cease targeting Roman
Catholics as well:
I have heretofore exercised my penne in handling of controversies against the
common adversarie, and as I was provoked, have written also in mine owne
defence, both against forren enemies, and some domesticall: But now, those
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occasions beeing if not altogether removed, yet somewhat intermitted, I have
propounded unto my selfe this course in the explaning of Scripture.51
Despite this assertion, Willet’s subsequent writing maintains its distinctly anti-Catholic
focus. While he does indeed largely avoid further open conflict with other Church of
England divines, his suggestion that he has moved on from combatting “the common
adversarie” is not supported by his actual work. He continues in this same Daniel hexapla
his old practice of referring to Jesuits as “Judasites” and to the Pope as “Antichrist.”52 In
1613 he would publish a revised and expanded edition of Synopsis Papismi, with
additional anti-Catholic material appended. And in the Romans hexapla of 1611 he
consistently frames his interpretation against Roman doctrine.
Several scholars have given much weight to Willet’s claim to have moved away
from religious controversy, leading them to characterize his midlife shift to commentary
as a turn away from polemics and towards more irenic pursuits. Milton tells of the
aftermath of Willet’s Limbo debates, writing that Parkes “disappeared into the obscurity
from whence he came, while Willet (possibly with Bancroft’s encouragement) vowed to
abandon religious controversy altogether and to concentrate instead on scriptural
commentary, which he continued to publish at a phenomenal rate throughout James’
reign.”53 Milton hedges his own statement somewhat by writing only that Willet “vowed
51
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to” move on from religious controversy, but his phrasing (“altogether”) suggests that
Willet also had his anti-papist work in mind, whereas the context implies only
“domesticall contentions” among English Protestants.54 Milton’s lack of any further
comment here suggests, too, that Willet in fact carried out this plan. Pederson qualifies
his account of Willet’s move to commenting on Scripture, though his wording implies
that Willet spent his final years out of the public eye, and he makes the context of the
shift more of politics than of polemics: “From 1607 onwards Willet retired to the life of a
private commentator, based largely on the suggestion of Richard Bancroft (1544-1610);
Willet complied but only in part; for the rest of his life his commentaries were used as a
springboard for political comment, however nuanced and subtle.”55 While some of
Willet’s political comments could accurately be considered “subtle” (Pederson gives the
example of his “modest, highly qualified endorsement of resistance theory”56), the
background of Willet’s own account of his genre shift concerns doctrinal polemics, and
the polemical elements of his commentaries are anything but subtle. Peter Van Kleeck’s
thesis on Willet’s hermeneutics alludes to, but does not in any detail expound upon the
polemical element in his exegetical work.57
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Other interpretations of Willet’s move to biblical commentary have more obvious
shortcomings. Robert Smith’s curious comment that “Willet favored a noncontroversial
approach” seems to stem from a misunderstanding about the nature of this shift,58 which
he later refers to as “a retreat into non-controversial safety.”59 Smith describes Willet
accurately as “a specialist in theological disagreements between Protestants and
Catholics,” and writes that “the accession of King James sparked Willet’s desire to see
the completion of England’s reform,” which sentiment Willet expressed in Ecclesia
Triumphans. But then Smith claims that Willet’s career as a commentator was motivated
by polity-induced disappointment: “As the king’s commitment to Anglican episcopacy
became apparent, Willet turned his energies to biblical exegesis.”60 This statement makes
Willet’s supposed frustration with the episcopal form of church government—rather than
the damage done by intra-Protestant quarrels—the motivation for his focus on
commentary. But even if his personal associations with the more radical presbyterians
indicate that he too had once desired this form of church polity for the English church, he
had moved on to open advocacy of episcopal government long before James came to the
throne.61 Granted, Willet opposed the notion of iure divino episcopal rule and his support
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for the bishops was contingent upon their doctrinal orthodoxy,62 but there is no
suggestion that James’s continuation of episcopal polity itself either demoralized Willet
or drove him to focus on biblical commentary.
Leticia Álvarez-Recio represents Willet in a nearly opposite fashion, making him
a representative of an English Protestantism the highest concern of which was
ecclesiastical uniformity, all in support of a strange contention that anti-Catholic works in
Willet’s period were no longer driven by theological concerns. This argument ÁlvarezRecio expresses by claiming:
Anti-Catholic literature of the second half of the reign of Elizabeth I takes a
somewhat different tack by comparison with the works of previous years. The
most notable example of this is the abandonment of theological polemics.
Mention of the Word of God is only made when it is needed in order to justify the
imperial theory of sovereignty, and with it the power of Elizabeth in relation to
the Pope. Given the bellicose state of the international situation, it is not
surprising that anti-Catholic authors replaced doctrinal elements with descriptions
of Catholic aggression in order to encourage a collective act of rejection.63
In advancing this argument Álvarez-Recio ignores a large body of anti-Catholic literature
from this period that focuses overwhelmingly on doctrinal issues, not the least of which
are the first three editions of Synopsis Papismi.64 Willet’s exegetical efforts (granted, all
Catholicism in Early Modern England, 1570-1625 [Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007], 117-118). Cf. also
Kenneth Fincham, Prelate as Pastor: The Episcopate of James I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990),
299-300. On Willet’s personal ties to English presbyterians, see Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 14, 25.
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but the 1602 Catholicon on Jude falling narrowly outside of the time frame ÁlvarezRecio highlights) directly contradict the notion of an abandonment of theological
polemics, these commentaries being—quite literally—the “Word of God” used in
theologically focused anti-Catholic polemics. Álvarez-Recio does mention Willet but,
again, paints him as a strict conformist whose primary concerns were political. She writes
that the “criticism of Catholicism allows it to be linked with other groups that were
considered sectarian within Anglican discourse, as they inhibited religious uniformity.
Willet points out the importance of fighting against these groups—‘Brownists,
Anabaptists, Papists’—which, according to the author, made peace in the Kingdom
difficult.” Thus far, this note is defensible, although her interpretation of Willet’s linking
of these various groups in A Catholicon seems to project King James’s heightened
concern for peace through uniform doctrine onto Willet. However, she continues:
the fact that Protestant authorities equated the Catholic menace with that posed by
Puritanism or by separatist groups indicates an advance in the policies of the
Elizabethan government, which kept itself in the exact middle between all these
currents. This explains the abandonment of religious polemic or of the ideological
struggles that could only slow down the process of conformity.65
The conclusions that Álvarez-Recio draws from Willet’s connection between the
schismatic tendency of the papists and the separatist nature of the Brownists and
Anabaptists misrepresent Willet’s conception of unity and schism.66 Willet’s opposition
to these groups is not simply because of their separatist tendencies; they have separated
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themselves, Willet would argue, by their heretical doctrine. This focus on doctrinal
orthodoxy, rather than on either doctrinal or institutional uniformity, is evident throughout
Willet’s work, and will be demonstrated throughout the chapters that follow in this
dissertation. To address only the immediate context of Álvarez-Recio’s citation of Willet,
however, it should be noted that he is commenting on a verse about sects (Jude v. 19) and
is writing from a defensive position, against the Rhemist charge of the Protestants being
schismatic for breaking with the Roman communion. Willet rebuts that “the protestants
then leaving the society of the false & corrupt Romane Church” simply follow the pattern
set by Noah leaving the sinful world for the ark, Lot moving out of Sodom, and Jesus
rejecting the traditions of the Pharisees. Immediately preceding the passage that ÁlvarezRecio quotes, Willet writes: “and they are the true Catholike Church, which retaine the
trueth, and professe the right faith, how small soever their number is.”67
Anabaptists to Willet were nothing like the nonconforming Puritans, the one
being doctrinally heretical, and the other a group that should be treated with a policy of
“brotherly connivence.”68 The suggestion, then, that Willet opposes all separatists,
regardless of their theology, because of his concern for conformity in the English church
exactly reverses his priorities.
These misconceptions about Willet’s work and the arc of his writing career reflect
a broader misunderstanding of the role of biblical exegesis in early seventeenth-century
polemics and, correspondingly, an insufficient understanding of the role that polemics
67
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had in shaping and focusing scripture interpretation.

2.5 Summary of the State of the Question
While numerous studies have recognized Willet’s influence on fields ranging
from Genesis scholarship to seventeenth-century poetry to early Stuart era politics, rarely
has this earlier scholarship focused on him as to treat any of his works in depth or to
consider his place more broadly within the early seventeenth-century religious landscape.
Despite playing a significant role in recent decades in fine works by historians such as
Milton, Tutino, and DeLapp, significant aspects of Willet’s theology and exegesis remain
unexplored or underexplored. The lack of a comprehensive study of Willet has
contributed to various misrepresentations of his thought. Several recent works have
missed the nuances of his political orientation, presenting him as either an unyielding
conformist or—conversely—as a radical presbyterian. More to the point of this present
study, a consensus has emerged that Willet’s mid-career shift to biblical commentary
represented not only a shift in genre, but a move away from polemics entirely. This view,
as expressed to different degrees by Milton, Pederson, and Van Kleeck, tends to
underestimate the polemical aspect of Willet’s exegetical work. The neglect of
exegetically-based polemics has, in turn, led others such as Álvarez-Recio to conceive of
the anti-Catholic polemics of Willet’s era as more politically than theologically
motivated, suggesting a polemical dogmatism that was untheological and non-exegetical.
This dissertation seeks to address some of these deficiencies in Willet scholarship, and to
clarify the integral connection between scriptural exegesis and theological polemics in
the early Stuart period.
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3. Statement of the Thesis
In this dissertation I will argue that, far from being a retreat from religious
controversy, Andrew Willet’s biblical commentary work maintained a significant element
of anti-Catholic polemics, only expressed in a different genre. This polemical
hermeneutic did not impose rigid doctrinal concerns upon his exegesis, but rather served
as an organizing principle and as a means by which to clarify the presentation of
traditional Reformed readings in relief against a body of theology (which itself had
developed polemically since the Reformation) that Willet believed threatened the gospel
of grace. I focus on Willet’s hexapla commentary on Romans because of the importance
of this epistle to the development of Protestant theology and because Willet identified it
as the epistle that “beateth downe all both old and newe heresies,” and which functions as
a “catechisme and introduction to Christian religion.”69 Paul’s letter thus provides ample
opportunity for Willet to identify what is distinctive about Reformed theology—or rather,
as Willet would have it, the particular ways in which papist dogma has diverged from the
true line of Christian belief running from the Fathers through to the Reformed church of
the seventeenth century.
Willet’s exegesis of Romans highlights many of the polemical issues that had
long been contended between Protestants and Roman Catholics, including the authentic
versions of Scripture, Scripture’s attributes (including its perspicuity and the authority to
interpret it), and principles of interpretation (including when and how to employ the
analogia fidei and analogia scriptura), as well as doctrines like justification,
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predestination, the assurance of salvation, and the place of good works.70 Willet’s
exegesis reveals also the impact that different polemical contexts have on Scripture
interpretation—as he is opposing different foes and addressing different issues, Willet’s
early Stuart era exegetical work looks different from that of his Reformed forebears and
his continental counterparts, despite their broad doctrinal harmony.
A close investigation into Willet’s exegetical method, moreover, helps to see how
an identifiable hermeneutical lens is consistent with a disciplined reading that is faithful
to the text. His polemical focus does not corrupt his exegesis or impose upon it meanings
that are alien to the text itself; rather, his polemical hermeneutic serves to focus his
attention, govern his distinctions, organize his observations, and frame positive doctrinal
statements against the sharp relief of erroneous readings. His exceptional skill as a textual
critic, his fidelity to the scriptural record, and his methodological rigor (as employed in
his unique hexapla format and making use of refined tools from humanist and scholastic
traditions) ensure that his polemical hermeneutic directs, and does not substitute for, his
careful exegetical efforts.

4. Willet’s Life and Context
Since Willet is, in the words of Daly and Valeri-Tomaszuk, “today little known
and less often read,”71 a brief introduction to his life and context is necessary. While their
“today” is now thirty years in the past—and three decades, moreover, that have seen a
definite surge of scholarly interest in Willet—it would be hard to argue that he has
70
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returned to a level of notoriety in which his reputation precedes him.

4.1 Biographical Sketch of Willet
Andrew Willet was born in 1562, or possibly at the very end of 1561, in “that
little Citie of Ely in Cambridge-shire.”72 His father, Thomas Willet, was also a pastor,
and had in his younger years been a schoolmaster and subalmoner [involved in the
distribution of alms] to Richard Coxe. When Queen Mary came to the throne upon the
death of Edward VI in 1553, Coxe went into exile and Thomas lost his job. He and his
wife were protected during Mary’s persecution, but struggled and were forced to spend a
lot of time apart. DeLapp suggests that this period of family history contributed to the
younger Willet’s fierce opposition to Catholicism.73 When Coxe returned from exile and
was made Bishop of Ely, he rewarded Thomas Willet’s earlier service with a prebendal
stall in his church, and later added his own congregations in Thurkiston (in
Leicestershire) and in Barley (Hertfordshire).74
Andrew was a devoted student, finding his studies “the most voluptuous” way to
spend his time. He eschewed recreation as an “impediment to his studies,” to the point of
worrying his parents, and Smith indicates that he “became the sole delight and solace of
his Teacher” (which may say more about the poor teacher than about Willet’s academic

72

Smith, “The Life and Death of Andrew Willet,” sig.a2r. The uncertainty about his birth year is
because Peter Smith did not give his date of birth in his biography, but noted that he was fifty-nine at the
time of his death on December 4, 1621. Thus, he was born either in 1562 or in the last three weeks of the
previous year. Smith’s biographical preface provides the vast majority of information that we have about
Willet’s life. I give an overview of additional biographical material—all of which draws heavily on
Smith—in a following section (I.2.3) on Willet’s legacy.
73

Smith, “The Life and Death of Andrew Willet,” sig.av; DeLapp, The Reformed David(s), 102.

74

Smith, “The Life and Death of Andrew Willet,” sig.av.

29

gifts).75 At the age of fourteen (“or thereabouts”), Willet was sent to the University of
Cambridge, under the care of his Godfather and namesake, Andrew Perne, who was the
Master of Peter-house. He soon transferred, for reasons unknown, to Christ’s College,
where he became acquainted with other future luminaries of the Church of England, as
George Downame and William Perkins.76
After thirteen years at Cambridge, Andrew was given the prebendal stall at Ely
upon his father’s resignation, and around that time he married the daughter of King’s
College Provost Roger Goad.77 Together he and his wife Jacobine had eighteen children,
thirteen of whom survived him, and he actually enjoyed being a father: “so children,
which to many are occasions of great trouble, to him were but the subjects of his delight
and recreation.” Smith makes a cryptic reference to one son who fell away, perhaps with
a grievous sin. Jacobine’s domestic heroism enabled Andrew to engage in his study and
ministry “without any the least distraction,” but he made time to recreate by playing the
organ and singing, playing with his children, engaging in various “delights” (“not
unlawfull or uncomely”), and splitting wood.78
Soon after his father’s death in 1598, Andrew Willet took over the parsonage of
75
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the same church in Barley that Thomas had led for twenty-seven years, and Andrew kept
that position until his death.79 While continuing to preach regularly, Willet took the
Doctor of Divinity degree from Cambridge in 1601, and around this time he also served
as one of the chaplains to King James’s son Prince Henry.80 Despite being one of
England’s best Hebraists, Willet was not selected as one of the fifty-four (or forty-seven,
depending on the account) scholars appointed in 1604 to translate the King James
Bible—an unexplained omission glaring enough to be mentioned in several accounts of
the origins of that bible.81 In his church and community Willet was known for his
generosity, paying for the majority of the university expenses for two sons of his friends,
setting up a trust for the poor of Barley and overpaying the poor for goods and services,
advocating for poorer pastors, and petitioning to have a local hospital built.82
In February of 1618 Willet was punished with a month of house arrest (under the
custody of one Dr. White) for his opposition to the proposed “Spanish Match” between
Prince Charles and the Roman Catholic Spanish Infanta Maria Anna. Willet’s open
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opposition to the union was expressed in the context of trying to persuade James’s
subjects to provide him with more funds so that James would not view the proposed
Match as an economic necessity.83
A riding accident in November of 1621 led to Willet’s death at the age of fiftynine. Returning home from business in London, his horse stumbled and fell, causing
Willet to break his right leg. Having been taken to a local inn, he was seen by an
orthopedic surgeon (“Bone-setter”), who advised ten days of rest before continuing
home. He worked and preached from his sickbed, and on the tenth day of his
convalescence he awoke early, discussed the subject of death and the heavenly fellowship
of the saints, and sang a hymn that he had composed and some psalms. Then, having
fallen into a brief trance, he was roused for his final words—which, as Smith reports
them, were: “Let me alone, I shall doe well; Lord Iesu-----.” Upon his death, his body
was taken back to Barley, where he was interred in the chancel of his church.84

4.2 Willet’s Sources and Hexapla Method
Willet the man was known in his time as a “living library,”85 and this breadth of
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learning is manifested in his encyclopedic use of a wide range of sources in his
commentaries. Among these copious citations, Augustine, Chrysostom, and Origen
predominate the Church Fathers, and Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Gorran (1232-1295),
and Nicholas of Lyra the medieval theologians.86 He appears to get many of these
interpretations directly from the sources, but also receives some through secondary
means, as when he relays selected readings of Augustine via Vermigli.87 From his own
Protestant heritage, he cites David Pareus (1548-1622), Vermigli, Calvin, and Beza
regularly, and others such as Beza’s colleague and successor Faius [Antoine de La Faye,
1540-1615], Bucer, Robert Rollock (1555-1599), and the Reformed Zurich pastor Rudolf
Gwalther (1519-1586) more sporadically.88 Willet’s theology is solidly Reformed, while
not slavishly deferential to any one particular Reformed exegete; Raymond’s description
of him as “independently minded, though fiercely anti-Catholic” is accurate.89 In the
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prefaces to several of his commentaries Willet mentions that he is drawing from a deep
pool of previous commentators that includes both Protestants and Roman Catholics—
always clarifying regarding the latter that he is adopting Jerome’s principle for reading
Origen of taking the best and leaving the worst.90 The “Directions to the Reader” in the
Genesis hexapla acknowledge a debt to Pererius (1536-1610), who took “great paines” in
his interpretation, though with a number of historical inaccuracies and “not a fewe errors
for doctrine.”91 In the Romans hexapla, Willet makes frequent appeal to Erasmus for his
linguistic expertise, while often rejecting his theology.92 Additionally, he engages with
Tolet (Francisco de Toledo; 1532-1596), Bellarmine (1542-1621), Pererius (Benedict
Pereira), Thomas Stapleton (1535-1598), Cajetan (1469-1534), and the head Rhemist
annotator Gregory Martin (d. 1582). As we will see, an instance of his agreement with
one of these modern Romanists often serves to highlight the error of another.93 Willet
also occasionally cites pagan authors (often through secondary sources), as when he
quotes such figures as Pythagoras, Draco, Plutarch, and Cicero to argue that the Ten
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Commandments can be discovered through natural law.94
Willet introduced his distinctive hexapla commentary method in his 1605
Hexapla in Genesin which, extending the connection to Origen beyond the title alone,
compares the original Hebrew with six different translations (the Septuagint; Chaldean;
two Latin bibles, of Jerome and Tremellius; and two English bibles, the Great Bible and
the Geneva Bible). This six-fold comparison of translations is given priority on the title
page over what would come to be associated with Willet’s hexapla method: “Together
with a sixfold use of every chapter,” in which he 1) summarizes the scope and argument
of the chapter, 2) presents the text, noting variations between manuscripts and
translations, 3) considers various questions generally of a linguistic or historical nature,
4) elicits doctrines from the text, 5) engages in controversies to show where others—
mainly Roman Catholics—have misinterpreted the text, and 6) offers moral observations
on the chapter.95 His subsequent commentaries drop the concern for comparing the text
with precisely six translations, thus applying the title solely to his six-fold use of the text
itself. The 1608 Hexapla in Exodum, for instance, indicates the comparison of ten various
readings, even though three of these—the “Hebrew originall,” and the Hebrew texts
given by Santes Pagnino (1470-1536) and Benito Arias Montano (1527-1598)—were
used also in the Genesis hexapla, but not counted because they were not translations. Had
he desired to continue to depict his textual work as a comparison between six different
translations, he surely could have presented his sources in such a way as to give that
impression. In the Romans hexapla, for which his textual sources naturally differ
94
95
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somewhat from those used in his Old Testament commentaries, Willet compares eight
different readings: “Vatablus,”96 the Vulgate, Beza, the Syriac, Tremellius, the Great
Bible, the Geneva Bible, and the (textus receptus) Greek.97
The logic of the hexapla method is addressed more fully in the “Directions to the
Reader” prefacing the Exodus hexapla. There Willet explains that two things need to be
considered when reading Scripture: the sense and understanding, and the use and profit of
that understanding. The hexapla approach, he writes, divides each of these into three
parts. Tending to the basic understanding of a text are the argument (which gives the
coherence of the chapter), the consideration of the various readings (which helps in
determining the true literal sense), and questions to remove doubts about the passage.
Likewise, three points apply to the use and profit of the text: the doctrines confirm what
is true, the controversies confute what is false, and the moral observations aid in
removing vice and cultivating righteousness.98 In his application of this hexapla method
Willet makes use of a wide range of humanist and scholastic exegetical tools, including a
consistent philological concern, the eliciting of theological loci from the text, and a
broadly disputational arrangement of his arguments.
96
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4.3 Willet’s Legacy
While, again, generally unknown today by non-specialists, Willet continued to
have an impact in the years following his death in 1621. Bishop Joseph Hall (1574-1656)
in a 1624 sermon listed Willet among twenty-one “great lights” in the English church’s
recent history.99 In 1634 a fifth edition of Synopsis Papismi was released, which Peter
Smith writes was “by especiall recommendation from his Royall Majestie,” Charles I. If
Smith is to be trusted on this point, it is curious that Synopsis Papismi would be reprinted
by royal decree during a decade when “vigorously anti-papal language and arguments
were not simply censured, but were also censored.”100 Augustus Toplady—best known as
the author of the hymn “Rock of Ages”—would comment over a century later on how it
might indeed not have been expected for one so solidly Reformed (though with “not a
grain of Puritanism mingled…with his conformity”) to have his major work republished
in the middle of Charles’s reign, concluding: “So uncorrupt in doctrine did the bishops,
the Universities, the clergy, and the people, generally, continue, even under the malignant
aspect of the Laudean planet!”101 It is perhaps more plausible that issuing a new edition
of Synopsis Papismi was a politically expedient move for Charles, Willet being both
popular with those having Puritan leanings and a strong supporter of the episcopacy and
the sovereign’s leadership of the church.102 This same fifth edition was “one of the best
99
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used” anti-Catholic works by the English minister Thomas Hall (1610-1665; no relation
to Joseph), who had a “heavily marked” copy in his library.103 Philip Benedict, to
illustrate how in 1670 Calvin was not considered the sole Reformed authority, relays the
reading list that a Scottish divinity student had reported to his home presbytery: Calvin’s
Institutes, the Theological System of Marcus Friedrich Wendelin (1584-1652), catechisms
by Pareus and Ursinus, Willet’s Synopsis Papismi, and the Course of Johannes Scharpius
(1572-1648)—“a mixture,” Benedict comments, “of famous and now obscure authors
active between the middle of the sixteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth”
century.104 As late as the end of the eighteenth century, Toplady continued to heap praise
on Willet, referring to Synopsis Papismi as an “inestimable book…which is one of the
very best batteries that were ever raised for the demolition of Popery,” and calling Willet
“that profound and indefatigable divine.”105 Willet’s relevance extends even later into the
nineteenth century, as a new ten-volume edition of the Synopsis, edited by John
Cumming, was published in 1852.106
Willet appears also in multiple biographical anthologies of important figures from
the English church written in the decades following his death, each generating most of
their material from Peter Smith’s 1634 account. He is among the lives of 139 “Learned
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Men and Famous Divines” dating back to the patristic period that Samuel Clark
memorializes in his 1650 Marrow of Ecclesiastical Historie. In 1651 the historian
Thomas Fuller included Willet among 107 important sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
church leaders from all over Europe (almost all Protestants, but also including Erasmus)
in his assemblage of biographies in Abel Redevivus.107 Clement Barksdale in 1670
honored Willet as one of his ten “excellent men” in recent English history.108 And the
non-conformist Benjamin Brook (1776-1848) included Willet in his 1813 Lives of the
Puritans—“those divines who distinguished themselves in the cause of religious
liberty.”109
Nor was Willet’s seventeenth-century impact limited to England. His work was
known on the continent through Latin translations,110 and important figures in American
church history valued his writings, as well. William Brewster, who came to America on
the Mayflower in 1620, had works by Willet in his library—indicating that books by
Willet were likely aboard the Mayflower—and Increase Mather partly patterned his
views on Jewish conversion after Willet’s model.111 Increase’s son Cotton Mather was
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impressed by Willet’s skill in refuting Roman Catholic doctrine.112 A 1723 record of the
holdings in Harvard College—the institution the elder Mather had earlier led—lists
Willet as one of the four Genesis commentaries in English, and the influential Virginian
William Byrd II had a copy of Willet as one of the three English Genesis commentaries
in his own collection.113 Apart from his writing, Willet’s influence in America was also
felt through his progeny, as his fourth son Thomas served as the first mayor of New York
City.114

5. Polemical Context
Many factors contributed to the complex religious landscape of post-Reformation
Europe and particularly of late Elizabethan and early Stuart England. Issues raised at the
Council of Trent (1545-1563) in Italy and in the writings of such Counter Reformation
figures as Robert Bellarmine shifted the focus of the defense required by Protestants.115
In 1582 English Catholics in exile in France published the Rheims New Testament,
featuring strongly anti-Protestant notes that would help shape Protestant polemical
responses in England for decades to come.116 In the 1590s Protestant England was at war
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with Catholic Spain. Jesuit missionary activity in England led both to fears of Protestants
converting (as in the notorious case of Benjamin Carier) and to concerns that the rift
between Jesuits and secular Roman clergy could lead to greater tolerance for moderate
recusants in exchange for their condemnation of the Jesuit faction.117 The building of a
new Jesuit college in La Flèche, France, in 1604 (two years before its most famous
student, René Descartes, would enroll) threatened to generate more popish missionaries,
though Willet’s references to the new college in the Romans hexapla are all to condemn
the lavish expense.118 The 1605 Gunpowder Plot, in which a handful of zealous papists
attempted to blow up James and his parliament, heightened tensions for years.119 Four
years later, in 1609, Chelsea College, an institution intended to train English Protestants
for anti-Catholic polemics, was founded with James’s blessing.120 James himself,
however, while expressing a personal Protestant faith, had many Roman Catholic ties,
including a Catholic mother (Mary, Queen of Scots) and a wife (Anne of Denmark) with
strong Catholic inclinations.121 James’s own issue with Roman Catholics was primarily
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political, so that the threat posed by Jesuits was essentially the same as that posed by
presbyterians. While James’s religious concerns occasionally overlapped with those of
one like Willet, James put a higher value on peace and order than on doctrinal
orthodoxy.122
Willet’s relationship with King James was complicated, as most relationships
involving a house arrest tend to be. James seems to have admired Willet’s theology and
learning,123 and Willet served as one of Henry’s tutors, and would have preached at times
for the court. At James’s ascension to the English throne, Willet wrote a treatise, Ecclesia
Triumphans, celebrating the occasion. The omission the following year of Willet from the
King James Bible translation team is indeed strange, though we do not know that it was
James himself who did not want Willet. It can be difficult to determine much from the
sycophantic genre of dedicatory epistles, but Willet did seem to have a genuine respect
for James’s leadership and personal theological views (even if Henry was the more
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Reformed Stuart).124 One can, however, detect an undertone in some of Willet’s letters of
distrust of James’s commitment to Reformed theology. In his dedicatory letter before An
Antilogie, Willet at times gets rather forceful in his expectations of James (suggesting that
he censor books “too much declining to poperie,” thanking him in advance for preserving
a state of religion free of papist influence, and telling him that the angels are counting on
him, with a reminder that princes stand on slippery places), all while claiming “not to
prescribe a course, but only to give [his] simple advice.”125

5.1 Willet’s Background as a Polemicist
Willet’s reputation as a preeminent anti-Catholic controversialist was built on the
“hugely popular” Synopsis Papismi, “a book of great importance in English religious
history between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”126 The Synopsis was published
in four different editions during Willet’s lifetime (1592, 1594, 1600, and 1613), in
addition to two reprints (1603 and 1614), the 1634 reprint with the appended biography,
and the ten-volume 1852 reissue. The work grew from a modest 626 pages in 1592 to
1,218 in 1613 (not including the appended works). The first edition is divided into three
books (or “centuries,” so called as each contains a hundred or more popish errors),
subdivided into a total of twenty controversies. Book 1 addresses the doctrine of
Scripture and ecclesiological matters; Book 2 deals with angels, departed saints, Christ’s
mediation, and the sacraments; and Book 3 concerns the additional Roman Catholic rites,
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the “benefits of redemption” (predestination, vocation, and justification), Christology,
and Christ’s return.127 Willet regrouped the controversies in 1594, with some
modifications to the final four, into the structure it would maintain through the rest of the
editions. The first sixteen controversies are the same, though all of the individual
sacraments and rites are treated together as Book 3. The next three controversies are
modified (the state of pre-fall humanity; original sin; and redemption, consisting of
predestination, God’s grace, free will, justification, and good works) and make up a new
Book 4. And the twentieth controversy—now consisting of Christ’s natures and return—
alone makes up a fifth Book.128 To commemorate the Papal Jubilee in 1600 Willet added
two additional jubilee-related controversies as a second part of the final Book.129
The year after the initial appearance of the Synopsis, Willet published a sequel (or
“a necessarie supplement or fit appertinance”) entitled Tetrastylon Papisticum—these
“four pillars” of papism being 1) “Intemperate Rayling, with shamefull slanders and
untruths,” 2) “Blasphemies, opinions contrary to Scripture, Heresies, ridiculous and
absurd positions,” 3) “Loose Arguments, weake solutions, and subtle and sophisticall
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Distinctions,” and 4) “Papists Contradictions amongst themselves.”130 Tetrastylon went
through three printings by itself, in 1593, 1596, and 1599, plus an additional three, in
1613, 1614, and 1634, as an appendix to Synopsis Papismi.131
Willet’s first foray into published biblical exegesis was his 1602 commentary on
Jude, entitled A Catholicon. The title was a multilayered pun, with two layers being
obvious connections (using one of the “catholic” epistles to refute Roman “Catholic”
doctrine), and a third layer referring to a cure-all or panacea—at the time a fairly new use
of the word in English.132 All of these layers are conveyed in the sub-title: “that is, A
generall preservative or remedie against the Pseudocatholike religion, gathered out of
the Catholike epistle of S. Jude.” In the “catholic catholicon for (pseudo) Catholicism”
that follows, dedicated to the bishop of Ely Martin Heaton, Willet through 217 pages
discerns from Jude’s twenty-five verses over fifty “popish errours, and as many
corruptions of manners.” While not following the “hexapla” method that he would
introduce in the Genesis commentary three years later, Willet does present a (somewhat
different) six-fold approach in the preface:
I have throughout observed this course. 1. To note the doctrine. 2. Then followeth
the probation by testimonie of Scripture. 3. Then the demonstration by example.
4. After that, the illustration or exornation [embellishment] by some similitude or
130
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comparison, likewise out of the Scripture. 5. Next the Aitiologia or confirmation
by declaring the cause or reason. 6. Lastly, is adjoyned the application.133
Following this explanation he adds that, as Paul’s practice was to note both doctrines and
moral uses, so Willet will apply Paul’s words to refute papist doctrine and to expose their
ethical shortcomings. Despite some variations, significant elements of his later exegetical
approach are evident here: a focus on the number six, an interest in causality, an
affirmation of the analogia scriptura, and—significantly—an explicitly polemical
hermeneutical framework.
The year of James’s accession saw multiple polemical works from Willet’s pen.
In addition to the reprinting of the 1600 third edition of Synopsis Papismi, Willet
published both A Retection, or Discoverie of a False Detection and An Antilogie or
Counterplea to an Apologicall (he should have said) Apologeticall Epistle in 1603.134 A
Retection was Willet’s response to the Roman Catholic pamphleteer Philip Woodward’s
anonymously published A Detection from the previous year. The works of John Baxter
and John Hull not being worthy of refutation and Jewell, Foxe and Fulke all being
deceased, A Detection had focused on Willet and Matthew Sutcliffe, as “the two
principall men of our time, that imploy their forces, in assalting the impregnable fort of
Gods Church.”135 Woodward, whose antipathy for Willet and Sutcliffe was matched only
by his fondness for alliteration, called Willet’s work “a fardle of fables, far fuller of lies
133
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then of leaves,” referring to Willet himself as “a Protestant Pigmie…[who] with
pretended sincerity, and terrible titles, laboured to fright timerous creatures, as it were,
with the sighte of his white sheete, and fearfull flashing firebox.”136 Willet’s response
refutes “the Libeller” point by point (or “slaunder” by “slaunder”), defending his own
arguments in Synopsis Papismi and Tetrastylon Papismi.137 Willet’s target in An
Antilogie was Richard Broughton’s An Apologicall Epistle (1601) to the Queen’s privy
council, a letter that had referenced Willet multiple times, though in a less ad hominem
manner than A Detection.138 In this epistle (signed “R. B.”), Broughton appealed to the
council’s influence with the Queen in his efforts to demonstrate the superiority of Roman
Catholic theology and piety, hoping to convince them that a return to Catholicism would
lead to the greatest peace for England and that—at the very least—Catholics in the
kingdom should be granted greater toleration. The full title of Willet’s response to this
letter returns Broughton’s charge of Protestants being schismatic: the semi-anonymous
author of the Epistle is one of the “Romane Separation” and likely from the “Ignatian
[Jesuit] Faction.” This emphasis on the “Catholics” as a sect, together with a minimizing
of the significance of Protestant divisions, an affirmation of the analogy of faith, and a
claim on the Fathers, previews many of the themes that will characterize his later biblical
commentary work.139 As with many of his polemical works, Willet also plays around
136
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with the title of the work that he is refuting. His own title promises an “antilogy” that will
contradict the content of Broughton’s “apology” (with the final section providing “an
Antilogicall rescript to an Apologicall Epistle”). The rest of Willet’s title also offers
Broughton editorial advice on his word choice—“(he should have said) Apologeticall”—
and throughout the book he frequently modifies the original title in a more negative
direction, referring to it as an “Alogicall” epistle. As mentioned earlier, Willet would
again in 1607 confute a (similarly anonymous) work by Broughton, The First Part of
Protestants Proofes, for Catholikes Religion.
Though Willet reserved most of his polemical energy for refuting Roman Catholic
literature, he did engage also in selected disputes with fellow Protestants whom he felt
had edged too close to papist dogma. He, again, may have written (or at least had a hand
in the composition of) the 1599 A Christian Letter, which accused Richard Hooker’s Of
the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie of breaking with Church of England orthodoxy on
such central matters as the authority of Scripture, predestination, and the importance of
preaching.140 Willet’s authorship of two later works directed at a fellow Church of
England minister is certain (even though the first was published anonymously). His
Limbomastix (1604) and Loidoromastix (1607) each deal with the issue of Limbo and
Christ’s descent to hell, taking a strong stance against the doctrine of Purgatory, as well
as Protestant interpretations that could suggest the Romish doctrine. Limbomastix refutes
both Bellarmine and the Oxford-trained Richard Parkes, who had recently published a
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brief anonymous treatise on the subject.141 Loidoromastix142 answers Parkes’s lengthy
refutation of Limbomastix (whereas Parkes’s initial effort was under sixty pages, his
defense of his first work extends to over five hundred pages). Each of the latter two
works bears the author’s name and is dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft.143
Two years after the first printing of the Romans hexapla, Willet dedicated to the
new mayor of London, Thomas Myddelton, a twenty-four page account of the charitable
deeds performed by Protestants in and around London over the past sixty years—a sum
of a million deeds (“or thereabout”).144 The catalog is introduced polemically, as
evidence against the Romanist contention that Protestants (“professors of the Gospell”)
are “barren and fruitlesse of good workes.” Willet holds that the charitable works that he
141
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recounts exceed those performed during the hundreds of years prior to the
protestantization of England in number, greatness, quality, and end. While the papist
deeds were done with pride and to purchase merit, these recent deeds “only serve as
testimonies of our faith.” Willet takes care in his dedication to Lord Mayor Myddelton
not to substitute one variety of merit for another:
I doe here present unto you of your owne, a catalogue of such good workes, as
have been done since the times of the Gospell, especially in this honourable City:
but what said I? (of your owne) nay of our owne we can have no good thing…I
here then offer unto your view, such worthie acts, as God hath stirred up the
worshipfull citizens of your body to be instruments of.145

6. Method and Overview of Chapters
6.1 Sources and Method
The present study began with a close reading and annotation of Willet’s Hexapla
upon Romanes, with the intention of focusing on his characteristic six-fold approach to
the biblical text. I wondered, specifically, how his method had developed and whether his
unique view into the texts gave him insights that other exegetes had missed—whether, for
instance, his discipline of eliciting both doctrines and moral uses from each chapter
yielded interesting doctrines from the chapters that he designates as dealing with
exhortation (chs. 12-16) or less-obvious morals from the chapters that primarily concern
doctrine (chs. 1-11). What I found to be more interesting was the way that so much of
Willet’s material—not just in the debates dealt with in the Controversies sections, but
also among the Doctrines, Questions, and Moral Observations—was formulated and
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expressed against a polemical (generally anti-Catholic) background. While virtually all
Protestant biblical commentary in England during this period shares this characteristic to
some extent, Willet’s background as one of the most incisive and popular religious
controversialists in England at the turn of the seventeenth century, combined with his
own precise division of his arguments, made his polemical hermeneutic both exceptional
and exemplary.146 He thus stands as an optimal window for understanding the polemical
lens that characterizes much of the exegesis of his era.
The primary document for the dissertation is, naturally, Willet’s Romans hexapla.
This was published twice, in 1611 and 1620. As there were very few changes made
between the two editions, I only mention the year when there is a variant reading. I have
made use of many of Willet’s other writings, particularly the Synopsis Papismi, which
features his polemics in full bloom. As the Synopsis underwent significant modification
through its several editions, I of course note the edition when I cite that work.
Additionally, I `compare several of Willet’s interpretations with those of other
contemporary exegetes who worked on Romans, such as Thomas Wilson, Elnathan Parr,
and William Cowper.147 I also cross reference many of Willet’s own citations,
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particularly when his presentation of the source seems skewed or otherwise uncharitable.
While there is less secondary literature on Willet to engage with than there is on other
better-known figures, I have tried to identify every substantial use of him that I could find
in modern scholarship, and I interact with these sources when I feel that they call for
correction, clarification, or a counterargument.
Finally, a few points concerning style and language. Some doctrines appear in
multiple places; this is not a work in systematic theology, but a study of method and
hermeneutics. As different doctrines appear in different contexts in the biblical texts
themselves, and as Willet treats them variously in different sections, so I come around to
certain doctrines in different places (for instance, justification as it pertains to language
concerns; justification as it pertains to causality; to the Pelagian heresy, and so forth).
Where possible, I quote Scripture in Willet’s translation. If I don’t have access to that
through one of his commentaries, I generally quote the Geneva Bible, which served as the
template for Willet’s own translation work. When referring to one of the six hexapla
sections, I capitalize the title, so as to distinguish between, say, the Doctrines section and
“doctrine” generally. Without strong objection to the commonly-used label “moderate
Puritan” (so long as it is carefully defined to avoid all of the attendant ambiguities of the
term), I prefer not to describe Willet in this way, largely because, as the word “Puritan”
was used in his day almost exclusively as a term of abuse, he found the “scandalous”
term objectionable. I instead refer to his positions as “Protestant” (another erstwhile
pejorative which Willet nonetheless accepted) or—particularly when necessary for
or An explanation of the seventh chapter of the Epistle of Saint Paul to the Romans delivered in divers
sermons (London, 1618); Thomas Ingmethorpe, A sermon upon the words of Saint Paul, Let everie soule be
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Exposition of All St. Pauls Epistles (London: by R. I. for Francis Eglesfield, 1659).
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distinguishing his interpretation from other Protestant strains—“Reformed.”
Unfortunately, for the sake of clarity, I cannot consistently extend the same courtesy to
Willet’s Roman Catholic foes. Since Willet rejected his opponents’ use of the title
“Catholic” for themselves and argued that Protestants were the true catholic Christians, or
Reformed Catholics, I cannot use this title regularly without causing undue confusion. I
frequently refer to this group as “Roman Catholic,” but as this gets somewhat
cumbersome when repeated too many times, I also make use of Willet’s own (pejorative)
terms “papist” and “popish.”148

6.2 Overview of Chapters
Already in this first chapter we have been introduced to Willet’s life and early
polemical writings, we have placed him within his early Stuart context, and we have
summarized the body of secondary literature on him—which, while not unsubstantial, has
rarely made him the focus of the investigation. Within this body of secondary
scholarship, we have identified some interpretations that mischaracterize both Willet and
his context in subtle and more blatant ways. The chapters that follow delve into his
Romans hexapla, considering his use of linguistic, philosophical, and historical
arguments, and how these elements function together within his anti-Catholic
hermeneutical framework.
The first two chapters that follow deal with textual and language issues that Willet
identifies in his effort to show that Roman Catholic doctrine depends on errors in the
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Vulgate and misinterpretation of Paul’s rhetorical usage. Chapter 2 (“Textual and
Translation Issues”) surveys the development of early modern textual criticism before
looking at arguments that Willet frames against Vulgate renderings, which differ from the
textus receptus Greek due to either manuscript variation or misleading translations. This
gives us a window through which to compare contested Protestant and Roman Catholic
understandings of such issues as the relationship between the intellect and the will, the
assurance of salvation, and the nature and function of the Mosaic law. The chapter
concludes with an analysis of the particular problem posed by Paul’s use of the
Septuagint translation in Romans.
Chapter 3 (“Grammar and Rhetoric”) focuses on Willet’s extensive use of
arguments based on grammar (particularly related to conjunctions and prepositions) and
rhetorical devices. Spending a fair amount of time on the issue of original sin and
Willet’s advocacy of Augustine’s theological and grammatical approach, the chapter also
deals with language issues related to union with Christ, faith, and merit. The chapter
highlights Willet’s careful attention to textual details and the relationships between
different scriptural pericopes, even as he frames these matters in opposition to Roman
Catholic doctrinal distinctives.
The following two chapters consider arguments based on causality, as Willet
employs the familiar Aristotelian fourfold division to claim that Roman Catholics have
misidentified the multiple causes of an effect, confused effects for causes, or attributed
principal efficiency to a subordinate efficiency. Chapter 4 (“Confusion of Causes”)
discusses the early modern assumption of the compatibility of primary and secondary
causes in achieving an effect, and explores how Willet uses this concept to argue that
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Roman Catholic exegetes had wrongly structured the causes of various effects in
Romans, leading to mistaken notions of faith and merit, and of God’s agency in human
affairs.
Chapter 5 (“Confusion of Cause and Effect”) shifts the focus to confusion of
cause and effect, based on the shared assumption between Willet and his foes that an
effect cannot precede its cause. Willet employs this reasoning primarily to argue against
the Roman Catholic notion of double justification (which confuses the effect of
sanctification with a second form of justification, which is one of its causes) and those
who base predestination on God’s foreknowledge of human faith (which concept leads to
circular reasoning).
The final two body chapters look at Willet’s polemical use of tradition, examining
first his correlation of Roman Catholic interpretations of Romans with ancient heresies,
and then his efforts to prove that Protestants, by their agreement with early church
orthodoxy and their concurrence with one another on major doctrines, are the truly
“catholic” ecclesiastical body. Chapter 6 (“The Polemical Use of Heresies”) details how
Willet attempted through their interpretations of Romans to connect modern Roman
Catholics to a range of early church heresies, from Pelagianism (the most common
accusation) to Marcionism, Donatism, and pagan rites. The chapter also considers the
common theme among early modern Protestants of the papacy being a manifestation of
Antichrist, Willet’s use of anti-Jesuit puns, and the complex relationship to Judaism,
including its polemical utility against the Roman church.
Chapter 7 (“Catholicity and the Polemical Use of the Fathers”) turns from
Willet’s alignment of Roman Catholicism with ancient heterodoxy to his more positive
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attempt to portray Protestants as the heirs of the church’s earliest orthodox tradition.
Having considered Willet’s measured affirmation of the patristic heritage and his use of
Augustine, Chrysostom, and Origen to counter Roman Catholic interpretations, the
chapter moves on to his efforts to depict Rome as fractured and schismatic, and
Protestant divisions as relatively minor, all in order to present Protestantism as the true
and catholic Christian tradition.

CHAPTER II.
TEXTUAL AND TRANSLATION ISSUES
1. Introduction
As a highly skilled linguist, Andrew Willet drew heavily on his nuanced
understanding of Greek and Hebrew, grammatical conventions, and rhetorical devices in
his commentary work, employing these tools as needed to combat various “heretical”
interpretations. The next two chapters will consider Willet’s polemical use of textual and
linguistic arguments in the Romans hexapla, looking first at manuscript and translation
issues in the Vulgate, and then focusing on the theological weight of prepositions and
conjunctions and the way in which identifying figurative language in Romans can
determine how Paul’s meaning is taken.
The interconfessional battle over which Christian tradition best expressed central
scriptural teachings extended beneath questions of interpretation to fundamental
disagreements over authority, concerning both the basis of the authority to interpret the
Bible, and which manuscript tradition offered the authoritative framework for resolving
theological disputes. This chapter considers textual and translation issues that divided
Protestants and Roman Catholics, focusing on Willet’s advocacy of the textus receptus
and original biblical languages, and the role that this played in his polemical
hermeneutics. Seemingly minor textual variants and nuances of translation, when
extrapolated and developed, could affect significant doctrinal matters such as certainty
and assurance, the nature and role of the Law, and the effects of sin and redemption on
the human faculties. We will concentrate on Willet’s criticism of the Latin Vulgate—the
guiding text for post-Reformation Roman Catholic exegesis—but will also consider how
discrepancies between the Hebrew of the Masoretic text and the Greek of the Septuagint
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factored into the debate over authoritative manuscript traditions. Given the Protestant
emphasis on Scripture as the sole authoritative norm for church doctrine, it was especially
important to establish the best possible text; since the Church rested on a foundation of
God’s word given through perspicuous and self-authenticating scriptures, the Reformed
claim to represent the truly “Catholic” church depended upon the corroboration of
Reformed doctrinal emphases with an authentic text tradition. While Willet’s
determination to demonstrate the superiority of the textus receptus and Masoretic text
over the Vulgate occasionally leads him to circular arguments based on an a priori
assumption of the superiority of original languages, his arguments against Roman
Catholic interpretations that were grounded in Vulgate variants form a significant
component of his polemical exegetical method.

2. Early Textual Criticism
Though still in the “precritical” exegetical tradition, Willet and his peers were far
from uncritical in their approach to the biblical text.1 Faced with inconsistencies both
within individual and between different manuscript traditions, the seventeenth-century
exegete was equipped with a solid set of humanist tools for considering these problems
and arguing for a favored reading. While the conclusions drawn from these textual
analyses do not always comport with the findings of later text-critical scholarship, and
while these early debates were as often based on theological usefulness as on quality of
manuscript evidence, still it is instructive to consider how these text- and manuscript1

Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:251: “It would be a mistake…to view the
seventeenth-century orthodox theory of inspiration as utterly opposed to the results of a more critical and
textual exegesis or as incapable of accommodation to the various problems of authorship and composition
raised by the critical approach.”
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based arguments factored into Protestant orthodox polemics.
The practice of textual criticism is—at least in a rudimentary form— almost as
old as written language itself, beginning among the Greeks several centuries before
Christ.2 As early as the second century CE, critical tools were applied to biblical texts by
the Theodotians, a heretical sect that had been excommunicated by Pope Victor, and the
following century saw Origen compiling six different translations in his Hexapla and
commenting on textual variants. Jerome in the fourth century showed even greater skill
as a text critic than Origen had, and his contributions in this regard were recognized and
appreciated later by Roman Catholics and Protestants alike.3 Despite knowledge of Greek
in the Latin West being “at a low ebb,” there were various attempts in the Middle Ages to
correct the text of the Vulgate New Testament using Greek manuscripts.4 Cassiodorus in
the sixth century and Theodulf in the ninth century used basic text-critical methods to
clean up biblical texts, and in the twelfth century the Cistercians and Andrew of St.
Victor further developed the art.5 Roger Bacon and others in the following century
noticed that many errors had slipped into the Paris bibles because the copying had been
done not by bible experts but by commercial scribes.6 He proceeded to address the
“widely recognized problems with the text of the Vulgate,” showing a preference for

2

Bruce Metzger, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration,
3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 149.
3

Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 150-153; Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics,
2:421-425, 427. Frans Van Liere, An Introduction to the Medieval Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 83-84.
4

Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 154. Van Liere adds that the study of Greek lagged behind
Hebrew studies in the Middle Ages (Van Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 102-103).
5

Van Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 98-99.

6

Van Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 98.
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older manuscripts, original languages, and readings appearing in a plurality of
manuscripts.7 Still, medieval critical tools were limited, making it difficult to determine
the best readings, and so “most medieval textual critics were content to show the
diversity of the textual tradition rather than deciding on one reading.”8
The humanist learning of the Renaissance period brought tremendous advances to
the textual criticism of the Bible. In the fifteenth century Italian scholars like Giannozzo
Manetti, Aurelio Brandolini, and—most eminently—Lorenzo Valla furthered the project
of correcting errors in the current Vulgate text.9 A watershed moment came in the early
sixteenth century, when the revolutionary printing technology developed the prior
century was used to produce the first printed New Testaments in Greek—first as one of
the languages in the 1514 Complutensian Polyglot, and then in Erasmus’s famous edition
two years later—making available to all with the requisite language skills a necessary
tool for critiquing the Vulgate translation.10 By the end of the sixteenth century,
Stephanus’s 1550 revised version had become the standard Greek New Testament used in
England. These early Greek New Testaments were, however, based on relatively late

7

Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson, “Introduction and Overview,” in A History of Biblical
Interpretation, vol. 2, The Medieval through the Reformation Periods, ed. Alan J. Hauser and Duane F.
Watson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 62; Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:30.
Bacon was able to identify the older manuscripts by looking for bibles that did not have a gloss but
included canon tables (Van Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 99).
8

Van Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 102.

9

Erika Rummel, “The Renaissance Humanists,” in Hauser and Watson, A History of Biblical
Interpretation, vol. 2, The Medieval through the Reformation Periods, 287-290; cf. Muller, PostReformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:427.
10

Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 96, 98. Though the Complutensian Polyglot was the first to
be printed, various logistical delays made Erasmus’s edition the first to be published and made widelyavailable. Many of the errors in Erasmus’s 1516 text are likely attributable to his rushing it to publication in
an attempt to precede the release of the Complutensian Polyglot (Timothy George, Reading Scripture with
the Reformers [Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011], 88-89).
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manuscripts11—a point seized upon by Roman Catholic apologists for the Vulgate’s
superiority. Still, a high level of textual work in sixteenth-century biblical studies was
made possible by Renaissance humanist resources and techniques, including a muchimproved knowledge of ancient Greek, and tools for comparing manuscripts with one
another and against citations in the Church Fathers.12 Yet as we consider the arguments
proffered for different text-critical choices, we find that—contrary to claims like those of
Erasmus that such decisions could be an entirely neutral enterprise13—text criticism and
translation are always, to some degree, intertwined with interpretation.14

3. Faulting the Vulgate
Willet attributes many of the theological errors of Roman Catholic exegetes to
their reliance on a flawed Vulgate text of Romans. This being an even more basic
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Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 104, 106.

12

Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 155.
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Rummel, “The Renaissance Humanists,” 291. Willet, like Erasmus, tends to distinguish between
translation and interpretation and to suggest that the two can be kept separate. For example, after giving his
translation of the opening words of Romans 3:26 (“Through the patience of God…”), he notes the
rendering given by Tremellius (“By the space which God gave us by his long suffering…”), commenting,
“but this is interpreted, rather then translated” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 145). This professed
possibility of neutrality in the work of translation and textual decisions had, naturally, great polemical
value.
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This, combined with the sacred nature of the scriptures, has ensured that—from its earliest
stages—textual criticism of biblical manuscripts has been a consistently controversial endeavor. From
Jerome in the fourth century being accused of corrupting God’s word to Valla being attacked as a heretic in
the fifteenth (George, Reading Scripture with the Reformers, 60n23, 58-59), to Renaissance humanists
being criticized as challenging the principle of inspiration (Rummel, “The Renaissance Humanists,” 280281), to John Owen’s attack on Brian Walton’s London Polyglot in the later seventeenth century (Metzger,
Text of the New Testament, 107n1), to questions about the orthodoxy of John Mill, Johann Albrecht Bengel,
and Richard Bentley in the eighteenth century (Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 108, 112-113; Muller,
Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:142), efforts to restore Scripture to its earliest form have always
been met with resistance. On Valla’s textual work, see George, Reading Scripture with the Reformers, 5761. On Bentley’s revision of the Greek New Testament, see David S. Katz, God’s Last Words: Reading the
English Bible from the Reformation to Fundamentalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
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problem than misinterpreted or wrongly collated texts, nearly every section of the
Romans hexapla contains a variation of the refrain “which the vulgar Latine corruptly
translateth,” “they which follow the Latine translation here doe thinke,” or “the vulgar
Latine giveth occasion of this question,”15 indicating that Willet believed that Roman
Catholic biblical interpreters were doomed to commit certain mistakes simply because of
their faulty source material.16
Sixteen years before Willet’s birth, the Council of Trent had in its fourth session
declared the Vulgate the “authentic” version of Scripture and the basis for Roman
Catholic teaching.17 While some Catholics considered Jerome’s work to be divinely
inspired and as free from fault as the Hebrew and Greek original autographs themselves18
—with some claiming even that the Latin represented an improvement over and
completion of the original material19—the council stopped short of stating that the Latin
translation was above reproach, claiming it only as the standard for theological
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These examples are drawn from Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 19, 362 and 259.
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Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:430, on Protestant translation and
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Cambridge University Press, 2004), 235.
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discourse.20 Thus, the Vulgate served as the basis two decades following the final
Tridentine session for the translation of the New Testament into English at Rheims,
France—an effort motivated by the perceived need for English Roman Catholic preachers
to have their own English text to use to rebut “Protestant distortions” in earlier English
bibles.21 This would be the only sixteenth-century English New Testament translated
(primarily) from the Vulgate.22
The Rheims New Testament was first published in 1582, having been
commissioned by (future Cardinal) William Allen, the president of the English College at
Douay (of which the college at Rheims was an extension). The translation had taken four
years, and was principally the work of Gregory Martin. As it was intended largely as a
counter to the Geneva Bible (with its distinctly Protestant notes), the Rheims translation
was graced by sharply anti-Protestant annotations.23 By taking aim at the Rheims
translation and annotations in the Romans hexapla, Willet was following in the footsteps
of several English Protestants who had criticized the work in the prior decades, including
John Prime, Edward Bulkey, George Wither, Thomas Cartwright, and—most
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Bedouelle, “Biblical Interpretation in the Catholic Reformation,” 432.
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Lee W. Gibbs, “Biblical Interpretation in England,” in Hauser and Watson, A History of Biblical
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significantly—the redoubtable William Fulke (to whom Willet often refers his readers).24
Roman Catholic and Protestant exegetes held many beliefs about the textual basis
of Scripture in common, with their dispute over the more authentic textual tradition
boiling down to a disagreement over the level of corruption of the later Greek
manuscripts.25 Each side acknowledged that the New Testament was originally penned in
Greek and conceded that an error-free Greek original would, were there an extant copy,
be the optimal basis for theological debate.26 Both recognized the value of text-critical
tools, though Roman Catholics believed that Jerome had already applied these
24

Fulke was well-regarded in Protestant circles for his detailed refutation of the Rhemist
annotations. In Thomas Fuller’s unbiased words: “Now the Romanists, seeing they could no longer
blindfold their laity from the Scriptures, resolved to fit them with false spectacles, and set forth the
Rhemish translation, which by Doctor Fulke was learnedly confuted, though he never attained any great
preferment in the church” (Thomas Fuller, The Worthies of England, ed. John Freeman [London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952], 364). Joseph Hall referred to Fulke as “that profound, ready and resolute
doctor, the hammer of heretics, the champion of truth” (Richard Bauckham, “William Fulke,” in Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 131). Weigle describes Fulke
as “eminently fair to his opponents, but singularly devoid of worldly wisdom,” due to his unwittingly
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refutation (Luther A. Weigle, The English New Testament from Tyndale to the Revised Standard Version
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their new translation of the new Testament, &others (London: Thomas Vautrollier for George Bishop,
1583); Edward Bulkey, An Answere to ten frivolous and foolish reasons, set downe by the Rhemish Jesuits
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Gospell, and the holie Apostles did write it, to follow the streame of the Latin translation, translated we
know not when nor by whom (London: George Bishop, 1588); George Wither, A View of the Marginal
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France (London: by Edm. Bollifant for Thomas Woodcocke, 1588); Thomas Cartwright, The Answere to
the Preface of the Rhemish Testament (Edinburgh: Robert Walde-grave, 1602).
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sufficiently in establishing the Vulgate text in the fourth century.27 Roman Catholics and
Protestants alike recognized some (minimal) degree of error in their own favored text
tradition. While Martin concedes scattered flaws in the current Vulgate text, he adds that
these have already been identified by the theologians at Trent so that they may be
“throughly mended.” Willet, similarly, admits that there are imperfections in the textus
receptus Greek, though he maintains its priority by adding that “for one scape in the
Greeke, it is an easie matter to shew twentie in the Latine.”28 Willet also demonstrates an
awareness that Stephanus does not always represent the best Greek manuscripts.
Countering Bellarmine’s argument for the Vulgate’s superiority from its reading “serving
the Lord” (Domino servientes) at Romans 12:11, where the textus receptus has the
curious reading “serving the time” (τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύοντες), Willet argues that “the best
Greeke copies have also κυρίῳ, serving the Lord, as appeareth in the Syriake translation”
[Stephanus notes this possibility in the margin], and he dismisses the confusion between
καιρῷ and κυρίῳ as an understandable scribal error, rather than as evidence of a major

Written in Latin?,” The Journal of Theological Studies 29, no. 116 (July 1928): 375-381. Burkitt concludes
that the old theory is not entirely implausible, though he finds the recent argument proposed by P. L.
Couchoud unconvincing.
27
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flaw in the received Greek text.29 Willet’s acknowledgment of minor errors in the
available texts runs counter to Van Kleeck’s overstated claim regarding Willet’s position
on the inerrancy of the present state of the scriptural text. Van Kleeck writes: “Indeed, if
the text is in fact God’s Word, then any modification to the text, no matter how
subjectively insignificant, must be investigated…If the text were errant [i.e. corrupted], it
would not qualify as God’s Word…If the apographa was untrustworthy in the minutest
sense, the integrity of the whole…would be in question.”30 Willet, while assuming the
basic integrity of the textus receptus, does not hang the reliability of the entire text on the
absolute absence of corruptions, but rather argues that these corruptions are insignificant,
and vastly outnumbered by the corruptions in the Latin.
Naturally, however, each side noted the other’s acknowledgement of errors in
their favored manuscript tradition and used that acknowledgement against them. Martin,
for instance, gives Beza’s use of the Vulgate as one of his ten reasons for using the
Vulgate at the basis for his own translation, and he claims that the Protestants’ assertion
of the superiority of the Greek text is contradicted in practice by their frequent appeal to
the Latin: “the proofe is more pregnant out of the Adversaries them selves. They forsake
the Greeke text as corrupted, and translate according to the vulgar Latin,” except when
they need the Greek text to support one of their own interpretations. Willet, likewise,
refers several times to Bellarmine’s acknowledgment of faults in the Vulgate and relays
how Mirandola in the fifteenth century advised Leo X that the Latin needed to be
checked against the original languages, concluding that Roman Catholics have “their
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owne testimonies against them.”31
Martin’s reasoning for the translators’ dependence on the Vulgate centers on its
antiquity and the assumption of willful corruption of the Greek text. Three of his ten
arguments for the Vulgate rely specifically on the approval of generations of theologians:
it is ancient, having been in use for over 1300 years, it was commended by Augustine,
and it was met with approval by many other Latin Fathers. Additionally, because of its
antiquity, it predates the Reformation controversies, and this neutral context adds to its
credibility: it shows the “least partialitie, as being without al respect of controversies and
contentions.”32 He reiterates this impartiality later in the preface, defending the Vulgate
against the Protestant charge that its language was biased toward Roman Catholic dogma.
A translation made over a millennium before the Reformation, he argues, is far less likely
to be skewed by bias than one made in the midst of the sixteenth-century controversies.
He argues further that the Greek text of the New Testament supports Roman Catholic
theology to a greater degree even than the Latin; if—he adds with a note of jest—the
Vulgate is as Protestants charge a “Papistical” text, then the Greek is more so, and
“consequently the holy Scripture of the new Testament is Papistical…[and thus] Papistrie
is very auncient.”33
But “simple artificers” among the Protestants had, he argued, in their “false

31

Martin, New Testament, sig.biiiv-biiiir; Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), 19-21.

32

Martin, New Testament, sig.biiir.

33
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translations” demonstrated “intolerable liberty and licence” in altering the “accustomed”
language that had been “used by the Apostles and all antiquitie,” and he accuses them of
meddling with the accepted text by “corrupting both the letter and the sense by false
translation, adding, detracting, altering, transposing, pointing, and all other guileful
meanes.”34 The received Greek text, moreover, he held to have been long ago altered to
corroborate the twisted theologies of the likes of Marcion and the Nestorians: “because
most of the auncient Heretikes were Grecians, & therfore the Scriptures in Greeke were
more corrupted by them, as the auncient fathers often complaine.”35 This argument for
the corruption of Greek texts parallels the occasional Roman Catholic assertion of the
time that the Hebrew of Old Testament manuscripts had been deliberately corrupted by
the Jews sometime after the translation of the Vulgate.36 Willet mentions the theory of
intentional Jewish corruption of the MT and, like virtually all Protestant orthodox
Hebrew scholars, dismisses the possibility: “[the Jews] were faithfull keepers of the
34
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Scriptures, preserving them from falsitie and corruption, and are to this day, though they
understand them not.”37
Responding to the Roman Catholic appeal to the antiquity and long-established
use of the Vulgate, Willet in the Synopsis Papismi rejects the argument by challenging
the catholicity of the Roman church: “there were other Churches besides the Latine all
this while, as amongst the Greekes famous congregations and Churches.” Since other
legitimate ecclesiastical bodies had been using a Greek New Testament for at least as
long as the Roman church had been relying on the Latin, the mere endurance of the
Vulgate in the West was no good argument for preferring it to the original languages. A
long-standing failure to correct a faulty text, besides, was not evidence for that text’s
authenticity, but an indictment on the church for its negligence.38
Despite his awareness that the fundamental disagreement with Rome concerning
the authoritative version of Scripture had to do with the relative level of corruption
between the Hebrew/Greek and Latin manuscripts, Willet structures his apology for the
Hebrew and Greek rhetorically around statements asserting the superiority of originals
over translations. In the Romans hexapla, for example, he uses Paul’s quotation from
Psalm 19 in Romans 10:18 as an occasion to criticize those who claim the authority of the
Latin over the Hebrew, illustrating his point by likening their preference to the
“preposterous” notion of putting a river before the spring that feeds it.39 While he does

37

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 147.

38

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), 17.

39
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appeal at times to the agreement of Greek passages with the old Syriac translation and
citations in the Fathers,40 Willet’s arguments for the priority of the extant Greek
manuscripts tend to be circular, relying less on textual evidence than on ideological and
theological factors. He avoids addressing possible corruptions in the Greek, for instance,
when he asserts in the Synopsis Papismi that “the Greeke ought to be preferred (being the
same tongue wherein the Apostles and the Evangelists wrote) to be the onely authentike
copie.”41 But few defenders of the Vulgate would have disputed that the New Testament
was written in Greek, dissenting from Willet rather over whether a pristine Greek text
still existed. Similarly, two pages later Willet counters Bellarmine’s claim that the Latin
New Testament was less corrupted than the Greek by asking, “How can the trueth of the
Latine be tried, but by the Greeke, out of which it was translated? which being more
ancient, must first bee beleeved.”42 Here again his argument relies not on reasons why the
current Greek text can be trusted (a point he assumes), but on the general priority of the
original language over the translation. We see this circularity again on the following
page, where he argues: “There are many and great errors in the vulgar translation, and
contrarie to the originall: Ergo, it is not authentike.”43 Without access to a true “original,”
his argument assumes that differences between the current copies of the Vulgate and the
Greek New Testament demonstrate that the Vulgate is the version that has strayed from
the Greek autograph. Van Kleeck also seems to neglect the debate over which manuscript
tradition was less corrupted in his assessment of Willet’s preference for the scriptural text
40
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as found in the Greek commentaries: “Also, in that the Latin commentaries are one more
translation away from the Greek, it is not surprising that Willet finds the best reading in
the Greek commentaries rather than the Latin.”44 Willet indeed favors the linguistic and
semantic observations of the Greek Fathers, but their linguistic advantages with the
Greek would have little bearing on the Roman Catholic argument that the Greek texts had
been corrupted.
Willet also bases some of his textual arguments on theological criteria or
apologetic utility (a standard, of course, not unique to him).45 This is perhaps less circular
than his arguments for the Greek text that assume a priori the superiority of the current
Greek manuscripts, since harmony with an author’s broader theological perspective is
indeed a sound method for textual criticism and interpretation,46 but some of his
arguments here, too, appear to equate his premise with his conclusion. On the absence of
a reference to the Son in the Vulgate version of Psalm 2:12, for instance, Willet writes:
“And thus an evident place against the Jewes for the second person in Trinitie, is
obscured and overthrowne, by the corrupt Latin text.”47 His criticism of the Latin here is
not based on a contradiction with another part of the text, but on the loss of one of the
44

Van Kleeck, “Hermeneutics and Theology in the 17th Century,” 94.
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Medieval scholars, for example, used theological criteria as part of their method for discerning
the best reading, which sometimes led them to reject a particularly difficult, while still “correct,” text (Van
Liere, Introduction to the Medieval Bible, 100). Cf. Bengel’s nearly opposite approach in the eighteenth
century, in which he systematically preferred the more difficult reading, under the premise that a scribe
would be more likely to seek to correct a difficult reading than to muddy up a clear one (Metzger, Text of
the New Testament, 112).
46

The fair assumption here being that writers tend to be more or less consistent in their thought.
Cf. Reformed use of the analogia fidei.
47

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), 20. While most of the English bibles read “kiss the Son” here,
because of some obscurity in the Hebrew the Vulgate reads “adprehendite disciplinam” (“embrace
discipline”), following the LXX’s “δράξασθε παιδείας” (note the etymological connection between
παιδεία—education or discipline—and παῖς—child).
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useful trinitarian dicta probantia.48 Erasmus scholar Gregory D. Dodds, similarly, notes
“Willet’s a priori reasoning” and the “rather circular” nature of Willet’s rejection of
Erasmus’s textual work on Romans 9:5, which he criticized for weakening the scriptural
evidence for Christ’s divinity.49
Having acknowledged these weaknesses in Willet’s arguments for the priority of
the textus receptus Greek over the Vulgate, we will proceed not by focusing on the
textual basis of his arguments, but on the theological ramifications of the textual
differences between the different manuscript traditions and on Willet’s polemical use of
these variations. We can divide his Vulgate-oriented polemics into those stemming from
textual variants and those related to translation issues.

3.1 Vulgate: Textual Variants
The study of the origin of textual variants in the Bible is interesting in its own
right, even apart from theological considerations.50 In Romans manuscripts alone we find
multiple instances of errors—due to mistaken hearing (e.g. εἰ δὲ/ ἴδε in 2:17), mistaken
48

Cf. the concurrent debate over the textual basis of the “Johannine comma”: see, for example,
Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:141-145; William Orme, Memoir of the Controversy
Respecting the Three Heavenly Witnesses, 1 John v. 7 (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1830); Joseph M.
Levine, “Erasmus and the Problem of the Johannine Comma,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 4
(Oct. 1997): 573-596.
49

Dodds, Exploiting Erasmus, 144. Cf. Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 434. Willet objects to
Erasmus’s suggestion in his annotations on this verse that an acceptable grammatical reading could
separate “God” from “Christ”: “Then after a period, there would follow ‘God [be] blessed forever,’ so that
this would be an expression of thanks as a result of the contemplation of love towards the human race so
great that God wished God the Son to assume a human body for our sake” (Erasmus, Annotations on
Romans, 242). Although Erasmus accepts also the grammatical legitimacy of the reading Willet prefers
(“Christ, who is God over all, blessed for ever”) and adds that other parts of Scripture make it “clearer than
day” that Christ is God (p. 243)—a disclaimer that Willet acknowledges—these are insufficient to keep
Willet from accusing Erasmus of having “given occasion to these newfangled Dogmatists [i.e. the heretics
Eniedinus and Socinus].”
50

See the chapter on the causes of New Testament manuscript errors in Metzger’s classic study,
where he provides examples of accidental and intentional alterations generated by such factors as faulty
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seeing (e.g. ἈΛΛΑ/ ἉΜΑ in 6:5), or expansion based on logical extrapolation or
comparison with parallel biblical texts (e.g. the expansion of Paul’s citation of four of the
Ten Commandments in 13:9, or the added logical converse in 14:6 about those who do
not observe particular feast days)—that provide insight into the history of the scribal
transmission of these texts but have minimal theological effect.51 Our focus here, though,
will be on the variants that, whether generated intentionally or through a scribal error,
impact to some degree the theological ramifications of a passage.

3.1.1 Romans 1:31/32 and “non intellexerunt”
Despite his vigorous disapproval of Erasmian soteriology, in textual matters
Willet often found an ally in Erasmus, whose work on the Greek New Testament was so
pivotal in establishing the Stephanus text that served as the standard Greek in Willet’s
England. Such was the case, for instance, in the disputed text of Romans 1:31/32 (the
verse that Willet and Geneva number as verse 31 is subdivided in most other versions,
including the 1551 Stephanus).52 Erasmus had pointed out that the better Greek
manuscripts of Romans lacked the Vulgate’s mitigating phrase non intellexerunt (“they

hearing or seeing, accidental engrafting of marginal notes, harmonization or conflation of different
passages, the addition of natural complements, attempts at geographic or historical correction, and doctrinal
issues (Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 186-206).
51

On these examples, see: (2:17)—Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 100; Erasmus, Annotations on
Romans, 83-84; (6:5)—Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 187; Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 176;
(13:9)—Metzger, Text of the New Testament, 198; (14:6)—Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 624, 633;
Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 373-376.
52

The Rhemist text, with my brackets added around the disputed words, reads: “Who whereas
they knew the justice of God, [did not understand] that they which doe such things, are worthie of death:
not only they that doe them, but they also that consent to the doers” (Martin, New Testament, 384).
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did not understand”), which could alter the meaning of the passage.53 While stating that
he (in perhaps a slight play on words) “certainly [did] not quite understand” how these
added words came into the text, he suggests that they were introduced to “fill out the
meaning” of Paul’s words.
But the Greek manuscripts now extant, with large consensus, suggest that Paul’s
meaning was very different, namely, that to approve of the evil deeds of others is
more serious than to fall into sin yourself, for the latter is very often due either to
chance or to weakness; the former either to a most pernicious flattery or to a most
deplorable malice.54
Willet, citing Erasmus among others, follows this line of critique, arguing that the added
words, with their appeal to ignorance, “quite invert the sense of the text, [making] it a
lesse thing to consent unto evil doers, and approve them, then to commit evill.”55 The
confused Vulgate rendering is further muddled by the muted translation of
συνευδοκοῦσιν as consentiunt, as opposed to the stronger patrocinantur (Beza) or
applaudunt (Piscator).56 The Vulgate’s translation follows the minimized culpability
communicated by the added non intellexerunt—it is worse to commit than to consent to
sin; but the order of severity expressed in the Greek text agrees with an approval stronger
than “a bare consent unto evill”—to fall into sin (perhaps by weakness) is a less severe
offence than to delight in others’ evil acts.57
Several of Willet’s text-critical principles are displayed in his arguments against
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“Could” because the order of severity would be maintained if the added words were taken as a
negative question: “Did they not understand?”
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 67.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 84.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 85.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 97.
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“the corrupt reading of the vulgar Latine translation” of this verse in the Controversies
section of chapter 1. From manuscript evidence, he counters Bellarmine’s appeal to the
presence of the clause in “some Greeke copies” with the assertion that “the most, and the
most auncient have [it] not,” and the agreement of the Syriac text. Resolving the
discrepancy between the interpretations of the older Latin and Greek commentaries, he
again shows a preference for the (native Greek-speaking) Greek Fathers: “the Greeke
authors and commentaries are more to be respected in this case, for the finding out of the
best reading in the Greeke, then the Latine writers.” And from internal evidence he
argues that the Vulgate reading introduces a contradiction into the text: “the
understanding is in the judgement of the minde, not in the practise: and therefore to know
a thing, and yet not to know or understand it, includes a contradiction.” It would be
impossible to “know” God’s justice without “understanding” its consequences for
sinners.58
Other Protestant commentaries on this verse, both prior to Willet and by his
contemporaries, tend to interpret it in line with Willet’s emphasis, though without
drawing on the Vulgate’s textual variance. Calvin associates approving of the sins of
others with a dangerous lack of shame, adding that “he who is ashamed is as yet
healable.”59 Thomas Wilson writes of celebrating others’ sins as “an high pitch and
degree of sinne,” and argues that “sinnes against our knowledge” are the ones that are
“chiefely to be avoyded,” as these “give greatest wounds to our conscience, and so most

58

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 97.
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Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 83.
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trouble the peace of our owne hearts.”60 And in an explication of Romans 1-3 published
the same year as Willet’s Romans hexapla, William Sclater draws a distinction between
simple and willful ignorance, applying the more pernicious directly to the Roman
Catholic church’s encouragement of sin:
Wherein how farre they of Rome have ingaged themselves, those many
dispensations by them granted for murther, even of the Lord’s annointed, for
marriages within the degrees prohibited, &c. are abundant witnesses. Things that
heathen by light of nature detested are allowed by them as commendable, yea in
some cases meritorious, and worthy of canonization.61
While not mentioning the textual or translation issues with the Vulgate, Sclater’s
amplification of the Protestant reading of this passage manages to exceed the polemical
virulence of Willet’s text-based critique by accusing the Catholic church directly of the
passage’s more sinister sin.

3.1.2 Assurance of Salvation in Romans 5:1 and 7:25
Two of Willet’s textual critiques of the Vulgate have a bearing on the believer’s
assurance of salvation, one stemming from an altered vowel and the other from the
substitution of a cognate word. In each of these cases, too, Willet’s readings follow
Erasmus’s textual work. Seeking to correct the Vulgate text of Romans 5:1, which reads
pacem habeamus ad Deum (“let us have peace toward God”), Erasmus had argued
(incorrectly) that the majority of Greek codices had the indicative form ἔχομεν (“we
have”) instead of the hortatory subjunctive ἔχωμεν (“let us have”).62 What is more, had
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Wilson, A Commentarie upon…Romanes, 109-110.
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Sclater, A Key to the Key of Scripture, 171.
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In fact, “the vast majority” of Greek manuscripts contain the ἔχωμεν reading that is the basis for
the Vulgate translation, though “most modern commentators” agree with Erasmus and Willet that the less
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Paul’s purpose here been primarily to exhort believers to maintain peace with God,
Erasmus holds, he would have used a different hortatory subjunctive, τηρῶμεν (“let us
keep”), that would have described our responsibility more accurately. But Paul’s use of
the indicative mood shows that he is “not warning those who are justified, but he is
expressing joy in their felicity.”63 Still, Erasmus presents his preferred reading with less
than full certainty, even remarking himself that he has argued his position “without…
absolutely condemning the other reading.” Nor does the indicative ἔχομεν remove
completely the hortatory element in Paul’s words: “there is no need, then, of a verb in the
imperative for his exhortation, but the situation itself exhorts us” to live out our peace
with God through obedience to his commandments. While affirming that our peace with
God is the “result not of [our] own merit,”64 he adds that “it is a familiar figure of
speech…[to] say something is being done that (we wish to have understood) ought to be
done.”65 Thus, Erasmus makes a case for reading ἔχομεν while stopping short of drawing
the conclusions from the indicative mood that we will see in Willet.
Addressing “what peace the Apostle meaneth” in the Questions section of chapter
5, Willet identifies two classes of misreadings of this verse that stem from the hortatory

frequently attested ἔχομεν is the original reading, being more consistent with Paul’s meaning in the passage
at large (editors’ note in Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 128n3).
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 127.
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The Payne/Rabil/Smith translation of this passage in Erasmus’s paraphrase of Romans is
somewhat misleading in rendering reconciliati sumus deo patri (“we have been reconciled with God the
Father”) with the active “we have made our peace with God the Father,” suggesting a greater human role in
effecting peace with God than is present in Erasmus’s words here. See Erasmus, Paraphrases on Romans
and Galatians, ed. Robert Dick Sider, trans. John Barton Payne, Albert Rabil, and Warren Sylvester Smith,
vol. 42 of Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 32; Paraphrases des
Erasmi Roerodami In epistolas Pauli apostoli ad Rhomanos Corinthios & Galatas (Basil: Joan. Frob.,
1520), 59.
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 128.
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ἔχωμεν variant. Oecumenius and those following him read the verse “in the imperative,
habeamus, let us have,” and interpret it as an injunction for believers to maintain peace
with other believers, especially in those situations where Jews and Gentiles were divided
by the Mosaic Law. This argument Willet dismisses on the grounds that Paul was not
among those contending about the Law and yet he includes himself by using the first
person plural; were he chiding others for an unnecessary division he would have used a
second person imperative.66 Others, as Origen, Chrysostom and Theodoret, read the
passage (correctly) as a reference to peace with God, but take the imperative to function
as a warning to the reader not to lose God’s favor.67 This is the understanding implied,
too, by the dismissal of the Protestant interpretation in the Rhemist annotations, where
Martin asserts that this verse “maketh nothing for the vaine securitie and infallible
certaintie which our Adversaries say, every man ought to have upon his presumed
justification by faith, that him self is in Gods favour, and sure to be saved.”68 Willet
counters both of these views by arguing that the immediate context of Romans 5:1-2
supports the confidence expressed in the indicative reading. As it immediately follows
Paul’s opening declaration that we are justified by faith, the “peace” should be read as the
“peace of conscience” that we have as the first fruit of our having been declared
righteous: “it is not an exhortation, but a continuation rather of the former doctrine of
justification.” The words following, likewise, support Paul’s use of the indicative. He
gives “through Jesus Christ” (not our own effort) as the efficient cause of this peace,
confidently declares our access to God that we can only have with an already66

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 236.

67

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 236.
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Martin, New Testament, 394.
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accomplished peace, and describes our “standing” in God’s grace, which communicates
“the certaintie which we have thereof by faith…being sure by the Lords assistance never
to fall away from thence.”69 In the Controversies section, Willet reiterates this
conclusion, arguing there (against Pererius) that our “integritie of life” is not a cause, but
rather the confirmation of, our peace with God.70 Our “peace of conscience is the worke
of our true justice, that is, Christ,” but it is “confirmed and ratified unto us by good
life.”71 In continuity with the mainstream of Reformed orthodox thought on the
relationship between a godly life and the assurance of salvation, Willet fully grounds
assurance objectively in Christ, while allowing a confirming role for good works.72
A subtle textual variant similarly impacts whether Romans 7:25 can be used to
69

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 237-238. Through a series of distinctions, Willet narrows down
the precise nature of the peace that Paul declares that we have. First, citing Calvin, he distinguishes
between “peace of conscience” and a “carnall stupiditie” that naively ignores God’s justice. This peace is,
further, not an external peace—which Satan and human corruption may “interrupt”—but rather “the inward
peace of conscience [which] Satan himselfe cannot deprive us of.” He then subdivides this inner peace,
explaining that the peace we are promised in this life is not from such battles as the tension between flesh
and spirit, but from fear of God’s judgment. And even our experience of this assurance may waver through
seasons of doubt, though never as to be rendered ultimately null; God’s gift of inner peace ensures “that we
fall not upon the rockes, to make a shipwracke of our faith, and a good conscience.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 265-266. Drawing on 2 Peter 1:9, Willet describes the
confirming role of good works here in terms paralleling, in a way, the “sign and seal” function of the
sacraments: a righteous life “declareth…unto us our peace,” and our good works make our election sure not
“in it selfe, which dependeth on the purpose of God, but it is made sure unto us.”
71
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 265-266.

On the assurance of salvation in Reformed theology, see Richard A. Muller, Calvin and the
Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2012), 244-276. Willet offers further evidence against those (such as M. Charles Bell and R. T.
Kendall) who supposed a contradiction between objective (Christ-based) and subjective (good works as the
effect of grace in the believer’s life) evidences for assurance (cf. Muller, Calvin and the Reformed
Tradition, 247-250). Kendall claims, for instance, that in Perkins’s system, “The doing of good works,
while not the ground of faith, is the ground of assurance” (R. T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to
1649 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979], 75). In Willet this is explicitly not the case, and a
comparison he offers could be used in defense of his Cambridge classmate: “the peace of conscience
wrought in us by faith, is confirmed and ratified unto us by good life, even as good workes are testimonies
of our faith, and in that sense are said by S. James, c.2. to justifie” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 266).
Good works, as Willet presents them, are no more the ground of assurance (or peace of conscience) than
they are the ground of faith, yet in each case they give witness to the work of Christ, who is the ground of
both graces.
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support assurance of salvation. To Paul’s question, “Who shall deliver me out of this
bodie of death?,” the Vulgate, with such Church Fathers as Origen and Augustine,
answers “the grace of God” (gratia dei—the Latin equivalent of χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ). “But,”
Willet counters with a bit of an overstatement, “all the Greeke copies have ἐυχαριστῶ [τῷ
θεῷ].”73 As an utterance of thanksgiving, Paul’s conclusion expresses a “certaine hope of
the inheritance to come.”74 Paul’s query in 7:24 functions rhetorically as a sigh, as to
“sheweth his desire to be delivered,” so the expected response is not the entity that can
effect his deliverance, but an expression of gratitude that the longed-for deliverance is
guaranteed.75 Though this deliverance (namely, the continued work of sanctification and
the resurrection of the body) is as yet unfulfilled, “yet hee giveth thankes for it, as
enjoying the same in hope.”76 A few pages later, as part of a larger discussion of “that
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 333. For the sake of simplicity, I am writing ἐυχαριστῶ with a
sigma-tau, rather than with the ligature stigma, which Willet uses. Metzger lists multiple manuscripts that
read χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ, or ἡ χάρις κυρίου (Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the
Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. [Stuttgart, Ger.: United Bible Societies, 1994], 455). There is no reason that
Willet would not have been aware, at least, of a variant of the first reading, as Erasmus writes in the
Annotations that Lorenzo Valla “points out that in some manuscripts χάρις τῷ θεῷ was written” (Erasmus,
Annotations on Romans, 195). If this was the only Greek variant that Willet knew of, though, it is possible
that he would have included this among “all the Greeke copies [that] have ἐυχαριστῶ,” since the meaning
would be basically the same (“I thank God,” versus “thanks to God”). The Valla variant would better
explain the source behind the Vulgate version, as the only difference between these two readings is the case
of θεός—the dative τῷ θεῷ (“to God”) or the genitive τοῦ θεοῦ (“of God”).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 334. Erasmus concurs with this reading, as well, stating that
“with these words, he gives thanks—now freed—to God” (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 196).
Kroeker describes Erasmus’s comments on this verse, as they developed through multiple editions, as
becoming increasingly similar to the interpretations of Augustine, Luther, and Melanchthon (Kroeker,
Erasmus in the Footsteps of Paul, 71-72).
75

Cf. the description of the source material behind the Vulgate’s rendering in Metzger, A Textual
Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 455: “Two Western readings…pedantically provide a direct
answer to the question τίς με ῥύσεται; in ver. 24.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 333-334. Willet differs here from Calvin, who reads Paul’s
thanksgiving as referring not to a further, future deliverance, but to benefits already received. The central
issue to Calvin was not Paul’s “thank you in advance” gratitude for the fullness of his future salvation, but
rather his contentment with his current blessings, even though they represent only the first fruits. The
Apostle renders thanks to God “lest any should think that in his complaint [i.e. v. 24] he perversely
murmured against God…It does not become the saints, while examining their own defects, to forget what
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famous question, whether S. Paul do speake in his owne person, or of an other here in this
7. chapter,” Willet clarifies further the issue at stake. Arguing that Paul is speaking as
himself (against those, as Tolet, who held that he wrote the seventh chapter in the voice
of “a man not yet delivered or freed from his sinne”), Willet asserts that the more reliable
manuscripts do not respond to the question in 7:24 with a merely hypothetical answer
(i.e. “it is God’s grace that delivers”), but with an outburst of thanksgiving for actually
granting the deliverance that he so desired. The word of thanks speaks to the Apostle’s
condition, as “one not in the state of grace, cannot give thankes unto God.”77 The
difference to Willet, then, between the cognate words χάρις and ἐυχαριστῶ was the
difference between an individual’s salvation as a hypothetical future reality and that
salvation as an accomplished fact. Willet’s exposition of this variant highlights the
divergence between the contemporary Protestant and Roman Catholic understandings of
the relationship between hope and certainty. Whereas Catholic thought presented hope as
requiring further confirmation and thus falling short of assurance,78 to Willet, Paul’s
expression of thanksgiving for his future deliverance demonstrates a confidence that his
salvation is “a certaine hope,” and that he is already able to enjoy “the same in hope.”

they have already received from God.” Despite not yet enjoying the “promised glory of heaven,” yet Paul
has reason to take joy in God’s present blessings (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 273-274). Willet does
not mention Calvin’s comments on this verse, but cites Vermigli, Rollock, Osiander, Theophylact, and
Pareus as some who wrongly attribute Paul’s thanksgiving to his previous attainments (Willet, Hexapla
upon Romanes, 333-334).
77
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 338.

As expressed, for example, in the distinction made in the Rhemist marginal note on the
reference to hope in Romans 5:4, which claims that Christians “do not vaunt themselves of the certaintie of
their salvation, but glorie in the hope thereof onely, which hope is insinuated here to be given in our
justification, & is afterward to be confirmed by probation in tribulation” (Martin, New Testament, 393).
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3.1.3 Romans 13:1 and the Status Quo
Lastly, we will consider a textual variant in Romans 13:1. Though the problematic
reading that Willet disputes appears only in “a minority of Latin manuscripts,”79 still
Willet’s arguments concerning the ramifications of the faulty reading are interesting and
worth mentioning. “The vulgar Latine,” writes Willet, “readeth, The things which are,
are ordained of God,” adding that the same reading is found in Anselm and the
interlinear gloss.80 This reading (“Quae autem sunt a Deo, ordinata sunt”), Willet claims,
contains a “double error,” in that it lacks an explicit reference back to the “powers” from
the first part of the verse and “the word ordinata, ordained, is put in the neuter, which in
the Greeke is in the feminine, answering unto powers.”81 The “double error” that Willet
decries is perhaps better viewed as two aspects of a single issue: if “ordained” is put in
the feminine (ordinatae), then the reference back to (the feminine) “powers” earlier in the
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Editorial comment in Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 348-349n12. Erasmus himself also
supports the more important part of Willet’s reading: “Again, in my copy, in old type, and in the codex of
Constance, the reading is ordinatae, not ordinata, so that the latter appears to be a corruption of the
copyists” (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 347). It is not difficult to imagine how these variants might
have entered into the text, given the single-letter difference between the neuter ordinata and the feminine
ordinatae, and the similar forms of the Greek ἐξουσίαις (powers) and οὖσαι (being).
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Cf. the neuter ordinata variant in a recent printing of the ordinary gloss (Bibliorum Sacrorum
Cum Glossa Ordinaria, tomus sextus [Venice, 1601], 163-164). The most recent editions of the Vulgate,
though, generally contained the feminine ordinatae reading—a point Willet doubtlessly was aware of. The
multiple printings of the Sixto-Clementine Vulgate, starting in 1592, all contain ordinatae. Cf. Biblia
Sacra: Vulgatae Editionis (Rome: Apostolica Vaticana, 1592). Christophe Plantin’s 1580 Latin bible used
the Louvain Vulgate as the basis for the text, but included variants in the margins. Thus, at Romans 13:1 he
gives “quae autem sunt, à Deo ordinata sunt” in the main text, but adds “ordinatae 2 MS. G.S.” in the
margin (Biblia Sacra [Antwerp: Christophori Plantini, 1580] ). The Rheims New Testament reads “…there
is no power but of God. And those that are, are of God ordeined,” which properly connects God’s
ordination to the aforementioned powers (Martin, New Testament, 414). Some in the early seventeenth
century, though, maintained the ordinata reading. Pererius, writing in 1604, has ordinata, without making
any specific comment on this phrase (Pererius, Disputationes super Epistola beati Pauli ad Romanos, 637).
Pareus is unusual in combining a reference to the powers with the ordinata form: “qua sunt potestates, sunt
à Deo ordinata,” though in his exposition he gives “quae vero potestates sunt, a Deo sunt ordinatae,”
which is the same form that Bucer had given (Pareus, In Divinam ad Romanos, 1287-1288; Bucer,
Metaphrasis et Enarratio in Epist. D. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, 572).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 582.
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verse is understood. With the neuter form ordinata, however, the pronoun quae, which
can be either a neuter or feminine plural, is also read as a neuter (“the things”), rather
than as a feminine relative pronoun (“which [powers]”).
While many exegetes either glossed over the ordinata variant as an obvious
scribal error (as Erasmus) or chose not to mention it at all (like Calvin),82 Willet takes the
time to explain how the erroneous reading becomes a blessing of the status quo, limiting
our warrant for working against the broken elements of a fallen world. Willet cites
Tolet’s agreement on this point and, indeed, his entire argument appears to be drawn
directly from Tolet’s Romans commentary.83 Tolet and Willet each explain how the
unlimited breadth of the “things which are” would imply that such blights as “warre,
sicknes, [and] povertie” were ordained by God, making it unlawful to labor to ameliorate
these conditions.84 This is not, however, to deny that all of the “things which are” are, in
some manner, “of God.” Willet goes on to distinguish between things that are simply “of
God” and those that are “by speciall precept” ordained by God; such things as disease
and war may indeed be “of God” (as punishments for human sin) while not being
“ordained by precept and commandement.” Being “disposed of in the world by Gods
providence” but not by God’s ordinance, it is yet “lawfull to resist” these undesirable
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 347; Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 479. Erasmus simply
notes that “the reading is ordinatae, not ordinata, so that the latter appears to be a corruption of the
copyists.”
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Cf. Toleti, Commentarii et Annotationes in Epistolam B. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, 649-650.
Tolet’s fourth annotation on chapter 13 focuses specifically on this textual issue. He notes Anselm’s error,
the feminine form in the Greek text, and the theological dangers of a reading that would suggest that
whatsoever comes from God is ordained by God (“Quaecumque autem sunt a Deo, ordinata sunt”).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 582.
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states.85
Concerning those (civil governing) powers that are in fact said to be ordained by
God, Willet maintains an intentionality in God when these magistrates are corrupt, but
denies that God’s “ordaining” of the powers necessarily implies a hierarchy of governing
authority. The standard Roman Catholic explanation of evil rulers, in light of Paul’s
challenging words in Romans 13, was that these tyrannical rulers were not so much
ordained by God as permitted by God to maintain their misused power.86 Revisiting
many of the arguments against the notion of God’s “bare permission” of evil that he had
presented in Romans 1, Willet does not attempt to explain away the universality of the
divine sanction that Paul seems to grant to all civil governors, asserting that God’s will
ordains even corrupt rulers (generally as a punishment—as though to say “you get the
ruler you deserve”).87 Yet while Willet objects to those who so abstracted God’s
ordaining of power as to remove God’s will entirely from the establishment of unfit
85

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 583. Calvin makes a similar point in relation to Romans 13:1
about the lawfulness of resisting those things that come from God as punishments: “powers are from God,
not as pestilence, and famine, and wars, and other visitations for sin, are said to be from him…it is lawful
to repel wars and to seek remedies for other evils…for the punishment which God inflicts on men for their
sins, we cannot properly call ordinations” (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 479)
86

For example, the Rhemish annotations cite Chrysostom’s distinction between power itself as
God’s ordinance and those who abuse their power, who do so only by God’s permission. Following a list of
examples of those who had abused their power, the notes on Romans 13:1 concludes: “al which things God
permitted them, by the abuse of their power to accomplish, but they were out of the compasse of his
causing and ordinance” (Martin, New Testament, 415). As we shall see later (V.2.4), Willet included evil
rulers within the scope of God’s ordination, while attempting to make God “neither an actor nor a permitter
of evill, as it is evill” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 582).
87

Cf. my section on the causality of sin (V.2.4). While the direct context of Paul’s teaching in
Romans 13 involves civil magistrates, the general principles espoused by Willet and many Protestants met
a special challenge when applied to the worldly power wielded by Satan. Willet addresses this issue at a
couple places within the chapter 13 Questions. First he asserts that Satan is called “the Prince of this world”
because he is “Gods minister in the world, and used for the punishment of worldly men.” The power that he
exerts is not his own, but “is graunted unto him.” Later, though, when addressing whether it is lawful to
resist Satan as a ministering power under God, Willet relays Gorrhan’s answer, which seems to separate
God’s intention more distinctly from Satan’s manner of exercising his power (though, presumably, still
without severing entirely God’s permission from the divine will): “the power of Sathan…[is] a power of
permission, not of commission: or rather it is not so much a power which the devill exerciseth, as an abuse
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rulers, he disagrees also with those who took Paul’s words here to mean “that there is an
order and certain degrees in government, some…superiour to others.”88 Rather, God’s
ordaining of powers “hath reference unto Gods institution, not to the distinction and order
of degrees in the powers.” This clarification was occasioned by the thirteenth century
Pope Boniface VIII’s use of this passage to argue for the supremacy of papal over civil
power.89
Willet’s objection to the ordinata reading in Romans 13 highlights one aspect of a
highly nuanced interpretation of God’s ordination and exercise of power. God’s
ordination, as a direct expression of his will, pertains here to his establishment of civil
rulers (even those who rule tyrannically), greatly limiting the sanction for resisting
abused civil power.90 Other undesirable states—war, famine, disease, and the like—are
governed by God’s providence, but not his ordination, making it lawful to resist or
ameliorate these conditions. Last of all, the notion of God’s bare permission, if defined as
distinct from any sort of positive willing, does not free God from responsibility for any
evil that is allowed, but rather implicates him all the more, as One who could have but
of power, and therefore we are to resist him” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 581, 584). The many
distinctions involved serve, if nothing else, to illustrate the challenge of avoiding contradiction in any
attempt to reconcile God’s sovereignty with the problem of evil.
88

This sense of a hierarchical ordering could certainly be implied by the Greek τεταγμέναι. Cf.
Edward Leigh, Critica Sacra In Two Parts…The Second Philological and Theological Observations Upon
All the Greek Words of the New Testament, 4th ed. (London: Abraham Miller and Roger Daniel, 1662), 258
(pt. 2); An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1900), s.v. “τάσσω.” The
notion of ordering the powers, as opposed to merely instating them, is reflected in the text of some Latin
translations, as, for example, a 1564 Latin bible published in Basil: “…quae sunt Potestates, sunt à Deo
ordine distributae” (Biblia Veteris ac Novi Testamenti [Basil: Thomam Guarinum, 1564], 115).
89

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 583. Willet, as we discuss elsewhere, viewed the relationship
between ecclesial and state power not hierarchically, but as a matter of diverse functions (see III.3.4.1).
90

Willet’s allowances for resisting civil power are extremely limited, making it morally acceptable
for a private citizen to defend himself against a king acting illegally in order to protect one’s life, the
chastity of his wife, or the freedom of his children (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 593).
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refused to stop something that was opposed to his will. Each of these positions Willet
opposes to a Roman Catholic doctrine or text, as a means of clarifying and defining what
he takes to be Paul’s true message.

3.2 Vulgate: Translation Issues
On occasion, Willet points out places where the vulgar Latin “well-translateth” a
particular verse;91 even these instances, however, tend to be less a good will
commendation of the Latin translation than an opportunity to demonstrate that a faulty
Roman Catholic interpretation ran afoul of even the preferred Catholic text.92 The great
majority of Willet’s references to the work of translation in the Vulgate are critical of its
rendering of the Greek or Hebrew. Having considered problems stemming primarily from
textual variants, we will now look at some of the more significant theological errors that
Willet argued were drawn from or supported by poor translation of a portion of Romans
into Latin.93
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E.g. Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 75, 352, 481, 540. Cf. Van Kleeck, “Hermeneutics and
Theology in the 17th Century,” 51.
92

Cf. III.2.3, where we discuss Willet’s claim that the Vulgate itself argues against a Roman
Catholic argument for the invocation of saints.
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Some of Willet’s criticisms of Vulgate renderings are more a matter of emphasis than of great
theological misrepresentation. On a few occasions, for instance, Willet objects to the Latin representation
of Greek prefixes. For example, the Vulgate translates ὑπερνικῶμεν in Romans 8:37 with the muted
“superamus.” Where Beza reads “plusquam victores sumus” and most English translations have the
familiar “we are more than conquerors,” the “vulgar Latine readeth onely superamus, wee overcome.”
Since νικᾶν alone means “to conquer/overcome,” Willet reasons, the ὑπερ- prefix must modify the meaning
in some way. While he approves of the sense of overcoming with “great facilitie,” the best meaning, he
argues, speaks to the mindset of those overcoming: “the Saints are not onely not broken and terrified with
their manifold suffrings, but doe also glorie and rejoyce in their tribulation.” (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 386-387). Erasmus, interestingly, accepts the Vulgate’s superamus, but objects strongly to its
rendering of διὰ with the genitive causally as propter (because of) instead of as per (through), on the
grounds that our overcoming “because of” Christ implies an element of our own power effecting the
victory: “if you read ‘because of him,’ you spoil his argument” (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 236237). Similarly—though with less warrant—Willet claims in his translation of Romans 16 that the Greek
συνεργούς in verse 3 should be translated not with “adiutores” (“helpers”), as the Vulgate (and Beza and
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3.2.1 Translating νοῦς: Mind, Understanding, and Will
Of the five instances in Romans where Paul uses a form of the word νοῦς, only
once (7:25) does the Vulgate render it as “mind” (mens); the other four places are
translated as “sense” (sensus)—representing to Willet (and other Greek scholars, as
Erasmus) a confusion of faculty and function, and a narrowing of Paul’s true meaning.94
Commenting on Romans 1:28, where Paul says that God gave the Gentiles up to a
reprobate “νοῦς,” Willet explains that this corrupted mind does not know up from down,
being “voide of all judgement,” and he indicates the wide scope of the Apostle’s
meaning: “the word is νοῦς, which signifieth the verie judgement and understanding,
both theoreticall, and practicall, they erre both in their judgement and conscience.”95 He
illustrates this mental inversion of good and evil with Lyra’s example of a corrupted
sense of taste mistaking sweet for bitter. Sinners are delivered over to a reprobate mind,
Willet argues, “by diverse degrees,” so that the malfunction is “growne into a habit.”
Following Faius, he explains this progression as a movement from a lustful heart to vile
affections, and “last of all to a reprobate sense, to such an evill habit, that they could doe
Erasmus) read, but with “fellow helpers”—a translation only found in the Geneva among sixteenth and
seventeenth century English bibles. In his comments on the verse, Willet states that Paul’s reference to
“fellow helpers” (including lay people—yea, verily—“even a woman”) demonstrates Paul’s humility. But
the same is communicated by the word “helpers” alone (which word already includes the literal sense of
συνεργούς as “fellow workers” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 717, 720).
94

Romans 7:25 is the only place in Romans where νοῦς is juxtaposed with the “flesh,” making
“mind” a far more natural translation than “sense.” The Greek reads: “…ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ
θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας,” which is translated in the Vulgate as: “…ego ipse mente servio legi Dei
carne autem legi peccati.” Similarly, of Paul’s five uses of forms of νοῦς in 1 Corinthians, the two that are
translated as mens in the Vulgate are where νοῦς is juxtaposed with πνεῦμά (“spirit”). The Rheims New
Testament follows the Vulgate, as expected, in each instance in Romans, except for 12:2, where it has
“mind” where the Vulgate has “sensus” (see Martin, New Testament, 412).
95

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 79. Erasmus similarly argues for translating νοῦν as mentem
instead of sensum, though his explanation does not broach the theological implications of each term: “The
word here is not αἴσθησις ‘sense,’ such as seeing and hearing, but νοῦς, that is, ‘mind” (Erasmus,
Annotations on Romans, 59-60).
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nothing but evill.” So even if the Latin “reprobate sense” represents an aspect—perhaps
even the highest and most depraved level—of the mind’s reprobation, it is still an
unacceptable limitation of the full scope of Paul’s meaning. He concludes his discussion
of this question by reiterating the breadth of the reprobate mind’s depravity. Drawing on
Tolet’s distinction, Willet explains that the mind in this condition can err in two different
ways—either in its judgment of right and wrong, or in the affections moving one to act in
a way that “the judgement condemneth.”96 His conception of the “mind” thus comprises
both the judgment and the affections, and he understands sin to infect both the intellect
and the will.97
Willet again addresses the Vulgate’s mistranslation of νοῦς in Romans 12:2, and
there he explains the attendant theological problems more explicitly. There Paul writes of
our transformation “by the newness of the mind (νοός).” This qualification distinguishes
this particular transformation, Willet notes, from that of the body, though the same
renewal is alternately referred to elsewhere in Romans as a newness of life (6:4; from the
effect) or of spirit (7:6; from its author).98 While he again objects to the Vulgate’s
translation as “sense”—a function of the mind—he warns also of an overly physical
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 79.
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While Willet tends to take νοῦς as comprising both the mind’s judgment and its affections, he is
careful to distinguish between and is particular about sin’s effect on each faculty. He rejects, for instance,
Melanchthon’s suggestion that the adjective ἄκακος in Romans 16:18 describes those who are “weake in
their affections.” These easily-deceived people are “weake rather in judgement, then affection.” His larger
issue with this term, however, is against the Vulgate’s translating it to mean “innocent.” Were these people
truly “innocent,” they would not so easily be deceived by divisive hypocrites. They are said, thus, to be
“simple,” “not as innocent, for they are laden with sinnes, but as ignorant” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes,
730).
98

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 539. The reference to newness of mind, he adds, is with respect
to “the subject and place.” Willet thus describes Paul’s varying terminology for this newness using the
logic of multiple causality: the “newness of the Spirit” refers to its efficient cause, the “newness of life” to
its final, and the “newness of mind” to the material and formal causes. Cf. chapter 4, which details Willet’s
(more explicit) use of explanation though multiple causality.
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reading, which (presumably) would treat the “mind” as merely an aspect of the body. The
mind is renewed not in the “substance thereof, but onely in the condition and qualitie.”99
Its “substance” excepted, though, here again Willet takes “mind” comprehensively and
disputes interpretations that would unduly limit its reference. Haymo, who had followed
Origen in taking “mind” to mean only the understanding, is “too particular: by the minde
rather is understood all the faculties of the soule, the intellectuall part, and the will, where
this renovation must take beginning.” Gorrhan follows the Vulgate’s rendering and
narrows the scope in a different direction.100 Taking “newness of sense” as a call to
reform one’s affections, his reading supports a widespread reductionistic understanding
of the basis of and damage wrought by sin: “and hereupon that common error was
grounded, that sin had the seat & place in the affections, whereas the very mind hath need
to be renued.”101 Gorrhan’s reading of “affections” from “sense” might seem odd, but as
James M. Estes notes in his annotations to Erasmus’s letters, “Both sensus and affectus
can refer to mental as well as emotional states, so the meaning ranges from ‘thought,’
idea,’ to ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions.’”102
Willet’s criticisms of the interpretations of Haymo and Gorrhan reveal several
99

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 539.
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Despite his disapproval of Gorrhan’s reliance on the Vulgate translation here, Willet earlier on
the same page cites positively Gorrhan’s pithy summary of the pattern of human sin and redemption—in
which we are formed, deformed, reformed, informed, conformed, and transformed—showing again how
Willet can find both fault and value in a source, even within the interpretation of a single verse (Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 539).
101
102

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 539-540.

Estes’s note was occasioned by Erasmus’s comment in a 1530 letter to Pieter Gillis in which he
explains his preference for sensus or affectus as a Latin rendering of φρόνημα in Romans 8:27 (instead of
the Vulgate’s desiderit/“desires”)—a choice criticized by Lefèvre as unworthy words to use of the Spirit,
being rather “appropriate to the flesh—coarse, physical words for the coarse and lowest part of ourselves”
(The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 2204 to 2356, August 1529-July 1530, trans. Alexander Dalzell,
vol. 16 of Collected Works of Erasmus [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015], 152n34, 152-153).
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interesting aspects of his understanding of the mind, sin, and redemption. First, where the
traditional Aristotelian “faculty psychology” (to which many Protestants, as Calvin,
adhered) conceived of the mind and the heart as the two faculties of the soul—with the
intellect belonging to the mind and the will and affections to the heart103—Willet extends
the meaning of “mind” here as to make it virtually synonymous with the “soul”; the
“mind” in Romans 12:2, he argues, is the overarching entity that includes both the
intellect and the will.104 Secondly, Willet gives a certain priority to the will in the process
of redemption by identifying it as the place “where this renovation must take beginning.”
We must hold this assertion together, however, with his statement in the Controversies
section of chapter 12 that appears to give priority to the understanding: “if he perceive
not, nor knowe them, hee cannot choose to doe them: for there is nothing in the election
of the will, which is not first in the conception of the understanding.”105 The resolution to
this apparent contradiction most likely mirrors that of a similar tension in Calvin. Muller
argues that Calvin gives a temporal priority to the understanding (in that the will does not
blindly flail at its object), but a causal priority to the will (in that mere comprehension of
103

Richard A. Muller, “Fides and Cognitio in Relation to the Problem of the Intellect and Will in
the Theology of John Calvin,” Calvin Theological Journal 25, no. 2 (Nov. 1990): 212, 219.
104

Assessing similarities and differences between different conceptions of these faculties is
complicated by a certain fluidity in the use of these terms. For instance, Calvin acknowledged that the
“heart,” as used in Scripture, could also include the mind, and, “as Stuermann suggested, ‘heart’ is
frequently used by Calvin as a synonym for ‘soul,’ but also, particularly when juxtaposed with ‘mind’
(mens), the term refers to ‘the seat of the emotions’ or ‘the whole range of human affections,’ or indeed, the
faculty that reaches out toward known objects, which is to say, the will” (Muller, “Fides and Cognitio,”
218, 217). In Willet’s own usage in the Romans hexapla, too, we see some terminological flexibility due to
his affinity for synecdoche (cf. III.3.1): the “mind” can, by synecdoche, represent “all the regenerate part
both in the mind and body” (p. 334); similarly, the “body” can by synecdoche stand for the “whole man
both bodie and soule” (p. 536); and, for good measure, the “soul” can represent a human being holistically,
including the body (p. 578). Thus, given Willet’s wide-ranging use of these terms, and since Calvin can
occasionally take the “heart” to be synonymous with the soul, the affections, or the will, then we must be
careful not to assume too great a difference between his and Willet’s understanding of these faculties
simply from Willet’s making “mind” synonymous with “soul.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 570.
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Christ’s work is not of itself salvific).106 This appears to be Willet’s intent, as well,
especially given his context of attempting to refute the Roman Catholic conception of
faith (as Willet presents it) as either a mindless assent to Church dogma or as an
academic mental exercise. Here we see a high level of congruity between Calvin’s and
Willet’s understandings of faith, in that each viewed it as an activity of the entire human
being (however the constituent parts of a person’s soul might be arranged).107 And
thirdly, Willet seeks to correct the “common error” of thinking that sin is rooted merely
in the affections, rather than in the “very mind.” On this point too, though, there is some
ambiguity in his terminology. As we have seen, in the context of Romans 1:28 Willet
claimed that the errant affections that are drawn to that which the intellect knows to be
wrong are an aspect of the mind’s reprobation. In his discussion of Paul’s chapter 7
meditation on sin, Willet maintained that “the will bringeth forth sinne, and that
belongeth to the rationall part; the bodie doth but execute the edict of the reason and
will.”108 Taken together, Willet’s meaning is clear: the seat of sin is not in the flesh, but
deeper, more centrally, in the mind (and principally in the will). His meaning, however, is
somewhat obscured by the different ways that he writes of the “affections”: associating
them with the activity of the will in 1:28 (as Calvin often would do),109 and suggesting
their connection with the flesh in 12:2; if one were to claim that the seat of sin was “the
affections”—defined as the will—then Willet would have no reason to object.
Just as sin infects and redemption renews both the will and the understanding, so
106

Muller, “Fides and Cognitio,” 221.
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Cf. Muller, “Fides and Cognitio,” 220.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 329.
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Cf. Muller, “Fides and Cognitio,” 217, 220.
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Willet insists that faith intimately involves each faculty.110 He presents this argument
frequently against Bellarmine’s articulation of the nature of justifying faith as stated in
book one of De Justificatione (in volume 4 of Disputationes), selectively quoting
Bellarmine to make the Roman Catholic position appear self-contradictory. In the context
of Romans 10:10, Willet, citing Bellarmine’s sixth chapter, claims that “the Romanists
(as namely Bellarmine) doe affirme, that faith onely hath the seate in the intellectuall
part…and so they hold faith to be an act onely of the understanding.”111 Then,
commenting on Romans 14:2 and citing Bellarmine’s fifth chapter, Willet states his view
as being the exact opposite: “Bellarmine… will have faith to be…an assenting onely of
the will, not a knowledge… and therefore [Roman Catholics] say to beleeve is nothing
else but to give assent unto the doctrine of the Church,112 although one understand not
what it is.”113 Bellarmine thus, as Willet presents him, teaches a doctrine of justifying
faith that is at once “an act onely of the understanding” and “an assenting onely of the
will,” without any understanding, leading him in Synopsis Papismi to accuse Bellarmine
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Cf. Pitkins’s description of Calvin’s understanding of “faith as knowledge” impacting the entire
person holistically, and not the intellectual part alone (Pitkin, What Pure Eyes Could See, 23).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 479. Willet also references here the Rhemish annotation on 2
Corinthians 13 (verse 5), which states that we cannot know that we are in a state of grace, but that we can
know that we have faith, “because it is an act of the understanding” (Martin, New Testament, 493).
112

There is a fairly striking parallel between Willet’s unfair depiction of Bellarmine’s view of
faith and the unfair depiction of the Protestant scholastic view of faith given by Rogers and McKim. They
argue that “Scholasticism defined faith first as an act of assent by the mind to the deposit of truths in
Scripture and only secondarily as a relationship of personal trust in Christ wrought by the Holy Spirit”
(Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical
Approach [New York: Harper & Row, 1979], 186). The two accusations differ primarily in the object of
the assent, whether church dogma or scriptural doctrine. Willet’s arguments here and elsewhere reflect an
approach that bears no resemblance to the Rogers-McKim caricature.
113

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 659. Cf. Willet’s interpretation in Synopsis Papismi of
Bellarmine’s words: “Bellarmine saith, fidem non esse notitiam, sed assensum, that faith is no knowledge,
but a bare assent of the minde, without knowledge or understanding of that whereunto it assenteth” (Willet,
Synopsis Papismi [1600], 873). We will look at the context of Bellarmine’s statement below.
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of inconsistent thought (“Bellarmine forgetteth his owne argument used before”) and
Roman Catholics of destroying both the affective/volitional and the intellectual aspects of
faith: “As before they spoyled faith of the better part thereof, which is a stable and
certaine perswasion of the heart: so now also they rob it of the other part, which is an
evidence and light of spiritual knowledge.”114
Willet’s representation of the Cardinal’s teaching on faith is not entirely fair,
however, and he seems to use Bellarmine’s isolated comments here primarily as a foil for
framing his own emphases.115 Given the mystery of faith and human epistemic limits,
Bellarmine posits two different kinds of knowing—a basic apprehension (apprehensio)
that precedes faith, and a fuller understanding (intellectus) that emerges from faith, in the
classic Anselmian “faith seeking understanding” fashion.116 Thus, for Willet to claim that
Bellarmine divorces faith entirely from understanding is inaccurate. Bellarmine cites with
approval Augustine’s definition of faith as thinking with assent: “credere, nihil esse
aliud, nisi cum assensu cogitare.” Indeed, part of faith’s superiority to knowledge is that
one can have knowledge without belief, but belief always entails knowledge (“multi
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Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), 873, 874.
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In taking Bellarmine’s statements out of context, Willet makes himself guilty of the same
accusation he had levied against Richard Broughton in the “Further Advertisments to the Reader” prefixed
to Loidoromastix in 1607: “Such depraving and wresting of sentences, sheweth a badde cause, and a worse
mind in those that use such beggerly shifts” (Willet, Loidoromastix, sig.¶¶¶¶¶2v). Surely it is easier to
recognize such “beggerly shifts” when the target is one’s own work.
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Robert Bellarmine, Disputationum…de Controversiis Christianae Fidei, vol. 4 (Ingolstadt:
Adam Sartorius, 1601), 948. Mere apprehension, he writes, is not the same as, but precedes faith:
“apprehensio non est fides, sed aliquid fidam praecendens.” And, drawing on Augustine’s disciple Saint
Prosper, he puts understanding after faith: “ex fide intellectus existat…fides intellectum praecedit.” For
more on Bellarmine’s understanding of justification, see John A. Peltz, “Fides Justificans According to
Saint Robert Bellarmine” (master’s thesis, Marquette University, 1969).
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cogitant, qui non credunt…sed nullus credit, qui non cogitet”).117 The better part of faith,
according to Bellarmine, is not the mind’s basic understanding, but the assent that
follows.118 While this is not, as Willet claims, a “bare assent,” the intellect is not capable
in spiritual matters of attaining the level of clarity that it normally requires in order to
assent. Fortunately, faith does not need this normal level of clarity119 because it is able to
bypass what would otherwise be an impossibility by making the intellect assent to truths
that it does not (fully) understand (“quod intellectum faciat iis assentiri, quae non
intelligit”).120 This is why Bellarmine contrasts faith with knowledge and states,
somewhat provocatively, that faith is determined more by ignorance than by knowledge
(“melius per ignorantiam, quam per notitiam definitur”).121 Protestants also, of course,
acknowledged that faith transcended human understanding. So neither Protestants nor
Catholics made understanding the basis of faith—the disagreement centered on what in
fact was. For Bellarmine, assent was the core of faith, while for Calvin, for instance—
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Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 946. There is a certain parallel between Willet’s claim that
Bellarmine makes faith to be merely an assent (independent of knowledge) and the Roman Catholic charge
of the Protestant doctrine of justification making it merely a “legal fiction” that does nothing to transform
the believer. Bellarmine explicitly says that belief cannot exist without knowledge (even if the deeper
understanding follows faith), just as Willet and others on the Protestant side affirmed that justification
could not exist without good works and a sanctified life (which follow upon and in no way cause the
justification). Cf. my section V.2.
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Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 947 (“Fidem justificantem non tam esse notitiam, quàm
assensum”).
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Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 948 (“distincta autem & perspicua non necessariò
requiritur ad fidé”).
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Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 941. Adapting Paul’s words in 2 Corinthians 10:5, faith
captures the intellect and makes it believe what it does not understand (“B. Paulus per fidem dicit,
intellectum captivum duci in obsequium Christi, quia cogitur credere, quod non intelligit,” p. 945). To be
fair to Willet’s critique of Bellarmine, there is a kind of circularity to the idea that faith is thinking with
assent and that which drives the intellect to assent.
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Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 949.
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according to Leith—faith was “more in certainty than in comprehension.”122
Willet also misrepresents Bellarmine in stating that he makes faith “an assenting
onely of the will,” whereas Bellarmine considers assensus to be an activity not of the
will, but of the intellect (“quod intellectu, faciat iis assentiri”). Willet’s insertion of the
will into his portrayal of Bellarmine’s doctrine of faith heightens the perceived
inconsistency in Bellarmine’s thought, but also reveals one of the true differences
between Willet’s and Bellarmine’s understandings of justifying faith. While Willet’s
charge that Bellarmine makes faith a blind and “bare assent of the minde, without
knowledge or understanding of that whereunto it assenteth” twists Bellarmine’s meaning,
his assertion that Bellarmine’s faith “onely hath the seate in the intellectual part” is
accurate. Bellarmine places faith, even—and especially—in its assenting function, solely
in the intellect.123 Faith’s home in the intellect alone gives it a surer footing: “To
believe,” he explains, “cannot for any reason be distorted to confidence (fiduciam). For
we are not confident that God exists, but we declare it with certainty and we assent to
it.”124 Notice that both Roman Catholics and Protestants were concerned with protecting
the certainty of faith; the nature of that faith, however, was understood differently.
Whereas Willet and the Reformed wrote of faith as confirming the certainty of our good
estate with God, here Bellarmine affirms the certainty of faith as propositional beliefs
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Cited in Muller, “Fides and Cognitio,” 209. Cf. Pitkin, What Pure Eyes Could See, 29; Muller,
Fides and Cognitio,” 217.
123

“Faith is not confidence/trust (fiducia),” he writes, “but something pertaining to the intellect”;
again, “faith is a matter of the intellect and, as a result, in no way pertains to trust, which is a matter of the
will”; and he adds as an exegetical note on Romans 4:21, “the Greek πληροφωρηθεὶς properly means
‘having been completely convinced’ or ‘having certainty’ each of which pertains to the intellect”
(Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 942, 946, 944).
124

Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 942 (“neq; potest ulla ratione ipsum credere, detorqueri ad
fiduciam. Non enim confidimus Deus esse, sed certo indicamus & assentimur.”).

95

about God. Fiducia connotes to Bellarmine something less than full certainty—so to
bring the will, with its fiducial function, into the concept of faith impinges upon the
certainty of what we believe. His absolute statement, though, that faith “in no way
pertains” (“nullo modo pertinere”) to fiduciam, is meant more to distinguish the two than
to remove all causal connection between them, as he affirms that this confidence arises
from faith: “fiducia ex fide quidem oritur, sed non potest idem esse cum fide.”125 Still,
while many Protestants considered this “trust in the promises of God”126 to be of the very
essence of justifying faith, Bellarmine considered moving this effect of faith into its
definition to be a dangerous subjectivization of faith’s foundation.127
Calvin, interestingly, had made a similar move between his first and second
editions of the Institutes, adjusting his definition of fides away from fiducia and towards
cognitio. As Barbara Pitkin argues, by 1539 Calvin “will not equate fiducia and fides. In
this verse [“Perquem habemus audaciam, et aditum in fiducia, per fidem eius,” Eph.
3:12],128 confidence is derived from faith; the link between the two is so close that Calvin
acknowledges that ‘the word faith is often used for fiducia.’”129 While the two concepts
125

Bellarmine, Disputationum, vol. 4, 945. Bellarmine treats fiducia as more a function of hope
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remained intimately linked (so that “faith inevitably leads to fiducia”), in Calvin’s
developing theology, faith was “no longer synonymous with trust.”130 Certainly
differences remain between Calvin’s and Bellarmine’s conceptions of faith—including
fiducia retaining a more central position within Calvin’s notion of fides—but the
comparison serves to show that Calvin, too, had distinguished between fides and fiducia,
and in a manner not radically different from Bellarmine’s distinction.
Willet himself distinguishes between a general and a special faith, the second of
which is salvific. He writes:
There is a generall faith, as to beleeve the word of God, and the heavenly doctrine
therein contained, unto the which three things are required, a knowledge, and
assenting, and a full perswasion…There is a speciall and particular faith, which is
an assurance of remission of sinnes in Christ, which is that which we call
justifying faith: and beside those three things before concurring in a generall faith,
there is required in justifying faith confidence beside and firme assurance,
contrary whereunto is diffidence and distrust.131
Bellarmine’s conception of faith, then, corresponds to what Willet terms “general faith,”
and the fiducial element of having a “firm assurance” of forgiveness of sins in Christ,
while not exhaustively encompassing the fullness of faith’s essence, is the distinguishing
factor that for Willet characterizes a salvific, justifying faith.132
The Vulgate’s erroneous translation of νοϊ as “(in the) sense” in Romans 14:5
combines with the poor translation of πληροφορείσθω in the same verse as “abound,”
instead of as “be persuaded,” to falsely suggest a relativity to Christian truth. Whereas
Paul is here writing of a kind of confidence in which believers are “persuaded in their
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own minds,” the Vulgate’s wording teaches that all should “abound in their own sense”—
a reading taken by “the Libertines” to mean that “every man should be left unto himself
for the choice of his religion.”133 Willet is careful not to say that this is the Roman
Catholic teaching, but that certain “Libertines” had taken the misleading Vulgate
translation to mean this; he thereby shields himself from the accusation in the annotations
to the Rheims New Testament of Protestants twisting this Catholic teaching.134
The abound/sense reading, Willet notes, had led to myriad misinterpretations,
from Jerome’s and Hugo’s emphasis on one’s intentions in acts of worship (so that the
particulars of your obedience matter less than your performing these deeds with your
heart abounding “in faith”), to Haymo’s exhortation that we also “abound in good
works,” which application is derived from a word not found in the original.135 Even if
applied not to matters of great doctrinal moment but only to adiaphora (as implied by the
Rhemist annotations), the injunction for each to “abound in his own sense” cannot but
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lead to “horrible confusion.”136 The more accurate translation makes clear that Paul is not
referring to the human mind as the active agent effecting the certainty of faith (as implied
by “sense”), but as the location where that persuasion—defined and effected by God’s
word—takes place: “Wherefore the meaning is, that everie one should be fully perswaded
in his owne mind, that that which he doth…be not against the word of God.”137

3.2.2 The Goodness of the Law in Romans 5:20
Many of Willet’s references to the Law in the Romans hexapla are critical of
those who attribute to it too much power in effecting salvation—a Pharisaic legalism that
he associates with Pelagius and many strains of modern Roman Catholicism.138 He was,
however, no antinomian, and like many Reformed he distinguished between Law and
gospel (with the Law, when properly used, serving the gospel’s ends), but without pitting
them in absolute opposition.139 We see this aspect of Willet’s view of the Law in his
defense of its inherent goodness in Romans 5:20, against Marcion, the Manichees, and
the negative sense implied by the Vulgate translation.140 Much of the disagreement over
136
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the interpretation of verse 5:20 is tied to varied understandings of the prefix παρ(α)- in
παρεισῆλθεν, which word Willet translates as “entred thereupon”: “Moreover, the law
entred thereupon, that the offence should encrease.”141 Given the inherently challenging
nature of this verse—with its apparent implication of the Law as sin’s willing accomplice
(Marcion, unsurprisingly, seized upon this verse to impugn the Law)142—the manner of
the Law’s entry is significant for parsing how exactly it functions in Paul’s argument.
The Vulgate’s “subintravit,” to Willet, connoted too furtive an entrance, almost in the
sense of criminal trespassing: “it entred in by the way: as though it had entred in
secretly.” This characterization of the Law as a kind of stealthy stowaway played into the
hands of the Law’s denigrators. Those who affirmed the Law’s goodness, too, were led
astray in their interpretations when they took this verse to speak of a secret entry
(whether deriving that interpretation from the Vulgate or elsewhere). Gorrhan referred the
aspect of secrecy to the Law’s being given to a single race deep in the desert, and
Chrysostom and Tolet each took the Law’s merely slipping in “to shew that the use
thereof was but for a time” (whereas, Willet rebuts, that was true only of the ceremonial
law, and not of the “perpetuall use” of the law revealing sin).143 Willet seeks to correct
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these misreadings, explaining that the Law was not the proper cause of sin’s increase, but
that “sinne entred occasionaliter, by occasion only of the law,” and reading the prefixed
παρ(α)- not with any negative connotation, but simply to mean “beside,” so as to read
Paul as saying that the Law was given “beside that naturall corruption and deprivation of
nature in Adam…it came upon, or was added unto that naturall disease.”144
Erasmus—whose manuscript and translation work often helps establish the basis
for Willet’s text-based arguments—actually disapproves of the Vulgate’s rendering of
παρεισῆλθεν in 5:20 in the opposite direction of Willet, claiming that the Latin does not
sufficiently convey the negative sense of the Greek term. Reading the Vulgate’s lex
autem subintravit as a simple, neutral entrance (“the Law, however, entered in”), he
proposes the more clandestine alternative “ceterum lex obiter subiit (‘but the Law stole in
by the way’),” justifying this choice by commenting on the Greek compound:
“παρεισῆλθεν, that is to say, ‘crept in by the way’—because of the Greek preposition,
which is added usually with a derogatory sense.”145
In the Question following his discussion of this translation issue, as well as in his
treatment of this verse in the Doctrines, Controversies, and Moral Uses sections, Willet
continues to emphasize the Law’s goodness and stresses God’s intentionality even in its
function of revealing and magnifying sin. Having made his case for the Law’s having
come in not subversively but “beside” sin, Willet proceeds to explain three ways in which
the Law can be considered: according to its nature (in itself “holy, spirituall, and good”),
its recipients, and its author. The latter two perspectives reveal the (properly) causal
144
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connection between the Law and sin’s increase, as expressed in verse 5:20. Regarding the
Law’s impact on human hearts, “this particle ἱνα, that, may be [taken] causally, because
by the law properly sinne is manifested, and revealed.” Likewise, “in respect of [God’s]
counsell the lawe may be understood causally to encrease sinne, in regard of a further
ende” (i.e. the increase of grace).146 Willet affirms God’s causality in this verse more so
than, for example, Chrysostom, who had argued:
the particle ‘that’ again does not assign the cause, but the result. For the purpose
of its being given was not ‘in order that’ it might abound, for it was given to
diminish and destroy the offence. But it resulted the opposite way, not owing to
the nature of the Law, but owing to the listlessness of those who received it.147
Chrysostom, like Willet, emphasizes the inherent goodness of the Law, but is more wary
of connecting God causally to the “increase” of sin.148 Willet emphasizes God’s direction
also in the Moral Observations, where he comments that God sometimes “seemeth to
leave his children to themselves” in their sin, that they might better comprehend grace.149
God’s good intention in using the Law to expose the depth of human sinfulness is masked
when the Latin translation suggests that this function is somehow incidental, or apart
from God’s willing.150
In the Doctrines section Willet distinguishes between the Law’s “proper” and its
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“more principall” end: “the proper use of the lawe” is to reveal sin, “but we must not rest
in this use of the law, there is a second and more principall end”—that of grace
abounding all the more.151 So while others (as Chrysostom and Thomas Wilson)
considered the Law’s increasing and exposing of sin to be an improper end, to Willet this
was its proper (if not its principal) purpose.152 When he comes to the Controversies
section, Willet emphasizes a middle course between Pelagian and Manichean heretics,
“the one giving too much, the other too little to the law.” He continues his defense of the
Law’s goodness against the first group, who used “these and such like places, against the
law, as though it were evill,” noting that Paul himself will just two chapters later (7:12)
affirm that of itself the Law is holy. The Manicheans, Willet explains, failed to
151
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distinguish between the Law’s proper effects and those that it manifested through human
weakness.153 To the other extreme, the Pelagians attributed too much to the Law, “for
they held that the law was sufficient to salvation,” making sin merely an affliction of the
understanding and neglecting its impact on the will. Willet considered the Pelagian
perspective, as we shall consider in depth in chapter 6, to be a precursor to a virulent
strain of Roman Catholic legalism: “the Popish schoolemen differed not
much from this opinion.”154

3.2.3 Other Misleading Vulgate Renderings
We conclude this section on misleading Vulgate translations with a further
sampling of errors of some theological weight that Willet addresses. As we saw in the
previous section on textual variants, Willet was concerned that several faulty renderings
in the Vulgate could undermine God’s gift of certainty and assurance. This concern is
apparent also in its errors of translation. In 8:18 the Apostle Paul declares in hope: “For I
count (λογίζομαι) that the afflictions of this present time, are not answerable to the glorie
which shall be revealed unto us.” Following Erasmus’s lead,155 Willet rejects the
Vulgate’s existimo (which Willet translates as “I think”),156 taking it to represent a lower
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Erasmus, whom Willet cites positively here, elaborates on this translation issue more
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degree of certainty than “count.” The Greek, however, “signifieth not an opinion, which
is uncertaine, but a due value and estimation of the thing.”157 Paul’s confidence in the allsurpassing splendor of the coming age demands a verb stronger than “to think.” The
Apostle’s assurance of his own salvation is similarly weakened, in Willet’s judgment, by
the Vulgate’s “not so fit” translation of ταλαίπωπος in 7:24 as “unhappy” (infelix). For
Paul to consider himself infelix in his battle against sin, Willet reasons, would
communicate a tone of despair, as though doubting whether anyone could in fact rescue
him from his body of death. But Paul’s exclamation is not a cry of despair, but an
expression of hope and desire; it is the cry of one “wearied with continuall combates,”
who has labored valiantly “like a champion,” but who needs assistance to defeat a foe in
the course of a lengthy battle. Willet thus renders ταλαίπωπος not as “unhappy,” but as
“wretched,” the better to communicate that Paul’s anguish stems not from doubt, but
from “the greatnesse of this combate.”158
In his discussion in the chapter 8 Questions section of “how the wisdome of the
flesh, is enmitie against God,” Willet (following Faius) explains how translating ἔχθρα
with the concrete “enemy” instead of the abstract “enmity” fails to express the radical
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 332. Erasmus translates ταλαίπωπος as “miser,” though
without commenting in his annotations on his reasons for diverging from the Vulgate. Beza similarly reads
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question does not imply doubt: “But he asks not by whom he was to be delivered, as one in doubt, like
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nature of the flesh’s opposition to God.159 The wisdom of the flesh, writes Willet, “the
Apostle saith, is enmitie, not an enemie, as the Latin readeth.”160 After presenting a
grammatical analysis similar to Erasmus’s (the word is feminine, whereas “enemy” here
would be in the neuter, and the accent is on the first syllable, making the word a noun and
not an adjective)161 and denying that Paul is by metalepsis taking the “substantive for the
adjective,”162 Willet arrives at his central theological point: flesh and spirit are divided by
“irreconciliable enmitie.” Enemies may be reconciled (as were Esau and Jacob, Willet
reminds us), but enmity is—by definition—always in opposition; an enemy may become
a friend, but enmity cannot become friendship without fundamentally twisting the
language. In establishing an eternal, irreconcilable enmity between flesh and spirit,
however, Willet needs to clarify in the following Question what Paul means by “flesh,”
lest his interpretation suggest a Gnostic dualism. “Neither with the Manichees,” Willet
clarifies, “must we understand the substance of the flesh.” Paul is not suggesting that the
159
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physical and spiritual realms are eternally and necessarily at war, but is by “flesh”
referring only to the “pravitie and corruption of the flesh,” and indeed, more broadly, “of
our nature.”163
While Romans 13 has traditionally served as the locus for discussions of resisting
corrupt power—and indeed it is there that Willet’s restrained allowances for self-defense
have led him to be categorized among (moderate) resistance theorists, and where Pareus’s
somewhat stronger resistance theory created a stir in England164—already in chapter 12
Willet broaches the issue of self-defense. Commenting on “how we should not avenge
our selves, but leave it unto God,” he notes that the Vulgate translates ἐκδικοῦντες in
12:19 as “defendentes, defending…which is better translated, vindicantes, avenging, as
Chrysostomes interpreter; or ulciscentes, taking revenge, as Origens interpreter.”165 The
Vulgate’s prohibition of all “defense,” Willet holds, is too broad, as it rules out the
possibility even of legitimate self-preservation: “defence is somtime just, but all revenge
is very unjust.”166
Pererius, Willet observes, seeks to defend the Vulgate’s “defendentes,” not by
approving the meaning carried by the word’s basic sense, but by seeking to show that
defendere has been used before to mean ulcisci. In response, Willet concedes some
degree of potential overlap between the two words, but denies that they can be used

163

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 355.

164

Cf. Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, 10-11.
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The Rheims New Testament here diverges from the Latin to read “Not revenging yourselves”
(Martin, New Testament, 413).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 563. Willet mentions that this was also the opinion of Tolet.
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interchangeably.167 Others, as Haymo, have read the Vulgate’s injunction against
“defending” oneself in the more natural sense of the word, taking Paul to mean that
Christians facing persecution should follow the example of Christ keeping silent before
Pilate. Willet (seeming to assume a one-to-one correlation between Greek and Latin
words) takes this opportunity to criticize a perceived inconsistency in the Vulgate’s
translation method, since it renders both ἐκδικοῦντες and ἀπολογία (the word Paul uses to
describe his own “defense” in 2 Timothy 4:16) with the same Latin word.168 Nor does
Christ’s command in the Sermon on the Mount to “turn the other cheek” support this
reading. Christ’s words there, Willet writes (in agreement with Augustine’s
interpretation) “must not be understood according to the strict letter,” but rather should be
taken as referring to one’s state of mind—Christians ought to be “armed with patience to
suffer wrong.” To defend oneself, especially by seeking the magistrate’s protection, is not
prohibited so long as this comes not from a desire for revenge (as Paul in Acts 23 sought
only protection for himself, and not punishment for those pursuing him).169 To seek the
magistrate’s aid “with a malevolent minde” is (as Calvin also teaches) no better than
seeking vengeance directly. Likewise, to “give place unto [God’s] wrath” does not mean
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Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 563-564: “…neither doth the Latin interpreter keepe the propertie
of the word, who els-where translateth another Greeke word ἀπολογία, defence, 2.Tim.4.16.”
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The Vulgate’s wording, which suggests that we should be passive when in danger and leave
our defense in God’s hands, also calls to mind Moses’s experience in Exodus 14:14-15, when he tells the
people to stand firm because God will fight for them, and God responds by telling them to move forward
through the Red Sea. In his Moral Observations on this event in his Exodus hexapla, Willet writes: “As
prayer is necessarie and faithfull invocation, so also from prayer we must go forward unto action: we must
so depend upon God by prayer for his protection, as that we must also carefully use the meanes, which God
hath appointed for our preservation” (Willet, Hexapla on Exodus, 208). While Willet does not make this
connection in the context of the Romans hexapla, focusing instead on the distinction between defense
(sometimes acceptable) and revenge (never acceptable), he is clearly opposed to the kind of “pious
passivity” that the Vulgate’s wording could promote.
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that we can desire for God to do our dirty work and inflict vengeance upon our enemies
in our stead. We are to pray earnestly for our enemies’ conversion and then “leave them
to Gods justice.”170
In the opening verse of Romans 14, as Paul transitions to addressing dietary laws
and the weak and strong in faith, he warns against engaging in διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν,
which Willet translates as “controversies of disputation.” The Roman Catholic
translations, Willet argues, err by internalizing what Paul clearly describes as external
disputes: “The vulgar Latine readeth, as the Rhemists also translate, not in disputations of
cogitations: but the word is διαλογισμῶν, which signifieth not cogitations, but
disputations.”171 Willet includes Erasmus (who translates the phrase “ad diiudicationes
disceptationum”) among those who have read the verse as referring to inward thoughts
(“Erasmus readeth, ad diiudicationes, &c. for the judging of the thoughts”),172 even
though in his annotations Erasmus explicitly states that Paul is not referring to
thoughts.173 Willet’s confusion here likely comes from the similarity between the two
Greek words διακρίσεις and διαλογισμῶν.174 Since Erasmus translates διαλογισμῶν with
the same word that the Vulgate uses to translate διακρίσεις, Willet seems to attach to
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 564-565.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 626. Cf. Beza’s “certamina disputationum.”
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 367: “I find it strange that the Translator preferred to say ‘of
thoughts’ rather than ‘of disputes.’ Perhaps he did not read διαλογισμῶν but λογισμῶν.”
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Littleton’s Latin dictionary (1678), for example, defines discepto—the lexical verbal form of
the word Erasmus uses for διαλογισμῶν—as “to debate, reason, or dispute, to judge of a thing, to try a
cause” and gives διακρίνομαι (a different form of διακρίσεις) as a Greek equivalent. It defines dijudicatio
(falsely as a verb) as “to judge between two, to discern” and gives διάκρισις as a Greek equivalent. Thus,
according to Littleton, both of the Latin words that Erasmus uses to translate διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν are
acceptable equivalents for the first Greek word alone.
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Erasmus the Vulgate’s “cogitationum” as well, even though he does not use this word.
Paul is referring not to the judging of thoughts, Willet (as Erasmus) maintains, but to
unedifying outward disputes. Willet adds, though, that not all disputes are unedifying.
Some debate and discussion is necessary—it is only the “vaine janglings and brabbles
which breed contention” that Paul forbids.175

4. The Problem of Septuagint Variants
While Willet could attribute most textual variants and translation issues in the
Vulgate to human error in composition or transmission, the Apostle Paul’s regular use of
the Septuagint in places where it diverged from the Hebrew reading (and especially in
cases where it agreed with the Vulgate’s rendering) presented original language
apologists with a special challenge.176 Protestants insisting that discrepancies between the
Hebrew text and the Septuagint represented human translation errors thus faced, in
175

Paul’s warning, thus, does not support the opinion of the “Mahumetanes [Muslims], which can
indure no disputations at all” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 626-627).
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E. Earle Ellis noted in 1957 that “the priority of the LXX in Pauline quotations has long been
recognised. As early a writer as Henry Owen noted the fact and ascribed it to the desire of early Christian
missionaries to use a translation acceptable to Hellenistic Jews.” Ellis’s acknowledgment of the long
history of recognizing Paul’s preference for the LXX is correct, though he could have extended the history
well before Owens’s 1789 work. By Ellis’s count, Paul cited the Old Testament 93 times in his letters, of
which 51 are “in absolute or virtual agreement with the LXX, twenty-two of these at variance with the
Hebrew.” Four passages take the Hebrew over the LXX, and 38 diverge from both (E. Earle Ellis, Paul’s
Use of the Old Testament [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957], 11-12). D. Moody Smith’s tally varies
slightly from Ellis’s, listing 106 citations. Smith adds that “the exact count may vary slightly [since] only
when there is an introductory formula can one be absolutely certain that Paul intends to quote the OT and is
not simply falling into its language. The Epistle to the Romans, in Smith’s table, accounts for 55 of Paul’s
Old Testament citations; 36 of these he labels as following the LXX either closely or verbatim (of which 13
are also in virtual agreement with the MT), one (Romans 11:35) follows the MT over the LXX, and
eighteen follow neither version (D. Moody Smith, “The Pauline Literature,” in It Is Written: Scripture
Citing Scripture, ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson [Cambridge University Press, 1988], 272, 268270). As with the Vulgate, there was not a single, uniform Septuagint text, and so Ellis (pp. 16-20)
discusses the difficulty of ascertaining which LXX manuscript traditions lie behind Paul’s various citations,
and Smith (p. 273) suggests that “probably it is better to conclude that Paul’s usage is septuaginal than to
say that he uses the LXX, since the latter comes to us only through christian hands in manuscripts no earlier
than the fourth century.”
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Muller’s words, “the problem of an authoritative, inspired text containing quotations
from a less-than-authoritative, uninspired version of the Bible.”177 Willet expresses this
dilemma clearly in the Controversies section of chapter 10, where the LXX background
of Romans 10:18 forces him into a defensive position as he tries to demonstrate “That the
Hebrew text is more authenticall, then the vulgar Latine translation.” Given the
agreement of Paul, the LXX and the Vulgate against the Hebrew of Psalm 19:4 [LXX and
Vulgate 18:5], Willet states the problem thus:
Whereas the Apostle saith, their sound is gone through the earth, according to the
Septuagint: and so the Latine translator readeth: and yet in the Hebrew text,
Psalm.19. the word is cavam, their line: hereupon and by occasion of the like
places, our adversaries doe commend the vulgar Latine as more authenticall, and
freer from corruption, then the Hebrew.178
Willet does not specify which “adversaries” are advancing an argument based on Paul’s
use of readings that agree with the Latin Old Testament. It makes a compelling case for
the Vulgate, though, so we can assume that Willet is presenting the Roman Catholic
reasoning fairly.179 Acknowledging that the LXX seems to be the default text for Paul’s
Old Testament citations, Willet generally offers a standard Protestant orthodox
177

Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:433. Many Reformed exegetes took pains to
try to explain Paul’s citations as deriving from loose translations of Hebrew passages, rather than from
clearer reference points in the Septuagint. Consider Henry Knapp on John Owen’s explanation of the origin
of Hebrews 1:5b: “In his zeal to distinguish the apostle’s citations from the LXX translation, Owen, along
with Robert Rollock and Francis Junius, identifies the quotation…as coming from 1 Chronicles 22:10, as
opposed to the majority of commentators who connect it with 2 Samuel 7:14 and 1 Chronicles 17:13.” By
this maneuver, “Owen is able to claim that the author of the epistle was not using the LXX, but was citing
the Hebrew freely…” (Henry Knapp, “Understanding the Mind of God: John Owen and SeventeenthCentury Exegetical Methodology” [PhD diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2002], 202).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 482.

Martin, in A Discoverie of the Manifold Corruptions (pp. 160-161), makes related LXX-based
arguments in favor of Vulgate readings. For instance, on the Protestant hesitancy (claiming semantic
ambiguity) to render ( עקבeqeb) in Psalm 119:112 as “reward,” Martin queries: “Alas my masters, are not
the Seventie Greeke interpreters sufficient to determine the ambiguitie of this word?” He adds, even more
snarkily: “…if the Septuaginta do here so translate it in Greeke, and S. Hierom in his Latin translation
according to the Hebrue, and the auncient fathers in their commentaries: what upstart new Maisters are you
that set al these to schoole againe, and teach the world a new translation?”
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explanation that Paul uses this translation when its sense (if not its words) is consistent
with the original Hebrew, because it was a popular, long-established version.180 We
might compare the situation to a modern preacher choosing to use the King James
Version with an older congregation, opting for familiarity over more contemporary or
precise phrasings. Paul’s adherence to the LXX, though, is not absolute, as he departs
from the Greek translation when it either makes superfluous additions or strays from the
sense of the Hebrew.181 Willet describes Paul’s process in these instances as being similar
to that of the Septuagint translators—just as the LXX occasionally takes the sense of
Scripture over its words, so Paul occasionally (though with the added authority of the
Holy Spirit’s inspiration) takes the sense of Scripture over the LXX’s words.182 Willet’s
strongest criticism of a Septuagint rendering is precipitated, though, not by a citation by
the Apostle, but by a Septuagint-based misinterpretation of Paul by Origen. Seeking to
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Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:428, and especially Edward Leigh’s
arguments, expressed on p. 432. Cf. also Broadhurst, What is the Literal Sense?, 103-105, on John
Lightfoot’s perspective on the apostles’ use of the LXX. Lightfoot viewed the LXX translation more
negatively than did Willet, believing it to be in places deliberately mistranslated by the Jews (vs. Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 157: “It is not like[ly] that the Jewes could all conspire to corrupt the Greeke text,
who otherwise are found to have beene alwaies most carefull to preserve the Scriptures uncorrupted”), and
he emphasizes that Paul used the translation “out of pure necessity” in his mission to Graecophone
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The Journal of Theological Studies, n.s., 45, no. 2 (October 1994): 593-601; Smith, “The Pauline
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 682-683. Willet argues, for instance, that Paul omits the LXX
addition (from Deuteronomy 30:14) of the word being “in thy hands” in Romans 10:8, as the introduction
of works would distract from his emphasis on justification by faith alone (this against Vermigli, who
“thinketh [that the LXX addition did] nothing to hinder, but to helpe the Apostles meaning”: Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 461). Later in chapter 10, Willet mentions also that Paul “followeth the Hebrew
originall, leaving the vulgar translation,” at 10:15 (p. 465).
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Cf. “the Septuagint in their translation tooke that libertie, not alwayes to render the words, but
the sense” of Scripture, with “[Paul] followeth the sense of the Scripture, rather then the words of the
interpreters” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 497, 682).
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explain the nature of Paul’s “mystery” in Romans 11:25, Origen was “farre wide” in
claiming that it referred to angels inciting Israel to idolatry out of envy at God’s keeping
Israel as his own and assigning the other nations to angels. This “strange speculation” of
Origen’s, Willet explains, was “grounded upon the erroneous translation of the
Septuagint, Deut.32.8,” where national borders are said to be set not according to the
number of the children of Israel (per the Hebrew), but according to the number of the
“Angels of God.”183 Such a mistranslation would be dangerously appealing to Origen, as
one whose interpretations were often marred by his “runn[ing] to his usuall speculations
of Angells,”184 tainting his reading not only of the Deuteronomy passage itself, but of an
unrelated passage in Romans.

4.1 Maintaining the Sense of the Hebrew
Since, however, Willet’s primary textual concern was not to debunk the
Septuagint, but to assert the superiority of the original languages over all translations
(especially the Vulgate), his focus when addressing Paul’s LXX citations is to show that
the Apostle’s accommodation to the familiar wording of the uninspired translation does
not fundamentally alter the sense of the Hebrew original. Indeed, he often takes great
pains seeking to demonstrate a semantic consonance between a Hebrew word and its
183

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 509. The Vulgate does not follow the LXX here, reading
“juxta numerum filiorum Israël.”
184

This particular phrase comes from Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 722. Willet does, though,
seem to affirm some kind of a role for national “guardian angels,” with one of his arguments against
Origen’s interpretation stating that “not evil Angels but the good are appointed over nations to be
ministring spirits for their good,” (p. 509). This statement alone does not necessarily imply that particular
angels are assigned to particular nations, and could be read as a general guardianship of good angels over
all nations. Willet’s reference to these angels being “appointed,” though, seems to keep the question of
national guardians open. Cf. Joad Raymond’s use of Synopsis Papismi to juxtapose Willet’s dubiety
regarding the biblical basis of national angel guardianship with other Protestants (as Calvin) who affirmed
the notion (Raymond, Milton’s Angels, 56-61, 232-235).
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variant LXX equivalent. Returning to Paul’s use of Psalm 19:4 in Romans 10:18, for
instance, Willet, after surveying selected theories as to why the LXX differs from the
Hebrew, states, “But I rather thinke that the Apostle refuseth not the Septuagint, whose
translation was so well knowne, because they retain the sense of the place, though they
exactly render not the words,” and proceeds to show how “sound” and “line” can convey
the same basic idea in the present context. If taken to refer to the heavens (per the psalm’s
opening line), then the Hebrew and Septuagint concur because “[the heavens’] line and
workmanship, was as it were their voice,” and if taken as a reference to the apostles (as
implied by Paul’s application in Romans), then the two words are linked because “their
prophesies of their sound, and voice, [were] as a line, and rule of doctrine to the
church.”185 The two concepts are even joined together, Willet continues, in Isaiah 28:10,
where the prophet connects “precept upon precept” with “line upon line.”186 Still, his
concluding argument here for the priority of the Hebrew—Paul’s use of the Greek
notwithstanding—reverts to a dogmatic, argument-ending judgment of the “very
preposterous course” of granting a translation a higher status than the original.187
Elsewhere Willet attempts to reconcile the sense of the Hebrew with Paul’s use of
the Septuagint by suggesting secondary word meanings, or by arguing that the sense is
maintained through metaphorical usage or through a cause-and-effect relationship
between two principles (similar rhetorical analyses, it is worth noting, to those he uses to

185

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 482-483. Regarding the application to the apostles, Willet
describes “line” as meaning something similar to “canon.”
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Forms of the Hebrew “line” (קו, kav) are used in each verse, and Willet takes “precept” (צו,
tsav) to mean the same as the apostles’ “sound” (i.e. their teaching).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 483.
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charge various Roman Catholic commentators with confusing Paul’s true meaning).188
On the apparent discrepancy between the Hebrew ( אמוּנהemunah, defined by Willet as
“truth”) and the Septuagint’s πίστις (“faith”) in Habakkuk 2:4, Willet simply explains
that the Hebrew word “signifieth not onely truth, integritie, but faith.” Paul, besides, has
some prophetic flexibility in drawing on this passage in Romans 1:17, as he is “speaking
by the same spirit, that the Prophets spake by.”189
As with the line/sound variant in Psalm 19:4, Willet has little interest in
speculation as to the origin of the discrepancy between the Hebrew’s “make haste” and
the LXX’s “be ashamed” in Isaiah 28:16, which Paul quotes in Romans 9:33.190 Here,
though, the Latin issue is removed, since—while Paul follows the Septuagint—the
Vulgate (“non festinet”) translates the Hebrew expression in Isaiah. Again Willet seeks to
demonstrate a connection between the Hebrew and Greek works, explaining (following
Tolet) that the LXX is stating “properly” what the Hebrew expresses by metaphor, then
adding “or rather they put the consequent for the antecedent, and the effect for the cause,”
since one who is rash and “makes haste” tends to end up confounded and ashamed.191
Willet uses the same “consequent for the antecedent” explanation for the more closelyrelated pair of “delivered” (from מלט, malat) and “saved” (from σώζω) in Joel 2:32,
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Willet mentions and quickly moves past a suggestion by Beza. For modern linguistic and
theological discussions of Paul’s Old Testament citations in Romans 9:33, see Dietrich-Alex Koch, “The
Quotations of Isaiah 8,14 and 28,16 in Romans 9,33 and 1 Peter 2,6.8 as Test Case for Old Testament
Quotations in the New Testament,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der
älteren Kirche 101, no. 2 (2010): 223-240; Dane Ortlund, “The Insanity of Faith: Paul’s Theological Use of
Isaiah in Romans 9:33,” Trinity Journal 30, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 269-288.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 431. Clarifying what Isaiah meant by “making haste,” Willet
cites Vermigli’s application of the term to those who fail to wait patiently for God to fulfill his promises.
We might think, for instance, of Abraham’s attempt to generate progeny through Hagar.
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which Paul references in Romans 10:13. While these two words are similar enough in
meaning to be read (in some contexts) synonymously, Willet distinguishes them causally,
making the two “in effect…all one”: the LXX, he explains, “doe put the consequent for
the antecedent: for he that is delivered, shall consequently be saved.”192
On Paul’s citation in Romans 3:4 of Psalm 51:4 (LXX and Vulgate 50:6), which
speaks in the Hebrew of God being “blameless” when he judges and in the Septuagint of
God “overcoming” when he is judged (νικήσῃς ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε), Willet again insists
that there is harmony between the Hebrew and Septuagint versions. Here, however, it is
not a simple matter of two different words conveying the same sense; here the LXX also
shifts (in the most natural reading) from the active (“when thou judge”) to the passive
(“when thou art judged”) voice, and Paul applies this verse to a situation that implies a
very particular kind of “judgment.” Thus, Willet not only attempts to show a basic
consonance between being “blameless” and “overcoming,” but also has to deal with the
altered voice, and aims to present a reading that respects each context.193 He first rejects
interpretations by Augustine and Gregory, who—taking the passive κρίνεσθαί as a
reference to Christ being blameless and overcoming the judgment “of Pilate and the
Jewes”—wrest the meaning too far from David’s sense. Since David was humbly
confessing his own sin, reading this as Christ triumphing over unwarranted judgment
would make it so that “there should be small coherence in Davids words.” Willet likewise
rejects the interpretation of Calvin and Pareus that God overcomes the grumblings of men
192
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 463.

The separate issue of Paul’s appropriation of Old Testament passages into his own (sometimes
very different) context and situation is, of course, the subject of its own field of inquiry, and is a much
broader matter than can be dealt with here. On this issue, see Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the
Letters of Paul (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Ellis, Paul’s Use of the Old Testament;
Smith, “The Pauline Literature.”
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against all of his judgments against sin, because “in this sense it should not seeme to be
much pertinent to S. Pauls purpose,” since Paul is writing of God keeping his promises in
spite of human unfaithfulness.194
The reading that Willet deems best able to account both for David’s context and
Paul’s application takes the judging as a reference to God’s promise to forgive sins: “it is
more agreeable to the Apostles purpose, to understand this of Gods promise made to
David, by Nathan, that his sinne was forgiven him, then of the judgement there inflicted.”
God is “blameless” and “overcomes” in this gracious judgment, not offending any
principles of justice.195 Regarding the passive construction, Willet reviews suggestions
for how God’s being judged could make sense in David’s and in Paul’s context, but adds
that the Greek form “may as well be in the meane [middle] voice as in the passive,”
giving it an active sense. His rendering the clause actively in his translation shows that he
prefers taking κρίνεσθαί as a middle form.196
Willet returns to the unsatisfactory Calvin/Pareus interpretation in a concluding
thought on the LXX “[keeping] the sense of the originall.” One who is “pure and
194

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 152. Calvin had argued that “the sense is, So far is it that the
truth of God is destroyed by our falsehood and unfaithfulness, that it thereby shines forth and appears more
evident, according to the testimony of David, who says, that as he was sinner, God was a just and righteous
Judge in whatever he determined respecting him, and that he would overcome all the calumnies of the
ungodly who murmured against his righteousness.” He denies as “too strained” the argument that the
reference is to God’s promises and not to his judgments (the position that Willet will assume), and claims
that the objection that immediately follows in Romans demonstrates that “Paul has quoted this passage
according to the proper and real meaning of David” (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 116-117). Willet
treats Calvin and Pareus together here, although Calvin takes κρίνεσθαί passively (“vincas quum judicaris,”
p. 114), and Pareus translates it actively (“vincas quando judicas;” having noted that some take it passively,
he writes “sed rectius media voce & activè.”: Pareus, In Divinam ad Romanos, 249-250, 257).
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Calvin, as we see him quoted below, acknowledges this grammatical possibility but reads Paul
as using the verb passively. Among modern commentators, Sanday and Headlom agree with Calvin:
“κρίνεσθαι: probably not mid. (‘to enter upon trial,’ ‘go to law,’ lit. ‘get judgment for oneself’) as Mey. Go.
Va. Lid., but pass. as in ver. 7 (so Vulg. Weiss Kautzsch, &c.)” (William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam,
The Epistle to the Romans, 9th ed. [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1904], 72).
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blamelesse, overcommeth in right judgement,” and—restating the proposal he had
rejected earlier—“God beeing pure and free from the accusations of the wicked, therein
overcommeth their murmurings, against his judgements, Pareus.” While this
interpretation failed, in Willet’s judgment, to account sufficiently for Paul’s purpose in
citing the psalm in Romans 3:4, it could serve to demonstrate how the words “blameless”
and “overcome” could communicate a common message.197 This distinction that Willet
makes is somewhat ironic, since Calvin unapologetically states here that (so far as the
change in voice is concerned), the Septuagint translators have clearly altered the meaning
of the Hebrew: “Though the word κρίνεσθαι, may be taken actively as well as passively,
yet the Greek translators, I have no doubt, rendered it passively, contrary to the meaning
of the Prophet.”198 So Willet cites an interpretation (that he disagrees is the proper
reading of Romans 3:4) to illustrate that the Hebrew (“blameless”) and LXX
(“overcome”) versions of Psalm 51:4 convey the same sense, while Calvin uses the same
interpretation to demonstrate that (regarding the shift in voice) the LXX reads contrary to
the Hebrew meaning!
In his disagreement with Calvin on the proper reading of this verse we again
notice Willet’s independent mind, seen here through differing approaches to reading the
Old Testament in the New and different judgments on the Septuagint. Calvin and Willet
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 152-153. In this correlation—one who is blameless
overcoming because of his innocence—this word pairing would also fit within Willet’s “consequent for the
antecedent” scheme.
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Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 117. Calvin’s nineteenth century translator and editor John
Owen mildly chides Calvin in a note on this comment (pp. 117-118n1), insisting that, whenever
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Calvin.
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each show a concern for maintaining a common sense between David’s original meaning
and Paul’s appropriation of the psalm. But each context contains a mix of words of
judgment and of mercy, and Calvin and Willet collate those messages differently in their
efforts to distill a univocal message from the prophetic words. In Nathan’s confrontation
with David that precipitates Psalm 51, the prophet speaks words of temporal punishment
(2 Samuel 12:10-11, 14), but also, following David’s confession of guilt, pronounces
God’s forgiveness (2 Samuel 12:13). Similarly, Romans 3:4 is bookended by contrasting
questions, each of which is met by a strong μὴ γένοιτο—will the peoples’ faithlessness
nullify God’s faithfulness? Absolutely not! So is God unjust to inflict wrath? Absolutely
not! Calvin takes David’s acknowledgement of God’s righteous judgment against sin as
the primary referent and applies this to Paul’s words (focusing on the objection
concerning condemnation following Romans 3:4, rather than the message of hope that
precedes it), while Willet takes God’s faithfulness to his faith-challenged people in
Romans 3 as the basic sense and reads this back into David’s situation, so as to make the
judgment refer not to David’s punishment, but to God’s gracious words of forgiveness.
Calvin also is bolder in acknowledging a different sense between the Hebrew of
the Masoretic text and the Greek of the Septuagint. While Willet could be highly critical
of the LXX translation, at points where Paul cites an LXX variant instead of the MT
reading, Willet’s emphasis on the MT’s primacy over all translations required that the
LXX and MT carry the same sense; any significant variation in meaning at these points
could be interpreted as Paul indirectly sanctioning a Vulgate Old Testament reading over
the Hebrew text. Thus, while Willet holds that Paul only quotes from the LXX when its
sense is consistent with that of the Hebrew, and then only because it was the more
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familiar version in many of his churches, Calvin states that the LXX here is “contrary to
the meaning” of the Hebrew and that Paul opts for the structure in the Greek translation
because it “answered his purpose here even better” than the Hebrew would have.199

4.2 Romans 11:8 and the Derivation of κατανύξις
Paul’s Old Testament citation in Romans 11:8 is cobbled together from at least
two sources, with some divergence from the wording of both the MT and the LXX. The
first clause is commonly accepted to be from Isaiah 29:10, with the key word (κατανύξις,
“compunction”) following the Septuagint over the Hebrew’s “slumber” ( תּרדּמה,
tardemah), and Willet attributes the second clause to Isaiah 6:9.200 He begins his
discussion of this citation by distinguishing between and rejecting the proposals of
Origen and Erasmus. Origen, unable to find Paul’s precise words in the Old Testament,
had suggested that Paul was here stating in his own words the prophet’s basic sense. “But
if it were so,” Willet replies—despite his own acknowledgement later that Paul’s words
do not follow exactly either the Hebrew or the LXX—“the Apostle would not have set
this sentence before, As it is written, if it were not so written, as it is here alleadged.”201

199

Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 117.

200

Calvin’s nineteenth century editor John Owen noted that the second clause could be from either
Isaiah 6:9 or Deuteronomy 29:4 (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 418n1). D. Moody Smith lists Isaiah
29:10 and Deuteronomy 29:4 as the two source texts (Smith, “The Pauline Literature,” 269). Willet
dismisses the possibility of Deuteronomy 29:4, claiming that “there is great difference betweene these two
testimonies”—i.e. not giving eyes to see, versus giving eyes not to see (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes,
495).
201

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 493. Willet notes the divergence between the wordings of the
different texts on the following page: “But there is some difference both betweene the translation of the
Septuagint, and the Hebrew, and betweene S. Pauls citation, and the Septuagint, and between S. Pauls
allegation, and the originall.” Despite his claim not to be able to find Paul’s source text, Origen quotes
Isaiah 6:9-10 as an example of the kind of prophetic message that Paul is summarizing. Since the content of
the message is not Paul’s own, Origen sees no issue with the prefatory “as it is written”: “Here then the
Apostle seems to have presented the meaning of Isaiah in his own words but to have added, ‘as it is
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Erasmus, while correctly offering Isaiah 6:9 as a source text, neglected to account for
Paul’s first clause—in Isaiah 6:9 “there is no mention made of the spirit of slumber or
compunction.”202 Willet thus prefers the composite theory, as argued by Pareus and Tolet.
We will focus on Willet’s analysis of the first clause of Romans 11:8, as it offers insight
into his method of translating and interpreting LXX passages cited in the New Testament.
One of the key issues in interpreting the phrase πνεῦμα κατανύξεως is the
derivation of the word κατανύξις; as Willet attests, “much adoe is made about the
signification of this word.”203 Two main possibilities are offered: Chrysostom,
Theophylact and Oecumenius take the word as deriving from κατανύσσω (as is
κατενύγησαν in Acts 2:27), “signifying pricking or compunction,” while others—as Beza
and Tolet—read it as a form of κατανυσάζω (cf. νύξ, “night”), meaning “slumber.”204
Willet’s own interpretive move is interesting, as he sides morphologically with the
Chrysostom camp, while maintaining—through a more circuitous path—the other sense
of the term. In so doing, he attempts to balance an etymologic integrity with his
conviction that Paul’s use of the LXX does not deviate from the sense of the Hebrew.
Deferring to those commentators closest linguistically to the Romans text, Willet
maintains that “the word κατανύξις, signifieth compunction, as…the Greeke interpreters,
Chrysostom, Origen, Theophylact, Oecumenius, who best knew the proper signification
written,’ because he was saying the meaning of the prophet” (Origen, Commentary on Romans, Books 6-10,
161 [8.8.4] ).
202

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 494. Erasmus’s annotators rightly note a close association
between the proposals by Erasmus and Origen, while arguing that Deuteronomy 29:4—not Isaiah 6:9—is
the source text for Paul’s second clause (editors’ note in Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 297n3).
203
204

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 494.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 494. Cf. Chrysostom, The Epistle to the Romans, 486-487
(Homily XIX).
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of the Greeke word, do interpret.” Given his evident desire to keep Paul’s meaning as
close as possible to that of the Hebrew (as seen in his opting to translate Paul’s words
“God hath given them the spirit of slumber”), Willet’s easiest move would have been to
adopt Beza’s reasonable explanation that κατανύξις is derived from a word that simply
means “slumber.” Instead, he argues that, while the word itself means “compunction,”
Paul uses it in such a way as to mean “slumber.” “Yet in sense,” Willet avers, “it is all
one, as if he should have said the spirit of slumber.” Osiander and Pareus each explain
this connection with examples of attempting to rouse a sleeping person by pricking him,
but Willet reverses the order and explains the connection as “a metaphoricall speech”
depicting how one who is pricked with grief loses awareness of all else, falling into a
kind of “spirituall giddines or slumber.”205 Willet’s identification of this rhetorical move
takes him beyond merely reconciling the LXX to the Hebrew, leading him to translate
Paul’s words not according to the literal sense, but by the metaphorical meaning (which
happens to be the literal sense of the Hebrew version of the cited passage).206

5. Conclusion
While not yet engaging in interpretive work at all resembling the historical
criticism of nineteenth-century biblical scholarship, early seventeenth-century exegesis
made extensive use of a variety of text-critical tools in an effort to establish the best
205

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 494-495. In his typical causal language, Willet explains that
Pareus interprets the relationship between compunction and slumber as “the effect [being] put for the
cause,” whereas Willet himself explains it as “the cause beeing taken for the effect.” (pp. 494, 486).
Willet’s association of the word with grief is similar to the understanding of Erasmus, who explains that it
“is used when one is bitten and stung by grief” (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 297).
206

This cross-referencing is an instance of the analogia scripturae influencing Willet’s
interpretation and translation, and Willet himself appeals to this principle in the following Question, as part
of his exposition of what it means for God to send the spirit of slumber: “we should compare one Scripture
with an other, and interpret one by an other” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 497).
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possible text. This critical work is especially evident in commentaries that engaged in
some degree of polemical exegesis, since different text traditions could be used to support
opposing theological views. In this chapter we have seen how Willet sought to discredit
various (primarily) Roman Catholic interpretations by arguing that the scriptural basis for
these readings was corrupted by textual errors or faulty translations in the Vulgate text of
Romans. Relying on a mix of his own linguistic expertise corroborated by textual notes
from other Greek and Hebrew scholars, a variety of humanist critical methods, and the
assumption that the superiority of original languages trumped any plausible corruption in
the textus receptus, Willet argues that the Vulgate offers invalid support for a variety of
flawed teachings, ranging from a skewed understanding of the impact of sin and the
effects of grace that was caused partly by too narrow a conception of νοῦς, to a severe
weakening of the assurance of salvation, to an overly negative view of the Law, to a
restricted warrant for resisting sinful elements in society.
While often presenting a fair picture of his opponents’ views, and even—as with
his extensive use of Erasmus’s textual work—making positive use of their exegetical
contributions, Willet also at times quotes these opponents rather selectively in order to
bring into relief elements of their thought that he found theologically troublesome or
logically unsound. His polemical lens often served to hone and sharpen his own
interpretations, but it could also lead him into some ambiguous positions, since in
refuting false readings that erred in many different directions, he sometimes drew on
refutations from other writers whose views were not identical to his own. In his frequent
(though more irenic) deviation from important first- and second-generation Reformers,
we see Willet’s independent mind and his fidelity to the scriptural text; his Reformed

123

forerunners and colleagues were valuable resources to him, though he followed none of
them slavishly.
Given the Protestant emphasis on Scripture as the norm for establishing church
doctrine, in his efforts to present the Reformed as making up the truly “catholic” church
Willet had to demonstrate that Protestants were relying on a scriptural text tradition that
accurately represented the language and thought of the original autographs. From here, he
had to show that his exegesis of the texts was a faithful reading and that it agreed with the
main line of the church’s historical interpretation. A later chapter will address Willet’s
polemical use of tradition (both his negative use of heretics and his positive use of the
Church Fathers), but already here we have seen how Willet draws extensively on the
Church Fathers in textual and linguistic matters, and how he tends to defer to the native
Greek-speaking Fathers on these questions. The next chapter will continue to focus on
language, moving from manuscript and general translation concerns in the Vulgate to the
narrower issue of translating and interpreting prepositions and conjunctions, and the
challenge of properly identifying where Paul is using rhetorical devices. We will continue
to see how Willet’s polemical hermeneutic functions to frame and nuance his exegesis of
Romans and his articulation of the Reformed catholic faith.

CHAPTER III.
GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC
1. Introduction
Different interpretations were bound to spawn from divergent manuscript
traditions and varying translations. But opposing readings of Romans emerged also when
Protestant and Roman Catholic exegetes agreed on the proper wording of a passage.
These conflicting interpretations, moreover, were only rarely caused by radically
different technical approaches to the text. In the present chapter, we will notice that
Willet and his opponents were frequently using similar tools and methods in defense of
their theological perspectives, arriving at different conclusions not due to textual variants
or to different methodologies, but by applying their exegetical tools differently and by
reading Romans through different hermeneutical frameworks. All generally agreed, for
instance, that Paul made use of the tropes of a trained rhetorician, yet disagreed over
where and in what manner he used this figurative speech.
Willet’s emphasis on sometimes relatively minor linguistic and grammatical
elements of Romans evidences, too, a strong fidelity to the text. Each doctrine and moral
use is rooted solidly in a close reading of the Apostle’s words, and Willet—while
staunchly in the Reformed camp—is not afraid to disagree with his Reformed forebears
(though in language more irenic than what he used against his ideological enemies) when
he believes they have misconstrued Paul’s words.1 This fidelity is heightened by the
polemical situation; no exegetical move can be facilely assumed, as his defensive posture
forces engagement with and careful refutation of other proposed readings (in clear

1

Cf. the discussion of Willet’s carefully-phrased disagreements with other Reformed exegetes in
section VII.3.2, where we consider Willet’s concern to demonstrate that Roman Catholic doctrine was more
fragmented than Protestant doctrine.
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continuity with the objections and sed contra of the medieval quaestio method).2 An
awareness of this polemical background is essential for understanding how Willet parses
the Romans text, how he draws from and interprets the exegetical tradition, and why
certain issues concern him more than others, as well as for how we assess degrees of
continuity between his and other periods.3

2. Conjunctions and Prepositions
Conjunctions and prepositions— those unassuming little words that glue together
the more glamorous parts of a language—can be notoriously difficult to translate. Yet in
certain circumstances the chosen rendering can significantly influence the meaning, or at
least the logical progression, of a passage. In one famous instance (the ἐφ’ᾧ in Romans
5) exegetes historically were divided even as to whether an important construction
functioned as a conjunction or a relative clause (composed of a preposition and a relative
pronoun). Andrew Willet, always thorough and ever precise, addresses the translation of
prepositions and conjunctions throughout his Romans hexapla—both in cases where the
basic meaning of the passage hinges in some way on these words and in those where the
difference is more a matter of semantics.4 This section will consider a few of the places
where Willet bases an argument of some theological weight at least partly on the
2

Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:502; Muller, After Calvin, 78. Willet’s
format shows both the newer influence of the locus method and remnants of the older quaestio method.
3

Among modern commentators on Romans, Meyer and Cranfield are particularly useful for
clarifying grammatical issues, especially within their historical exegetical context: Cranfield, A Critical and
Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans; Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Critical and
Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistle to the Romans (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1889).
4

Examples from the latter category include whether ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν in Romans 1:4
represents Christ’s resurrecting of (other) dead people or his own resurrection from the dead (both of which
events could indicate his divinity in different regards); whether the “for” in our confession that Christ died
“for our sins” is merely causal—he died because of our sins—or also an expression of his dying in our
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rendering of a conjunction or preposition.

2.1 Continuation or Contrast
Given the multiple kinds of connection that a conjunction can indicate,5 it is not
surprising that the precise meaning of some conjunctions could be debated in certain
contexts. Concerning Romans 2:1, for instance, Willet disputes the interpretation of Lyra
and Tolet that Paul “useth here a transition” to shift from addressing Gentiles in chapter
1 to addressing Jews in chapter 2. “But the particle διὸ, wherefore, sheweth,” he argues,
“that this is inferred out of that which went before, and so is a continuance of the same
argument.”6 The conjunction here, in other words, serves not an adversative function
(indicating a shift in the argument) but an illative function (drawing conclusions from
what has just been stated). Rejecting such a clean break in Paul’s intended audience here,
Willet adopts the opinion of Pareus, who maintained that, though the Jews were not
excluded entirely, the Gentiles remained the primary addressees of chapter 2.7
place (it is both, Willet asserts); and whether διὰ in δι’ ἀκροβυστίας is better translated “in uncircumcision”
or “by uncircumcision” (Willet prefers “in” because “by…were to give more vertue to uncircumcision, then
to circumcision”: Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 42, 190, and 193).
5

Joseph Caryl’s 1658 Greek grammar presents eleven types of conjunctions: copulative,
connexive or conditional, discretive, adversative, redditive (conveying a reply), disjunctive, causal, rational
or collective (also called illative by other grammarians), dubitative, potential, and expletive (“which
signifie nothing, only fill up a verse or sentence”: Caryl, An English-Greek Grammar, 44).
6

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 101. Bear in mind that “wherefore” here is Willet’s translation
of διὸ, and not a marker of his own concluding argument.
7

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 102. A different argument concerning the meaning of διὸ arises
in Willet’s Controversies section on Romans 14—even though the word itself does not appear in that
chapter, but is drawn in through Lombard’s paralleling of Romans 14:9 (“For to this ende Christ both died,
and rose again and revived, that [ἵνα] he might be Lord both of the dead, and quicke”) with Philippians 2:79. In the course of refuting Lombard’s argument (shared by the nonetheless “learned writer” Vermigli) that
Romans 14:9 taught that Christ merited his own Lordship through his Passion, Willet challenges
Lombard’s assumption that διὸ in the Philippians passage (“Wherefore [διὸ] God hathe also highly exalted
him ... .”) denotes a reward. Rather, the “word διὸ, therefore, doth not alwaies signifie the cause or merit,
but the order also and sequele [sequence] of a thing.” Christ’s work, thus, merits only for “his members,”
and each of these citations teaches only that his death led to his Lordship merely “because this was the way
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Paul’s famous self-examination in Romans 7 has inspired a similar dispute
between whether a conjunction should be taken in a causal or an adversative sense,
though here Willet breaks from his usual agreement with Pareus. Willet outlines a
diversity of opinion regarding the interpretation of Romans 7:21 (“I find then a law, that
when I would doe good, evill is present with me”8), with the discrepancies hinging on
how the word ὅτι is understood and whether the “law” (νόμος) signifies the Mosaic law
or the law of the flesh. Pareus was one of a group of exegetes who read “law” positively
to refer to the Mosaic law (thus connecting νόμον with καλόν and making the law of
Moses responsible for Paul’s will to do good), and ὅτι adversatively to mean “although”
—so that Paul’s meaning is something like: “Although evil is present with me, my study
of the (Mosaic) law helps me still to will the good.” Willet bases his refutation of all of
the “expositions tending to the commendation of the law” (which include also that of his
frequent adversary Bellarmine) on the way in which ὅτι connects the latter part of the
verse: “to say with Pareus, that ὅτι, because, may be taken for κάιπερ, although: or with
Faius, for αλλὰ, but, or that [it] is superfluously added, it seemeth not to be so fit.” With
ὅτι understood causally, the more natural association is between νόμον and κακὸν: “I find
a law that evil is with me when I will the good.” This reading Willet finds to be “most
agreeable to the text,” and it avoids crediting the Mosaic law with too much power to
direct a wayward human will toward the good.9 Willet’s mild disagreement here with his

and order appointed of God, whereby he should come to exercise his dominion” (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 662-663).
8
9

Εὑρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ὃτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 330. More subtle—and in this case also somewhat less
significant— is the disagreement as to whether the compound form διότι in Romans 3:20 reasons causally
forward (as an illative conjunction—“A, therefore B”) or backwards (as a proper causal conjunction—“A
because of B”). This issue arises in Willet’s textual comments in his translation of chapter 3, where he
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Reformed contemporaries Pareus and Faius is important to note; while drawing heavily
on other Reformed writers (especially Pareus) in his commentaries, Willet also displays
an independent mind and is not afraid to trust his own exegetical instincts over the
conclusions of illustrious Reformed interpreters.

2.2 Original Sin and the ἐφ’ᾧ Debate
Among the linguistic debates concerning the text of Romans, few issues have
inspired such heated dissention through the centuries as has the interpretation of ἐφ’ᾧ in
“the uniquely significant”10 Romans 5:12. While Augustine’s in quo (“in whom”) reading
that Willet strongly defends is “almost universally rejected”11 by modern exegetes, this
understanding had deep roots in the western church at the time of the Reformation.12 As
with many translation and interpretation issues, the proper understanding of ἐφ’ᾧ in this
verse cannot be determined solely by an appeal to grammar—there being a “variety of
possible nuances” conveyed by the use of ἐπί with the dative—and so the history of the

renders this verse: “Therefore (not because, L. B. because that, V. for it is a conclusion inferred out of the
former words) by the works of the Law shall no flesh be justified in his sight…for by the Law commeth the
knowledge of sinne.” (L, B and V stand for the Latin Vulgate, the great English Bible, and the Vatablus
edition, respectively). Willet does not elaborate on this point beyond this textual note—it being a matter
more of grammatical than of theological controversy—though the proper logical progression is too
important to Willet for him to omit the observation entirely: the inability of the Law to justify is the
conclusion drawn from all being declared guilty by the Law (and thus also the culminating point of this
section), and not vice-versa.
10

Robert Coogan, “The Pharisee Against the Hellenist: Edward Lee Versus Erasmus,”
Renaissance Quarterly 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 476.
11

Brian Vickers, “Grammar and Theology in the Interpretation of Romans 5:12,” Trinity Journal
27, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 277.
12

Cf. Coogan, “The Pharisee Against the Hellenist,” 476; Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans,
vol. 1, 276.
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exegesis of Romans 5:12 involves “a mix of grammatical and theological discussion.”13
There was, in general, a division between interpretation in the Greek East, where we find
an Adamic legacy of inherited mortality but not of congenital guilt, and the Latin West,
where an Augustinian doctrine of original sin “came to be accepted as church dogma, to
the exclusion of any alternative.”14 This theological division, however, is not matched by
as strong of a grammatical East-West divide. While Willet concurs with both
Augustine’s in quo reading and his theology of original sin (seeing Augustine’s
grammatical move as a kind of safeguard for the doctrine), many prominent western
theologians—as Calvin, Vermigli, and Bullinger—dissented from Augustine’s
understanding of ἐφ’ᾧ, even while accepting the broad pattern of his original sin
doctrine.15
While space prohibits and a sufficient comprehension of Willet’s position does
not require a comprehensive review of every interpretation of original sin, it will be
13

Vickers, “Grammar and Theology,” 275, 271. Henri Blocher, too—chiding those who have too
easily dismissed an Augustinian reading—declares that “the case does not (contrary to a superficial
understanding of the issues) rest on the rendering of the connecting words at the end of verse 12 for which
Augustine finally settled,” adding that “none of the many rival solutions is unassailable” (Henri Blocher,
Original Sin: Illuminating the Riddle [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997], 71). The history of the
interpretation of this verse is further complicated by the varied use of terms even between the earliest
Church Fathers and Augustine (Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, Developments, Contemporary
Meanings [Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2002], 53). Cranfield, while dismissing Augustine’s grammatical
argument, offers a helpful summary of the six main interpretations of Paul’s meaning here (Cranfield, The
Epistle to the Romans, vol. 1, 274-281).
14

David Weaver, “From Paul to Augustine: Romans 5:12 in Early Christian Exegesis,” St.
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1983): 187-188. Weaver’s trio of essays in St. Vladimir’s
Theological Quarterly, published between 1983 and 1985, are especially instructive in detailing the
background of this exegetical issue within the Greek-speaking church: David Weaver, “The Exegesis of
Romans 5:12 Among the Greek Fathers and its Implication for the Doctrine of Original Sin: the 5th to 12th
Centuries, Part II,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1985), 133-159; David Weaver, “The
Exegesis of Romans 5:12 Among the Greek Fathers and its Implication for the Doctrine of Original Sin: the
5th to 12th Centuries, Part III,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 29, no. 3 (1985), 231-257. See also S.
Lyonnet, “Le Sens de ἐφ’ᾧ en Rom 5,12 et L’Exégèse des Pères Grecs,” Biblica 36, no. 4 (1955): 436-456.
15

Cf. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, vol. 1, 276: “We must of course distinguish between
acceptance of Augustine’s general understanding of the thought of the clause and acceptance of his
grammatical explanation of ‘in quo.’”
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helpful here to lay out one possible framework for thinking about four main approaches
to its transmission. First, theologians have described original sin as a responsibility either
for Adam’s personal sin or for one’s own sinfulness. We can further divide the first group
between those who claim that Adam’s posterity was present seminally in Adam and so
participated, in a way, in his primal sin (the “realist” view), and those who view him as
our legal representative, making decisions on behalf of all who fall under his headship
(the “federal” view).16 Those denying a direct imputation of the guilt of Adam’s personal
sin can also be subdivided, between those who believe that Adam’s descendants inherit
his tarnished human nature (the very possession of which leads ineluctably to the sin of
concupiscence), and those who believe that we are born in a state of innocence but
inevitably imitate Adam in our own way (which amounts to a denial of original sin in any
proper sense).17 Given the complex nature of sin, these categories are, of course, not
mutually exclusive. For instance, Berkhof finds in Augustine both a realistic conception
of original sin and an emphasis on inherited corruption, while asserting that “he also
comes very close to the idea that [all people] sinned in Adam as their representative”18
16

See, for instance, Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996),
241-243; Wiley, Original Sin, 52-53; Blocher, Original Sin, 71; Aaron Denlinger, “Calvin's Understanding
of Adam's Relationship to His Posterity: Recent Assertions of the Reformer's ‘Federalism’ Evaluated,”
Calvin Theological Journal 44, no. 2 (Nov. 2009): 228; George Park Fisher, “The Augustinian and Federal
Theories of Original Sin Compared,” The New Englander 27 (July 1868): 468-516; Stephen Strehle,
Calvinism, Federalism, and Scholasticism: A Study of the Reformed Doctrine of Covenant (Bern,
Switzerland: Peter Lang, 1988).
17

On these views, cf. Denlinger, “Calvin’s Understanding,” 228, 237; Henri Rondet, Original Sin:
the Patristic and Theological Background, trans. Cajetan Finegan (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1972),
125, 129; Berkhof, Systematic Theology, (240-241, 243); Wiley, Original Sin, 69-70. In modern terms, the
transmission of a vitiated nature can be compared to recent research suggesting that one’s experiences can
be passed on genetically through one’s RNA. See, for example, Dan Hurley, “Grandma's Experiences
Leave a Mark on Your Genes,” Discover Magazine, May 2013, http://discovermagazine.com/2013/may/13grandmas-experiences-leave-epigenetic-mark-on-your-genes. Those presenting the Eastern understanding
of an inherited mortality would fall into one of these latter two categories—an inherited corrupt nature or
sin by imitation—depending on how the connection between mortality and sinfulness is expressed.
18

Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 237.
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(although a developed federal understanding of original sin did not develop until over a

millennium later, in the post-Reformation period).19 Blocher notes that the Reformed
tradition has highlighted the federal/judicial aspect (“we were ‘in him’ in the sense of
being legally represented by him”), while qualifying that this tendency has not been to
the exclusion of “the natural connection.”20 And Willet himself, as we shall see, stresses
that original sin refers not solely to Adam’s sin imputed to his progeny, but also to “a
reall and inherent corruption in the nature of man.”21

2.2.1 ἐφ’ᾧ and Erasmus and Theodoret
Willet focuses his exegetical displeasure on Erasmus, whose rendering of ἐφ’ᾧ
causally to mean “because” he deems “rather to be misliked,” and he cites Augustine’s
near-contemporary Theodoret as an earlier, and Calvin, Vermigli, Osiander, and “our
English translations” as more recent examples of grammatical divergences from
Augustine.22 In the initial 1516 edition of his Novum Testamentum, Erasmus had rejected
the Vulgate’s in quo translation in favor of in eo quod (“in that which”),23 adding in the
notes the grammatical possibility of options that were even more clearly causal: quatenus
(“in so far as”) or quandoquidem (“since”). In later editions he opted for quatenus in the

19

Lyle Bierma, “Covenant or Covenants in the Theology of Olevianus?,” Calvin Theological
Journal, 22, no. 2 (Nov. 1987): 250; Richard A. Muller, “The Covenant of Works and the Stability of
Divine Law in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Orthodoxy: a Study in the Theology of Herman Witsius and
Wilhelmus à Brakel,” Calvin Theological Journal 29, no. 1 (April 1994): 89.
20

Blocher, Original Sin, 71-72.

21

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 275.

22

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 250.

23

By this time, the expression could also simply mean “because” (Jozsef Herman, Vulgar Latin,
trans. Roger Wright [University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2000], 92).
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main text.24 Erasmus expanded the arguments for his position in 1535, defending his
interpretation against charges that his focus on our conformity to Adam and to Christ by
imitation—rather than by inheritance and imputation—reeked of and aided the cause of
Pelagianism.25 Claiming the support of Origen, Ambrose,26 Theophylact and Chrysostom,
Erasmus argued that Augustine was the only Church Father to hold the extreme original
sin position, and he only in his later years, during the Pelagian controversy.27 Any
association with Pelagius being toxic in the sixteenth century, Erasmus naturally asserts
his condemnation of the soteriological arch-heretic and acknowledges “some original
sin”—though characterizing it more as a natural propensity to sin than as a corruption of
our nature in a full Augustinian sense.28 Willet, not surprisingly, casts doubt on this
professed opposition.29 But regardless of whether this denunciation of Pelagius was more
genuine or expedient, Erasmus’s positioning of himself between Augustine and Pelagius

24

Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 12.

25

Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 13; Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings,” 16. Erasmus
asks sardonically, “Will the Pelagians suddenly spring back to life because I have interpreted this one
passage otherwise than did Augustine in his fight, when there are many other passages by which heretics
can be more effectively refuted?” (Annotations on Romans, ed. Robert D. Sider, trans. John B. Payne et al.,
vol. 56 of Collected Works of Erasmus [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994], 150-151).
26

Actually Ambrosiaster. See Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 8n41.

27

Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings,” 16, 17; Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 13. On
the development of Augustine’s understanding of original sin, see for example Wiley, Original Sin, 56-75.
Erasmus also claimed the support of Jerome, although he knew that the commentary he was citing was
written pseudonymously. He did not seem to know, however, that the actual author was Pelagius—a rather
important point that had been suspected as early as Augustine (Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,”
9n44, 13; Coogan, “The Pharisee Against the Hellenist,” 476; Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 250).
28

Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings,” 16, 17. Cf. my discussion of sin and concupiscence in
relation to causality, V.2.4.
29

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 250. Carrington takes Erasmus more at his word when he
condemns Pelagianism and affirms some kind of original sin. He is not “dodging the issue,” she argues,
when he claims that his contention is not with the existence of original sin but with whether Romans 5:12
teaches it. While recognizing that he did not “uphold a fully Augustinian doctrine of original sin,”
Carrington writes that Erasmus’s qualm with the traditional Western approach to Romans 5:12 “reflects his
belief that interpreting any passage from Scripture should reflect the context of the passage in relation to
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in an attempt to temper what he viewed as Augustine’s overcorrection of the Pelagian
error helps us to see a “polemical chain” that forms the backbone of the history of the
exegesis of this verse (and which is representative of other such chains winding through
the exegetical history of other disputed verses). Andrew Willet is seeking to correct
Erasmus, who was attempting to moderate Augustine, who was reacting against Pelagius,
who—for his part—was unwilling to accept an inherently sinful human nature that could
suggest a gnostic Manichean dualism.30
Theodoret, who Willet claims had taken the error “yet further then Erasmus,”
interpreted Romans 5:12 in a way that was fairly representative of the Greek church as a
whole (including—we shall see—those Fathers whom Willet cites as supporting the
Augustinian view). Willet summarizes Theodoret’s understanding that Adam’s personal
sin was not the cause, but the occasion of the introduction of sin into the human
situation,31 and that our immediate inheritance from Adam is not sin per se, but mortality,
which makes people “subject to perturbations.”32 The connection, then, between Adam’s
sin and the sin of the rest of humanity was for him an indirect path traveling through the
specter of death. Theodoret affirmed that in Adam’s sin “both sin and death spread

the chapter and book in which it appears, and ultimately all of Scripture; interpretation should not be a
mining of individual passages for doctrine” (Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings,” 17). Indeed, few exegetes
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would support non-contextual readings and “mining” Scripture
for proof-texted doctrines.
30

On Pelagius reacting against the Manichean worldview, see Weaver, “From Paul to Augustine,”

31

Cf. the section on Willet’s use of the cause/occasion distinction, V.3.2.

200.

32

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 250. According to Theodoret, a mortal nature requires many
physical things, the necessity of which “often provokes the passions to excess. And excess begets sins”
(quoted in Weaver, “The Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Part II,” 152). Part of his reasoning was that there will
be no sin in the resurrection because we will then be immortal. And if immortality and sinlessness go hand
in hand, it must be our mortality that inclines us to sin (Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Part II,” 156).
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throughout the race,” but his focus was on death, and especially death as the penalty for
personal sin.33 As with those Greek Fathers whom Willet claims in support of his own
position, there is some ambiguity in Theodoret’s explication of ἐφ’ᾧ. His interpretation
encompasses the notion both of inherited mortality and of individually-merited mortality
and, as with Paul himself, his meaning here cannot be determined from a bare
grammatical analysis, but demands “reference to the more general tenor of his
thinking.”34 This characterizes much of the Greek commentary on Romans 5, in which
the concept of “original sin” was discussed with less precision than in Western Latin
commentaries,35 due at least in part to a common tongue allowing a direct transference of
Paul’s own terminological ambiguity.

2.2.2 ἐφ’ᾧ and Other Reformed Theologians
While Willet portrays Erasmus and Theodoret as dancing on a slippery slope
toward Pelagianism, his disagreement with Calvin and Vermigli is a more constrained
matter focusing on whether the verse in question refers to original sin or actual sins and,
thus, how the verse fits into the logical progression of Romans 5. In his comments on
verse 5:12 (in the Questions section), Willet names Vermigli and Calvin among those
proffering the less desirable reading, but does not present a specific critique of their
exegesis. Explaining the following verse, though, he notes how each has misread the
reference to sin that was in the world “unto the time of the lawe” because of a faulty
reading of 5:12. In apparent agreement with Beza, Willet writes that Calvin “suspendeth
33

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 152.

34

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 153.

35

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 159.
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all this sentence by a parenthesis, which Beza misliketh: because it hath a very good
coherence with the former verse,” and Vermigli argues that the reference is to actual sin
that was present in the world prior to the written law (in violations of the conscience and
the light of nature36), but which was not at that time imputed.37 To Willet, these
explanations—treating 5:13 as either a loosely-connected aside or as a reference to sins
against natural law—merely obscure the clear connection between original sin in 5:12
and pre-legal sin in 5:13.38
That Willet’s dispute with these Reformed allies is not primarily an argument
over the nature of original sin itself is evident by his appeal to Vermigli in six of his first
eight Controversies in an extended thirteen-page section specifically refuting errors
pertaining to original sin,39 and his later citation of Calvin to argue that “sin” in Romans
7:8 refers to “the originall pravitie” within humanity that is “none other, but natura
corruptio, the corruption of our nature.”40 Regarding verse 5:12 specifically, however,
Vermigli—having acknowledged that there is “no small controversie how it ought to be

36

Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 113v.

37

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 251

38

Willet muddies his own water a bit, however, when he approves of placing verses 13-17 within
parentheses to account for the grammatical association between the “wherefore as” in verse 12 and the
“likewise then” in verse 18: “but I rather with Beza and Pareus thinke, that the second part of the
comparison is suspended by a long parenthesis in the words coming betweene unto the 18. and 19. verses,
where the Apostle setteth downe both parts of the comparison” (Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 246). So
Willet both (seemingly) disapproves of Calvin’s parentheses when considering the logical progression
from verse 12 to 13 in Question 25 and (explicitly) expresses approval of the parentheses when trying to
account for the awkward grammatical step between verses 12 and 13 in Question 17—and he claims Beza
for each position! Calvin’s nineteenth-century translator and editor John Owen isolates Willet’s
grammatical comment when he cites Willet as one who agreed with Calvin’s placement of vv. 13-17 within
parentheses (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 199-200n1).
39

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 271-283. He cites Vermigli positively in Controversies 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, and 17.
40

Willet, Hexapla on Romans, 321.
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taken”—flatly denies the “in quo” reading of ἐφ’ᾧ, claiming that Jerome “was deceived,
which turned this sence thus. In whom all men have sinned,” and arguing that it should
instead be taken as “a particle causall.”41 This rendering, to Vermigli, fits best both
linguistically and contextually. Many of Paul’s hearers, he reasons, might have thought it
“very sharpe and harde, that for the sinne only of the first man all men should dye,” and
so Paul completes 5:12 with an assertion that all people have sinned on their own as well,
leaving no room to question the justice of God’s death sentence.42 This was, however, not
to the exclusion of original sin; Paul here “taketh sinne most amply, so that it
comprehendeth both the roote, and all the fruites thereof.”43 Calvin also defends a causal
translation (quandoquidem) against those who would complain that “we are so lost
through Adam’s sin, as though we perished through no fault of our own,” though his
interpretation of what is meant by “all sinned” is somewhat closer to Willet’s sense of
inherited sinfulness than to Vermigli’s emphasis on actual sins: “to sin in this case, is to
become corrupt and vicious,” and even before this natural corruption begins to yield its
“own fruits, [it] is yet sin before God, and deserves his vengeance.”44 Willet’s treatment
of Calvin’s and Vermigli’s readings of this passage shows, again, his independence as an
exegete, even as he depicts a theological solidarity among the Reformed on the most

41

Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 112v-113r. Vermigli—siding explicitly with Erasmus—
prefers “this conjunction causall, For” (in Vermigli’s original Latin, “eo quod”: Vermigli, S. Paul to the
Romanes, 113v; Vermigli, S. Pauli Apostoli ad Rom., 348).
42

Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 112v.
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I.e. both original and actual sin (Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 113r).

44

Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 200-201. Vermigli likewise argues that natural corruption and
concupiscence are real, and not merely potential, sins, affirming that “lust and pronesse to sinne [are]
grafted in us all,” and that these “are also in very dede sinnes” (Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 113v).
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central doctrines.45
As for the English bibles printed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only
his hated Rheims New Testament and later editions of the Geneva Bible have Willet’s
preferred “in whom” reading; others contain some sort of causal rendering, as
“forasmuch as” (early Geneva versions), “insomuche as” (the 1568 Bishops’ Bible), or
“for that” (the 1611 King James). The Geneva Bible translation was altered to read “in
whom” in 1576 (New Testaments) and 1587 (complete bibles), to correspond with
Laurence Tomson’s addition of Beza’s textual notes. Beza’s note on “in whom” specifies
“That is, in Adam,” and his note on the verse as a whole reads: “But that this Law, was
not that universal Lawe, and that that death did not procede from any actuall sinne of
every one particularly, it appeareth hereby, that the very infantes which neither could
ever know, nor transgresse that naturall Lawe, are not withstanding dead as well as
Adam.”46

2.2.3 ἐφ’ᾧ and Willet’s Appeal to Greek Commentators
The Greek commentators whom Willet cites in support of the “in whom” reading
are especially interesting to consider, since three of them (Origen, Chrysostom and
Theophylact) are also cited by Erasmus, and since they all present an interpretation
similar to Theodoret’s. As they were claimed by opposing sides, it is not surprising that—
as with Theodoret—there is some ambiguity in the expressed positions of each of these

45
46

Cf. section VII.3.2.

Geneva New Testament, 1576 (with Beza notes), 241v. For more on Laurence Tomson’s
revision of the Geneva Bible, see the chapter in David Daniell, The Bible in English, 348-357. We will see
shortly how Willet also uses infants to develop a similar argument.
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Greek exegetes.47 Origen is perhaps the most curious of Willet’s references in his
arguments against Erasmus, given the Alexandrian’s well-known influence on the
“Prince of the Humanists,”48 but it is also relatively easy to imagine how he could have
been interpreted as supporting a form of original sin. First, the speculative nature of
Origen’s exegesis, in which he often offers multiple possible explanations, makes it
possible for theological opponents to cite his authority on the same issue.49 Willet’s
primary support for claiming Origen comes from the latter’s use of an analogy that seems
to lead toward a realist position. Having acknowledged Erasmus’s appeal to Origen,
Willet rebuts:
But Origen manifestly interpreteth the Apostle to speake of originall sinne: for he
saith, as Levi was in Abraham’s loynes when he payed tithes to Melchisedeck, sic
omnes homines erant in lumbis Ada,&c. so all men that are borne were in the
loynes of Adam, and when he was expelled out of Paradise, they were expelled
with him, &c.50
47

Consider the following assessments: “The expressed opinions of Origen on the question of the
origin of sin are consistent with the cosmology developed in On First Principles, but are stated in
traditional terms, which results in some ambiguity” (Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. I,” 194); “In
the present section [Origen] is somewhat ambivalent. He seems to allow the interpretation of in quo as a
relative clause, i.e., “in whom,” namely in Adam” (editor’s note in Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to
the Romans, Books 1-5, trans. Thomas P. Scheck [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2001], 303n1); even Erasmus recognized ambiguity in Origen, stemming from both his own wording and
from his translators: “From Origen, however, it is not so easy to gather wheat his view was, for he is, of
himself, often slippery in argument, [and is so] especially since we have translated freely with many things
added, removed, or changed” (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 142); “Unfortunately, one cannot tell
precisely in what grammatical sense [Chrysostom] understood the phrase ἐφ’ᾧ” (Weaver, “Exegesis of
Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 142); and Theophylact makes certain statements that “seem to be capable of an
Augustinian interpretation” in suggesting Adam as the antecedent to ἐφ’ᾧ, but “his thinking is not so
straightforward” as to lead to an Augustinian concept of original sin, as he goes on to describe this
inheritance as one not of guilt, but of mortality (Weaver, “The Exegesis of Romans 5:12, part III,” 248).
48

See, for example, Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 6-7; Kroeker, Erasmus in the
Footsteps of Paul, 37; Rabil, Erasmus and the New Testament, 51-52n42, 105, 116; Christ-Von Wedel,
Erasmus of Rotterdam, 49; Dodds, Exploiting Erasmus, 46.
49

Cf. Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle, 44: “[Origen’s] different approaches will allow later
commentators to use his exegesis of this locus in different ways, as can be illustrated by comparing
Augustine and Erasmus.”
50

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 250. Thomas P. Scheck in his editorial notes on this passage in
Origen acknowledges a “resemblance between the thoughts expressed here and later views developed by
Ambrosiaster and Augustine” and concedes that “Origen may be attributed with passing down the
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Still, despite his use of an image supporting a seminal connection and transmission of sin,
Origen never explicitly connects this to vicarious guilt, focusing rather on inherited
punishment and mortality (to say that all people “were expelled with Adam” is slightly
different than saying that all bear the guilt of his action), and his broader context
emphasizes personal responsibility for actual sins. Origin’s comments elsewhere about
humans being born in a sinful state come within the context of his theory of the pretemporal existence of souls. So, while appearing also in other places to anticipate an
Augustinian realist view of original sin (insofar as each seeks to establish a physical or
natural link between an actual sin and each individual’s inborn culpability), Origin differs
by making individuals all the personal culprits of their own primal sins, rather than
locating them seminally within Adam when he sinned.51 Just as significantly, Origen’s
fourth-fifth century Latin translator Rufinus “tended to adjust Origen’s teachings in the
direction of western orthodoxy,” including the ἐφ’ᾧ in Romans 5:12, which he presented
“as meaning ‘in whom,’ whereas [Origen] really understood it as meaning ‘since.’”52 As
Willet quotes Origen in Latin, we can assume that he received his thought on original sin
through Rufinus’s filter.

exegetical material for the doctrine of original sin,” while expressing agreement with the scholarly
consensus that this resemblance does not lead Origen to an affirmation of inherited guilt (editor’s note in
Origen, Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5, 311n69). Erasmus, commenting on this same passage from
Origen, states that “these words seem to have in view original sin, although on closer inspection it appears
otherwise,” and he goes on to explain that Origen was simply explaining here why Paul considers Adam,
instead of Satan or Eve, to be the author of sin. Its propagation according to Origen, Erasmus insists, is by
imitation (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 143-144). Willet objects to this logic, claiming that if sin’s
propagation to humanity were solely by imitation, then Satan would be considered here the author of sin.
The identification of Adam as sin’s entry point into the rest of humankind indicates to Willet that the
connection is not by mere imitation but by natural propagation (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 246, 272).
51

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. I,” 195-196; Jordan Cooper, “The Lutheran Doctrine of
Original Sin in Light of Other Christian Traditions,” Logia 22, no. 4 (Reformation 2013): 13.
52

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. I,” 196, 196n29.
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We can find in Chrysostom, too, statements that could lead to opposing
interpretations. He writes, for instance, that for one man to be “punished on account of
another does not seem to be much in accordance with reason,” while asserting that
“nothing is unreasonable in the fact that one committed sin and was made mortal, and
that they who are from him are in the same condition.”53 To one as Willet, who took the
connection between mortality, punishment, and sin for granted,54 Chrysostom’s
distinction would be untenable; if death was the penalty for Adam’s guilt, then the
passing on of that mortal nature would assume that the guilt also was passed along. This
issue hinges on the broader anthropological question of how immortality is attributed to
humanity. If immortality is seen as a supernatural gift that is added to the essential nature
of humanity, then a congenital mortality can stem from sin and yet cease to be viewed as
a punishment in each succeeding generation. If, however, the supernatural grace of
immortality is considered to be an essential element of true (pre-fall) human nature, then
the penal aspect is logically appropriated to each mortal individual. Chrysostom himself
stops short of affirming inherited guilt, which would to him (as to Pelagius) suggest “the
Manichean-sounding idea of an inherently evil nature.”55 Adam’s progeny bear
consequences from Adam’s sin, but not its guilt. Similarly, in the eleventh century
Theophylact—who was influenced by Chrysostom56—focused on inherited mortality.
Although he—to Willet’s satisfaction—makes Adam the antecedent to the ἐφ’ᾧ, he does
53

Quoted in Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 141. Cf. “But what means, ‘for that all
have sinned?’ This; he having once fallen, even they that had not eaten of the tree did from him, all of
them, become mortal” (Chrysostom, The Epistle to the Romans, 401 [Homily X] ).
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See, for example, Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 249-251.
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Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 141.
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Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. III,” 247; Payne, “Erasmus: Interpreter of Romans,” 9.
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not develop this grammatical choice toward a theology of original sin, but focuses rather
on mortality.57 Thus, while Willet tries to establish broad historical support for his
reading in both the western and eastern branches of the church, his strongest support from
tradition is from Augustine; despite some ambiguity in its articulation, the general thrust
of the Greek side was the same concept of inherited mortality that Willet condemned in
Theodoret.58
From a narrowly linguistic perspective, the possibility of Willet’s Augustinian
rendering of ἐφ’ᾧ depends on whether the preposition ἐπί can be taken to mean ἐν, and
he provides only two debatable instances from Hebrews to argue that it can.59 Willet
offers as examples “Heb.9.17. ἐπὶ νεκροῖς, the testament is confirmed in the dead, Beza:
and Heb.9.[10]. ἐπὶ βρώμασι, in meates.”60 The renderings that he cites, however, are rare
in early English bibles, with only Wycliffe’s translation and Rheims having
“in” in both places, and the Geneva and King James having it in 9:17.61 Vermigli, in fact,
had cited the unlikelihood of this usage (in “good authors,” anyhow) in support of taking
ἐφ’ᾧ in a causal sense: “Others thinke that ἐφ’ᾧ, ought to be referred unto Adam. But
against these men is the signification of this preposition ἐπί, which when it is joyned with
57

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. III,” 248-250. Photius too, whom Willet claims but
Erasmus omits, lacks a clear formulation of inherited guilt in original sin: “Neither does he hold to an idea
of a racial participation in the sin of Adam, his language at that point referring in fact to humanity's
sinning with Adam, as partners, accomplices or collaborators through their own sins, not in him” (Weaver,
“Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. III,” 246-247).
58

Weaver, “Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. II,” 150.
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As we have seen, there was no unanimity even as to whether the two words ἐφ’/ἐπί and ᾧ
should be taken as two separate words or as a single unit.
60

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 250. Beza’s Latin rendering of Hebrews 9:17 translates the
phrase: “Testamentum enim in mortuis ratum est…”
61

Tyndale, Coverdale, Matthew’s, the Great Bible, Taverner’s, and the Bishops’ Bible all have
variations of “with meats” in Hebrews 9:10 and “when men are dead” in 9:17.
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a dative case, as Erasmus sayth: is not amongst any good authors, founde to signifie all
one with ἐν, that is, in.”62 Vermigli actually takes Erasmus’s grammatical assessment a
hair beyond how Erasmus himself stated it. Erasmus does not say that no good author
ever used ἐπί for ἐν, but that he had himself never encountered such usage: “Since, then,
the use of Greek prepositions is so varied, I should not dare to assert that ἐπί is never
found with the dative case when one thing is said to be in another, as a tree is in the seed;
but I, at least, have not this far happened to come upon any such thing.” He goes on to
claim that even if the “in whom” reading is granted, the passage can still be read as
referring to imitative sin.63

2.2.4 Original Sin and Related Theological Concerns
Many theological concerns connect to one’s understanding of original sin, and
Willet attempts to toe a narrow line between several potential pitfalls; skewing the
balance between actual sin and inherited guilt in either direction could lead to too narrow
a conception of sin’s toxicity and questions about God’s justice.64 Whereas actual sin
consists of “such things as are said, done, or coveted against the law of God,” sin’s full
power extends beyond the wayward will to encompass “any thing which is contrary to the
62

Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 112v.
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Erasmus, Annotations on Romans, 141.
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Willet also attempts—with limited success—to communicate a moderate position on whether
original sin is a substance or a privation. He refutes, on one hand, the suggestion of Flacius Illyricus that
original sin is “a kind of substance,” reasoning that “God onely is the Creator of substances, and nature: but
hee made not sinne,” but denies, on the other hand, the argument of “Bellarmine with other of the
Romanists” that original sin is merely the privation of original justice, since this take poor account of the
scriptural language of “an in-dwelling sinne” and “the bodie of death,” which language suggests that
original sin does have “a kind of existence” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274-275). While Willet
himself does not make this connection, his suggestion of a non-substantial reality somewhere between
privation and substance bears some similarity to the Reformed understanding of Christ’s “real presence” in
the Eucharist.
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law of God,” including “the naturall rebellion and resistance of the flesh.”65 This
conception of sin treats it as more than merely a broken rule; it functions as a kind of
disease, or as a toxin that is noxious whether ingested intentionally or unintentionally.66
And yet—since death is a punishment for sin—in order to stand with God’s justice, all
who die (i.e. everyone) must also be guilty of sin.67 Anyone who lives long enough will
accrue plenty of sin of all kinds, but the death of infants (a tragic reality that Willet
himself had experienced in his own family) evidenced to Willet a corrupt nature that
precedes the committing of actual sins. “But the Apostle evidently sheweth,” he reasons,
“that not onely death is entred into the world, but sinne also: for how could infants in the
justice of God be subject unto death, if they were not also guilty of sinne.”68 Willet’s
logic here raises the question of whether imputed guilt or guiltless punishment would
render God more “unjust.” While many critics of the notion of inherited guilt had argued
that it was inconsistent with God’s justice,69 Willet argues in essence that the alternative
65

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 275.
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Erasmus also describes sin as a kind of poison, and Carrington points out how this image can
work against his emphasis on the propagation of sin by imitation (Carrington, “Erasmus’s Readings,” 1516).
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Those opposed to the Augustinian teaching on original sin, naturally, understood the
relationship between punishment and death differently. The Pelagians, for instance (as Willet reports their
view), favored a view of death as a “defect of nature” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 272), and Erasmus
drew a distinction between a physical and a spiritual death of infants (Erasmus, Annotations on Romans,
139).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 250-251. The example of infants—whether the disturbing
incidences of infant mortality or the age-old sacramental practice of infant baptism—factored frequently
into debates about original sin, since these infants represent a form of human nature that is minimally
affected by experience. In addition to Beza (cited earlier) and Willet, we find, for example, Augustine
reasoning “backwards” from the church’s practice of paedobaptism toward a theory of original sin (Wiley,
Original Sin, 49-52) and Pelagians seeking to affirm the same practice while highlighting other benefits of
baptism (i.e. besides forgiveness of sin), so as to avoid the suggestion of innate sinfulness (Weaver,
“Exegesis of Romans 5:12, Pt. I,” 201-202). Willet reasons not only from the death of infants, but from
Christ’s death on behalf of all (including infants); if Christ died for babies, there must be some punishment
(he reasons) that was due to them (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 280).
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Cf. Blocher, Original Sin, 121.
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of an inherited penalty (apart from any guilt) would be a greater affront to justice.70
Just as neglecting inherited guilt leads to theological problems, so does
diminishing the role of a corrupted nature and its sinful fruit. Willet criticizes certain
Roman Catholics (Pighius and Catharinus)71 who “too much extenuate [original sin], and
allow it too little,” in focusing solely on the imputation of Adam’s guilt on his posterity.
Pighius had argued that, in Willet’s words, original sin referred exclusively to Adam’s sin
imputed to his posterity “because Adam in himselfe contained all mankind, and God
made his covenant not onely with him, but with all his posteritie, being then in his loynes,
and so his sinne is imputed unto them”72 (that is, a hybrid of the federal and realist
models). This denial of any inherent corruption in original sin could falsely lead to a kind
of Christian perfectionism73 and would also go against divine justice: “if there were not in
us originall sinne by nature of our owne, but onely Adams imputed, it would follow, that
his posteritie should be punished not for their owne, but an others sinne: which were
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Turretin would make a similar argument about God’s justice in his defense of inherited guilt (in
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Denlinger demonstrates, though, that Pighius’s interpretation was not well received by Roman
Catholics, and that Catharinus—whose views were markedly different— has been unfairly lumped together
with Pighius (Denlinger, “Calvin’s Understanding,” 233). On Pighius and his debate with Calvin, see John
Calvin, The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defence of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choice
Against Pighius, ed. Anthony N. S. Lane, trans. G. I. Davies (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1996);
Anthony N. S. Lane, “The Influence upon Calvin of his Debate with Pighius,” in Auctoritas Patrum II:
neue Beiträge zur Rezeption der Kirchenväter im 15 und 16 Jahrhundert, ed. Leif Grane, Alfred Schindler,
and Markus Wriedt (Mainz, Ger.: Philipp von Zabern, 1998), 125-139; Anthony N. S. Lane, “Albert
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274-275.

This Willet addresses while refuting the Pelagian/Papist claim that original sin is completely
removed in baptism (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274).
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against the rule of Gods justice, Martyr.”74 This is virtually the same complaint of those
who denied original sin altogether. For Willet, the difference between God justly and
unjustly punishing people for another’s sin hinged on whether that sin also corrupted the
“heir’s” own nature. If it did not, punishment would be unjust; if it did, it would not only
be just, but it would explain how infants could bear guilt (the guilt of congenital
concupiscence) even before they commit actual sins.
Willet notes the division in Roman Catholic opinion on this issue, but he
disapproves of the confutation offered by Bellarmine and Pererius, which merely
“confute[s] one error by an other.” This line of response to Pighius was based on a faulty
parallel with the “inherent justice” that is supposedly infused in the believer through
Christ’s meritorious work; just as Christ makes the believer truly just (argue Bellarmine
and Pererius), so Adam’s sin truly corrupts his descendants. But the parallelism between
Adam’s legacy and Christ’s redemption, Willet counters, is not quite so simple and
direct. The righteousness that is imputed to us through Christ corresponds to Adam’s
imputed sin and guilt, but our additional “evilnes and pravity of nature procured by the
transgression of Adam” finds no correspondence in our justification: “there is also in the
faithfull an inherent righteousnes also, which is their holines and sanctification, but they
are not thereby justified before God.”75 Since the Adam/Christ parallel deals with our
condemnation and redemption, forcing an element of our sanctification into service to try
to demonstrate a truth about the damnable condition of fallen humanity merely confounds
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 275.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 275.
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the issue.76
The translation and interpretation of ἐφ’ᾧ in Romans 5:12 illustrates the intricate
interplay between linguistic and polemical concerns in the exegesis of Romans.77 The
text’s bearing on original sin creates a veritable minefield for one as Willet, who
carefully sidesteps readings that could lend support to a Pelagian works-righteousness, a
Manichaean dualism, a traducian distancing of God from successive generations of souls,
an Erasmian threat to Paul’s Adam/Christ parallel, or a denial, à la Pighius, of personal
responsibility. While he concedes that “we cannot give a sufficient reason of this, how
originall sinne should be propagated”—averring simply that “it is enough for us that it is
so”78—Willet suggests that the safest course of interpretation follows Augustine’s
translation of ἐφ’ᾧ as “in quo/ in whom,” which he interprets to include both the realist
conception of Adam’s progeny sinning “seminally” in him79 and the reality of individual
souls being tarnished by an innate depravity. The characterization of the Reformed
position as emphasizing inherited guilt through Adam’s federal headship, to the exclusion
of other understandings, thus misses much of the nuance of Reformed commentators like
Willet. For instance, Jordan Cooper—while offering a generally fair picture of one strain
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I deal more extensively with Willet’s arguments concerning justification and sanctification in
chapter 5, in the section on confusion of cause and effect (section V.2).
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Contra Calvin’s nineteenth-century editor John Owen’s claim that the particles ἐφ’ᾧ “ have
been variously rendered, without much change in the meaning,” (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 201n1).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 273.

Despite the roots of English federalism within Cambridge Puritanism (Strehle, Calvinism,
Federalism, and Scholasticism, 328-329), Willet leans toward a realist interpretation of what it means to
sin “in” Adam (e.g. “And thus sinne entred into the world: first Adam sinned beeing in and a part of the
world, and in him all mankind sinned, beeing then in his loynes,” Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 247).
However, in spite of passages where Willet denies that original sin is “imputed onely” (e.g. his arguments
against Pighius, p. 275), he never flatly denies the possibility of a federal theory of original sin—only a
federal theory that is divorced from “a reall and inherent corruption” in human nature. Cf. Denlinger’s
critical response to suggestions of a federalist model in Calvin.
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of Reformed thought on original sin—mentions Calvin’s rejection of the Augustinian
realist view, but not the acceptance of other Reformed thinkers. His assessment, also,
that, “In contrast to the later Reformed approach, which emphasized Adamic guilt in his
representative role, Melanchthon argued that guilt is due to the inheritance of a sin nature
rather than the actual sin of Adam,” overlooks the presence of this emphasis also among
many Reformed thinkers. His conclusion, then, that “while the other various traditions
have valid concerns and thoughts on this issue, it is only the Lutheran tradition that
retains a proper balance between these patristic ideas,” is not entirely fair to the breadth
of the Reformed perspective on original sin.80

2.3 “Believing” vs. “Believing in”
A misunderstanding of the Hebrew preposition ְ( בּbeth) in Exodus 14:31 lent
faulty support, argued Willet and other Protestants, to the Roman Catholic invocation of
saints. The Rhemist annotators had appealed to this verse to defend the practice in the
context of Romans 10:14 (“How shall they call on him, in whom they have not
beleeved…?”),81 which various Protestant writers had averred invalidated prayers to
anyone but God. We can believe human witnesses, these Protestants had argued (that
their testimony is true), but we are to believe in (and, therefore call upon) God alone. The
Exodus passage (“they beleeved in []בּ
ֽ ַ God and in [ ְ ]בMoses”), Willet explains, offers no
scriptural warrant for trusting in humans because the Hebrew case structure functions
80
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Cooper, “The Lutheran Doctrine of Original Sin,” 16, 18, 20.

The relevant portion of the Rheims annotation reads: “But if our adversaries thinke that we can
not invocate [saints in heaven], because we can not beleeve in them: let them understand that the Scripture
useth also this speech, to beleeve in men: and it is the very Hebrew phrase, which they should not be
ignorant of that bragge thereof so much. Exod. 14,31. They beleeved in God and in Moyses” (Martin, New
Testament, 409).
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differently from that of Latin or Greek: “though the preposition (beth) which signifieth
(in) be used, yet it is no more, then is expressed in the Latine phrase in the dative case”—
a basic point of grammar that is translated properly and clearly communicated even in the
Vulgate (“crediderunt Deo & Mosi”).82 The Israelites in the Exodus narrative do not,
thus, put their trust in Moses, but rather believe that he is a true prophet of God.
Willet directs those desiring a more extended refutation of the Rhemists’
annotations on Romans 10:14 to the answer given by William Fulke. Fulke’s response to
the Rhemists—published first in 1589, the year of his death and seven years after the
publication of the Rheims New Testament—makes the same grammatical point, stating
that the phrase in Exodus 14:31 should not be “translated with the Preposition that ruleth
an Accusative or Ablative case, but with a Dative case,” and he mentions no fewer than
three times that the Romanists’ own Latin Bible translates this correctly.83 In his
English rendering of the Latin version of Exodus 14:31 (and of a related construction in 2
Chronicles 20:20), Fulke attempts to avoid confusion by carefully distinguishing between
credere with and without the added preposition by translating the former “to believe in”
and the latter “to give credit to.” He also curtly dismisses the Rhemist citation of the fifth
verse of Philemon84—“where any man that is not obstinately blinde” can recognize that
“faith” is linked to Christ, and “love” to the saints—and enlists a team of the early
Church figures Cyprian, Eusebius, Rufinus, and Primasius (d. c. 560) to counter the
Rhemist reference to the Creed’s stated belief in the holy Catholic Church and the claim
82

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 481.
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Fulke, Text of the New Testament, 254v.
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“…thy love and faith which thou hast toward our Lord Jesus, and unto all the Saints…” The
Rhemish annotations on this verse also argue that faith and love appear together because both are necessary
for justification. For Willet’s response to this popular Roman Catholic assertion, see section V.2.2.1.
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that “the ancient fathers” read that article similarly to how the Roman Catholic church
interpreted it.85 In the usage of the Church Fathers who applied the Creed’s preposition
“in/εἰς” to “the holy Catholic church,” Fulke explains, “to beleeve in the Church, was no
more but to beleeve that there is a Catholike Church.”86 He defends this assertion with
lengthy quotations in which Eusebius and the fourth century Italian Rufinus make God
the only appropriate object of (proper) “belief in.”87 The Eusebius citation also refers to
the parallel distinction between “believing” and “believing in” God, noting the familiar
example of the devil’s impious “belief.”88 “Therefore,” Willet’s predecessor in polemics
concludes, “the Scripture useth no such speech, that can be translated in English” to
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The (Apostles’) Creed does not have a preposition immediately preceding the mention of the
church, though the grammatical structure certainly implies that the “in” would distribute along with “I
believe” to govern “the holy catholic Church” as well as “the Holy Spirit.” The Rhemist annotations claim
that the Church Fathers read “indifferently, I beleeve in the Catholike Church, and, I beleeve the Catholike
Church…” For our purposes, it will suffice to note Fulke’s position that those Fathers who used the first
construction did not mean what was commonly conveyed by the preposition “in.” Interestingly, it is the
Latin form of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed that—contrary to what we might expect given the
present debate—lacks the preposition before the mention of the church (“Et unam…ecclesiam”) that is
present in the Greek form (“εἰς μίαν…ἐκκλησίαν”). These creeds can be found in William A. Curtis, A
History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark,
1911), 64, 74-75.
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Rufinus is particularly appropriate to Fulke’s argument: “…but of creatures and mysteries, the
Preposition In, is not added, that it should be said in the holy Church, but that we should beleeve that there
is an holy Church, not as God, but as a Church gathered to God. And men should beleeve that there is
remission of sinnes, not in the remission of sinnes, and they should beleeve the resurrection of the body, not
in the resurrection of the body. Therefore by this syllable of Preposition, the Creatour is distinguished from
the creatures, and things pertaining to God, from things belonging to men” (Fulke, Text of the New
Testament, 254v; emphasis added).
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Eusebius states this distinction as: “to beleeve God, is to know naturally, but to beleeve in God,
that is faithfully to seeke him,” (quoted in Fulke, Text of the New Testament, 254v). The meaning denoted
by the preposition in Eusebius’s explanation, then, is consistent with Fulke’s broad argument (i.e., belief in
is something stronger than mere “belief”), but it is the opposite of Fulke’s particular explanation of the
creedal expression where “belief in” can simply mean belief that something exists. Our modern usage tends
to make a rule of what was in Fulke’s work the exception—“belief in God” now signals mere theism, while
“believing God” designates the trust of a follower. Cf. Calvin’s use of Augustine’s threefold distinction
between “credere Deum (believing that God exists), credere Deo (believing what God says), [and] credere
in Deum (embracing God in knowledge and love),” as described in Barbara Pitkin, What Pure Eyes Could
See: Calvin’s Doctrine of Faith in Its Exegetical Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 13.
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support the belief or trust in creatures that constitutes the basis for invoking the saints.89

2.4 “Baptism in” vs. “Baptism into”
The preposition “in” factors into Willet’s argument also in his comments on
Romans 6:3, where he insists that a correct reading hinges on the proper understanding of
εἰς with the accusative in ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν as our being “baptized into
Christ.” The Vulgate’s rendering as in Christo (“in Christ”)90 misreads and tames Paul’s
expression; “it is one thing to bee baptized in Christ, an other into Christ.”91 Willet cites
Lyra and the interlinear gloss as examples of the “in Christ” rendering leading to false
interpretations of the phrase to mean merely baptism in Christ’s faith, or as instituted by
him. Even some interpreters, though, who “follow the Greeke text, and read, into Christ”
soften the language and interpret it to mean baptism “in the name of Christ” (Vermigli,
Pareus, and Faius)92 or into Christ’s “mysticall bodie” (Erasmus; Willet objects: “but the
Apostle speaketh of Christ himselfe,” while conceding “that they which are graft into
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Fulke, Text of the New Testament, 254v.
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As the Latin preposition in can mean both “in” (with the ablative) or “into” (with the
accusative), Willet’s issue here is, properly, with the Vulgate’s translating the Greek accusative Χριστὸν
Ἰησοῦν as a Latin ablative, Christo Jesu (cf. Beza’s in Christum Jesum). Since the shift in cases affects the
meaning of the preposition, though, I am including this translation issue in this section on prepositions. On
the seventeenth-century understanding of this Latin preposition, cf. entry for “in” in Riders Dictionarie
(London: Adam Islip for John Bill, 1626). The Rheims New Testament follows the Vulgate’s lead and
translates this phrase “baptized in Christ Jesus.” While the Rhemist annotations on the verse give no hint of
any exegetical tension between “in” and “into,” their description of this baptism as “the entrance to
Christian religion” exemplifies the impersonal kind of reading that Willet was opposing. The Rhemist
commentary on this verse does take one subtle jab at Protestant soteriology by stating that Paul would have
“not onely faith to justifie, but the Sacraments also, and al Christian religion” (Martin, New Testament,
396-397).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 287.

Pareus interprets this verse in light of Acts 10:48, which specifies baptism as being in Christ’s
name. His commentary on this verse does not mention a distinction between baptism into Christ and in his
name, but rather focuses on how the expression does not exclude the other members of the trinity (Pareus,
Commentarius…ad Romanos, 560-561).
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Christ, are also members of his mysticall body”).93 Among those interpreting the phrase
with the “better” signification “that we are by baptisme incorporated into Christ,” Willet
lists Calvin, Beza, and Tolet.94
In reality, there is very little substantial difference on this issue between Willet
and the different Protestants whom he seeks to correct—his disagreement with them
being confined narrowly to the grammar of this one verse and not extending to any
broader doctrinal divide concerning our union with Christ in baptism. His selective
quotations serve here only to illustrate minor grammatical choices, obscuring somewhat
some broader similarities among his sources. For instance, Calvin, who receives Willet’s
approbation for writing that we are “really united to the body of Christ” and that through
baptism “we may be one with him,” also draws from this verse that baptism is the means
“by which we are initiated into [Christ’s] faith”—a description similar to the Lyra
reading that Willet found wanting.95 Likewise, while Vermigli is reproved for one
element of his reading, his interpretation also includes language consonant with union
with Christ: we “passe into Christ,” are “joyned together with him,” and “in baptism we
are bound unto Christ.”96 Calvin even explicitly communicated to Vermigli his agreement
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 287. Willet does not spell out here what constitutes the
distinction between baptism into Christ’s mystical body and Christ himself.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 287-288.
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Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 220.
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Vermigli, however, also employs a similitude that weakens the potential unio cum Christo
overtones of the image of being “bound” to Christ, likening our being bound (obstringimur) to him to
soldiers being bound (obstringuntur) to their captain, and characterizing the latter as a matter of vows and
obedience. Vermigli’s language of “binding” in this context, then, is less one of being engrafted and more
one of being “honor-bound” (Vermigli, S. Paul to the Romanes, 143v; Vermigli, S. Pauli Apostoli ad Rom,
450).
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with him regarding the nature of our union with Christ.97 And, though Willet disapproves
of Pareus’s reading of 6:3 as baptism in Christ’s name rather than into Christ himself, in
his reading of union with Christ as a guiding motif of Romans 8 he “appears to borrow
heavily” from Pareus98 (as indeed he does in many other parts of the commentary, as
well).
While Willet’s insistence on maintaining the sense of baptism “into Christ” that is
communicated by the Greek text of Romans 6:3 is not a characteristic Reformed
emphasis, it is not difficult to imagine why the distinction might have seemed to him
worthy of mention. The notion of a movement into Christ, as opposed to a mere loyalty to
Christ or a sharing of his faith, clearly connects baptism to the Reformed theme of our
unio cum Christo. And, while union with Christ had a long history in Roman Catholic
thought, there it was seen as the “culmination of spiritual experience”—as the goal, rather
than a driving force, of the Christian life.99 For Protestants, this notion of a union with
Christ that was not “the achievement of a few heroic souls but a divine gift received by
all true Christians”100 helped to show that Protestant theology did not neglect the
personal, transformative element of the Christian life—that the charge that its emphasis
on grace and faith made its conception of justification a mere “legal fiction” was
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unfounded.101 Indeed, Craig Carpenter notes that the idea of unio cum Christo provided
Calvin with a defense against a wide range of Roman Catholic attacks: “To seemingly
every objectionable point related to justification raised by Roman Catholics, from total
depravity to the necessity of assurance, Calvin responds by developing his doctrine of
union with Christ.”102 Thus, while Willet does not develop the theme of unio cum Christo
extensively at this point, his insistence on maintaining language suggestive of unio in
relation to baptism (the sacramental beginning of the Christian life) implicitly highlights
the Protestant understanding of union with Christ as a divine gift (not a human
achievement) and presents the transformative element of the Christian life as a matter of
believers being fused into Christ, rather than being infused with their own righteousness.

2.5 Different Prepositions Used Indifferently
As careful as Willet is to delineate shades of meaning conveyed by different
conjunctions and prepositions, he also at times accuses other exegetes of creating false
distinctions in places where Paul uses various prepositions indifferently. These instances
tend to involve a division drawn between different means of justification, with an
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Craig B. Carpenter, “A Question of Union with Christ? Calvin and Trent on Justification,”
Westminster Theological Journal 64, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 378. Moderately interesting side note: Carpenter
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Seminary.
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Carpenter, “A Question of Union with Christ?,” 384. Critics such as J. V. Fesko and Jeong Koo
Jeon have charged Carpenter with overemphasizing the centrality of “union with Christ” in Calvin’s
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Catholics had no place for unio in their doctrine of justification: J. V. Fesko, Beyond Calvin: Union with
Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700) (Göttingen, Ger.: Vanderhoeck
& Ruprecht, 2012), 19-20, 217n40; Jeong Koo Jeon, Covenant Theology and Justification by Faith: The
Shepherd Controversy and its Impacts (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2006), 14n17. These criticisms,
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unio cum Christo to deflect various Roman Catholic attacks against the Protestant conception of
justification.
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opponent citing Paul’s use of variant prepositions to justify a corresponding distinction
within the doctrine itself. Concerning Romans 3:30, for instance—though he disapproves
of Tremellius indifferently translating both ἐκ and διὰ as “through”103—Willet insists that
the expressions “of faith” and “through faith” are used to mean the same thing. He rebuts
most forcefully Origen’s (albeit creative) interpretation that the Jews (“the circumcision”)
are said to be justified “of faith” because their process of justification begins with faith
and reaches its perfection through good works, while the justifying path of the Gentiles
(“the uncircumcision”) begins with their good deeds and is perfected through faith.
Origen, for his part, was aware of the speculative nature of his suggestion, introducing it
with the caveat, “although it is possible to see excessive curiosity in this, nevertheless…”
However, he hazards this “excessive curiosity,” deeming it preferable to “casually
pass[ing] over” Paul’s prepositional variation; since Paul elsewhere chooses his
prepositions “in a carefully considered fashion,” it seemed probable to him that here, too,
the “alteration of prepositions…was not uttered by [Paul] purposelessly.” 104 Willet
objects to Origen’s insertion of works into the logic of the passage to explain Paul’s
choice of prepositions, arguing that this contradicts both the Apostle’s clear meaning and
Origen’s own previous statement about the sufficiency of faith for justification.105 Origen
himself was attempting to defend Paul against those who accused the Apostle of “writing
mutually contradictory statements.” Origen’s own (apparent) contradiction can be
103

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 145.
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Origen, Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5, 233, 231 (3.11.1, 3.10.2). Willet disapprovingly
mentions this interpretation of Origen again in the context of Romans 9:30-32, where he asserts that neither
is there any distinction “between righteousnesse of the law, and by the law” (although Willet there seems
accidentally to invert Paul’s expression [νόμον δικαιοσύνης], even though he had translated this correctly
as the law of righteousness in his translation of chapter 9: Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 429).
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explained largely by his different polemical context. While Willet was reading Romans 3
against the background of Roman Catholic justification doctrine, Origen was at this place
opposing Marcion’s rending of Jews from Gentiles, and the Old Testament God from the
New Testament God. Thus, when Origen states that “the very same God justifies
members of both peoples who believe, and this is based not upon the privilege of
circumcision or uncircumcision but in consideration of faith alone,” he is opposing the
phrase “faith alone” not to works (as the Protestant movement would do), but to the
notion of a race-based justification. This, to Origen, makes sense of the Apostle’s
statement in the following verse, 3:31, that we do not make the law void through faith.
The “transient glory” of the law, Origen argues, may indeed be “set aside,” yet not by
faith or by an active disposal by any individual, but by its being “surpassed” by Christ’s
eternal glory.106
Exegetes proposing what Willet deemed a “more reasonable difference” between
the expressions ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ πίστεως include Gorrhan, Tolet, and Faius. Yet
Gorrhan’s distinction between Jews born within the covenant and Gentiles entering from
without (akin to the distinction between infant and adult baptism) would require linking
“of faith” to “the circumcision” instead of to “justified” (a move Willet deems untenable),
and Tolet’s concern to maintain “some difference” between Jews and Gentiles here to
avoid “confound[ing]” the two is justified, though not as pertains justification. The
Genevan Protestant Faius posits a distinction not between different means of justification,
but between identity and means, so that “of faith” serves to characterize which members
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Origen, Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5, 230, 233-236 (3.10.1, 3.11.1-5). For more on
Willet’s complex relationship to Origen, including the impact of each exegete’s polemical context, see
section VII.2.1.3.
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of each group are justified and “through faith” describes how that justification is effected.
While the statement that those who are of faith are justified through faith is
unobjectionable, Willet rejects this reading here, for then case Paul’s “sentence should be
very imperfect.”107
The best option, then, for a theologically consistent reading that avoids taking too
many liberties with Paul’s syntax is to take the diverse prepositions in these constructions
to “meaneth the same thing,” understanding “no difference betweene these two, to be
justified of faith, and through faith.” Willet notes that this was the opinion also of Calvin,
that Paul elsewhere uses the phrase ἐκ πίστεως in reference to the justification of
Gentiles,108 and that the Apostle uses the same two prepositions in Romans 11:36 in
reference to God, “not insinuating by this diversity of phrase, any different thing in
God.”109 From these observations Willet concludes that neither is there any distinction
between the means of justification of Jews and Gentiles.110
We find a similar argument in Willet’s discussion of the phrase “righteousness of
107

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 173. Willet does in other places, however, draw a similar
distinction between the identity of a group and some action attributable to the group (cf. V.3.1). Here,
however, he sees no theological necessity for such a distinction.
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distinction between Jew and Gentile, in referring to Gentiles as God’s children, though it lacks the phrase
“of faith.” It seems likely that Willet intended to point to Galatians 3:8, where Paul indeed writes of
Gentiles being justified “of faith”: “…ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῖ τὰ ἒθνη ὁ θεός…”
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the law” in Romans 10:5. Here Willet cites a distinction drawn by Pererius, Stapleton,
and Bellarmine between righteousness “of the law” and “by the law”—the first referring
to “when God by his grace doth helpe us to fulfill the law” and the second to that “which
a man doth of himselfe, without faith & grace, onely by the strength of free will.” It was
only this second kind of graceless legalism (iustitia ex lege), argued Willet’s Roman
Catholic foes, that Paul juxtaposes with the “righteousness of faith” in Romans 10:5-6;
the righteousness “of the law” (iustitia legis), they insisted, was fully compatible with
salvation by faith.111 Willet counters that the particular preposition used to connect
“righteousness” and “law” cannot alter the fundamental function of the law, which is not
to justify. There is no difference between “the righteousnesse of the law, and by the law,”
since “both of them have the same definition.” The same holds true for various other
prepositions that Paul uses when writing of the law—these prepositional phrases, “in
matter of justification are all one, and in effect the same: as that which [Paul] calleth the
righteousnesse νόμου, of the law, Rom. 8.4. the same is ἐκ νόμου, by the law, c.10.5. διὰ
νόμου, through the law, Gal. 2.21. ἐν νόμου, in the lawe, Gal. [3].11.”112 The Roman
Catholic interpretation of the expression “righteousness by the law” fails, moreover, since
any attempt to be justified apart from God’s grace and gift of faith would be “no justice
at all”—making the phrase a misnomer even within the (Semipelagian) Roman
understanding.113 Willet acknowledges, however, that Augustine had made a similar
distinction between righteousness “of the law” and “by the law.” While he dismisses this
as “impertinent to this purpose” since Augustine did not argue that either of these could
111
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justify, Willet’s recognition of Augustine’s usage shows at least a tacit acknowledgment
that the word “righteousness” could be applied (even if imperfectly) to processes that fail
to lead to any true righteousness.
The only true and proper “righteousness of the law,” then, is “no otherwise
fulfilled in us, then by faith in Christ”; Christ himself is the sole active agent in the
righteousness effected by the fulfillment of the law. There is indeed an active role for
Christians to play in being guided by the law, but this obedience comes in the context not
of justification but of sanctification, and Scripture speaks of this not as a way “to fulfill or
keep” the law, but as a way of life in which we “walke according to the law.”114
The Rhemist annotators also make a preposition-based argument for a role for
human merit in justification, arguing in Romans 8:18 that Protestants had twisted the
meaning of the verse through the “heretical translation” of ἄξια…πρὸς as “worthy of”
instead of “worthy to.”115 Whereas their Protestant “Adversaries” had taken this to mean
that our sufferings are not “worthy of” (i.e. able to merit) our glory, they argue that Paul
is simply saying that our sufferings are not “worthy to” (i.e. equal in magnitude to) the
glory that is (in some small way) merited by them. Willet’s response resists a distinction
of meaning between the two prepositional choices by nodding to the Rhemist annotators’
grammatical point in his translation of Romans 8 (translating the phrase as “not
answerable to”) while maintaining the “worthy of” translation of the majority of English
Protestant bibles in his Controversies section. He links the two translations by reasoning
that “if the sufferings of this life are neither in quantitie nor qualitie proportionable to the
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glorie, which shall be revealed, then can they not be meritorious; for betweene the merit
and reward there must be a proportionable equalitie, and an equall proportion.”116 Willet,
in essence, acknowledges that πρὸς is more naturally rendered as “to” here, while
insisting that to say that our suffering is not equal to our glory means also that it is not
worthy of, and cannot in any way merit, our glory. The shift in preposition here, then,
indicates not opposing interpretations, but different aspects of the same truth.117

3. Willet’s Identification of Rhetorical Devices in Romans
Despite a preference for literal interpretation, Andrew Willet was not such a rigid
literalist as to neglect rhetorical tropes and figures of speech in Romans that fit within a
broadly conceived literal sense.118 The identification of these devices provided a tool for
reconciling biblical texts that seemed to be at odds with theological conclusions drawn
from a collation of other passages, which was especially useful in the post-Reformation
era to counter the use of these troubling texts by Roman Catholic polemicists to refute
Protestant doctrine. Arguing for Paul’s use of figurative language gave both Protestants
and Roman Catholics, then, a measure of interpretive flexibility in drawing doctrines out
of the epistle to the Romans. This works, too, against the charge of “proof-texting” levied
against scholastic orthodoxy by John H. Hayes and others; the recognition that the
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language in many verses could be read in different ways necessitated reading these verses
within their immediate and broader contexts.119

3.1 Synecdoche
Willet identifies synecdoche (that is, “when a part is put for the whole”)120 in
Romans more than he does any other rhetorical device, this accounting for nearly onethird of all his comments on Paul’s usage of particular rhetorical techniques.121 Several of
these instances have to do with the relationship between body and soul, with each of
these terms standing frequently as shorthand for the entire body-soul unity.122 The most
interesting example of this from a polemical perspective comes in the context of the
series of controversies drawn from Romans 5 dealing with original sin. Addressing “the
manner how originall sinne is propagated, against the Pelagians, where it is disputed,
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whether the soule be derived from the Parents,” Willet selectively identifies synecdoche
in the process of delicately agreeing with the Pelagians’ anti-traducian position while
more vehemently repudiating the conclusions they draw concerning original sin. The
Pelagians, “to strengthen their error,” had denied the doctrine of original sin by arguing
that sin resides in the soul, which is not passed down genetically from one’s parents.123 In
refuting this assertion, Willet refuses to adopt the opinion of Tertullian that “the soule of
man is derived also ex traduce, as they tearme it,” arguing that only the flesh is
mentioned in Eve’s generation from Adam, and “no mention is made of the soule and
spirit of Eve.”124 Yet when it says in Genesis 46:26 that “66 soules came out of the loines
of Jacob,” this we must read as a synecdoche, the soul representing the whole person,
“because of the unitie of the person, and the neare conjunction of the soule and bodie,
which is true onely in the one part, namely the bodie, which onely came out of the
parents loynes.”125 Willet’s identification of synecdoche in Genesis wants somewhat for
consistency, his selective recognition of this trope aligning with his anti-traducian bent;
so if “flesh” is said to be hereditarily begotten, it must be limited to flesh alone, but if
“souls” are generated, the term is taken rhetorically to stand for the body in which the
123
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biologically inherited flesh and divinely created soul are united. Having dismissed the
traducian approach to refuting the Pelagian rejection of original sin, Willet admits (as we
saw earlier) that a confident account of how original sin is propagated may be beyond
human capacity. He follows this acknowledgment, though, with an image from Lyra to
depict how the process might take place: God creates and implants a soul, “concurring in
that naturall act of carnall generation,” and the soul is immediately tainted by the sinful
flesh, “as a good liquor is infected by the corruption of the vessell.”126 In this manner
Willet hopes to avoid both the traducian approach that distances God from the immediate
creation of souls and the Pelagian view that frees souls from the taint of original sin, as
well as the dangerous alternative of God creating souls in a sinful state “agreeable to their
corrupt bodies,” which would make God responsible for sin.127
Not surprisingly, Protestants and Roman Catholics interpreted references to
“faith” in Romans differently, and each side made occasional use of synecdoche to
expand a narrower conception of the term, as called for by context and theological
commitments. When Paul writes in Romans 12:3 that God has given “to everie one the
measure of faith,” Willet joins Vermigli in refusing the explanation given in the
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interlinear gloss that the reference is to justifying faith, since many who were not justified
received gifts of many kinds from God. Instead, Willet approves both of Vermigli’s
explanation that “faith” stands here (by metonymy) for “the gifts of faith” and of Beza’s
reading, in which faith “comprehendeth by a Synecdoche, the knowledge of Christ,
whereof the habite of justifying faith is a fruit and effect.”128 This broader reading, to
Willet, better encompasses the various gifts (and degrees of gifting) that God grants “to
everie one.” When, two chapters later, Paul discusses the weak and strong “in faith,” it is
the immediate context of Paul’s words that leads Willet to endorse Piscator’s note that
“here by faith we may understand the perswasion of the use of things indifferent, by a
synecdoche, the whole beeing taken for a part.”129 Willet seems to connect this reading
with the important distinction between a faith that is lacking due to obstinacy and one
that is flawed by insufficient instruction—the Romans 14 example of divisions over
adiaphora illustrating the (less serious) ignorance-based failing. All of this supplements
Willet’s central argument from Paul’s words here that “there is great difference betweene
a weake faith, and a false faith: for faith, though it be weake may justifie, so can not a
false faith.”130
The Romanist attempt to expand faith by synecdoche to include a broader nexus
of virtues, however, Willet dismisses based on his working definition of faith. Willet,
citing Vermigli, denies that the faith that was imputed to Abraham as righteousness in
Romans 4:3 could be “taken here by a Synecdoche, when one part is taken for all, as
including workes.” While this would seem an exegetical move similar to Willet’s
128
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synecdochic treatment of faith elsewhere, here the reference is clearly to justifying faith,
which in Protestant understanding is in its very nature independent of good works. And
so, “faith cannot include that which it excludeth: if faith justifie without workes, then
under workes, cannot faith be comprehended.”131
We will spend some time in chapter 5 both looking at the “golden chain” in
Romans 8 (V.2.3.1) and considering the rhetorical inversion of cause and effect that
Willet occasionally identifies throughout Romans (V.2.5). It is fitting here, though, to
note an instance within that Romans 8 chain where Willet’s interpretation combines
justification and sanctification—which he is normally very careful to keep distinct—
through synecdoche. Addressing why Paul skips over sanctification in Romans 8:30—
vaulting from justification directly to glorification—Willet explains that “sanctification
must be understood, and it is here by a synecdoche included in justification, as the more
principall.”132 While it might seem somewhat surprising that Willet would venture such a
close association of sanctification with justification, given how adamantly he criticizes
Roman Catholic exegetes for confusing the two elsewhere,133 he reminds us among the
moral observations drawn from Romans 8 (citing verse 8:1) of the organic connection
between justification and sanctification: “Sanctification must not be severed from
justification.”134 The two are, in an almost Chalcedonian fashion, both necessarily
distinguished and inseparable. Thus, while it may be a fine distinction, it is nonetheless
131
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an essential one between confusing justification with sanctification, and rhetorically
including sanctification within justification as its necessary effect.

3.2 Metonymy
A close rhetorical cousin of synecdoche, metonymy—which Willet defines as
when the subject is put for the adjunct (as when the sign is given for the thing signified,
or the effect for the cause)135—also plays a significant role in Willet’s exegesis of
Romans. As we will see in a later chapter,136 a rhetorical device that intentionally inverts
cause and effect also increases the complexity of those polemical debates involving the
supposed confusion of cause and effect. The close association between metonymy and
synecdoche is apparent in Willet’s occasional recognition of the two tropes operating in
tandem. We have already seen the pairing in Willet’s interpretation of the “measure of
faith” in Romans 12:3, which can either point forward (by metonymy) to the effects of
faith, or backwards to represent (by synecdoche) the knowledge of Christ from which
faith emerges. Part of the distinction, then, is a matter of perspective; with cause and
effect, for example, if the two are viewed as different but related, they can be connected
by metonymy, but if the effect is seen as being somehow included within the cause, the
connection can properly be termed synecdoche. The same “double figure is to be
admitted” also in reference to Paul’s serving God in his “minde” in 7:25, where the mind
can by metonymy represent “the sanctitie and holines wrought in the minde by grace,” or
by synecdoche the renewed mind standing in for the regenerate totality of mind and
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body,137 and in the mention of “your bodies” in 12:1, where the bodies can (by
synecdoche) stand for the body-soul unity, or (by metonymy) the affections residing in
the body.138
The recognition of some instances of metonymy is a matter of common sense, as
the literal meaning would create an absurdity. Such is the case, for instance, in Paul’s
referring to Jews and Gentiles not as “the circumcised” and “the uncircumcised,” but as
“the circumcision” (ἡ περιτομή) and “the uncircumcision” (ἡ ἀκροβυστία). Willet
identifies these titles as examples of metonymy (the characteristic sign representing the
people group), with little commentary or argument, the identification being unlikely to
stir much controversy.139 Other instances, if not necessarily involving matters of great
controversy, are not as obviously identified. So, for example, regarding Paul’s statement
in Romans 11:24 that the “gifts and calling of God are without repentance,” Willet cites a
“strange interpretation” of Ambrose that strains to maintain a literal signification of
“repentance” by referring the verse to those who were received into the church by
baptism, “of whom such exact repentance is not required.” This understanding, however,
fails by falsely assuming that anyone (of age) could receive baptism without repentance,
by referring the repentance to sins rather than to gifts, and by making humans the subject
of a “repentance” that is attributed by Paul to God. Since God, being perfect, cannot
properly “repent,” however, the best interpretation is to discern here “a figure called a
137
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metonymie, when the effect is taken for the cause, repentance here signifieth mutation
and change, whereof repentance is the cause.”140 Similarly, Ambrose and Origen both
misread Paul’s speaking “by grace” in Romans 12:3, making the “grace” to refer to a
particular divinely granted attribute of Paul’s, whether his eloquence or his wisdom.
Rather, Willet argues (with Vermigli and Calvin) that the proper reference is, by
metonymy, to Paul’s apostleship, so that “the Apostle ascribeth his calling unto grace,
[and] he thereby both freeth himselfe from all ambition, that he intrudeth not himselfe, as
also presseth his Apostolike authority, that they might more readily obey.”141 Again,
Willet holds that overlooking Paul’s use of metonymy here leads one to miss some
important nuances of his argument.

3.3 Metaphor
As was the case with synecdoche and metonymy, that Paul is using metaphor is
beyond dispute in certain places—as when he describes abstract nouns substantively.
Even in these cases, though, how exactly the metaphor is to be taken can be a matter that
is open to some interpretation. When Paul admonishes the Romans, for example, to “put
on the armour of light” in verse 13:12, it would strain the laws of logic and of physics to
read the image as anything but a metaphor. Willet, thus, jumps right to the signification,
explaining that the “metaphor noteth three things”: we must do good works with
“diligence” (as armor covers the whole body, and not only one part), “with delight” (as
there is “comelines in cloathing the body wherin we delight”), and with “constancie” (as
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armor is not donned just for one brief moment).142 Willet also identifies Paul’s imagery
of “night” and “day” in this verse as metaphor (the transition from night to day
representing the present age, which is a mix of darkness and light). All of this comes
under the question heading that purports to speak “of the literall sense” of this verse—
indicating that the “literal” sense of a text was seen as being broad enough to comprehend
tropes such as metaphor.143
Other images in Romans are not as plainly metaphorical, and so require a greater
measure of argumentation. Willet notes that, in seeking to understand what Paul means
by the “sealing of the fruite” that he is delivering to the saints in Jerusalem (Romans
15:28), “some take it literally,” with the “seals” being official stamps indicating how
much each church had contributed to the collection.144 This overly literal reading,
however, misses Paul’s point, as “the Apostle useth onely a metaphoricall speech” and
means to convey “no more but this”: that he will faithfully deliver what had been
entrusted to him.145 Similarly, a failure to recognize the metaphorical nature of Paul’s
language of “bear[ing] the infirmities” of the weak in 15:1 can minimize the true
obligations of the strong—for “to beare βαζάζειν, is not onely to tolerate and support” the
infirmities of the weak, but it is also “a metaphor taken from the fashion of building,
where the pillars doe carrie the weight and burthen of the house”; and supporting the
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weight of a house is surely a greater task than merely tolerating the foibles of a lessmature believer.146 In addition to helping to reveal new shades of meaning in a text, at
times properly identifying a metaphor could serve to equate the meanings of two texts the
meanings of which were apparently disparate, as in Willet’s explanation of the different
wordings of Isaiah 28:16 in the Hebrew and the LXX (“make hast[e]” vs. “be ashamed”).
Willet explains that Paul’s quoting of the LXX over the original in Romans 9:33 is not an
issue, as “there is no great difference in the sense: for that which the Prophet did expresse
by a metaphor, the Septuagint doe translate properly.”147
Touching a more significant polemical issue, Willet also attributed some of the
Romanist confusion concerning the Eucharist to their misreading of a metaphor. Without
citing any particular exegetes who had associated Romans 12:1 (“present your bodies a
living sacrifice”) with the Eucharist, Willet maintains that “the Romanists would proove
it out of this place” that this text shows that the Church is required to make a particular
external sacrifice, which is best understood as the celebration of the Mass.148 Willet
responds to this line of argument by distinguishing between a true sacrifice (Christ on the
cross) and “other sacrifices, not properly so called, but metaphorically; such are the
spiritual sacrifices of Christians” of the sort described by Paul in 12:1. Further, the Mass
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is not a sacrifice of either variety, but rather “a Sacrament, therefore no sacrifice: for a
Sacrament is a representation of a thing absent, a sacrifice is an oblation of a thing
present.”149 The respective characteristics of sacraments and sacrifices, argues Willet,
make the two mutually exclusive, and properly identifying the “sacrifice” in Romans
12:1 as a metaphor keeps the exegete from plundering the concrete elements from the
realm of the sacraments in search of a physical sacrifice that we can offer to God.
Given the interpretive flexibility inherent in identifying and explaining certain
metaphors, it is not surprising that Willet also rejects several of his opponents’
attributions of metaphor to various texts. Concerning Paul’s language of “redemption” in
Romans 3:24-25, for instance, Willet insists against those who would tame the term by
making it a mere metaphor that it “is not metaphorically so called; but it is a very true
redemption: there beeing all things concurring in redemption: the captives, which are
men, the redeemer Christ, the price his blood, and from whom we are redeemed, from
Sathan, hell, and damnation.”150 In the subsequent Controversies section, Willet connects
this misunderstanding directly to the Socinians, whose understanding of salvation was
incongruous with a redemption price. Here Willet argues “against Socinus that Christ
properly redeemed us by paying the ransome for us, and not metaphorically,” explaining
that simply because the language of redemption could be used metaphorically to exclude
a literal payment (as in the Exodus 15:13 description of the exodus) does not mean that it
should be read this way in every case.151 Willet also rejects the sixteenth-century Roman

149

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 571.

150

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 178.

151

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 188. Though the redemption itself is partly from Satan, Willet
insists that the ransom price is paid to God: “There is a difference between corporall and spirituall bondage:
for there the price is paid to the enemie, as to the great Turke, to get the captives out of his hand: but here

171

Catholic Oleaster’s attempt to soften Moses’ request in Exodus 32:31 that God blot him
out of his book (which is raised as a parallel to Paul’s similar expression in Romans 9:3)
by making it a kind of metaphor, stating that “it is more then a metaphoricall speech, as is
evident by the Lords answer.”152

3.4 A Minori ad Maius
Willet also frequently comments on Paul’s use of a minori ad maius (“from the
lesser to the greater”) arguments, which Paul often marks clearly by such expressions as
“how much more” (πόσῳ μᾶλλον). Many of these instances come in the context of
Romans 11, where God’s salvific work among the Jews and Gentiles broadly follows a
“lesser to greater” pattern. Willet’s emphasis on this a minori movement is evident in his
repeated highlighting of the device in his presentation of the sum and parts of chapter 11:
God’s end regarding the Jews is “amplified...v. 12. by an argument from the lesse to the
greater: that if the world gained so much by the rejection of the Jewes, much more by
their conversion”; that the Gentiles ought not to boast is supported “by an argument from
the greater to the lesse: if God spared not the naturall branches, much lesse the unnaturall,
v. 19, 20, 21”; and Paul’s hope for the conversion of the Jews “is amplified, by the
efficient, the power of God, and by an argument from the lesse to the greater, v. 24.”153

the price is paid to God, not to deliver us from him, but to reconcile us unto him.” And this ransom price
(the blood of Christ) is required by God not because “God thirsted for the blood of his Sonne, but after
mans salvation, quia salus erat in sanguine, because there was health in his blood” (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 189, 190).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 411. While it may seem obvious to take God’s response into
consideration in determining the meaning of Moses’ words, it is worth noting that context plays a
significant role in Willet’s interpretive method.
153

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 488. The second of the three cited here is technically an
argument a maiori ad minus, but the basic principle of argument by variation of degree is the same. Indeed,
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Despite the grim warning culminating in verse 21’s “take heede, [lest] he also spare not
thee,” Willet reads this section as a word of strong assurance, noting that its a minori
logic implicitly rules out an alternate logical pattern of parallelism that would have dire
consequences for Gentiles: since “the falling away of the Jewes was an occasion of the
calling of the Gentiles: it might be objected, that the conversion of the Jewes might
likewise be an occasion of the falling away of the Gentiles.” Paul, however, rejects this
implied possibility, and “he confirmeth his answer by an argument from the lesse to the
greater.”154 God’s having drawn Gentile faith from Jewish infidelity does not lead to the
converse of Jewish conversion occasioning Gentile rejection; rather, if God can transform
unfaithfulness into blessing, how much more can he draw good from faithfulness: “for
there is a greater force in that which is good , then in that which is evill.”155
When Willet arrives at the Controversies section of Romans 11, he applies Paul’s
“lesser to greater” pattern to the prevailing theme of election by grace in order to defend a
Reformed understanding of certainty and perseverance. Stapleton and Pererius had
interpreted verse 11:29 (“the gifts and calling of God are without repentance”) as
referring solely to the general election of the Jewish nation—and the lack of
“repentance,” moreover, meaning not that God could not change his mind, but that he did
not regret the initial act of electing the Jews. Willet’s own preferred interpretation (which
is consistent with “the judgement of Tolet a more worthie man, both for his judgement

the difference is largely semantic: “much lesse [will he spare] the unnaturall” could just as easily be
expressed “how much more will he not spare the unnatural.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 502. A similar argument can be found on p. 505.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 515.
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and dignitie in the Papall Church”)156 refutes this limitation on the scope of the constancy
of God’s election. Though Paul does not employ his a minori reasoning himself in this
verse, the “lesser to greater” spirit that pervades Romans 11 still informs Willet’s reading
of this passage: “The argument followeth not, because the Apostle speaketh of a generall
calling and adoption, therefore this sentence can not be applied unto particular election:
nay it followeth more strongly; if the common adoption be immutable, much more the
particular vocation of the elect.”157 Since Willet considers particular election to hold
greater weight than general election, it logically follows that if the latter is irrevocable, so
must be the former.
Paul’s image of the potter and clay, also drawn from the Romans 9-11 unit (verse
9:21) illustrates the potential challenge in distinguishing similitudes from opposites.
Absent a clear marker like “how much more,” a similitude cannot always be infallibly
identified as such. “Lukewarm” and “scalding” can, for instance, be taken as two ways of
describing heat, differing only by degree—or they can be used as opposites, as in
Revelation 3:15-16, with one denoting an extreme and the other a passionless middle
ground. Thus, when Jerome commented on the Romans 9 potter image, he erred—in
Willet’s judgment—by making “this a dissimilitude rather then a similitude, in this sense:
O man thinke not, that God hath made thee like a peice of clay, without any will or
motion: for the clay cannot answer the potter any thing: but thou makest answer to
God.”158 Chrysostom correctly recognized the analogy as a similitude, but made the
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For more on Willet’s practice of pitting various Roman Catholic exegetes against one another,

see VII.3.1.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 528.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 423.
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connection too limited. Erasmus, likewise, focused on the similarity between humans and
the clay, though he restricted God’s potter-like control to temporal, non-salvific
matters.159 The proper reading, Willet thus argues, is that “the Apostle in the enforcing of
this similitude, reasoneth à minori, from the lesse to the greater, that if a potter have such
power over his vessels which he maketh, God hath much more over the creature, to frame
and fashion it, as it may best serve for his glorie.”160 The varied interpretations of this
passage reflect each exegete’s understanding of election, whether in seeking to defend the
sovereignty of the human will, as Jerome and Erasmus, or in emphasizing God’s
sovereignty as Creator, as Willet and other Reformed readers.
Similarly implicit, though having more to do with ethics than polemics, are Paul’s
a minori arguments concerning the Christian’s responsibility for the weak brethren in
Romans 14-15. These exhortations draw on the moral implications of Christ’s selfsacrifice and the natural preference for friends over enemies. Considering questions
drawn from Romans 14, Willet applies a minori logic to Paul’s reminder in verse 15 that
Christ gave his life for the weak (“destroy not him with thy meate, for whom Christ
died”). Willet draws on Chrysostom’s “amplification” of this verse, summarizing his
argument: “Christ refused not death for him, thou…wilt not for thy brothers cause,
neglect thy meate: Christ died for his enemie, thou wilt not doe this for thy brother.”161
Again, in the following question (in the context of refuting those—Chrysostom
included—who read this verse as suggesting that those for whom Christ died truly could
159

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 423-424.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 424. Willet does acknowledge that there are certain
dissimilarities between a human and a lump of clay—including Jerome’s point that “clay hath no motion or
understanding, as man hath”—though he presents these as clearly subordinate to the primary similitude.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 645.
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be lost) Willet makes the “lesser to greater” progression more explicit: “if Christ gave his
life to redeeme him, much more should we give a piece of flesh to help save him.”162 In
the following chapter, Willet draws instead on the scriptural injunction to care for one’s
enemies when he expounds on Paul’s verse 15:1 counsel that “we which are strong ought
to beare the infirmities of the weake, and not to please our selves.” The reasoning,
though, still follows the a minori pattern: “the law of God…prescribeth, that if our
enemies asse should lie downe under his burthen, we should help him up, Deut. 22.4.
how much more ought we to shew this compassion to our weake brother?”163 In this
instance Paul neither makes the a minori connection explicit nor even references the
comparison to loving one’s enemies, but Willet draws these elements together through a
collation of texts to express what he deems to be an implicit aspect of Paul’s argument.

3.4.1 A Minori Logic and Politics
There is much to be said about the various political ramifications of Romans 13,
but we will limit ourselves here to a minori reasoning regarding magistrates as this was
employed by both Protestants and Roman Catholics. In this context Willet first uses this
type of argument to defend just war, claiming that Paul’s statement in 13:4 that the civil
magistrate “beareth not the sword in vaine: for he is the Minister of God, and revenger
162

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 646. In the course of addressing this question, Willet makes
use of the distinction between the “sufficiencie” and “efficacie” of Christ’s death, commenting that, as
Christ “died sufficiently for all,” if this is all that is meant by “for whom Christ died,” then one of these
could truly perish. But those for whom Christ died “effectually” cannot perish. For more on the distinction
between the sufficiency and efficiency of Christ’s atoning work, see Muller, Calvin and the Reformed
Tradition, 75-78, 88-96. Willet additionally draws on the distinction between the visible and invisible
Church, commenting that—because of our limited knowledge—“the Apostle speaketh not exactly and
precisely of those, whom in deede Christ died for, but of such, as in our charitable opinion, are held to be of
that number.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 673.
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for wrath on him, that doth evill” puts it “out of doubt, that it is lawfull for the Magistrate
to take in hand just and lawfull warre.”164 After citing biblical examples of lawful use of
force, Willet reasons from the (what he takes to be) more widely accepted role of the
ruler protecting individuals to a defense of a broader use of force: “if it be the Magistrates
office and party to defend every particular person from wrong, much more the whole
people.”165
Later in the chapter, amid several controversies dealing with “arguments against
the Lordship peramount of the Pope above Kings and Princes,” Willet uses a minori logic
to discredit the temporal ambitions of the papacy. He develops this argument in reference
both to the power allotted to the apostles and to that assumed by Christ. Since Christ
instructed his apostles (Matthew 20:25 and Luke 22:25) to lead as servants and not to
“have dominion” in the manner of worldly kings, it follows that the apostles should not
presume to rule over those same kings: “if no Lordly dominion be permitted them over
others, much lesse over Princes.”166 And so the Pope, claiming his authority through
apostolic succession, could not then place himself above kings and princes. Similarly, in
eschewing worldly ambition and identifying his own kingdom as being “not of this
world,” Christ himself “by his owne example…confirmeth the same.” And Christ’s
164

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 587.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 587-588. Of course, volumes have been filled with the further
question of precisely what constitutes “just” warfare, and Willet cites a few instances that would meet his
standards —when a country is invaded, when bound by a league to help an ally, or (a somewhat looser
sanction) “in the quarrell of religion and defence of the truth.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 607. The exegetical basis for Willet’s disagreement with
Bellarmine on this issue is rooted in the different terms that Matthew (κατακυριέυειν) and Luke (κυριέυειν)
use to describe the manner of Gentile government. Neither Bellarmine nor Willet assumes a discrepancy
between the evangelists’ meanings, but where Bellarmine emphasizes Matthew’s κατα- prefix to argue that
in each case Jesus is forbidding only tyrannical rule, Willet argues that Matthew’s use of the compound
form suggests nothing beyond Luke’s simple form, so that in each case “all kind of temporall rule is simply
forbidden” the apostles.
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example, likewise, bears on the power claims of the Pope: “If Christ then assumed not the
person and office of a temporall Prince in earth, what warrant hath the Pope, who
challengeth to be Christs Vicar in earth to arrogate more, then Christ himselfe tooke upon
him.”167 In each of these cases Willet’s argument relies on a minori logic rooted in the
varied degree of a person’s dignity—if no dominion over commoners, much less over
princes; if no worldly kingdom for Christ, surely not for one claiming to be his (mere)
representative.
In his corresponding defense of the authority that civil magistrates have in
ecclesiastical matters, Willet challenges a Roman Catholic attempt at a minori logic.
Thomas Stapleton had reasoned that since princes could not perform the “lesser” tasks of
preaching and administering the sacraments, neither could they do the “greater” task of
governing the church.168 Willet refutes this argument in two ways, both reframing the
matter as a question of vocation and explaining that a minori logic does not operate as an
absolute principle in every instance. First, Willet counters by arguing that pastoral tasks
and church governance are “in divers respects both lesse and greater”—the first the
greater in spiritual power and the latter in external authority. The civil magistrate does
not perform ministerial duties only “because he is not thereunto called”; such vocational
matters cannot be settled by simply referencing a hierarchy of roles, because these
matters depend on God’s calling and distribution of gifts and tasks. Moreover, even if
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 607.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 611. Thomas Stapleton, Principiorum fidei doctrinalium
relectio scholastica (Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1596), 258: “Ergo non possunt iudicare de vera
doctrina verbi, dare potestatem praedicandi verbum, dare potestatem administrandi Sacramenta,
praescribereritus & ceremonias circa Sacramentorum administrationé, aut ullo modo regere & dirigere
Ecclesiam circa talia. Probatur consequentia, quia qui non potest quod minus est facere, nec quod maius est
in eodem genere unquam poterit facere.”
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preaching were deemed a lesser duty than governing, that alone would not disqualify the
magistrate from having ecclesiastical functions, as it is not “alwaies true, he that can not
doe the lesse, can not doe the greater.” Because some tasks are “not beseeming” a person
of a certain nobility, one may be granted great responsibilities even while being barred
from lesser duties—as (in Willet’s example) it is unfit for a prince to dig ditches, though
he performs the much greater role of making laws.169 Thus Willet rejects Stapleton’s use
of “lesser to greater” reasoning on both logical and contextual grounds.

3.5 Other Rhetorical Devices
Several other rhetorical devices that Willet identifies in Romans do not occur
frequently enough to warrant separate subsections, yet are worth mentioning to broaden
our picture of the rhetorical instruments in Willet’s exegetical toolbox; among these
devices we find hendiadys, prosopopoeia, and hypallage. While he does not use the
technical term for the trope, Willet’s insistence in his explication of Romans 1:5 (“By
whom we have received grace and Apostleship”) that Paul is not referring to separable
entities clearly implies the use of hendiadys. Against exegetes like Theodoret and Tolet
who read grace and apostleship as “two distinct things,” Willet argues that “the particle
καὶ, and, is put by way of exposition, grace, that is Apostleship.”170 This insistence that
Paul’s καὶ denotes an explication rather than a separation (so that the phrase
communicates something like “the grace of apostleship” or “gracious apostleship”)
emphasizes that Paul’s vocation was not merely aided or amplified by grace, but that it
169
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 611.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 43. For a more detailed discussion of the theological
interpretation of conjunctions, see section III.2.
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was, through and through, a product of God’s unconstrained and gracious activity. Willet
makes a similar rhetorical argument about the relationship between grace and election in
Romans 11:5, though there the two terms are linked not by a conjunction but in a genitive
construction (“ἐκλογὴν χάριτος”). Where certain Church Fathers like Chrysostom and
Origen (“in his wandring speculation”) had sought here to draw a distinction between an
election based on grace and one incorporating foresight of good works, Willet explains
that all election is entirely of grace, noting that “here the Apostle useth an Hebraisme, the
election of grace, for gracious election.”171
Paul’s reference in Romans 8:19-23 to all creation “groaning” under the burden of
sin forces an interpretive decision regarding the nature of this groaning, which serves in
turn to identify the “creatures” in question. Origin and Augustine, for instance, in reading
this waiting and groaning in a more literal sense, were constrained to attribute it to
sensate creatures—whether human beings (Augustine) or angels or preincarnate human
souls (Origen).172 Willet, with Chrysostom and a host of others,173 takes the groaning
metaphorically and attributes it to insensate or senseless creatures, rejecting Augustine’s
reading because humans are distinguished from these creatures by the “we also” in verse
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 492. Thomas Wilson also identifies this construction as a
Hebraism, commenting that Paul’s expression tells us that “election unto eternall life proceedeth from the
free favour and grace of God” (Wilson, A Commentarie upon…Romanes, 867).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 366.

Cf. Pareus, Ad Romanos, 737: “In utroq; est prosopoeia seu fictio poëtica. Tribuit huic universo
& rebus brutis atque inanimis affectus humanos”; Dickson, Exposition of All St. Pauls Epistles, 20: “the
whole frame of the world” here is “figuratively propounded”; Wilson, A Commentarie upon… Romanes,
583: “There is in this phrase both a Prosopopoea, and a Pleonasmus. For he putteth upon the creature the
person of one who most desirously expecteth and looketh after some person or thing.” Additionally, Willet
cites Irenaeus, Hilary, Tolet, Rollock, and Bucanus as holding to this interpretation.
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23, and Origen’s speculations for obvious reasons.174 Paul, Willet explains, is using the
“figure called prosopopeia ascribing unto the unreasonable and senselesse creatures, a
kind of sense and feeling of their miserie, and longing desire to be eased from it.”175 The
recognition of this form of personification allows Willet to follow the logic of the
passage, rather than beginning with the assumption of a literal groaning and then
straining the logic in search of creatures capable of such longing. As such, it is a rare
instance of Origen erring because of an overly literal interpretation.
Willet later identifies an instance of hypallage (“which is the putting of one word
in an others case”) as part of a triple figure in verse 15:19; he terms Paul’s reference to
Jerusalem and Illyricum a synecdoche—each “country” representing its citizens—and in
Paul’s expression “I have replenished the Gospel” (πεπληρωκέναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) he
notes both the use of metaphor (associating the act of “replenishing” or “filling” with the
world of fishing) and hypallage, arguing that Paul is not claiming to have filled up the
gospel (with the people), but to “have filled them with the Gospel.”176 Whether metaphor
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Willet dismisses Origen here with a pun, commenting that his speculation about the referent of
“vanitie…is vaine.” Origen’s suggestion was that preincarnate human souls were subject to vanity by being
thrust into corruptible bodies (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 365-366). While too Platonized for Willet’s
sensibilities, Origen’s interpretation shares a logic with Lyra’s image (III.3.1) offering a non-traducian
explanation of the propagation of original sin; the main difference is that Origen’s untarnished souls existed
from eternity, while Lyra’s were “made to order” by God at the time of their entry into bodies.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 366. While claiming no certainty and presenting his position
only as the “most probable,” Willet limits this metaphorical groaning (and literal next-world restoration)—
to the chagrin of Don Bluth and other canine universalists—to inanimate elements of the created order. He
gives five arguments for why “no living creatures…but onely man” will experience immortality, along with
“the heavens and the earth, and the elements between them,” focusing on the eternal utility of each (Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 371-373).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 691. See III.3.1 and III.3.3 for Willet’s discussion of Paul’s
use of synecdoche and metaphor in Romans. Pareus also identifies synecdoche and hypallage in this verse.
Pareus, Commentarius…ad Romanos, 1617. Rollock makes the same inversion as Willet (taking the
genitive Evangelium as though it were a dative, Evangelio), but without the technical label of “hypallage”:
“Videtur dictum esse (im pleverim Evangelium Christi) pro (impleverim omnia loca Evangelio Christi)”
(Rollock, Analysis Dialectica…in…Romanos, 307). So also the Dutch Annotations: “I have fulfilled the
Gospel of Christ.” [that is, I have filled all those lands with the preaching and knowledge of the Gospel of

181

and synecdoche are identified in this verse has little theological significance,177 but
reading the expression “fill the gospel” as an hypallage does impact how Paul’s words are
interpreted: namely, is the gospel conceived of as a kind of vessel to be filled, or as a kind
of substance that fills its recipients? Willet’s preference for the latter conception seems to
stem from a concern not to suggest that the gospel was somehow lacking apart from
Paul’s evangelistic efforts—in response to a series of interpretations that focused on the
perfection of Paul’s theology, Willet counters: “but [Paul] sheweth here onely the
largenes and extent of his preaching, not the perfection of his doctrine.”178 This reading
of Paul’s words as a rhetorical inversion of subject and adjunct logically follows from his
words in the preceding verse (“I dare not speake of any thing which Christ hath not
wrought by me”), which Willet had explained as Paul attributing the full efficacy of his
ministry to Christ.179 Especially in light of this message in 15:18, taking 15:19 as an
hypallage seems to be Willet’s way of emphasizing that the deficiency in need of remedy
was in the people—not in the gospel.

Christ.]” (Theodore Haak, trans., The Dutch Annotations Upon the whole Bible: Or, all the Holy Canonical
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament [London: Henry Hills, for John Rothwell, Joshua Kirton, and
Richard Tomlins, 1657] ). Thomas Wilson’s interpretation combines a kind of hypallage (by inserting a
“with,” so as to read “filled the gospel” as “filled with the gospel”) and a metonymy (interpreting “gospel”
as “the faith of Christ” (Wilson, A Commentarie upon…Romanes, 1223-1224).
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That the cities cited comprehended also the people living there could be taken for granted, even
without considering this an instance of synecdoche—no one argues that Paul was preaching to the
inanimate elements that made up the cities’ infrastructures (not even those elements personified as
“groaning” for release from bondage); and if Paul intended πεπληρωκέναι as a fishing metaphor it would
represent, as a matter of curiosity, a rare instance of Paul employing one of the very common images from
the gospel narratives, but—again—the metaphor alone would not alter the plain meaning of Paul’s words.
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(see IV.2.3).
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4. Conclusion
Given the priority of the literal sense in Protestant orthodox exegesis, Andrew
Willet’s detailed attention to grammatical concerns as the foundation of his polemical
interpretation of Romans comes as no surprise. In his disciplined hexapla form, he
ensures that each chapter of his commentary begins with an analysis of questions and
disputes arising from the linguistic elements of Paul’s epistle. We have seen in this
chapter how an exegetical choice like the meaning conveyed by a preposition or the
identification of a rhetorical device can be intimately connected to the interpretation of a
passage, both shaping an exegete’s understanding and being influenced by that exegete’s
broader theological commitments. These linguistic arguments were common to both
Reformed and Roman Catholic interpreters in the Post-Reformation period, so a
polemical exegete like Willet had to rely on convincing contextual arguments and finelytuned grammatical observations in order to make a persuasive case for his particular
application of these methodological tools.
In his effort to refute interpretations that he deemed heterodox—or at least
tending away from orthodoxy—Willet reasoned from prepositions to argue against the
Roman Catholic invocation of saints, to intensify the union with Christ effected in
baptism, and to counter an Erasmian reading that he feared could be used to support
Pelagianism. We have also seen how his rhetorical arguments sought to protect the
assurance and perseverance of the elect and the privileged place of faith in the economy
of salvation.
This chapter has also helped demonstrate the importance of polemical context to
understanding a position. This was especially evident in the polemical chain of
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interpretations in Romans 5:12 and its connection to original sin doctrine. There we saw
exegetes reacting to the dangerous implications of prior readings, and sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century authors selectively citing a sometimes ambiguous tradition, in which
a different polemical context had not demanded the same level of precision in defining
the issue. The polemical demands of Willet’s era created both a “common enemy” for
Reformed exegetes that served as an organizing principle for the articulation of shared
central concerns, and a need for a heightened precision of thought that at times revealed
differing nuances within a broad Reformed tradition.180 Significantly, however, Willet’s
focus on the papist enemy in no way diminishes or subverts his critical approach to the
text and to other exegetes; his polemical hermeneutic is fully compatible with his
commitment to textually faithful exegesis. When necessary he is willing to differ from
fellow Reformed exegetes, and even to approve of valid interpretations given by his
adversaries. This suggests a thoroughly theological basis for his anti-Catholic fervor;
were his enmity more political, personal, or pathological, we would expect a more rigid
allegiance to the Protestant party line. As it is, his anti-papist polemical lens guides and
organizes—but does not replace—his careful exegetical work.
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Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:64, on the role of polemics in increasing
the specificity of an argument.

CHAPTER IV.
CONFUSION OF CAUSES
1. Introduction
In addition to his prodigious talent as a textual scholar, Andrew Willet was well
versed in Aristotelian philosophy. The curriculum when he was at Cambridge
incorporated Aristotelian logic throughout.1 Willet’s first published work, De aminae
natura (1585), was an academic teaching manual on the soul that drew heavily from
Aristotle—the “only work [of its kind] published in England during the sixteenth
century.”2 Thomas Fuller adds (in one of his few pieces of information not drawn from
the biography by Peter Smith) that this work was preceded by a manuscript that Willet
wrote at nineteen in which he defended “his Master Aristotle” against the Ramist William
Temple.3 Given this familiarity with and respect for Aristotle, it is not surprising that
Willet employs a modified Aristotelian causal model throughout the Romans hexapla as a
tool for parsing precisely where his papist foes had gone astray in their formulations of
different doctrines. In so doing, he appears to endorse Aristotle’s principle that to “know”

1

Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition , 93, 96, 111; Paul R. Schaefer, “Protestant
‘Scholasticism’ at Elizabethan Cambridge: William Perkins and a Reformed Theology of the Heart,” in
Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. S. Clark (Cumbria, UK:
Paternost Press, 1999), 150-151. Cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:362.
2

Charles B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England (Kingston, ON:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 20n27. Schmitt describes the work as “largely, but by no means
exclusively, Aristotelian in orientation,” and writes that Willet’s various sources “indicate humanistic
Aristotelianism of a distinctly northern Protestant flavour” (p. 70); Andrew Willet, De animae natura et
viribus quaestiones quaedam (Cambridge: Thomas², 1585). Cf. also McKitterick, A History of Cambridge
University Press, vol. 1, 95.
3

Fuller, Abel Redevivus, 567. Fuller adds that he had seen a copy of this work, noting especially
that it contained a dedicatory epistle, “as if he had intended it for the presse.” Per Muller, Ramism was not
necessarily anti-Aristotelian, and many Ramists maintained various Aristotelian assumptions (Muller, PostReformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:368).
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something is to know its causes.4
While his background made him particularly conversant with Aristotelian logical
tools, Willet’s frequent use of a filtered and modified Aristotelianism reflects a common
pattern among the Reformed orthodox of an “eclectic Christian Aristotelianism” assisting
in their polemical need for increased precision of thought.5 It must be emphasized that the
manner in which Willet applies these Aristotelian tools strongly contradicts the RogersMcKim theory of a Protestant scholastic “reliance on Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning”
in pursuit of a “rational defense of a settled deposit of doctrines” and which tended to
“subject scriptural material to inappropriate Aristotelian or Cartesian modes of
presentation.”6 As we look at Willet’s use of Aristotelian causal distinctions, we will see
a consistent pattern of the Philosopher’s tools serving as a subservient interpretive aid to
the Apostle’s theological message.7

2. Multiple Causality
Aristotle’s model of fourfold causality, consisting of efficient, formal, material,

4

David Ross, Aristotle, 6th ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 74. Cf. also “Definitions and Aitia,” in
Marguerite Deslauriers, Aristotle on Definition, 81-112 (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2007); R. J. Hankinson,
“Philosophy of Science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 109-139. Willet’s frequent use of causal reasoning supports J. V.
Fesko’s contention (refuting Mark A. Garcia) that causal language in the early modern period was not
unique to the Lutheran tradition (Fesko, Beyond Calvin, 38-39).
5

Cf. Muller, After Calvin, 35, 55-56. On early modern causality, cf. chapters 15-18 in Franco
Burgersdijk, Institutionum logicarum, libri duo (Cambridge: the University Press, 1637); Franco
Burgersdijk, Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick (London: for Ric.
Cumberland, 1697).
6
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Cf. especially Muller’s pair of essays: Richard A. Muller, “Scholasticism, Reformation,
Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism,” Trinity Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 8196; Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early
Modern Philosophy,” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 (2001): 306-325.
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and final causes, had a tremendous impact on medieval philosophy (especially in
Aquinas’s logic),8 and remained the standard causal lens for both the Reformers and the
Protestant orthodox.9 Aristotle inherited the material and formal causes from the earlier
Greek philosophical tradition and described these as, respectively, that out of which a
thing is made, and the structure or pattern that makes it one thing rather than another.
Whereas Plato had conceived of matter and form as each having an independent
existence, for Aristotle the formal cause inhered as an active principle within material,
sensible things.10 Aristotle additionally expanded the traditional two causes to include
also the efficient cause (the agent that produces change) and the final cause (the purpose
or end).11 Aristotle held that none of the individual causes were sufficient to explain an
effect and, in general, all four were necessary.12 The various causes could, however,
overlap with one another (as when the form in a natural thing also acts as the efficient
and final cause, moving the entity towards its purpose),13 and one thing could function as

8

See Michael J. Dodds, “Causality in Aquinas,” in Unlocking Divine Action (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 11-44; Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding
Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 136-142; Dictionary of the Middle Ages, s.v. “Aristotle in the
Middle Ages.” Cf. also “The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics and the Science of Motion,” in The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration
of Scholasticism 1100-1600, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, 521-536
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
9

Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:367-369, 373. Cf. also Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Aristotelianism in the 17th Century.”
10

Dodds, “Causality in Aquinas,” 11-12, 15-27; Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology,
120; Ross, Aristotle, 74.
11

Dodds, “Causality in Aquinas,” 12, 28-33. Ross notes that the efficient and final are the two that
fit best with our common modern conception of a “cause,” matter and form seeming to us more as “static
elements,” (Ross, Aristotle, 75). In the movie Happy Gilmore, Happy draws on the logic of final causality
when his putt misses the cup and he yells at his golf ball: “Why didn’t you go home? That’s your home!
Are you too good for your home?!” (Happy Gilmore, directed by Dennis Dugan, Universal Pictures, 1996).
12

Ross, Aristotle, 75.

13

Ross, Aristotle, 77; Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 124-125. Allen adds that
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different kinds of causes depending on the perspective, as when a brick is viewed either
as a form (the informed clay) or as matter (the material cause of a different end—say, a
brick wall).14
The Protestant orthodox used the fourfold causality model as a means for
structuring the discussion of an issue, taking the earlier Reformers’ acceptance of the
model and expanding its application into new debates.15 Muller’s description of the
loosely defined “Aristotelianism” that characterized much of the Reformed scholastic
philosophical framework focuses on the issue of multiple causality: “a view of the
universe that affirms both a primary and a secondary causality, that assumes the working
of first and final causality through the means of instrumental, formal, and material causes,
and that, using this paradigm, can explain various levels of necessary and contingent
existence.”16 This description accurately summarizes Willet’s own use of Aristotle to
structure his exegetically derived definitions into polemically-potent arguments.

2.1 Compatibility of Multiple Levels of Causality
At the most basic level, arguments based on multiple causality acknowledge that
various levels of causation can coexist and together achieve an effect. Whereas the post“unlike Plato’s Forms, Aristotle’s forms have a built-in telos or end. Aristotle detects or specifies a form by
means of ends or goals achieved,” (p. 121). For natural things, this essentially reduces the causes to the
material and the formal. Applying this concept to the Protestant critique of Roman Catholic soteriology, we
might say that, by giving too much efficiency to faith (an instrumental cause often functioning like the
formal), Roman Catholics were treating justification as a natural process.
In the theological application of Aristotle’s causes, we might add, we still find overlap within the
causes, as with theology itself, which has God as both the material and efficient cause—it is God’s
revelation of himself (Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:244).
14

Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 122.

15

Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:238.

16

Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:372.
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Enlightenment approaches to causal relationships would tend to account for an effect
with relation to a single efficient cause, this older, broadly Aristotelian tradition
recognized a plurality of reasons both for why an effect came about at all, and why it
came about in one way rather than another. We will see that this distinction of causes is
often used to explain the relationship between human and divine agency and to establish
the proper balance between the extremes of Pelagianism and determinism. Other times,
however, the distinction is more exemplary than effective. Willet cites Augustine’s use of
this argument to explain why Paul “distinguisheth the benefits of redemption” in Romans
4:25, with Christ’s death causing our forgiveness and our justification stemming from
Christ’s resurrection.17 While Willet in this case is not entirely satisfied with Augustine’s
explanation, he agrees that the Apostle is “not really distinguishing them in the causes,”
but rather showing the complementary nature of Christ’s passion and resurrection in
working salvation for the elect. Since both of these cause both remission of sins and
justification, their causality is “discerned, rather then distinguished.”18 While this
principle of multiple causality was commonplace in Willet’s day, even in his age he still
had to engage in debate over which causes conjoined in bringing about particular effects
and which did not. We find this clarification, for instance, in the Controversies section of
Romans 3, where Willet answers Pererius’s argument that assurance cannot come from
faith because it is properly wrought by a good conscience with the statement that “there
may be divers causes of one and the same thing.” Just because the sun gives off heat, he
17
18

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 217.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 219. Related to this notion of an “exemplary cause” are Christ’s
formal prayers to the Father, which he made as an example to his followers, and God’s complaining of
sinners, which functions as a means by which they might be “pricked in heart” and brought to repentance
(pp. 385, 444).
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explains, does not mean that heat cannot also be generated by fire.19 Assurance, then, is
sustained and increased by the conscience, but it is born of faith. Naturally, Roman
Catholic polemicists frequently used the very same logical argument against Protestants
with regard to faith’s role in justification—that is, just because faith justifies does not
mean that other graces do not contribute as well to justification. The difference here
between Roman Catholics and Protestants, thus, is not strictly a matter of how each party
understood multiple causality, but of how each applied the concept to support differing
theological frameworks.
An issue in Romans 13 demonstrates more specifically the coexistence of primary
and secondary causes. In the course of arguing that all earthly rulers have their power
from God, Willet addresses the possible objection that magistrates are known rather to be
appointed by humans by averring that “the second causes exclude not the first.” He goes
on to illustrate this truth with a very Pauline image: “as the fruits of the earth are brought
forth by the industrie and labour of man, yet cease they not to bee Gods gifts.”20
In most cases secondary causes are necessary, even with God’s primary causality
infallibly operating. The Reformed scholastics assumed that God, as the primary cause,
was ultimately responsible for all ontological motions,21 but they also acknowledged that
God tended to work through the agency of secondary causes acting according to their
natures. Willet sees this understanding reflected in Paul's request for prayer in Romans
15:30, concluding that “the meanes working under Gods providence are not to be

19

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 185.

20

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 581.

21

Here we see Aristotle’s influence on Reformed scholasticism filtered through Aquinas, who
held that all efficiency in the universe depended upon God’s primary efficient causality. Cf. Allen,
Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 139.
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neglected.” Citing Origen, who “well observeth” this truth, Willet explains that Paul
“knew praier to be necessarie, even in those things, which he knew would certenly come
to passe.”22 In these sorts of situations, navigating between God’s primary causality and
secondary human means requires avoiding the twin perils of relying entirely upon the
means with a “carnall confidence,” and neglecting the means, which is “presumption and
a tempting of God.”23 Secondary causes assume a significant role also in situations that
lack the certainty of a specific divine promise. When Paul expresses his hope of traveling
to Spain in Romans 15, Willet interprets Paul’s “I trust” to mean that he “is not sure, but
hopeth well.” While acknowledging that all things are ordered by God’s providence,
Willet argues that Paul’s hope here falls short of assurance “in respect of the second
causes; because he knew not how his navigation should fall out” regarding water currents
and weather patterns.24
The opening of Romans 12, where Paul “beseeches” his readers “by the mercie of
God” to worship God properly, presents an opportunity to make a similar point in relation
to evangelism and exhortation. Though our salvation is entirely attributable to God’s
mercy, Willet remarks, Christians are not thereby released from their hortatory
obligations, “because our salvation is not wrought without meanes, as preaching,
admonition, exhortation, and such like: and therefore these means may be used, and yet

22

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 705.

23

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 705. As this chapter progresses, we will note how Willet works
to keep this principle from representing a form of synergism.
24

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 696. Leading into this assertion, Willet summarizes the
arguments undergirding the “two famous opinions” concerning whether Paul ultimately made it to Spain—
the one side reading Paul’s expressed intentions prophetically and as an absolute promise, and the other,
which has Willet’s own sympathies, holding that verse 15:24 should be read as a conditional, and
ultimately unfulfilled, hope (p. 694)
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the foundation of Gods mercie in saving us, shall remaine unshaken.”25 Again, these
human actions may even be necessary, while in no way transferring any salvific
efficiency from divine to human agency.
The relationship between primary and secondary causes, and especially the issue
of overreliance on means, is at play also in Paul’s account of heathen worship in Romans
1. Willet dismisses as a “frivolous excuse”26 the explanation offered by heathens that
their worship of created objects was merely a way of worshiping God in those objects,
and he presents Paul’s counterargument that they rather “changed the glorie of the
incorruptible God, into the similitude of those things.”27 The heathen, in other words,
were guilty of confusing natural secondary causes with God’s primary causality. It is
perhaps fitting, then, that God’s wrath against this ungodliness is revealed from heaven
using natural means as a secondary cause. Willet offers as the “best sense” of Romans
1:18 the interpretation that “men should not thinke, these plagues sent upon the world, to
be ordinarie and naturall, (though God therein may use naturall and secondarie
causes)…but that they are inflicted of God.”28 Just as the heathen had falsely worshiped
the creation as the Creator, so one might falsely attribute the Creator’s punishments
solely to random natural occurrences. This is not to suggest that all natural misfortunes
are necessarily a divine punishment, but rather that one must not expect God’s wrath to
come through supernatural means; “naturall and secondarie causes” are fully compatible
25

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 568.

26

In the 1620 printing, Willet amends “frivolous excuse” to “frivolous cause”—one of very few
editorial modifications between the 1611 and 1620 editions.
27

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 72. Cf. section VI.2.4, where we consider in more depth
Willet’s charge of the papists mimicking idolatrous heathen practices.
28

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 58.
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with God’s primary causality, both in providential care and in judgment.

2.2 Priority of the Efficient Cause
While Aristotle’s fourfold model of causality gave explanatory primacy either
(depending on the subject) to formal and material, or to final and formal causes,29
theological employment of multiple causality gave pride of place to final and—
especially—efficient causality.30 Aristotle’s understanding of the Unmoved Mover as a
final—but not as an efficient—cause gave priority in his conception to the final over the
efficient cause. As the causes were adapted to a Christian understanding of the world and
the role of the Unmoved Mover shifted to the biblical God, the efficient cause took
precedence (albeit without being divorced from final causality). The intermediate causes,
as we’ll see in the following section, were held to serve the others instrumentally and
subserviently, being appointed by the efficient cause as a means of achieving the final. In
this section we will consider the priority that Willet gives to efficient causality, with God
acting as the efficient cause of nearly every good effect.
Following the logic of Paul’s own usage, Willet tends to ascribe the efficient
causality of good gifts and virtues to either a member of the Godhead or an attribute of
God; in only of a handful of instances does he present a human efficient cause of a
29

Andrea Falcon, “Aristotle on Causality,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2015 Edition), accessed September 5, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aristotlecausality. On the use of Aristotle more broadly in the Church of England, see Victor Lyle Dowdell,
Aristotle and Anglican Religious Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942). Dowdell rightly
observes that English divines have made extensive use of Aristotelian language and categories, though their
church “has never been rigidly confined by any particular philosophy for very long” (p. 85).
30

To use a house as an example, Aristotle would argue that the (teleological) need for a house and
the (formal) design for how it would look would determine the appointment of the (efficient) builder.
Christian use of the model, with a more personal and purposive deity, would take a broader perspective and
consider the efficient cause not as mere “sweat labor,” but as the One who determines originally that a
house should be built.
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positive end.31 Generally, these efficient causes are identified as God, the Spirit or
Christ,32 a divine attribute such as God’s power, commandment, or grace,33 or a divine
action, as his calling or his decree.34 As such, the first cause, at the level of primary
causality, understood as efficient, functions as a kind of field general, overseeing and
directing the instrumental causes in the execution of its will. This kind of language is
reflected in Willet’s comments on Paul’s statement in verse 11:11 that salvation came to
the Gentiles through the falling of the Jews. Seeking to clarify that the stumbling of the
Jews was not thus the principal efficient cause of the Gentiles’ salvation, Willet explains
here that “the efficient cause having expelled one forme, doth bring in another…so Gods
providence as the cheife efficient cause, doth by occasion of that which is evill, bring
forth that which is good.”35 In a later section we will look at this passage from the
perspective of the confusion of an occasion with a principal efficiency. What is of interest
in this context of multiple causality, though, is the active directing role of the efficient
cause, which maneuvers—or even operates through—finite efficient as well as formal
causes (be they good, evil, or neutral) to bring about a good end, without disrupting or

31

This occurs, to my count, only three times in the Romans hexapla. The first instance is among
the doctrines elicited from Romans 11, where the restored human will is given as a subordinate efficient
cause (following the primary “God mooving by his spirit”) of good works (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes,
520). The second comes from a citation of Gorrhan, regarding the causes of a proper “spirituall sacrifice” in
verse 12:1. Here the efficient is expressed “in this word give up, it must proceed from a true and sincere
devotion” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 536). The final instance comes when Willet is setting forth the
scope and parts of Romans 15. Here, drawing on verse 15:26, Willet writes that Paul identifies “their
voluntarie contribution” as the efficient cause of the benevolence shown to the saints in Jerusalem (Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 671). Had he been pressed on the matter, though, Willet’s theological framework
suggests that he would clarify that each of these human causes operated not autonomously, but through a
higher, divine efficiency.
32

For example, Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 24, 87, 118, 220, 388, 678, among many others;
130, 377; 53.
33

Examples include Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 53; 718, 734; 146, 168, 177, and 256.
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As examples, Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 404; 443.
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overriding the operation of any secondary efficiencies.36
We see the primacy of the efficient cause also in its relationship to the cognate
term “efficacy.” In his Questions section of Romans 10, Willet explains that, while faith
has a causal role in salvation (as verse 10:9 clearly states), faith’s efficacy does not come
from its own strength. The human element in faith “is not understood in regard of the
beginning and efficient cause of faith: for man hath no more power to beleeve of himselfe
then to doe good workes.” Since faith is an externally granted gift, and not an internally
generated virtue, it is naturally subordinate to and derives its efficacy from the One who
grants the gift:
Neither doth our salvation depend upon the force and efficacie of faith, but upon
the worthines and vertue of Christ apprehended by faith: as when a sicke man
walketh leaning upon his staffe, it is his staffe that stayeth him, not his hand,
which only layeth hold upon the staffe.37
Willet’s image here of Christ as the staff that provides the efficacy of salvation could
misleadingly suggest a priority of the material cause (and, indeed, in some instances an
efficient and material cause could overlap38), but his linking of the staff image in this
question to “the beginning and efficient cause of faith” and “God that worketh in us both

35

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 501.
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Because primary and secondary efficiencies can operate concurrently, the same event viewed as
the effect of each, can also have different final causes. A classic statement of this principle comes from
Joseph in Genesis 50:20 (“When yee thought evil against me, God disposed it to good”). Willet in the
Doctrine elicited from this verse in the Genesis hexapla draws a natural parallel to Judas’s betrayal of
Christ and explains that “here the preservation of the Church by Josephs captivitie, proceedeth from the
goodnesse of God, not from any such intendment in the instrument,” (Willet, Hexapla in Genesin, 468).
God and Joseph’s brothers operated from different final causes, which precludes the attribution of any good
to the brothers’ actions and any evil to God’s.
37
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 461.

As in, recall, the discipline of theology itself. We see this not infrequently in Willet, too, as in
his interpretation of Romans 1:16, from which he gathers that Christ is both the efficient cause (Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 53) and the material cause of salvation (p. 388).

195

the will and deed”39 makes it clear that—though a material object—the staff here
represents Christ’s efficient causality.
Thus, the primary efficient cause is reserved for God, and it presides over the
other causes. In the specific case of saving grace, moreover, God is the sole efficient
cause, given the inability of the human will. For a human agent, then, to assume this role
in matters related to salvation is to usurp the divine prerogative and tread into dangerous
Pelagian waters. We can see now how this hierarchical distinction of causes could be
used polemically against theological opponents who ascribed to human agency the wrong
kind of causality, while at the same time allowing Reformed theologians to avoid the
other extreme of denying any kind of causal significance of faith in the economy of
salvation. Commenting on Romans 3:24 (“justified freely by his grace, through the
redemption that is in Christ Jesus”), Willet draws on the primacy of God as the efficient
cause to refute what he considers to be heretical understandings of justification:
The efficient, which is the grace of God, that is, not the doctrine of the Gospel
freely revealed, as the Pelagians understand it, nor the graces of the spirit infused,
as the Romanists; but by the grace of God wee understand, the free mercie and
goodnesse of God toward humankind.40
Here the hierarchy of causes provides Willet with the framework for countering Pelagian
and Roman Catholic interpretations—not by denying outright that infused grace or the
revelation of the gospel functions in justification,41 but by rejecting his opponents’
39

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 461.

40

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 168. Commenting later on Romans 11:5-6, where Paul writes
that the elect are saved by grace, and therefore not by works, Willet argues that the Roman conception of
infused grace would contradict Paul’s plain meaning: “grace cannot be here understood , to be a thing
infused into and inherent in man, as the Romanists, for then it were a worke” (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 493).
41

For example, Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 267-268: “We graunt, that faith, hope, and
charitie, are habites of the minde infused by the spirit, and permanent in the soule […] But we denie, that
by any such inherent habite we are made formally just: they are not causes of our justification, but rather
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exaltation of these to the highest causal position.42 Similarly, Willet uses this distinction
to counter Cajetan’s insertion of merit into Romans 5:5 (which states that tribulation
“worketh” in us patience). Willet explains that Paul uses the verb κατεργάζεται variously,
not always indicating primary causality. Rather, “it is sometime ascribed unto the
prin[ci]pall efficient cause, as unto God the author and worker of all good things in
us…sometime to the second or next under working cause.”43 The suggestion that
tribulation effects patience as its primary, efficient cause must be rejected on both
theological grounds (as the afflictions would thus generate a kind of merit, which would
redound to the afflicted) and experiential grounds (for in “the wicked” tribulation works
not patience, but “impatience and despaire”). Instead, “tribulation worketh patience, not
as the efficient cause, but as the organe and instrument, whereby the spirit worketh
patience in us.”44 Again we see divine causation determining the good produced.45

the fruits and effects.”
42

The Council of Trent (sixth session, January 1547) also used multiple causality to explain the
workings of justification (Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, trans. H. J. Schroeder [Rockford,
IL: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1978], 33-34). Trent’s final cause (the glory of God and Christ, and life
everlasting) and meritorious cause (Christ) are similar to the divided final cause and the meritorious cause
that Willet gives for justification on p. 168. The instrumental, formal, and efficient causes that Trent lays
out differ more significantly from Willet’s corresponding causes. Where Willet identified faith as the
instrumental cause of justification (pp. 146, 168), Trent gives the sacrament of baptism (“without which no
man was ever justified”). The formal cause (which Willet identifies variously—depending on Paul’s
wording in different contexts—as the remission of sins, without merit, the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness, by faith, and Christ’s obedience; pp. 146, 168, 177, 237, 256) is defined in Trent as the
justice of God that is infused in the believer: “not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which he
makes us just.” And the efficient cause—the focus of Willet’s argument here—is given in the Tridentine
decree as “the merciful God,” though the added “who washes and sanctifies gratuitously” introduces
sanctification into justification’s efficient cause. Willet does not address Trent directly in this argument,
although the issue of infused grace that Willet takes issue with is clearly present in the causes Trent asserts.
Cf. also the Rhemist annotations on Romans 3:22, which refer to imputation as “a phantastical
apprehension of that which is not” (Martin, New Testament, 390).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 266. Note here Willet’s explicit identification of the efficient as
the chief among the various causes.
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While Willet’s greater concern was the confusion of efficient with mediate causes, in at least
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2.3 The Relativizing of Instrumental Causality
The logical complement of the priority of the efficient cause is the relativizing of
secondary or instrumental causes. In this section we will consider how Willet both
emphasizes the instrumental nature of human causes and condemns those who would
diminish the full divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit by relegating their activity to
merely instrumental causality.
Along with their commitment to ascribing the efficiency of one’s own salvation to
divine causality alone, the Reformed were likewise careful to avoid making ministers
(including Paul) the efficient cause of others’ salvation. We see this concern in Willet at
places where Paul’s language could suggest a human efficiency in evangelism. In his
comments on Romans 11:14 (“If by any meanes I might provoke unto emulation and
might save some of them”), Willet explains Paul’s use of the first person subject here
briefly, writing that “God is the efficient cause and author of salvation, but because the
Ministers are the instruments, they are also said to save.”46 Willet expounds further on
this idea in the context of Romans 15:18 (“I dare not speake of any thing which Christ
hath not wrought by me”), where the proper interpretation hinges on the more nuanced
matter of emphasis. Where Origen and Erasmus had placed the emphasis on the qualifier
“by me,” Willet argued that the proper emphasis should fall on “Christ.” Paul’s point was
not “to shew by what instrument Christ wrought, as by him, not by others,” but to say that
one case he corrects an exegete’s confusion of efficient with final causality. We find this in the Questions
section of Romans 11, regarding Christ’s use of parables. Whereas Pighius had interpreted the “spirit of
slumber” in verse 11:8 as the efficient cause of Christ’s speaking in parables (i.e. because the Jews were
blind, Jesus spoke in parables), Willet argued that the spirit of slumber was, in fact, the final cause of
Christ’s cryptic parables (making the Jews’ blindness a punishment for their obstinacy): (Willet, Hexapla
upon Romanes, 496). In the next chapter we will consider the reasons for Willet’s objection to Pighius on
this issue (see V.2.1).
46

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 504.
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his only achievements that he deemed worthy of sharing were those that Christ had
accomplished through him.47 This understanding of human agency in the ministry of the
gospel holds true for all who are called to this office: “It is peculiar unto God to save, but
the Lord communicateth this excellencie to the Ministers which are the instruments, to
shew the necessitie of preaching, and the reverence thereunto belonging.”48
Likewise, inanimate mediators of salvation such as Scripture possess merely
instrumental causality. Willet makes this point in a comment on the pairing of verses 4
and 5 in Romans 15. In the first of these verses, Paul attributes “patience and comfort” to
the scriptures, yet he proceeds in the second to refer to God as “the God of patience and
consolation.” Willet explains that “the Apostle doth attribute the same effects unto God,
patience and consolation, which before he gave unto the Scriptures, but in a diverse
manner: for God is indeede the author of them.”49 Though God is the actual author and
giver of patience (as the efficient cause), Paul can also refer to the “patience and comfort
of the Scriptures,” because God uses them as an instrumental cause, granting these gifts
“together with, and by” them.50 While the assumption is clear throughout that the
instrumental causes operate in subservience to the efficient, and thus do not accrue merit,
Willet does occasionally make the opposition of instrument to merit clear, as when he
affirms the modern Lutherans who “somewhat refined” their teaching on election to state
47

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 689. In the Argument of chapter 15, too, Willet makes clear
that the efficient cause of the efficacy of Paul’s apostleship is “the grace of Christ,” while the various signs
and wonders were mere helping causes (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 671).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 531. These words come from the Moral Observations of
Romans 11, and are occasioned by Paul’s statement in verse 13: “I magnifie my ministrie.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 677.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 677. Cf. also Romans 16:26, where Paul’s instrumental
phrasing “by (διά) the Scriptures” guides Willet’s explanation that “here the efficient cause is showed, with
the instrumentall meanes, the propheticall Scriptures” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 735).
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that “faith is not the meritorious but the instrumentall cause of election.”51
This same principle of instrumental causes being subjugated to the efficient lies
behind Willet’s accusations of trinitarian unorthodoxy against exegetes who relegated the
work of Christ or the Spirit to mere instrumental causality. As one would expect, the
Arians prove guilty of this charge regarding the Son’s role in creation. In their
interpretation of Paul’s doxology at the close of Romans 11 (“of him, through him, and
for him are all things”), the “Arrians, as Theodoret here testifieth, doe understand all this
to bee spoken onely of God the Father, to confirme their heresie, in making the Sonne
inferiour to the Father, and onely as the instrument, not the efficient cause of creation.”52
Willet refutes this interpretation by citing Paul’s application directly to Christ of a similar
expression in 1 Corinthians 8.53 Nicholas of Lyra, too, receives Willet’s disapprobation
for interpreting the phrase “through Jesus Christ” in Romans 5:1 to mean that Christ
functioned only instrumentally in effecting our peace: “Neither doe we understand by this
phrase, that Christ in respect of his humanitie, was instrumentum coniunctum, a joynt
instrument of this our peace, as Lyranus. But Christ is the true author and efficient cause
of this our peace, as…fellow-worker with his Father.”54 Again here, Willet refutes the
disputed understanding not by criticizing his opponent’s linguistic skill in rendering the
passage in question, but through appeal to other Scripture passages that express Christ’s
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 435; the implication being that a cause would not be both
instrumental and meritorious.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 518.
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Note Willet’s use here of the analogy of Scripture, as well as his reliance on Theodoret as a
secondary source (not at all surprising in this case, given the destruction of many primary Arian sources; cf.
R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God [1988; repr., London: T&T Clark, 2005], 56).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 237.
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efficiency less ambiguously (including Ephesians 2:14, which directly equates Christ
with and makes him the active agent of our peace). Willet likewise clarifies among the
Romans 15 “Places of Doctrine” that Paul’s use of the preposition “through” with the
Holy Spirit (in 15:13) does not suggest a merely instrumental causality, and he again
defends his reading through a collation of texts:
[the word “through” does not imply] that the holy Ghost is the organe or
instrument of God, but that there is one and the same power of God the Father,
and of the holy Spirit: for the Spirit distributeth to everie one as he will, 1 Cor.
12:11. but this is a divine power, to give unto every one as he will.55
While Christ and the Spirit may at times function additionally as instrumental causes,56
their serving as active subjects of divine deeds indicates that to exclude them from the
divine efficiency would be heretically to subordinate them within the Trinity.

2.4 Final Causality
Before looking in more detail at the specific roles played by the formal, material,
and other instrumental causes, we will explore how Willet treats the (more important)
final cause. In his comments on Paul’s assertion in Romans 10:4 that Christ is the “ende
of the Law,” Willet presents four different ways that “the ende of a thing” may be taken:
its final position in space or time, that which motivates its first movement, the goal it

55

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 704. A similar argument concerns the use of prayer language by
individual members of the Godhead—language which, as formal prayers would be “unmeete and not
beseeming the divine majestie,” must thus be taken either as an example for the faithful to follow or as
simply a way of describing the effects of each member’s efficacious activity (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 385).
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We’ve seen already that God is both the author and subject of theology, and that Christ is both
the efficient and material cause of salvation. Additionally, Christ is presented as the material cause of the
gospel and the “meritorious and working cause” of justification, his obedience is given as the formal cause
of justification, and the formal cause of concord among believers is given as “according to Christ.” (Willet,
Hexapla upon Romanes, 24, 87, 734; 168; 256; 678).
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strives toward, or its completion and perfection.57 This awareness of the range of possible
meanings of language pertaining to a thing’s “end” is evident also in Willet’s treatment of
places where Paul’s argument signals final causality.
As in the case of the efficient cause, Willet often notes a division in a thing’s final
causality, which is explained as differentiating a principal and a secondary end, a proper
and an accidental end, or a God-oriented and a human-oriented end.58 In many of these
cases a primary end relates to God’s glory, while a secondary end pertains to the human
realm—as with good works, where God’s glory, and not a “mercinary”59 desire for
reward, must be the “principall ende of [one’s] well doing.”60 In the Doctrines section of
chapter 5, Willet distinguishes between the “proper” use of the law (to make humans
aware of their sin) and a “second and more principall end” –“that by the abounding of
sinne, grace may more abound.”61 Here the less principal end comes first in time, as a
penultimate end, and serves the ultimate end instrumentally. Later, commenting on
Romans 10, Willet concedes to his Romanist opponents Pererius and Stapleton that our
obedience is “one of the endes of our coming to Christ,” but denies that this obedience is
the primary end, which he identifies here as being our justification by faith in Christ.62
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 456. In the context of Christ’s being the end of the law, Willet
prefers the second and fourth definitions. On various interpretations of Christ as the telos of the law, cf.
Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle, 113-120.
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This division into a twofold final cause was common to many Reformed orthodox systems
(Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:245).
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Willet’s spelling.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 137.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 265. This doctrine is occasioned by verse 5:20, where Paul
states that the law came “that the offence should encrease: but where sinne increased, grace abounded much
more.”
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 457-458.
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This division and hierarchical arrangement of final causes allows Willet to skirt possible
antinomian accusations, while avoiding contorting the central purpose of the gospel into
a mere matter of ethics and human character.
The somewhat vexing description of Christ as a stumbling block in Romans 9:33
(alluding to imagery from Isaiah) presents an occasion for Willet to draw a rather
stronger distinction between a principal and an accidental end. He explains that the
stumbling itself is “the accidentall ende” of the stumbling stone, while the principal end
is “the building and raising up of many by this stone.”63 When mention of the Jews
stumbling appears again in Romans 11:11, Willet subdivides this principal end as it
pertains to Gentiles and to Jews: “here he sheweth a double end of their stumbling; one,
that thereby salvation might come unto the Gentiles, the other, that by the calling of the
Gentiles, the Jewes againe might be provoked and stirred up to beleeve in Christ.”64 We
find a similar situation in the hardening of Pharaoh, which Paul mentions in verse 9:17.
Willet refutes Bellarmine’s charge that leading Protestants had made the hardening of
Pharaoh a principal end of God’s activity, and that God orchestrated it with no regard for
Pharaoh’s own sin. Neither Calvin nor Vermigli, Willet rebuts, “affirme that God raised
up Pharaoh, to this ende to resist him, but the ende was the demonstration of Gods power,
by his obstinacie and disobedience, which God procured not, but ordered it so, that his
glorie and power might bee set forth by it.”65 Read together with Willet’s other
statements about God’s hardening activity and his interpretation of Christ’s role as a
stumbling block, we can summarize his view on Pharaoh’s hardening by saying that this
63

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 430-431.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 500.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 419.
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too was an “accidental end” that likewise served the principal end—the demonstration of
God’s power—instrumentally.
Other times the dividing line in a double end falls between a thing’s impact on
humans and how that impact redounds to God’s glory, with the latter’s priority an oftenunstated assumption.66 This distinction is drawn in relation to several divine actions, as—
for example—justification, the final cause of which “in respect of us, is our salvation and
justification: in respect of God, the manifestation of his righteousnes to his glory.”67
Likewise, the (fraternal) twin doctrines of election and reprobation each contain a double
end, election serving both for the elect’s “happines” and God’s praise and glory, and
reprobation serving the ends of “the just condemnation of the wicked, and the
demonstration of the power of God.”68 In both election and reprobation, Willet also
differentiates between ends and effects—a distinction that we will consider further in the
next chapter on confusion of cause and effect.69
It is worth noting that an entity’s good end is not in every situation infallibly
achieved, as even positive ends can be corrupted by sinful agents.70 This principle is
demonstrated perhaps most clearly in Romans 13, in relation to Paul’s statements
regarding the role of power and of political leaders. Given that governors often reward
evildoers and punish those who do good, many exegetes have wrestled with Paul’s
66

A priority nonetheless clearly established by the broader theological context.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 169.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 433.
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See V.2.1. In other places, however—as in the multiple causes of good works that Willet
presents among the Romans 11 Doctrines (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 520), the “effects” are given in
place of the ends, suggesting either that the two terms are being used synonymously here, or (less likely)
that Willet believed no true “end” to be expressed by Paul in the passage cited.
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seemingly naïve statement in verse 13:3 that those who perform good works will receive
praise from the ruling authorities.71 Willet prefers the explanation (which bears some
similarity to Augustine’s) that Paul’s reference is to power’s absolute qualities, and not to
the concrete circumstances in which it happens to be employed:
Wherefore I take this to be the better answer, that first the Apostle speaketh here,
of the power it selfe, and of the true ende wherefore it was ordained, and not of
the personall faults in those, that abuse this power: for if the good be not
rewarded, as well as the evil punished, it is the fault of the governors.72
The misuse of power, Willet argues, does not negate the good that inheres within God’s
gift of power; rather, it is necessary to “distinguish between the power it selfe and
authoritie, which is ordained of God, to these ends.” Moreover, he adds, even a bad ruler
is preferable to anarchy, so that there is a net good even with those governors who most
abuse their power—Paul’s appeal to Caesar was, after all, to Nero.73 Note, again, that
Willet’s preferred explanation relies on the language and logic of final causality, in
describing how power’s unambiguously good “true ende” may be abused.
Similarly, the final cause can determine the morality of a given action—that is, it
is possible for identical actions to be considered either good or evil based on the
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Willet catalogs specifically interpretations by Origen (said praise will come from God at the
Judgment Day; Willet responds that Paul specifically refers to praise from the magistrate), Augustine (Paul
intends to say that the righteous will be worthy of praise from rulers, regardless of whether they actually
receive it), Gorrhan (the rulers will either actively give praise or, by withholding it, be the occasion of
greater praise from God), Bucer (Paul is alluding to a particular custom among the Greeks and Romans),
and Vermigli (the praise referred to is sometimes manifested by escaping punishment): (Willet, Hexapla
upon Romanes, 585).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 585-586. While Willet does not cite him here, this is basically
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from which however they who hold power often degenerate” (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 480).
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intention.74 This is due to the priority of the final cause in directing the means working to
effect it;75 since the various actions and events employed to bring about the appointed end
are as foot soldiers carrying out a general’s instructions, the moral status of these means
hinges on the morality of that general’s aims. So the final cause, which within itself may
have a certain hierarchy of ends, together with the efficient cause determines the
instrumental causes, the moral status of which derives from the more principal causes.

2.5 Formal, Material and Other Causes
The various instrumental and helping causes serve as intermediates through which
the efficient cause effects the ends designated in the final cause. These subordinate causes
may distinguish between various aspects of divine activity and, as they also form the
realm in which human activity may play a role in the economy of salvation, they tend to
be non-meritorious76 and subject to human error. Willet frequently identifies the
traditional Aristotelian formal and material causes, but also regularly supplements or
substitutes these with causes designated as “meritorious,” “working,” “impulsive or
motive,” or generically as “helping” or “instrumental,” as well as identifying among the
causes in some cases the “subject,” “object,” “effect,” or “manner.” There are some
obvious parallels and overlaps among these various causes: for instance, the “manner”
resembles the formal cause, the “subject” and “object” often appear as subdivisions of the
74

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 388. This principle is still widely held today—as, for instance, a
doctor wielding a needle is held to be morally quite different from a man on a subway sticking people with
needles. In a later section, on Causation and Evil (IV.3.3), we will see how this idea informs Willet’s
explanation of why even pagan “good deeds” merit judgment.
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Cf. Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 398.

The “meritorious cause” being an obvious exception. On subordinate causality, cf. Burgersdijk,
Monitio Logica, 50-51 (Institutionum logicarum, 61-62).
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material cause, all of the intermediate causes can fit in the category of “helping and
instrumental,” and effects and final causes share some common features.
The formal causes that Willet discerns among Paul’s definitions have to do with
patterns and forms of practice. For example, the formal cause of natural law as presented
in Romans 2:15 is its agreement with God’s truth.77 The formal cause of true prayer
(8:27) is its being offered up “according to the will of God,”78 and concord among
believers (15:5) is formally “according to Christ.”79 Often the formal cause identifies
God’s particular activity, while the efficient cause points to broader aspects of God’s
character, as his grace or faithfulness. So when Paul gives the causes of justification in
5:15-19, the efficient cause is the abundance of God’s grace, while the formal is Christ’s
obedience.80 This important distinction serves to root all of God’s activity in his
unchanging nature, and to avoid false characterizations of a fickle or bloodthirsty deity
who requires a checklist of deeds in order to be merciful and loving; the formal cause, in
other words, serves—and does not alter—the efficient.
The “manner,” as Willet presents it, is sometimes described as a non-cause, and
other times is listed among the causes. Responding to Haymo’s and Anselm’s argument
from Romans 4:17 that God’s paternity promise to Abraham was caused by Abraham’s
faith, Willet explains that this passage “rather sheweth the manner how, then the cause”
of his being made the father of many nations.81 So “manner” in this case is an alternative
77

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 118.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 377.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 678.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 256.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 209. Manner and cause are opposed also in relation to our
service to Christ (14:18) on p. 649 (on this passage, see my discussion of prepositions, section III.2).
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to a “cause”—though, as human faith is in other passages presented as a formal or
instrumental cause of divine actions,82 we can read this to mean that Willet is denying
more particularly any efficient causality to faith. Elsewhere the manner is given among
the various helping causes and is linked especially to the formal cause. Willet describes
the graces of the Holy Spirit as being spiritual in “forme and manner,” without
differentiating the two83. In a doctrine elicited from Romans 3:21-25 Willet lists the
manner between the “forme” and the “ende,” and it shares with the form an orientation to
Christ’s blood: “The forme is the imputation and application of Christs righteousnesse,
obtained by his obedience and blood…The manner is, through faith in his blood.”84 In
this usage the form and manner are as two sides of the same coin, with the form
representing a divine action and the manner prescribing the proper human response to
that action.85
With the manner holding a position of subordinate causality that frequently
incorporates the human element into God’s pattern of activity in the world, it also
represents a factor through which human sinfulness is liable to corrupt the process. In
matters that are in themselves either good or neutral, we may err in our manner of
seeking or engaging with the thing. In prayer, for example (here Willet draws his
example from Paul’s Romans 8:26 statement that we do not know how to pray as we
ought), we may ask for a good thing, but with the wrong motivation or without the proper
82

E.g. 24, 146, 168 and 237.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 648.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 177.
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The manner is not, however, limited to the human element, as in 15:13, where the manner of
God’s filling his people with graces is “by the power of the holy Ghost” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes,
684).
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patience or faith.86 Willet reads a similar situation in Paul’s partial praise of the Jews in
the beginning of Romans 10. Paul affirms that the Jews “have the zeale of God,” but with
the caveat that it is “not according to knowledge.” This scenario, too, Willet interprets as
an error of manner: “because their zeale was a good thing in it selfe, and they failed in the
manner onely, the Apostle so farre commendeth them.”87 Christ’s Sermon on the Mount
promise that those who seek will find assumes the condition that the seeking be done
toward the true end (God’s glory) and in the proper manner (by faith).88 In the same way,
a false manner and end can corrupt heathen actions even when the deeds themselves
conform to the law (“whatsoever is not of faith, is sinne,” Romans 14:23). When the
heathen perform good deeds, it is not as though the substance of honoring one’s parents
or providing for the needs of the poor has become suddenly sinful (as the Rhemist
annotators accused Protestants of saying), but these actions are considered marked by sin
“in respect of the manner and circumstances, because they were not directed to a right
ende.”89
The material cause, as the name denotes, tends to90 refer to the physical element
in a causal process—in cases of divine activity, then, either Christ, as the incarnate
member of the Godhead, or some material element of the created world serving as a
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 375-376.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 456.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 493.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 667.
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I am qualifying this fairly commonsense assertion because of a few places where Willet’s
identification of a material cause is less concrete than might be expected. From Paul’s prayer in Romans
15:5 that “the God of patience and consolation give [the Romans], thet [they] be like minded one toward an
other, according to Christ Jesus,” for example, where one might expect the material cause of concord
among believers to be the believers themselves and the formal to be their being like-minded according to
Christ, Willet finds both the material and the formal cause in the latter statement: “the materiall [cause], to
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nexus for God’s action. In Willet’s commentary, Christ is given consistently as the
material cause of the gospel, and is also presented as the material cause of salvation.91
From the creaturely realm, the bodies of the saints are the material cause of the spiritual
sacrifice that Paul describes at the beginning of Romans 12, “certaine practicall
principles” comprise the material cause of natural law, “all beleevers” are the material
cause of justification,92 and so forth. Like the efficient and final causes, the material is
occasionally subdivided—in Willet’s application, generally into subject and object. Thus,
the “subject” of hope—for instance—is “the faithfull heart,” while its “object” is “things
which are not seene.”93 Also like the formal cause, people may err with regard to the
material cause—otherwise neutral matters that are pursued in the wrong way involve a
fault in manner, while “things in their nature evill” that should not be pursued at all
accrue guilt through a fault in the matter itself (the material cause).94
As noted above, Willet also drew on an assortment of causes developed in the

be like minded, the formall, according to Christ” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 678). While the more
important identifications in this passage are of God as the efficient cause and the united praise of God (in
15:6) as the final, considering how Willet subdivides the intermediate causes can also provide general
insight into how multiple causality was conceived of in this era.
Cf. also Ross’s clarification concerning the “materiality” of the material cause: “‘Matter’ is not for
Aristotle a certain kind of thing, as we speak of matter in opposition to mind. It is a purely relative term—
relative to form,” (Ross, Aristotle, 76).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 354. Willet’s language here of “things in their nature evill”
appears to hedge close to the Gnostic idea of inherently evil matter that he condemns elsewhere (e.g. p.
524, see VI.2.2). The example that he offers—“the sinnefull workes of the flesh”—clarifies that his
reference is not to bare material, but to those fleshly deeds already qualified as sinful. The implication is
not (as Gnostic thought would have it) that matter can be inherently evil, but rather the tautological truth
that evil deeds are evil. His purpose in this Question is not to lay out a metaphysical theory, but to explain
the difference between erring according to matter and according to manner (i.e. by the material vs. the
formal cause).
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Peripatetic tradition after Aristotle for his analysis of Paul’s doctrinal definitions.95 “True
and lively prayer,” the efficient cause of which is the Holy Spirit, is aided by the sighing
of the human heart as “the instrument and organe of the spirit,” and by the saints in
general, as “the helping and underworking causes.”96 Though God is the principal
efficient cause of human good works, he effects these through various “helping causes”
that form a major portion of the Church’s vocation: instruction, exhortation, enacted
faith, and prayer.97 In other places, even when he does not explicitly lay out a matrix of
causes, Willet employs divisions that mirror the multiple causes he has elsewhere
identified. Describing the stumbling stone of Romans 9:33, for example, he uses instead a
set of (what we might term) “journalistic W’s” that correspond loosely to the traditional
four Aristotelian causes: “who layeth” (efficient), “who was” the stone (material), “where
laid” (formal), and “to what ende” (final).98 Willet also occasionally lists various
“effects” among the causes (which we will consider in depth below), and alongside the
causes of hope he includes, as a kind of anti-cause, “the contrarie…[of] despaire, and
diffidence.”99 In all of these delineations of intermediate causes, Willet is—again—
seeking to show that Paul’s definitions of Christian graces and doctrines in Romans
incorporate (sometimes human) means in a way that invalidates Pelagianistic
95

Willet’s cause-oriented interpretation of Paul’s words reflects the complexity of efficiency and,
especially here, the multiplicity of finite, instrumental causes in bringing about specific effects.
Burgersdijk, for instance, presents a fourfold division of the formal cause (material/immaterial;
substantial/accidental; natural/artificial/ principal/disposing): (Monitio Logica, 56-57 [Institutionum
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principal/less principal: (Monitio Logica, 58-68 [Institutionum logicarum, 69-78] ).
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interpretations.

3. Theological Application of Multiple Causality
3.1 Causes of the Gospel
Midway through his introductory overview of the entire epistle, Willet notes that
Romans begins with a definition of the gospel (“it is the power of God to salvation to
everie one that beleeveth,” verse 1:16), and he describes all that follows as the Apostle’s
“amplyfying and tractation [i.e. handling or treatment] of this definition.”100 Given the
centrality of this definition, then, it is fitting that Willet discerns the multiple causes of
the gospel in both chapter 1 and chapter 16 of Romans, as a kind of bookends to the
epistle. Willet extracts these causes from 1:16 in three different places—in the Questions
section of his introduction, and then again in both the Questions and Doctrines sections of
chapter 1.101 His identification of the particular causes remains broadly the same between
these three citations, with minor variations attributable to his varied use of sources and
his broadening the scriptural citation in the chapter 1 Doctrines section to include verses
2, 4 and 5. Only the final cause (“to salvation”) is identical between the three lists, this
being the least ambiguously expressed of the causes in 1:16.
We saw above in the section on the efficient cause that, in the analysis of grace
and the gospel, this designation is given generally either to God or to a divine attribute.
Here we find both of these, with Willet first (citing Gryneus) listing God,102 and later the
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 24. “For the most perfect and artificiall [i.e. artful] Methode,”
Willet adds approvingly, “is that which beginneth with the definition.”
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power of God,103 as the efficient. The formal cause also differs between these first two
instances. In the Gryneus citation the formal cause contains both a human-oriented (“faith
and beleefe”) and a God-oriented (“his efficacious power”) aspect, while the list given in
Question 40 of chapter 1 presents only the human side (“to every one that beleeves”).
This second list also neglects to offer a material cause (which in the other two places is
given as Christ), though later in the same Question Willet states that “Christ is the
efficient cause of salvation.”104 So we see some variation in Willet’s treatment of the
causes of the gospel as given in the very same verse, with God’s “power” acting in one
place as the efficient itself and in another as a formal cause through which God’s
efficiency works, and with Christ in one place presented as the material cause of the
gospel, and in the other as the efficient cause of the salvation brought about by the gospel
as its final cause.105
In Willet’s recapitulation of these causes of the gospel as one of the Doctrines
elicited from Romans 1, he supplements verse 16 with an added effect from verse 5, a
new formal cause from verse 4, and an observation regarding the relationship between the
two testaments from verse 2. Here, elaborating on the doctrine “of the Gospel, and the
nature thereof,” Willet derives the formal cause from the fourth verse, presenting it as
“the declaration and manifestation of [Christ] to be the Sonne of God.”106 Though
differing formally from the earlier expressions of this cause, its substance incorporates
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elements of both the God-oriented aspect and the human-oriented aspect given earlier—
God’s power being reflected in Christ’s divinity, and the declaration of the same being
necessary for human faith. From verse 5 Willet draws the “effects” of the gospel, namely
“obedience to the faith.”107 And from Paul’s words in verse 1:2 that the gospel was “afore
promised by [Christ’s] Prophets in the holy Scriptures,” Willet makes the important point
that, though the circumstances change, there is a single gospel “promised” before Christ
and “performed” in his coming, “one and the same in substance.”108
When Willet revisits the definition of the gospel as found in Paul’s closing
doxology in Romans 16:25-26 (“…according to my Gospel and preaching of Jesus
Christ, by the revelation of the mysterie, along time kept secret: [But now is opened, and
by the Scriptures of the Prophets, at the commandement of the everlasting God for the
obedience of faith, published among all nations.]”), the causes he discerns have changed
somewhat from the opening chapter. These causes he lays out twice—first when giving
the outline of the final chapter among the “Argument, methode, and parts,” and then
again near the end of the Questions section. In the first presentation he gives the causes
as: “the author and efficient, the commaundement of God; the instrument, the Scriptures
of the Prophets; and the ende, for obedience of faith.”109 In the following section,
exegeting the same doxology, his causes more strictly follow the Aristotelian four:
There are foure parts of this description, containing the foure causes thereof. 1.
The materiall cause, or object, which is Jesus Christ. 2. The forme, revealed now
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by the Scriptures of the Prophets, before kept secret. 3. The author and efficient,
at the commandement of God. 4. The ende, for the obedience of the Gentiles.110
We can note several interesting variations between all of these different enumerations of
gospel causes.111 In the chapter 16 iterations we now have God’s commandment as the
efficient cause (an action of God, rather than a divine attribute or God himself), Willet’s
earlier observation from verse 1:2 regarding the continuity of the gospel between the Old
and New Testaments finds parallels in an added instrumental cause (the writings of the
prophets of old) and a new formal cause (the shift in form from hidden to revealed
indicating again that the substance of the gospel has remained unchanged). Perhaps most
significantly, the human obedience described in the first chapter as an effect of the gospel
is in the final chapter given as the end, or final cause.112
We can make several observations based on the variations in Willet’s
identification of the causes of the gospel. First, the discernment of multiple causes was
not intended to serve as a rigid classification, but as an interpretive device for explaining
Paul’s definitions. As such, there is a certain fluidity to and overlap among the identified
causes. Related to this, we can observe that Willet’s exegesis gives a clear priority to
Paul’s language over any externally imposed philosophical desire for systematic
consistency. Also, given Willet’s extensive use and citation of a broad range of other
exegetes, it is reasonable to expect some variation in details that do not compromise his
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central theological commitments. Finally, we see that—in addition to the hierarchy
between causes (with priority given to the efficient and final cause)—we also
occasionally find a hierarchy within individual causes. An efficient cause can refer to an
agent (e.g. God) or to an agency of that agent (e.g. God’s power or commandment)—or,
indeed, as we saw earlier, to a subordinate human efficient. And a final cause can contain
degrees of “finality,” ranging from absolute ends (like God’s glory) to penultimate ends
(like human obedience) that might in certain contexts be downgraded to mere “effects.”

3.2 Sacramental Causality
Causal distinctions also proved helpful for Willet in defining the proper Reformed
understanding of the sacraments against the extreme positions of the Roman Catholics
and Anabaptists. Paul’s description of circumcision as “the seale of the righteousnes of
faith” in Romans 4:11 informs Willet’s statements on the sacraments in general in his
Doctrines and Controversies sections of chapter 4. His second Doctrine concerns the
“nature and substance of the Sacraments” and includes Faius’s delineation of their
causes:
So here are collected all the causes of the Sacraments: 1. The efficient cause and
author is God onely, because he onely is able to give efficacie and vertue unto the
sacraments, as God was the author of circumcision, so of all [the other]
Sacraments both of the old and new Testament. 2. The materiall cause is the
visible and externall signe. 3. The forme is the rite and manner of institution. 4.
The end to seale unto us the promises of God for remission of our sinnes in
Christ, Faius pag. 238.113
As we have seen in other cases, so here the identification of the efficient and end causes
proves most important to Willet’s arguments regarding the sacraments. “God onely” (and
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not the elements themselves, which serve as the material cause) is the efficient cause, and
the end of the sacraments is “to seale” (not to save). So when Willet arrives again at this
verse a few pages later among the Controversies, he uses this understanding to highlight
“two errors [that] are to be taken heede of”: that of Roman Catholics who “ascribe…too
much to the outward signe” (making the sign itself the efficient), and that of Anabaptists
who make “them but bare signes” (in essence doing away with the end cause of sealing
God’s promises, and making the sacraments ends unto themselves).114
In chapter 2, as well, Willet had drawn on Paul’s teaching on circumcision (2:2529) to declaim his opponents’ sacramental theologies. Against the Roman Catholic
teaching that the visible sacraments actively confer grace, Willet insists that “invisible
things doe not need visible, but the visible have need of the invisible,” so that in baptism,
for example, “the water is the instrument of cleansing, but the efficient and working
cause is the word.”115 It is noteworthy that Willet specifically identifies God’s “word” as
the efficient here, and not simply “God,” as it asserts not merely the (commonsense)
notion that God himself has a greater efficiency than the sacramental elements, but the
distinctly Protestant understanding of God’s word of promise having a clear priority over
the physical sacraments. In the Controversies section of Romans 9, Willet makes this
point again through Paul’s words there about the priority of promise (word) over flesh
and an analogy from Chrysostom. Chrysostom had likened Sarah’s womb to the water of
baptism in that each apart from the power of God’s word of promise was barren. Willet
connects this idea to Paul’s words in Ephesians 5:2[6] (“Cleansing it by the washing of
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water thorough the word”) to argue that “the water cleanseth, but by the operation of the
word.”116 Willet had also argued for the priority of word over sacrament from Paul’s
definition of the gospel in Romans 1:16, which we looked at earlier; if the “gospel” was
the power of God to salvation, then the implication was that the sacraments could not be
the efficient cause of salvation. Roman Catholics, he thus argued, had misplaced their
emphasis. The word preached does not serve merely to prepare for the salvific work of
the sacraments; rather, the sacraments serve to “confirme and seale” the word’s function
of begetting faith.117 Part of the issue here (which Willet acknowledges, even while
dismissing the Roman Catholic position) had to do with how the word “gospel” itself was
understood in the context of Romans 1:16. Roman Catholic theologians like Bellarmine
took the term more broadly to include all aspects of Christ’s ministry, while Willet
limited its meaning to the “preaching and publishing [of] the same.”
Romans 2:25-29 also provided Willet with ammunition against sacramental
beliefs espoused in Anabaptist and Donatist thought. Without naming particular figures,
Willet claims that “the Anabaptists” had used verses like 2:28, which states that physical
circumcision does not make one truly a Jew, to reject all sacraments entirely. But in
doing this, he argues, they ignore Paul’s previous statement (2:25) that “circumcision is
profitable, if thou doe the Law.”118 The external elements of the sacraments lack value,
116
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he explains, only when they are divorced from the internal parts (as in Roman Catholic
practice). Yet neither does the conditional “if thou doe the Law” support the reasoning of
the “old Donatists, who measured the Sacraments by the worthinesse of the Minister.”119
Since human unbelief does not “make the faith of God without effect” (Romans 3:3), an
unworthy minister cannot nullify the impact of a sacrament, which depends instead “upon
the truth of God” for its “force and efficacie.”120 Neither the presiding minister (contra
the “old Donatists”) nor the elements themselves (contra the Roman Catholics) are the
efficient cause of the sacraments, yet God—the true efficient—does work through the
sacraments (contra the Anabaptists), so they should not be neglected.121
3.3 Causation and Evil
Willet’s application of multiple causality to matters of evil and sin is especially
significant for our purposes, since the relationship between God and evil was one of the
more heated polemical issues between Protestants and Roman Catholics. For Reformed
polemicists this involved the delicate balance of affirming God’s sovereign rights and
rule, without making him the efficient cause of anything unbefitting of his divine
goodness. Thus, while we are accustomed to finding God designated as the sole efficient
of all things good, we discover other efficients—working either alone or “synergistically”
with God—as the motive causes of darker ends.
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And so, beginning with the initial transgression, the efficient cause of original sin
is identified as “the perversenes of Adams will.”122 Similarly, sin itself (especially when
ingrained as habit) can function as the “efficient and mooving cause” of further sin, as
Paul demonstrates in Romans 1.123 The situation is a bit more complicated regarding
death, with Pererius’s explanation that God “is not the efficient cause of death, which is a
meere privation” lacking, to Willet’s judgment, adequate nuance. While not disagreeing
with Pererius here absolutely, Willet argues that his “answer also is insufficient”:
“wherefore we answer further, that as God created light, darknes he created not, but
disposed of it: so he made not death, but as it is a punishment: God, as a disposer rather,
and a just judge, [than] an author, inflicteth it.”124 This distinction between creating and
disposing, between God as author and as judge, allows Willet to keep from making God
the efficient cause of sin and death, while maintaining God’s sovereignty over all aspects
of creation.
A similar distinction serves in the case of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart, where
God plays an active role in the hardening (as it is a punishment), though not in causing
the justly punished wickedness in Pharaoh’s heart. Willet denies Pererius’s charge that
Protestants made God “the efficient cause of stirring up the malice of Pharaoh,” averring:
“farre be it from us to make God the author of evill, or the proper cause of any ones
hardnesse of heart.”125 Yet, while not the efficient cause of Pharaoh’s hard heart, neither
was God causally divorced from the hardening entirely—a concept we will explore in
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more depth, in relation to the hardness of the Jews’ hearts, in the following chapter on
cause and effect.126
As we have seen, these distinctions determine how we understand God’s
relationship to sinful elements within the created order. Willet’s own position is summed
up by Hugo, who “well saith, that God …by his invisible operation doth temper and order
even wicked wills according to his owne mind, &c. yet God giveth unto evill and
perverse wills, non corruptionem sed ordinem, not corruption but order.”127 God does not
limit himself to sinless material when orchestrating his grand design, but neither is he
responsible for the sinful substance itself of any material:
Now whereas the Apostle calleth as well the reprobate as the elect, the vessels of
God, the one of his mercie, the other of his wrath; thereby we see, that God useth
them both, as his instruments, though not in the same manner: for he po[u]reth of
his grace into the vessels of mercy, and so maketh them fit instruments for
himselfe; the other he useth also not by infusing that evilnes into them, which
they have, but by moderating, ordering, and overruling the same, as it pleaseth
him.128
As this principle pertains to reprobation, then, God is not the efficient cause of the
wickedness of the reprobate, but he is the efficient cause of the reprobation of the wicked.
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We will conclude this section with a look at the multiple causes of damnation that
Willet identifies in a lengthy discussion on the decree of reprobation among the Romans
9 Controversies. Having identified opposing “rockes of offence”—that of foresight of sin
being the sole cause of reprobation (which Willet claims would render God impotent),129
and that of the decree of reprobation being entirely attributable to God’s will (which
Willet allows would be technically within God’s right according to his absolute
power)130—Willet lays out a series of variations upon a “middle or meane way,” which
attributes “the decree of reprobation partly to the will of God, as the efficient, partly to
the foresight of sinne, as the material cause thereof.”131 This measured approach, which
takes into consideration both human culpability through sin and God’s power and right as
sovereign over all creation, Willet deems “the safest from any inconvenience, and the
fittest to give satisfaction to the contrarie objections.”132 The logic of multiple causality
provides a framework for fitting this “synergistic” effort together, as we see in the causes
of damnation that Willet elicits from a definition of reprobation provided by “judicious
Polanus”: “the efficient, is Gods decree and purpose, the materiall is sinne, the formall,
the deniall of mercie, and the leaving them to themselves, the finall cause, is the setting
forth of the justice of God.”133 So God remains the guiding force behind the more
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significant causes, even while contributing none of the evil that, as the material cause,
leaves the reprobate fully culpable for his own damnation, with no valid grievance
against God.

4. Conclusion
As an exegetical tool providing categories for framing Paul’s causal language in
Romans, the Aristotelian fourfold causality gave Willet a vocabulary with which to refute
various erroneous papist readings of the epistle. Roman Catholic and Protestant exegetes,
equally familiar with Aristotelian logic, agreed on the compatibility of multiple levels of
causality, but disagreed over how these various causes should be assigned. Willet argued
that Roman Catholic exegetes interpreting Romans had confused the multiple causes of
several key doctrines, generally by mistaking a subordinate, instrumental and nonmeritorious cause (the material or formal) for the primary, efficient cause. Using this
causal framework, Willet refuted papist interpretations, which in turn sharpened his
articulation of his own Reformed understandings.
Overemphasis of a partial truth being the essence of heresy, Willet drew on the
hierarchy of compatible causes to stake out theologically balanced positions. To rely on
secondary causes was to place one’s trust in created entities, yet to neglect secondary
causes entirely was to test God. Regarding justification, Catholics erred by giving too
much efficiency to faith and good works. Willet held that faith was indeed necessary, but
only as it acted subordinately as an instrumental cause (whereas works are, properly,
effects). To rebut the Roman Catholic accusation that the Reformed by their emphasis on
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divine sovereignty made God the author of sin, Willet divides the causes to affirm God’s
efficient causality in directing sin to good ends (thus guarding God’s sovereignty and
keeping from envisioning him as a weak or indifferent God of “mere permission”),134
while making the sinful element itself the material cause (freeing God from charges of
generating evil or of acting unjustly). Similarly, Willet explains the inherent sinfulness of
heathen “good deeds” through a distinction between their material and formal causes—
the material aspect of giving to the poor may be good, but the deficient formal cause
(giving not out of love for God) designates the entire action as sin. Explaining
sacramental causality, Willet refutes both Roman Catholic and Anabaptist extremes by
arguing that God—not the elements themselves—is the efficient cause of the sacraments’
efficacy, while the elements do— as instruments through which God works—provide a
material causality. In each of these cases we find the Aristotelian fourfold causal model
functioning not as a form of philosophical speculation, nor as a corrupting influence on
the scriptural witness through an imposed, alien structure, but rather as an organizing,
explanatory tool that for Willet served to clarify precisely where Roman Catholic
exegetes had strayed from a faithful reading of Romans.
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CHAPTER V.
CONFUSION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT
1. Introduction
While Willet frequently charged his theological opponents with misidentifying
the particular multiple causes of an entity, condition or event, elsewhere he claimed not a
confusion of different causes but of cause and effect—an argument sometimes only
subtly distinct from the one drawing on multiple causality, due to close correspondence
between an effect and a final cause. This confusion of cause and effect was certainly
understandable, given the general acceptance that temporal order does not always
indicate causal order,1 the fact that an effect of one thing could in a causal chain serve as
a cause of another,2 and the possibility of an intentional inversion of cause and effect for
rhetorical purposes.3 Arguing for rhetorical inversion in Romans also gave an exegete a
considerable amount of interpretive flexibility, as he could base his argument not simply
on the words actually used in the epistle, but on Paul’s supposed intention in constructing
a particular argument. Willet and his opponents agreed on the basic principle that no
effect can precede its cause.4 The goal, then, was to establish a proper causal sequence,
and to argue that the opponents had mistaken the order of and relationships within the

1
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sequence. This chapter will consider how Willet addresses the relationship between cause
and effect, focusing on the doctrinal ramifications of improperly establishing the
sequence of cause to effect.

2. Confusion of Cause and Effect
2.1 Consequence or Final Cause
We noted in the last chapter that a final cause could be subdivided with reference
to different subjects, and could be distinguished from consequences or effects. This
flexibility further illustrates Willet’s fidelity to the scriptural text and to his Reformed
heritage, as well as his use of the highly developed description of kinds and levels of
causality characteristic of the Peripatetic tradition in his day, and it enabled him to argue
that certain apparently causal relationships were in fact incidental or accidental. With
regard to the subdivision of a final cause, Willet would variously label a secondary end as
a second final cause (to highlight God’s purposiveness to multiple ends), or as an effect
(to illustrate its subordinate position). So, as we saw in the final section of the last
chapter, in Romans 3:25 Willet explains Paul’s doctrine of justification by noting that
“the ende is the declaration of the righteousnesse of God by the forgivenesse of
sinnes…[and] the effect thereof is our reconciliation with God.”5 Whereas in other places
Willet makes it clear that human salvation is not merely an afterthought or unintended
consequence of God’s activity, here he emphasizes by his use of causal categories that
the demonstration of God’s glory is the higher end.
In other situations an “effect” could be more nearly a (mere) consequence, with
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little or no intentional causation. This is the case, for example, in many instances of
prophetic speech, wherein a prophet’s words predict but do not cause an occurrence.
Discussing Paul’s reference to Isaiah in Romans 10:16 (“But they have not all harkened
to the Gospel: for Esaias saith, Who hath beleeved our sayings?”), Willet accepts Tolet’s
note that the Latin enim (“for”) can indicate the cause of the speech as well as the cause
of the thing itself, but prefers here Vermigli’s avoidance of any causal language at all:
“the better answer is, that this particle (for) doth not shew the cause, but the consequence:
for, not because the Prophet so said, did they not beleeve: but because they beleeved not,
the Prophet so foretold.”6 Neither Tolet nor Vermigli thought that Isaiah’s words had
caused Israel’s less-than-universal belief, but Willet credits Vermigli with the “better
answer,” presumably for his expressing this in the language not of cause but of
consequence. Yet, since the prophets spoke the very words of God, in some cases Willet
allowed that a prophet’s speech could function as an instrumental cause. Such was the
case with Isaiah’s warning quoted in Romans 11:7. Refuting Albert Pighius’s assertion
that Isaiah’s words here were merely a prediction and no cause of the hardening of the
Jews, Willet rebuts:
It followeth not: for even that word which Isay preached, did provoke the Jewes,
and they were thereby further hardened: and though every prediction be not a
cause of that which is to come, yet such predictions, as foretell of such things as
the Lord himselfe will worke, as here the Prophet speaketh of the hardening of the
heart, doe not onely shew the thing but expresse the cause also.7
Willet’s interpretations of these two citations from Isaiah seem inconsistent and almost
contradictory until we consider the extended context of Willet’s disagreement with
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Pighius. In order to free God from any charge of dealing unfairly with his people, Pighius
had argued that God himself was in no way a cause of hardened hearts. Thus, according
to Pighius, when God spoke through Isaiah of hardening and blinding people, these were
not to be read actively as God’s own doings, but as predictions of what God knew his
obstinate people would do of their own accord.8 So in the first instance, in Romans 10:16,
Willet was arguing that Isaiah himself was in no way a cause of the Jews’ unbelief, while
in the second case he was claiming that God’s words (given through Isaiah) did play a
causal role in the hardening of unbelieving Jews’ hearts.
Other arguments within the same debate with Pighius regarding God’s role in the
hardening of hearts further illustrate the complex relationship between cause and
consequence. Commenting on the “spirit of slumber” that God is said to send in Romans
11:8, Willet sought to avoid two extreme positions: that of Pighius, who by removing
from God all responsibility for the hardening made God a weak bystander and falsified
the clear word of Scripture,9 as well as that of the supralapsarians (“they which hold the
absolute decree of reprobation”) who “doe extenuate the power of God too much, and so
doe ascribe too much unto God, in making him the principall cause of hardening of mens
hearts.”10 The proper moderating position for Willet, as we touched on also earlier in
reference to Pharaoh’s hardened heart, was one where God’s actions in further hardening
and blinding were performed as just punishments for the willful “blindnes and obstinacie
of mans heart.”11 This blindness is thus, in different respects, both a cause and a
8
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consequence. Man’s blinding of himself causes God’s judgment, which then effects
further blindness as the consequence of God’s punishment. Pighius had used the example
of one with “tender eyes” increasing his blindness by looking at the sun; no one would
say (Pighius argued) that the sun caused the blindness—rather, “the fault is in the eyes.”12
Willet counters this example by writing that this “similitude maketh directly against
[Pighius]: for though the first and principall fault be in the eyes, yet accidentally the
brightnes of the Sunne doth increase the blindnes of the eyes.”13 One is bound to err,
Willet argues, when the hardness of heart is attributed entirely to a single cause. Multiple
agents play a role: human corruption as the first cause, Satan as an instigator, and God as
the just judge. Willet illustrates this point with the image of a blacksmith: “the corruption
of mans heart is as the coale, that sendeth forth sparkes, Job 5:7. the devill bloweth and
stirreth the coales, and kindleth the fire: God he smiteth as it were on the anvile, and
frameth and disposeth every thing to his owne will.”14 Willet’s insistence that God
actively hardens hearts, but only as a just punishment for sin, allows him to maintain a
strong place for God’s sovereignty while defending his Reformed predecessors against
various Roman Catholic accusations, demonstrating for instance that Stapleton’s charge
that Calvin made God “the active cause of sinne” was “a meere slaunder.”15
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2.2 Cause versus Fruit
In his polemic against what many Reformed of his age considered to be a
Semipelagian tendency in Roman Catholic hermeneutics, Willet frequently argued that
his opponents had mistakenly identified the various fruits of justification as its causes.
This error was generally expressed in Protestant circles as a confusion of justification and
sanctification. In Willet’s Romans commentary, for instance, we find him using this
argument in reference to Paul’s counsel in 6:13 not to “give your members as weapons of
unrighteousnesse,” refuting Bellarmine’s suggestion that this “inherent justice” justifies
us before God by explaining that “here the Apostle treateth not of justification, but of our
sanctification, and mortification, which are necessary fruits of justification, and doe
follow it; but they are not causes of our justification.”16 Similarly, Willet uses Paul’s
teachings on righteousness in Romans 3 as an occasion to refute the Roman Catholic
invention of a “second justification,” in which humans increase God’s initial justifying
action by their own meritorious charitable works. “For that,” writes Willet, “which they
call the second justification, is nothing els but sanctification, which is the bringing forth
of the fruits of holines after that we are justified by faith.”17 Later, in the Controversies
section of Romans 10, Willet uses the causal relationship between justification and
sanctification to explain the distinction between the “righteousness of faith” and the
“righteousness of the law,” against those who like Stapleton had treated them as
synonymous, as well as those who presented them as contraries: “the righteousnes of the
law, doth necessarily follow and accompany faith, (though not to be justified by it) as
16
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sanctification doth accompanie justification.” He also denies that the distinction between
these two kinds of righteousness is merely ratione, non re, which Grynaeus had argued.
This view treated them as two forms of the same species, differing not in substance but in
the mind of the perceiver. Willet insisted, rather, that there was a real, extra-mental
distinction between them, being as they differ in “forme, matter, qualitie, [and]
subject.”18 He reiterates the nature of the relationship between the two in a summary
statement at the end of the Controversy: “and so the justice of the law in our holinesse
and sanctification doth followe necessarily our justification by faith.”19
It is interesting to note here that, at least in the Controversies section,20 Willet
makes the highly unusual move of associating Paul’s reference to the “righteousness of
the law” not with a Mosaic form of righteousness antecedent to the advent of Christ or an
impossible standard of conduct that drives us out of despair to Christ, but with the
sanctification that follows justification by faith in Christ.21 By essentially defining the
18

For more on different kinds of scholastic distinctions, see Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of
Latin and Greek Theological Terms Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), s.v. “distinctio.”
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the law offered was derailed by human sinfulness, and—as a Doctrine elicited from the text—delineating
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covenant of works (Wilson, Commentarie upon Romanes, 782), Parr describes the righteousness of the law
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phrase in the Controversies section through the traditional Reformed “third use of the
law,” Willet emphasizes the law’s essential goodness and the unity of God’s redemptive
plan through time—the two “species” of righteousness (one imputed and the other
inherent) are fully complementary, since the one leads necessarily to the other. And while
the law itself indeed leads (indirectly, and “by an accident”) to the righteousness that is
by faith, the righteousness of the law, Willet seems to argue, must properly describe the
inherent righteousness that we actually attain (i.e. sanctification), and not a righteousness
distinct from faith that has become for us, because of our sinful nature, a mere chimera.
Willet refutes a similar argument from Augustine for failing to adequately separate our
good works from justification. Describing what Paul means by the one who does the law
“living” thereby, Augustine explained that “hee that hath obtained justification by faith,
doth the righteousness of the law, and may live thereby: But,” Willet interjects, “this
were to confound the law and the Gospel.”22 While this exchange from the Questions
section seems to reject a view quite similar to the one Willet himself will put forth in the
Controversies, what seems in Willet’s judgment to be missing is the explicit clarification
that the just subsequently do and live by the righteousness of the law, “though not to be
justified by it.”23
In the Romans hexapla, as in his other works, Willet vehemently disputes the
Roman Catholic charge that the Protestant insistence on justification by faith alone
diminishes the importance of Christian ethics and necessarily leads to laxity in
performing good deeds. His exegetical move concerning the “righteousness of the law”
expressed of attaining a righteous status “onely by the knowledge of the Law without the helpe or grace of
Christ” (Martin, New Testament, 408).
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demonstrates this argument already, and it is fitting to consider in more depth the
theoretical basis for his defense of Protestant good works. In his reflections on Paul’s
designation of eternal life as “the gift of God” in Romans 6:23, Willet states that
Good workes are so farre from beeing meritorious causes of eternall life, that they
are not alwaies and in all, causa sine qua non, the cause without the which we
cannot attaine unto life, as in infants; and in them which are of yeares, though
without good workes they cannot be saved, yet good workes are rather a
beginning of eternall life, then the cause thereof.24
The salvation of infants who die before they reach an age where they can perform any
good works is evidence for Willet that works are not absolutely necessary for eternal life,
and thus cannot be its cause. For those, however, who do have opportunity to manifest
the fruit of their faith, good works are the expected outgrowth of the unmerited gift of
grace—a natural characteristic of the eternal life that begins prior to their physical death,
at the moment when they are justified. Thus, even the redeemed thief on the cross next to
Christ was able to demonstrate good works as an outflow of his salvation in the short
period he had before his death, when he “shewed his faith by his workes, in confessing
his sinne, and honouring Christ.”25 The Protestant doctrine of justification, Willet insists,
is fully compatible with a robust ethical emphasis: “we doe not separate works from faith,
though wee exclude them from justification: faith which justifieth cannot be without
workes, yet it justifieth without workes: it alone justifieth, yet it must not be alone.”26 Yet
even these works of sanctification are considered good and “pleasing unto God” not by
an intrinsic property in the acts themselves or in the manner in which they are offered,
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\but as an effect of God’s acceptance of them.27

2.2.1 Causality and the Theological Virtues
Willet’s treatment of causality in relation to the virtues of faith, hope, and love
can clarify for us the relationship between cause and fruit, and how these may be
confused. Two primary concerns are evident in Willet’s approach to these virtues. First,
in order to protect the central position of justification by faith alone, he is careful to
maintain the primacy of faith among the theological virtues. And second, to avoid any
suggestion of Semipelagian soteriology, he reminds us that faith is itself an effect of
election. This second concern we will develop in more detail in the following section, on
election and foreknowledge.
In the comments on Romans 8:24 (“For by hope we are saved…”), the Rheims
annotators took the occasion to argue for a salvific role for virtues other than faith:
That which in other places [Paul] attributeth to faith, is here attributed to hope, for
whensoever there be many causes of one thing, the holy writers (as matter is
ministred and occasion given by the doctrine then handled) sometimes referre it to
one of the causes, sometime to an other: not by naming one alone, to exclude the
other, as our Adversaries captiously and ignorantly do argue: but at divers times
and in sundrie places to expresse that, which in every discourse could not, nor
needed not to be uttered.28
In similar fashion to how Willet would argue that multiple causes lay behind such effects
as a hardened heart, so here the Roman Catholic Rhemist annotators had argued for a
kind of causal synecdoche in Paul’s language of justification, with varied virtues cited
individually according to contextual needs, each representing the entire network of
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justification’s many causes. This denial of justification by faith alone—which we will
recall Willet held to be, with election, one of the “two chiefe points” of Christianity29—
necessitated a defense of this important doctrine at this juncture in Willet’s commentary.
To allow a place for even so noble a virtue as hope alongside faith in causing our
justification could open the gate for a Trojan horse of works-righteousness that would
erode the theological foundation of the Protestant churches.
Willet dismisses the Rhemist interpretation of Romans 8:24 with diverse
arguments. He begins by drawing a distinction between salvation and justification. “By
being saved,” he explains, “the Apostle understandeth not to be justified, for our
justification is presently had and possessed: but by salvation, he signifieth the perfection
and accomplishment of our redemption and adoption in Christ.”30 The division here
parallels the distinction between justification and sanctification, with justification in each
case being an accomplished fact, and sanctification and salvation denominating a process
or destination. Adding to the potential for confusion, Willet acknowledges that “saved”
can at times be used to mean “justified,” though in this case it is the Rhemist annotators
who “would deceive us by the homonymie.” Yet even with this distinction between
justification and salvation in mind, Willet rejects also what would seem to be the plain
sense of Paul’s words, denying that hope is the cause of salvation: “so that hope is not the
cause of salvation, but it is as the way and meanes, whereby salvation begunne in us by
faith, is brought unto perfection.” We can presume here that Willet’s use of the definite
article in “the cause” narrowly implies the efficient cause, as the reference to hope as “the
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way and meanes” would certainly suggest instrumental causation. Finally, citing William
Fulke and Vermigli, Willet uses an argument similar to the Rhemist synecdoche
explanation, though in a way that guards the primacy of faith. When Paul writes of hope,
Willet reasons, “we must understand the Apostle to speake of hope, as joyned with
faith…And when as these things, as our justification, salvation, are ascribed to hope or
charitie, we must so take it, that the manner of our justification is showed, not by the
causes, but by the effects.”31 He goes on to liken hope and faith to a tree and its roots; just
as a tree springs from its root system and cannot exist without it, so hope emerges from
faith and cannot exist in isolation.
In his Controversies section on Romans 5, Willet similarly establishes faith’s
priority over love in justification. Pererius had argued that Paul’s assertion that “the love
of God is shed abroad in our hearts” indicated an infused love that believers had for God
that contributed to making them formally just in God’s judgment. Noting that this
interpretation differed from those even of other notable Roman Catholics, Willet counters
this reading on two points. First, where Pererius had taken ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ as an
objective genitive—our love for God—Willet holds that arguments regarding any merit
associated with our love here are “impertinent, because the Apostle treateth not here of
the charitie or love, which is in man toward God, but of Gods love towards us.”32 Despite
the purported impertinence of the debate, Willet girds his case with other arguments.
Acknowledging that the faithful are marked by infused and permanent virtues,
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including—naturally—love for God, he explains that these attributes cannot contribute to
our justification, as “all our righteousnesse is as a stained cloth…and therefore not able to
justifie us.” Our love for God, as our justification, is an effect of the efficient causality of
God’s love for us.33 Willet also affirms here a more general priority of faith over love.
Pererius in his disputations on Romans 5 had cited 1 Corinthians 13, plus no less an
authority than Augustine, to argue that love was the greatest of God’s gifts.34 Against this
absolute exaltation of love, Willet counters that “charitie is not simply the greatest of all
other gifts, and absolutely preferred before faith,” but is the “greatest” virtue only with
regard to its permanence. But apart from the consideration of duration, “faith is the
greater…as it engendereth all other vertues.”35 As to Pererius’s appeal to Augustine in
this context, Willet points out in the Questions section that Augustine is not entirely
consistent in how love is to be interpreted in Romans 5:5, so that “Augustine shall answer
Augustine” to rebut those Roman Catholics who cited him on this issue.36
Willet likewise subordinates confession (and other “works”) to faith in his
discussion of the yoking of belief and confession in Romans 10:10, using a “ways and
means” explanation similar to the one he uses to subordinate faith to election (see the
section below). Responding to Bellarmine’s inference from this verse that confession
33
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serves together with faith as a principal cause of salvation, Willet—after sending
“Bellarmine to his auncient Cardinal Tolet” for a more sound reading—draws on Beza
for “that rule in Logike, causa causa, est causa causati, the cause of the cause, is the
cause of that which is caused by that cause.” Just as the first in a chain of dominoes is the
true cause of the final domino’s fall, so faith is the cause of salvation, even though its
causal chain runs through confession: for “faith is the cause also of confession, which is
required, not as a cause, but tanquam medium, as a way and meane unto salvation.”37

2.3 Election and Foreknowledge
As careful as Willet is to protect the privileged place of faith in Reformed
justification against the incursion of works of Romanist soteriology, he has to strike a
delicate balance to keep from making faith an efficient cause of justification, as in the
Arminian exaltation of the human will. Faith holds the highest causal position within the
hierarchy of faith, hope and love, Willet argues, but faith is itself an effect of God’s
gracious election. Passages such as John 6:29 and Ephesians 2:8 make it clear that faith is
not a human work, but a gift from God.38 Thus, the argument that God’s election depends
on his foresight of faith is “a vaine and absurd tautologie,” as God would merely be
foreseeing the faith that he himself was going to grant.39
One of Willet’s extended refutations of the notion that predestination depends
upon God’s foresight of faith is occasioned by the interpretation of Romans 8:29 (“Those
whome he knewe before he also predestinate…”) by Chrysostom, one of Willet’s most37
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cited Church Fathers.40 Chrysostom, followed by several other Greek exegetes and joined
also by Latin expositors Ambrose and Jerome, as well as some sixteenth-century
Lutherans, took this passage to mean that God elected those whom he knew would show
themselves worthy to be called—if only, as in the case of the Lutherans, in view of
foreknown faith.41 This same view was taught by a young Augustine (though he changed
his opinion, “ingeniously confessing” the opposite view in his Retractions) and by the
Rhemists (though the “most learned among” the Romanists, as Bellarmine and Pererius,
agreed with Willet’s position).42
As part of his refutation, Willet again draws here on the example of a child dying
in infancy. Such a child’s election could not depend on foreseen good works, since these
would never exist. And the suggestion that God in these cases would “see” instead the
hypothetical good works that the child would have done had she survived is untenable, as
the same logic could argue that one could be condemned for hypothetical future evil
deeds, which Willet judges would “standeth not with the justice of God.”43
It is necessary too, Willet argues, to “distinguish betweene the decree it selfe, and
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the execution of the decree.”44 This argument relies on the logic of causality, which
we considered in the previous chapter. “First the end is propounded,” he explains, “then
the meanes are thought of, as tending to that end.”45 God’s decree of election points
toward an end of human salvation, and faith is the predominant means that works to
effect that end. It would be absurd to suggest that the appointed means were the ultimate
cause of the end for which those same means were appointed. Willet elaborates on this
notion in the Controversies section of the next chapter, Romans 9, with the example of a
“nephew” (which he uses in the now obsolete sense of “grandson”46): “the father is the
cause of his son, and the son of the nephew, and yet the son is not the cause of the father;
so election is the cause of faith, and faith of salvation: but it therefore followeth not that
faith should be the cause of election.”47 Such an argument, of course, is only possible
with a proper distinction drawn between election and salvation. This distinction allows
Willet to take Paul’s strongly predestinarian language in the heart of Romans 9 at its face
value, yet without neglecting a role for faith in the economy of salvation. “Faith then in
Christ is not the cause of election, but a meane subordinate to bring the elect unto
salvation.”48 Faith thus retains an instrumental (though not meritorious) causality with
regard to the goal of salvation, while possessing no causality at all toward election.
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While Willet frequently cites election as the cause of many of the graces and
virtues in a Christian’s life, he does occasionally reach behind election to give its cause,
which he denominates variously, depending on the language Paul uses in the particular
context. This practice of allowing the scriptural context to provide differing names for the
“first cause” of election was not uncommon among Reformed exegetes.49 Most often
Willet describes the cause of election as God’s “good pleasure.”50 He associates this good
pleasure with God’s absolute will (when explaining the distinction between God’s
“effectuall calling” and his “calling not effectuall” in Romans 2)51, and, following
Vermigli, with God’s secret will (in the context of discussing God’s hardening “whom he
will” in Romans 9).52 Willet is careful to keep election separate from any suggestion of
merit. Having cited interpretations by Socinus and Ostorodius that took Romans 9:18
(God “hath mercie on whom he will”) as evidence that God’s forgiveness does not
require satisfaction by Christ, Willet responds by drawing distinctions between God’s
general and special mercy, and (again) between election and salvation. God does not
require Christ’s satisfaction in order to show mercy, as it is a quality and faculty that “is
naturall in God, and absolute in him without any condition.”53 Thus, God extends his
general gifts (sunshine, rain, and the like) to all of his creation, and also freely chooses to
49
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bestow his special grace upon his elect. And so God’s election is caused by “none other
but onely the good pleasure of God, [requiring] no merit of any creature, no not of Christ
himselfe.”54 The error of Socinus and Ostorodius (in this matter) was applying this
understanding to God’s temporal work of redemption. God’s “first decree and purpose”
to demonstrate mercy through election was rooted in his good pleasure alone, but the
various means through which God effects this election have additional causes, including
especially Christ’s satisfaction, as it was God’s will that this “should not be done without
Christ.” A proper trinitarian reading of Romans 9:18 further removes any wedge the
heretics attempted to position between God’s forgiveness and Christ’s work of
satisfaction: “therefore God forgiveth sinnes for his owne sake, because he forgiveth
them for Christ, who is the Jehovah and eternall God, that forgiveth sinnes.”55 But if even
the merit of Christ’s work did not motivate God’s purpose to elect some freely by his
grace, it would be a blasphemous absurdity to presume that God’s election could be
caused by his foreknowledge of any human faith or works.
Particularly threatening to this understanding, as we saw earlier with
Chrysostom’s interpretation, were various passages that gave a foundational position to
God’s foresight or foreknowledge within the causality of salvation. Paul begins the
“golden chain” of Romans 8:29-30, for instance, with: “those whom [God] knew before,
he also predestinate to be like fashioned to the image of his Sonne…” Since God’s
prescience is listed before predestination, Willet must be careful to clarify that this is not
a foreknowledge of any quality within the individuals elected, but references God's good
54
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pleasure: “first, there is the purpose of God in generall to glorifie his name in saving
some. then he foreseeth, liketh, and approoveth a certain number according to his good
pleasure, whom he chooseth out, electeth, and separateth from the rest.”56 Willet presents
God’s foreknowledge as the cause of election also in the Doctrines section of Romans 11,
in reference to the second verse of the chapter (“God hath not cast away his people,
which hee knew before”). Here, drawing on 1 Peter 1:2 (“Elect according to the
foreknowledge of God”), he explains: “and thus Gods foreknowledge differeth from
election, as the cause from effect: for the love, acceptance, and approbation of God, is the
cause of election.”57 While Willet doesn’t state it explicitly in this context, clear
statements elsewhere in the commentary necessitate that God’s “love, acceptance, and
approbation” here be understood as stemming from God’s absolutely free purpose, and
not from any “loveable” or “acceptable” qualities inherent in the elect themselves.58

2.3.1 Positioning Election and Predestination within the Ordo Salutis
It is worth saying something here about Willet’s ordering of election and
predestination, since it reveals two different working definitions of predestination within
the Reformed theological camp. Muller notes that while some of the Reformed
orthodox, as Herman Rennecherus, simply re-presented the elements given in Romans
8:28-30 (that is, foreknowledge, predestination, calling, justification and glorification) as
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the “golden chain” of salvation, many others additionally folded in aspects from
Ephesians 1 to flesh out their chains.59 Since Paul does not include “he elected”
(ἐξελέξατο) in the list he gives in Romans 8:28-30, those wanting to incorporate the
reference to election in Ephesians 1:4 into this model had to choose whether to add it
before or after “he predestined” (προώρισεν), and this placement coincided with the
exegete’s understanding of predestination—namely, whether it was a blanket term that
included both election and reprobation, or a narrower term that was limited to the benefits
associated with election.
Many continental Protestant scholastics used the term praedestinatio to include
both electio and reprobatio.60 Yet there were some, especially in the British context, who
resisted this broader definition and tended, thus, to reverse the order of predestination and
election. Willet’s contemporary Thomas Wilson, for instance, favored the narrower
understanding of predestination in the 1616 second edition of his A Christian Dictionary,
concluding this entry with: “So as predestination is of larger extent than election,61
though in Scripture it is not found to concern any other save the elect. But Scholasticall
writers make it the general both to election and reprobation, as a decree of God which is
touching the ends of both, which bee without end.”62 Wilson’s understanding of scriptural
predestination as referring only to the elect is reflected in the order in which he lists the
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causes of justification in commenting on verse 8:30 in his 1614 Romans commentary:
“the true & proper causes [of justification] be Gods foreknowledge, election,
predestination, & calling, Faith beeing but the Organ and helping cause (as I said before)
verse 22.chap. 3.”63
Elnathan Parr in his 1618 exposition of Romans 8-11 argued likewise against the
common broader understanding of predestination: “Predestination is by Divines usually
taken and used in their writings, for the whole counsell of God concerning the Elect and
the Reprobate: and this they doe for plainnesse sake. Here [in Romans 8:29] it is used
onely for Election: neither doe I observe it otherwaies used in the Scripture.”64 Unlike
Wilson, Parr does not apply his understanding of predestination to an extended list of
salvation’s causes, preferring to limit his chain to the elements Paul cites in Romans
8:29-30.65 William Cowper, writing in 1609, allows for both definitions of predestination,
but limits its meaning in Romans 8 to the narrower reference, so that it “is no larger than
Election.”66 Indeed, in this context he treats election as the broader term, consisting of
God’s foreknowledge and predestination. In his initial summary of Paul’s order, he
substitutes election for these first two links: “this golden Chaine of our salvation reaches
(so to speake it) from eternitie to eternitie; the beginning of it, albeit without beginning, is
our Election; the end of it, albeit without end, is our Glorification…[connected by] the
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two middle linckes thereof, to wit, our Calling and Justification.”67 He continues to break
election down into the “two acts or preordinances (so to call them)” of foreknowledge
(which “lookes to the person to be saved”) and predestination (which considers the
“meanes whereby they are to be saved”), adding, however, that this distinction is made as
a kind of didactic accommodation “for our capacitie,” as the two are, with relation to
God, “one act without prioritie or posterioritie.”68
Willet himself presents his ordering of the “Golden Chain” against the order given
by Gulielmus Bucanus, basing his argument on the order in which Paul mentions the two
in the first chapter of Ephesians and including a standard caveat on God and temporality:
Concerning election ἐκλογὴ, 1. Some thinke that it followeth predestination in
order, in respect of us, for with God there is no distinction of time, and order in
these things: as Bucanus, loc. 36. quest. 3. but it rather goeth before as the Apostle
first saith, Ephes. [1.4]. Hee chose or elected us in him, &c. that wee should be
holy, then he saith, v. 5. Who predestinate us, &c. and v. 11. In whom also we
were elected beeing predestinate: for first the persons are elected, and then the
thing is decreed, which is predestinate unto the elect, namely, eternall life, with
such things as doe accompanie it.69
Willet’s issue with Bucanus seems to stem from their different definitions of
predestination (i.e., whether it serves as a narrow term applied to the elect, or as an
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umbrella term encompassing both election and reprobation) and differing understandings
of how Ephesians 1:4-5 relates to Romans 8:29-30. Bucanus argues that the terms
“election” and “reprobation” can each be used two different ways—“properly,” as
referring to the ordo salutis that humans experience, or “metonymically,” referring to
God’s mysterious will, which Bucanus will clarify has no temporal order (all things being
“present” to God). “It is to be noted,” Bucanus writes, “that election and reprobation are
taken two waies. In deed they are properly referred to the condition of man alreadie
created, and through his fall corrupted...”70 Bucanus’s explanation of the “proper” sense
of these terms thus establishes his infralapsarian position. But he soon continues:
But they are often used metonimically for the very decree of Election &
Reprobation, which God hath decreed in himselfe, as Eph.1.4. He chose us in
himselfe before the foundations of the worlde were layde, that wee might bee holy
and blameless before him in love. The mysterie whereof is hidden from us,
although both of them are manifest to us in due time, by those causes, meanes or
effects, which God hath expressed in his word.71
Bucanus seems to be saying, in essence, that since in Ephesians 1:4-5 Paul is referring to
the pactum salutis and not the ordo salutis, it cannot simply blend in to the order given in
Romans 8. For Willet, however, the one text can indeed inform the other.72
Willet’s understanding of predestination, similarly to Wilson’s, encompasses both
the end of salvation and the means by which it is accomplished, though Willet adds
(further muddying the terminological waters) that “this part of predestination, which
decreeth the meanes to bring the elect to salvation, is properly called ordination.” Thus,
70
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in Willet’s summary statement on the order of the causes of salvation, election precedes
predestination, as a winner might be selected in a contest before the prize itself is
determined. He concludes:
This then is the order: first, there is the purpose of God in generall to glorifie his
name in saving some. 2. then he foreseeth, liketh, and approoveth a certaine
number according to his good pleasure, whom he chooseth out, electeth, and
separateth from the rest; then hee doth predestinate them unto everlasting life, and
ordaineth the way and meanes, whereby they are brought unto life.73
2.4 Sin and Concupiscence
We will consider the causality of sin and its relationship to concupiscence as a
final illustration of the polemical use of cause and effect argumentation. Willet presents
Bellarmine (in relation to Romans 6:12)74 and Pererius (in the context of Romans 7:20)75
as examples of Roman Catholics who denied that concupiscence could be considered sin.
In places where Paul “directly calleth even concupiscence, wherewith hee is unwilling,
sinne,” these Romanists argued that concupiscence “is called sinne, either because it is
effectus peccati, the effect of sinne, as the writing is called the hand, because it was
written with the hand: or because it bringeth forth sinne, as frigus, cold, is called pigrum,
slothfull, because it maketh one so.”76 Before we consider Willet’s refutation of this
interpretation, it is worth noting again how Roman Catholic polemicists in this age were
employing forms of argumentation very similar to those of their Protestant counterparts.
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Just as Willet argued that Scripture passages that seemed to make, for instance, good
works a cause of justification ought to be read as a rhetorical presentation of an effect for
its cause, so Bellarmine and Pererius in this instance held that Paul’s referring to
concupiscence as “sin” did not equate the two, but highlighted the causal link between
them.77 In all of these cases, Reformed and Romanist exegetes alike read the texts
through the lens of their own hermeneutical framework, each supporting their preferred
readings with reference to supporting doctrines and dicta probantia.
In his Questions section of Romans 6, Willet explains that concupiscence can be
taken to mean either inborn original sin or a particular “inward act of the minde, whereof
there are three degrees”—the first motion of temptation, followed by a delight in and a
consent to that motion. In the case of the warning in 6:12 not to let sin reign in the body,
“that yee should obey it in the lusts,”78 Paul “speaketh not of the first motion, which no
man can helpe, but of the second and third, which by Gods grace may be staied, that a
man neither delight in, or consent unto those evill motions, which arise in the mind.”79
Yet the limitation here to the second and third motions of concupiscence in no way
excuses the sinfulness of its first motion, despite its being a motion “which no man can
helpe”; it is the hortatory context of 6:12, and not a denial of the sinful nature of the first
impulse of concupiscence, that excludes that aspect from consideration here. Willet
makes this clear in his discussion of the same verse in his Controversies section, where he
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asserts that “all sinne is not voluntary,80 for then originall corruption should not be sinne,
which is even in children, which can give no consent.” It is not the consent of the will
that makes something sinful, but its being “contrarie to the lawe of God.”81 Again, in the
Controversies section on Romans 7, Willet draws on the Sermon on the Mount to show
that the prohibition of “the very first motions” in Christ’s interpretation of the law “doth
condemne the very appetite, which tickleth us, though it have not our consent.”82 The
nature of sin, Willet insists, runs deeper than our external actions, and deeper even than
the human will—which all the more impresses the need for God’s grace, and the inability
of good works to justify. Willet also alludes in this context to the limitations of natural
law:
[Paul’s] concupiscence tempted him even against his will: and whereas he saith,
he had not knowne lust without the law, he meaneth the very first motions: for the
second motions, which have the will concurring, as envie, hatred, and such like,
many of the heathen, which knew not the lawe condemned by the light of nature
as evill.83
In distinguishing between the capacity of the light of nature to recognize the first and
second motions of concupiscence, Willet presents the standard Reformed orthodox
perspective on natural law, which lay somewhere between the Roman Catholic
endorsement of natural law and the twentieth-century neoorthodox representation of the
historical Reformed position as being one of absolute rejection.84 Natural law had some
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utility in Reformed orthodox thought, though it was insufficient to address the
thoroughgoing brokenness of the human condition.
While insisting that concupiscence itself was sin, and not merely its cause or
effect, Willet acknowledged that a sin could at times be a cause or an effect of other sins
(yet without ceasing itself to be sin). Presenting the Argument for Romans 1, he
summarizes the middle of the chapter by explaining that the Gentiles’ “depravation of
Gods worship, is expressed, in the causes, their unthankefulnesse, which brought forth
vanitie of minde, and foolishnesse, v. 21. the effect, in worshipping corruptible things in
stead of God, v. [23]. then the punishment followeth, they were given up to their hearts
lusts, v. 24.”85 Later, in his lengthy Questions section on Romans 1, he delineates more
explicitly a four-fold distinction of sins: a sin may be additionally the cause of further sin
(a scenario Willet illustrates with the example of one’s drunkenness leading to adultery),
it may be both a cause and a punishment (as when, Willet explains, one is—as
“punishment” for gluttony— given over to adultery, which in turn causes a murder to
cover up the adultery), it may be a punishment but not a cause, or it may be simply a sin,
and neither a cause nor a punishment (“as namely when any one repenteth of his sinne,
and proceedeth no further”).86 Thus, even when a sinful action is a cause of further sin or
an effect of previous sin, it does not cease itself to be sin.
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As with election and faith, Willet illustrates the relationship between
concupiscence and sin with a familial example—though here he employs the image
differently. While the first case relies on the logic of a man being a cause of his son but
not of his father, in this instance the analogy draws from a grandfather, son, and grandson
all being men, and from the grandfather being a remote cause of the grandson. Similarly,
Willet explains, “it followeth not concupiscence bringeth forth sinne, therefore it is no
sinne,” and concupiscence and enacted sin both lead to death—the first as “the remote
cause” and the second as “the neerest cause.”87 As the men in a family line are all
(different) men, so concupiscence and the sinful actions it bears can all be sins (even if
they are different sins); and merely being an extra generation removed from the grandson
does not remove the grandfather from his progeny’s causal chain.
The strong Reformed emphasis on God’s sovereignty also invited Roman
Catholic accusations that these theologians made God responsible for sin, so polemical
responses typically included defenses that excused Reformed theology from the charge of
making God the ultimate cause of sin and evil. Willet specifically cites Stapleton’s
levying of this charge against Calvin (which we considered earlier in this chapter),88 and
the accusation against Bucer delivered by Pererius. Earlier we saw how Willet explained
God’s (active) hardening of hearts as a just punishment, and additionally we have seen
elements that contribute to Willet’s defense in his treatment of efficient and final
causality, which established a middle ground between the extremes of viewing God as the
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principal cause of sin and as a passive bystander, so here we will focus on his counteroffensive in his response to Pererius.
Pererius’s charge against Bucer comes in the context of Paul’s discussion of evil
rulers in Romans 13. Criticizing Bucer’s assertion that even power that is abused is
granted by God, Pererius had accused Protestants of thus imputing the guilt of that abuse
of power to God himself, making him responsible for the evil.89 Willet responds to this
“meere slaunder” with a similar line of reasoning to that he used against the charges of
Stapleton and Pighius, objecting that “the Romanists are rather guiltie [of making God
the author of evil], that affirme God to be a permitter and sufferer of evill: for he which
suffereth evill to be done, which he can hinder, must be accessarie unto it.”90 It is not,
however, the idea of God permitting evil (per se) that Willet and the Reformed object to
(“his permission we grant”), but rather the notion that this permission can be extended
apart from God’s (secret) will. A God, he argues, who is able to hinder an evil deed that
defies his absolute will and fails to do so is implicated in the evil; perhaps counterintuitively, an omnipotent God must then have “a further stroke in these actions, then by
permission onely, and withholding of his grace”91 to avoid being implicated in the
sinfulness of the action. Without claiming God as the principal cause of these evil
actions, his permission must be seen as bound together with his secret will, either as a just
punishment of prior sin, as a demonstration of his patience,92 as an opportunity for testing
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and refinement,93 or in directing human sin towards various positive ends.
This last reason draws again on the logic of final causality. The first Doctrine that
Willet elicits from Romans 8 concerns “how the same worke may be both good and
sinnefull as it proceedeth from God, the devill, and man.” He cites as the particular
source of this teaching verse 8:3, which implicates God in the death of his Son. Since
God intended this for his glory and human salvation, it was not an evil action as it
proceeded from him. But since Satan and humans carried out this death out of “envie and
malice,” these evil ends made their actions sinful.94 In a sense, God cannot be the author
of evil because he has no evil intentions or ends. Willet is careful, though, to keep from
suggesting that God’s own intermediate actions may be anything less than godly, even if
they tend toward good ends—God is no Machiavellian: “although Gods judgements
proceed with great reason and equitie; yet God doth not evill, that good may come
thereof.95 God’s good works may be turned to evil ends by human wickedness, and evil
human actions may be turned to good by God, but in each case no evil component can
come from God’s hand. Nor can humans claim to be in the right when God turns their
sins to a noble end. This matter arises in connection to Paul’s citation of Psalm 51 in
Romans 3:4 (“That thou mightest be justified in thy words, and overcome, when thou
judgest”). At issue is the causal orientation of the word “that” (ὅπως ἄν)—specifically
whether the expression is to be taken in a purposive or in a temporal sense—leading to
the question of “Whether a man may doe evill, and commit sinne to that ende to set forth
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Gods justice.”96 Willet’s preferred resolution comes from the Roman Catholic Pererius,
who argued that David’s own end in sinning was not to express God’s justice, and so
“this word that, doth not then shewe the cause, but the order rather and event of the
thing.”97 The “that” here is properly to be taken in a merely temporal sense—David
sinned, and then God’s justice was displayed. If any causality exists between David’s
own action and the “that,” Willet adds as a second interpretive option, this purposive
“that” would have to reach before David’s reference to his sin in Psalm 51:4 to connect to
his confession of that sin in the third verse.98 Regardless of how the expression is taken,
though, Willet is clear that turning evil to a good end is a prerogative unique to God.

2.5 Rhetorical Inversion of Cause and Effect
In chapter 3 we saw how Willet identified various rhetorical devices that Paul had
used in composing Romans, and we considered how this identification comported with
Willet’s theological framework and affected his interpretation of Paul’s meaning. Here
we will look specifically at instances where Willet argues that Paul intentionally inverted
a cause and an effect through the use of metonymy, and how this argument complicates
Willet’s accusations of Roman Catholic confusion of cause and effect.
Some of these instances concern Paul’s frequent citation of the Old Testament
from the Septuagint. We have seen already how Willet argued that Paul only did this
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when the meaning of the Septuagint did not vary significantly from that of the original
Hebrew. Occasionally Willet explained discrepancies between the two texts as minor
rhetorical variations, differing as a cause from an effect. Recall the textual variation
regarding Romans 9:33 (previously discussed in II.4.1), where Willet explains Paul’s
choice of the LXX version of Isaiah 28:16 (“shall not be ashamed”) over the “originall”
(“shall not make hast[e]”) by noting that those who act hastily or rashly inevitably end up
being ashamed—so that the LXX gives the “consequent for the antecedent, and the effect
for the cause.”99 Conversely, regarding another quotation of Isaiah (verse 59:20), Willet
explains that the Septuagint translation (which speaks of God removing sin) presents the
cause behind the effect given in the Hebrew (that of God’s people turning from their sin).
So when Paul uses the LXX phrasing of this passage in Romans 11:27, he is not
diverging substantively from the sense of the Hebrew, but rather rising “higher to the
very cause, which is the taking away of sinne: for none can turne away from sinne,
unlesse they have first grace and remission of their sinnes.”100 Rather than treating the
discrepancy between the Hebrew and Greek versions as a problem, Willet uses the
variations as an opportunity to demonstrate the causal connection between God’s
forgiveness and human obedience—the first necessarily effecting the second.
In other places, Willet’s assertions that Paul was communicating through
metonymy had a more clearly polemical context. The conditional expression used in
Romans 11:22 (“If thou continue in his bountifulnes”), for instance, had led exegetes like
Chrysostom to emphasize here the role of human effort in following Christ, and the need
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for a human goodness that is worthy of the divine goodness. Willet responds to this line
of thought by explaining that Paul’s purpose is to exalt God’s—not human—goodness,
and he points to the reference to unbelief in the following verse to argue that faith is the
true matter also of verse 22: “here rather the cause is taken for the effect, as the goodnes
of God, for faith which is wrought in us by the goodnes and grace of God.” While he
does not list any Roman Catholics here by name, the polemical background of his
interpretation is clear from his insistence that this passage need not undermine a
Reformed understanding of perseverance: “This neither sheweth, that it is in mans power
to continue, for all is ascribed to the goodnesse and mercie of God: neither yet can it be
hence gathered, that the elect may fall away, and not continue.”101 The conditional
formulation, read especially in light of Paul’s metonymic inversion, is not intended to
convey a sense of either pride or doubt, but rather to stir up the elect to a greater
dependence on God for their security.102
We can now see that the way an exegete identified the relationship between a
cause and an effect in Scripture was not a naked textual issue, but one that involved a
host of hermeneutical presuppositions. This is not to suggest that either Romanist or
Reformed exegetes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries twisted the scriptures to fit
within a rigid theological system, but to assert that each party made sense of seemingly
disparate passages by reading them through a particular lens and interpreting them within
a particular hermeneutical framework.
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3. Confusion of Cause with Identity or Occasion
Elsewhere in his Romans commentary, Andrew Willet claims that various of his
opponents’ theological errors were connected to their faulty attribution of causality to
scriptural statements that had rather to do with the identity of the elect, or with the
occasion or conditions associated with their calling and the outworking of their salvation.
Exploring selected examples of this argument, we will again encounter elements of the
analogy of Scripture (whether in efforts to harmonize Paul with James, or “for the full
reconciling…of the Apostle to himselfe”103), and we will revisit the distinction between
primary and helping causes—with the latter, in a theatrical manner of speaking, “setting
the stage” for the narrative action of the former. Additionally, we will see the important
distinction drawn between the ontology and the epistemology of salvation—that is, how
it is that the elect exist as saved individuals, as opposed to how we come to possess this
knowledge.

3.1 Confusion of Cause and Identity
Given their consistent insistence on excluding human merit from the economy of
salvation, how did the Reformed deal with passages like Romans 2:6 (“[God] will reward
every man according to his workes”), which Romans Catholics like Tolet read in
conjunction with Christ’s teaching on the sheep and the goats in Matthew 25 as proof of a
meritorious role for human works? Willet, citing his favorite contemporary exegete
David Pareus, presents one approach to this question when he explains: “In that place,
Matth. 25. it is showed, to whom, not for what the reward shall be given: good works are
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required as a condition in those, which are to be saved, not as a meritorious cause of their
salvation.”104 We should not be surprised that the faithful are marked by their good deeds,
for God ordained this process of sanctification as a means of bringing the elect along the
path of salvation. But, Willet emphasizes, presenting a certain way of life as a means of
identifying those who are saved in no way suggests that those good works are the cause
of their salvation. Regarding the language of Romans 2:6, Willet points out that the
reward is granted “κατὰ τὰ ἔργα, according to workes, not διὰ τὰ ἔργα, propter opera, for
workes: so that this sheweth the measure rather [than] the merit of workes.”105
Willet uses the example of the shipwreck in Acts 27 to illustrate this distinction
between the designation of causality and identity later in the commentary, in the
Controversies section of Romans 10. Commenting on verse 10:13 (“For every one that
calleth upon the name of the Lord shall be saved”), Bellarmine had argued that this was
evidence that justification was not by faith alone, since here Paul attributed salvation to
calling out to God.106 Willet responds to this interpretation by explaining that the
invocation itself does not save, but rather shows “who they are that shall be saved,” since
calling on God is an effect of faith, and “without faith there is no invocation.” He goes on
to liken this scenario to Paul’s warning in Acts 27:31 that “except these abide in the
shippe, ye cannot be safe.” Willet assumes here that, since the ship was still destroyed,
we cannot read this passage to mean that those who survived the wreck were saved
because of the shelter offered by the ship—“for the ship brake, and some were saved by

104

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 134.

105

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 134. For more on the theological importance of prepositions in
Willet’s exegesis, see section III.2.
106

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 480.

259

swimming, some upon boards, and other peices of the ship.”107 To Willet, the
implication was clear that Paul’s designation of those who would “abide in the shippe”
served to give the identity of those who would be spared, and not the reason why they
would be saved.108
This distinction between causality and identity serves Willet in his Romans
commentary at places where salvation is associated with righteous living, being attributed
to those who “walke not after the flesh” or who are “doers of the law.” Paul’s argument
in Romans 2 proceeds from verse 6, cited above, to his warning in verse 13 against taking
smug confidence in mere knowledge of the law: “For not the hearers of the law, are just
with God, but the doers of the law shall be justified.” Since—as even Tolet had
acknowledged—works done without faith are unable to justify, one who performs the
works of the law must already have been justified (by faith); otherwise, he would be
unable to do good works.109 Thus, as in 2:6, “the Apostle then here sheweth, who shall be
justified, not for what.”110 Again, in the first and fourth verses of Romans 8, the righteous
are described by their actions, as those who “walke not after the flesh.” Willet counters
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Willet’s reading of Acts 27:31 is basically in agreement with the one presented in the English
Annotations, which noted here that Paul’s words did not imply that “the will of God, or his power to save,
or the effect of his promise, depended on second causes,” but rather demonstrated that God ordains both the
end and the means:Thomas Gataker, ed., Annotations upon all the books of the Old and New Testament
wherein the text is explained, doubts resolved, Scriptures paralleled and various readings observed by the
joynt-labour of certain learned divines, thereunto appointed, and therein employed, as is expressed in the
preface (London: John Legatt and John Raworth, 1645), Acts 27:31, in loc. Hereafter cited as English
Annotations. The Rhemist annotations, not surprisingly, read Paul’s warning differently, taking from it that
“what providence, predestination, or foresight so ever God have of your salvation, you are not thereby
constrained any way. you have free wil stil, and can not be saved (though you be predestinate) except you
keepe Gods commaundements, repent you of your sinnes, beleeve, live and die wel” (Martin, New
Testament, 370).
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Tolet, Bellarmine and Stapleton, who each argued that this shows that regeneration is a
cause of justification, by distinguishing different elements within Paul’s assertion: “here
is an answer to two questions together: how we are justified, namely, by faith in Christ,
and who are justified, they which bring forth good fruits.” Or, as Beza had expressed the
same truth, we see here both an internal (justification) and an external (sanctification)
perspective.111 And, while the identity of the righteous is known outwardly by active
good works, verse 8:4 makes clear that the inward, justifying aspect is passive: “the
Apostle saith not that they which walke after the spirit fulfill the law, but the lawe is
fulfilled in them, that is, imputed unto them by faith in Christ.”112
Willet draws on this distinction also when commenting on passages that affirm
justification by faith, as a way of explaining the coherency of Paul’s thought in light of
verses like the ones discussed above. Among the questions he considers in Romans 3,
Willet presents various “solutions” that had been proposed to deal with the tension
between the declaration in 3:20 that “by the works of the Law shall no flesh be justified
in his sight” and the assertion about the “doers of the law” in 2:13. The ordinary gloss,
for instance, had explained the pair of verses by drawing a distinction between the
Ceremonial and Moral Law—the former being unable to save, but the latter retaining a
justifying role. The “modern Papists” explain the apparent contradiction using the
“Popish fiction of the first and second justification.”113 Even Pareus’s solution—that Paul
is speaking in 2:13 “ex hypothesi, by way of supposition…that is, if any could keep and
performe the law, they should thereby be justified”—while a “good distinction,” is
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deemed by Willet here to be “not so fit.”114 The “best solution,” Willet reiterates, is that
in Romans 3 Paul tells of the causes of justification, while in 2:13 he rather “sheweth
who, and upon what condition men are justified, and who are not justified.”115 Romans
4:7 likewise offers an opportunity for Willet to teach this distinction. Roman Catholic
exegetes had sought to balance this verse’s attribution of blessedness to the forgiveness
of sin with other passages that “ascribeth beatitude to…innocencie of life,” and Willet
deemed the responses offered by Calvin and Vermigli to be incomplete. Thus, he
supplements his Reformed brethren’s replies with “the more full answer”: “that the
Apostle here sheweth the cause and manner of our justification, which is by faith in
Christ: but in other places it is onely declared, to whom this justification belongeth.”116
The delineation between cause and identity allows for a distinctly Protestant defense of
justification by faith, and we find Willet employing its utility more frequently than even
his fellow Reformed exegetes.
The distinction itself is a variation of the important division between the
ontological and the epistemological elements of salvation, so that Roman Catholics and
others exhibiting Semipelagian tendencies were held to be guilty not of a minor semantic
error, but of inverting and misconstruing the very nature of salvific reality. The external
elements serve a function in the publication of salvation—whether as a witness to others
or as a “practical syllogism” undergirding one’s own assurance117—but not in effecting
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salvation itself. This same line of argument informed how many of the Reformed read
Paul in conjunction with James: Paul addresses our justification before God by faith,
while James writes of the manifestation and declaration of our justification before other
humans through our works.118

3.2 Confusion of Cause and Occasion
While the distinction between cause and identity was normally drawn to keep
from attributing any element of salvation to human activity, Willet’s differentiation of
cause from occasion was more often employed to avoid implicating God in evil deeds
(even those that would ultimately be turned to good) or imbuing sin with any inherent
tendency toward positive ends.119 Answering his own hypothetical question in Romans
6:1 (“Shall we continue in sinne, that grace may abound?”), Paul had sharply and pithily
responded μὴ γένοιτο (“God forbid; let it not be”) and explained that, being baptized into
Christ’s death, we are to be dead to sin. Willet’s commentary on this passage elaborates
Paul’s answer in more philosophical terms. The “false teachers” who had occasioned
Paul’s query erred by taking “non causam pro causa, that which is not the cause for the
cause: for the abounding of sinne, is not the cause of the abounding of grace…[rather,]
the Apostles speach is to be understood occasionaliter, by way of occasion, and they take
118
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See in Willet, for example: Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 188, 201.

Burgersdijk writes that the efficient cause is divided into the Principal and the less Principal;
the less Principal further subdivided into the Procatarctical [that which excites the Principal cause to action
externally], Proëgumenal [that which excites it to action internally], and the Instrumental; and the
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and Place to act in, which it self also has some Force of moving to Action…all these are without the
principal Cause…Occasion is sometimes taken for Cause Meritorious. As when an Injury committed or
done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight, or War, or Slaughter,” (Burgersdijk, Monitio Logica, 63-64). In
this sense, when Willet distinguishes between cause and occasion, he is arguing that his opponents have
mistakenly identified a subordinate, less principal efficiency as a principal efficient cause.

263

it causaliter, by way of a cause.”120 Willet cites both Augustine and Vermigli for
variations of the similitude of disease and medicine, in which disease is merely the
occasion, and not the cause, of the remedy. Additionally, he echoes Pareus’s assertion
that human sin does not “in it selfe set forth the justice of God, but ex accidente, by an
accident.”121
A parallel situation may be found in Romans 11 in the fall of the Jews, which—
also “by an accident” (as opposed to by necessity or as a direct cause)—led to the
introduction of Gentiles into the Church. Willet takes up the question of “how it standeth
with Gods justice” for his chosen people to be cast off in order for “strangers” to enter the
Church, and he determines that three conditions must exist in order for such an action to
be deemed just: guilt in the excised party, lack of a bound necessity to maintain grace,
and the tendency toward a greater good. As might be expected, all of these criteria are
met in this situation, and Willet concludes his response by asserting that the casting off of
the Jews was properly caused by their disobedience—the occasion of which God used for
the salvation of the Gentiles:
Neither was their rejecting simply the cause of the calling of the Gentiles, but ex
accidente, accidentally, as we say: it was properly the punishment of their
infidelitie, and a demonstration of the justice of God: but God, that can turne evill
unto good, did use this as an occasion to induce the Gentiles to beleeve.122
The fall of the Jews, Willet explains, cannot be the proper cause of the Gentiles’
salvation, “for evil is not of it selfe the cause of that which is good: but God by his power
draweth good out of evill.” The casting out of the Jews was not absolutely necessary for
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the calling of the Gentiles. Indeed, God could have called the two groups together had it
pleased him to do so, and even apart from the Jews’ incredulity Willet asserts that the
Gentiles would have been called, “but not so quickly.”123 Whether in the case of sin
magnifying God’s grace or the unfaithfulness of the Jews hastening the calling of the
Gentiles, Willet avoids ascribing any positive causality to evil by making these scenarios
merely the occasions of God’s saving activity.
Nor does Willet permit any negative causality to inhere within God’s good gifts,
with the same distinction between cause and occasion serving as well in this direction.
This argument arises especially in relation to the Old Testament law, prompted by Paul’s
own language. Discussing Romans 7:8-13, Willet considers what is meant by sin’s
“taking occasion” by the law, noting three possible meanings of the Greek word ἀφορμὴ.
He rejects the “proper” signification of “the opportunitie of doing a thing” because “there
can be no op[p]ortunitie to doe evill”—by which he seems to mean that the language of
“opportunity” would suggest too great a complicity of the law in sin’s hijacking of it.124
The other two meanings, though, Willet admits here: by “occasion” Paul means both
“any circumstance or accident, whereby one is occasioned to doe anything” and “that
which draweth a man from doing that he intended; as a rub [impediment] in ones way,
turneth him beside the way.” The definitions that Willet allows serve to underscore the
pivotal idea, expressed as well by Calvin and Beza, that “the law indeed gave not
occasion, but sinne tooke it.”125 The full weight of the blame lies with sin.126 Thus, since
the law is merely the occasion and not the cause of the increase of sin, its goodness is
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vindicated against the Marcionites, Manicheans, and other rejecters of the Old Testament,
who misread verses like Romans 4:15 (“Where no law is, there is no transgression”) to
“thereby conclude that the law is the cause of transgression, and so condemne the law.”127

3.3 Confusion of Cause and Conditions or Manner
In related fashion to his arguments concerning both occasion and identity, Willet
also at times explained theological errors as stemming from the misattribution of
causality to a set of conditions or a manner of action. So, responding to the possible
objection in the Controversies section of Romans 8 that if good works cannot justify then
their absence cannot condemn, he relies on the logic of sufficient and necessary
conditions.128 It is like, he explains, the relationship between food and health. A good diet
is necessary, but not sufficient, to restore a sick man to wellness. The similitude must not
be stretched too far, however, as a “good diet is an helping cause unto health, but good
workes are no cause of salvation, but only a condition necessarily required and
annexed.”129 Again, as we saw in the earlier discussion of election and foreknowledge,
the cause of a decree may differ greatly from the conditions necessary for its execution.
No human element, for example, functions as a cause of God’s forgiveness, for “that
which he requireth of us, is a condition to be performed by us, not the cause.”130 But, lest
126
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his language here be taken to suggest a conditionality to salvation, wherein the elect—
even if unable to cause their salvation can somehow sabotage it by failing in the
associated required conditions—Willet makes clear also that God provides all of these
required conditions:
…there are certaine conditions which doe accompanie or followe this free act of
Gods love and mercie, for the effecting of the worke thereof, in the sanctification
and glorification of the elect, which are these three, the ransome made by Christ,
faith in the Redeemer, and our conversion and turning to God: which conditions
God receiveth not of us, but conferreth upon us: the first without us, the other two
he worketh in us, that all may be of grace.131
So the difference between Christ’s salvific work and the various conditions required to be
“performed by us” is not that of a diverse efficient cause (tending toward some measure
of synergism), but rather of a different arena in which God is acting—the one external
and the other internal to the elect themselves.
Lastly, Willet on occasion clarified a position by differentiating between cause
and manner—a distinction related, naturally, to the argument regarding identity (as the
elect are identifiable by their manner of life), as well as to the third chapter’s discussion
of the significance of prepositions. We find a fairly straightforward example in Romans
14:18 (“For whosoever in these things serveth Christ, is pleasing to God, and approoved
to men”). Explaining his rendering of ἐν τούτοις as “in these things” (opposing Beza,
Vermigli and Erasmus, who read it as “by these things”132), he notes that Paul “sheweth
the manner how we serve Christ, not the cause.”133 We see here again the interrelation
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between translation and theology (though certainly Beza and Vermigli, at least, concurred
theologically with Willet on this point, even if their prepositional use was not up to his
standards of precision). Willet presents a similar argument concerning the role of good
works in the context of Paul’s Romans 12:13 counsel to provide for the needs of the
saints. On this question Willet refutes Tolet’s “very corrupt” insertion of merit into the
passage (in the argument that those succoring suffering saints would share a portion of
the merit accrued by those sufferings), conceding that “God indeede shall reward the
works of charitie exercised upon the Saints,” but with an important clarification that
“good workes are not the cause of everlasting life, yet they are a rule, according to the
which God will give everlasting life.”134 While in this context he simply assumes the
difference between merit and reward, he does address this distinction in other places in
the commentary. For example, in his doctrinal comment on Romans 2:11 (on how God is
no respecter of persons) Willet asserts that “there are no merits or deserts which God
respecteth in his election,” while adding that “when God commeth to give the reward,
then he distributeth unto every man according to their works.” In the Controversies
section of the same chapter in Romans, he comments in the context of 2:6 (considered
earlier in this chapter) on the disproportionality between our reward and our works, and
explains how the fact that good works are profitable does not imply that they are
meritorious. And addressing a question on 11:6, he cites Origen and Vermigli on the
association of rewards with works, explaining: “though the reward follow works, yet the
merit of the worke is not the cause, but the grace and favour of God, which hath
appointed such a way and order, that the faithfull, after they have wrought and laboured,
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should be rewarded.” 135

4. Conclusion
The variety of distinctions that can be made within the framework of the
relationship between cause and effect gave the seventeenth-century exegete a means by
which to critique unsatisfactory scriptural interpretations. Just as a theological opponent
might seem to confuse the different causes of an effect, so he might falsely attribute
causality to something that is better considered a fruit, occasion, or identity marker.
Willet frequently draws on the logic of cause and effect in the Romans hexapla to
undermine a Roman Catholic reading or to defend a maligned Reformed doctrine. The
papists, he argued, wrongly lodged good works within justification instead of regarding
them as part of sanctification—a necessary effect of justification. The Reformed account
of God’s active hardening of hearts could be defended by viewing the hardening as
caused by God, while also being—as a just punishment—an effect of human sin. The
proper position of faith varied depending on the context—in justification it functions as a
non-meritorious formal cause, while in election it is not a cause at all, but an effect.
Willet occasionally makes the particularly fine distinction between an effect and a
final cause—sometimes even variously denominating the same thing each way in
different contexts. This distinction allowed him to subordinate one cause to another,
demonstrate a mixed causality, or deny causality entirely in a given context. In addition,
arguing for the rhetorical inversion of cause and effect (a form of metonymy) in Romans
provided Protestants and Roman Catholics alike with an extra degree of interpretive
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flexibility; even if the literal sense of a text suggested a causal role, an exegete could
argue from a collation of other texts that the apparent causality was merely a rhetorical
maneuver. The diverse ways in which Willet and other exegetes distinguished between
cause and effect thus reveals a good deal about their differing hermeneutical lenses,
theological commitments, and polemical aims.

CHAPTER VI.
POLEMICAL USE OF HERESIES
1. Introduction
In 1607 the Roman Catholic polemicist Richard Broughton anonymously
published the tract The First Part of Protestant Proofes, for Catholikes Religion and
Recusancy, in which he cited passages from recent English Protestant divines (including
several from Willet) that purportedly lent support to the verity of Roman Catholic
doctrine.1 One of his (more strained) arguments claimed that such Protestants as Wotton,
Perkins, and Field had accepted that tradition and Scripture were to be held with equal
authority. Since the church’s tradition favored Roman Catholic theology, these Jacobean
Protestants had all but conceded the truth of their opponents’ doctrinal positions.
Broughton’s bold assertion that Protestant leaders had acknowledged the co-equal
authority of tradition required some creative re-contextualizing of selected statements
presented in his sources,2 but neither were Protestant polemicists ready to allow his more
sensible claim that the weight of tradition was on the Roman Catholic side.

1

The majority of Broughton’s citations come from the eleven English Protestants that he lists in
the introductory epistle: (Matthew) Sutcliffe, (John) Dove, (Richard) Field, Willet, (Anthony) Wotton,
(William) Middleton, King James, the Bishop of Winchester (Thomas Bilson), (William) Covell, (Richard)
Parkes, and (Oliver) Ormerod ( [Broughton], The First Part of Protestants Proofes, for Catholikes
Religion, sig.Aiiir).
Broughton’s method of countering Protestants with their own was a common approach, and one
that Willet made use of as well (as we will see in the examples below from the Romans hexapla). In An
Antilogie, he had combined the main elements that we are considering in this chapter (papists as heretics,
and as internally rent) in a single argument: “The Popish Priests call the Jesuites Donatists, revived
Arrians: the Jesuites againe charge the Priests with Anabaptisme. Thus then we see by the confession of our
adversaries themselves, who are the Atheists, Antichrists, damned crew, the Anabaptists, Arrians, Donatists
of these dayes” (Willet, An Antilogie, 14).
2

For example, Richard Field had addressed the hypothetical situation of there being a true deposit
of unwritten apostolic teaching in order to make the point that it was not the act of writing that gave the
scriptures their authenticity and authority: “All these [traditions] in their several kindes [Roman Catholics]
make equall with the words, precepts, and doctrines of Christ, the Apostles, & Pastors of the Church left
unto us in writing. Neither is there any reason why they should not so doe, if they could prove any such
unwritten verities. For it is not the writing, that giveth things their authoritie, but the worth and credit of
him that delivereth them, though but by word and lively voice onely. The onely doubt is, whether there be
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The next two chapters will examine the polemical use of tradition in Willet’s
Romans hexapla and in the broader post-Reformation context. While Scripture was for
Protestants the final arbiter in defining orthodoxy, in practice this affirmation could
quickly arrive at a stalemate, with polemicists on every side staunchly asserting that their
opponents were misreading the biblical text. Efforts to demonstrate continuity with early
church tradition (whether the orthodoxy that was affirmed or the heresies condemned)
provided a potential way around the impasse. Before engaging in the next chapter with
Willet’s claim on and appropriation of the Church Fathers, we will look here at his
extensive polemical use of early church heresies.

2. Polemical Use of Older Heresies
Charges of heresy flew freely back and forth between Protestant and Roman
Catholic polemicists from the Reformation period through the early years of the
seventeenth century.3 While some more moderate critics, as Anthony Wotton and
William Forbes, preferred to write of the Roman church and its distinctive doctrines as
“erroneous” instead of as “heretical,” the charge of heresy in early seventeenth-century

any such unwritten tradition or not” (Richard Field, Of the Church [London: Humfrey Lownes for Simon
Waterson, 1606], 238). When he cites this passage, Broughton edits out Field’s conditional statements to
make him sound like a Catholic apologist: “There is no reason but these [unwritten traditions] should be
equall with the Scriptures. For it is not the writing, that giveth these thinges their authority, but the worth
and credit of him that delivereth them, though by word and lively voice only” ( [Broughton], Protestants
Proofes, for Catholikes Religion, 25). Field, with justification, objects to the excision of his conditionals. In
the appendix to the fifth book of On the Church, published four years after the first four, he likens the
abuse of his words to a Roman Catholic being told that he could not err if he were pope and deducing from
those words that he in fact could not err (Richard Field, The Fifth Book of the Church [London: Nicholas
Okes for Simon Waterson, 1610], the third part of the appendix, 26). His acknowledgement that a true
unwritten tradition is not inherently impossible, he explains, in no way infers that such a tradition in fact
exists.
3

Cf. Milton’s summary of English Protestant charges of heresy against the Roman church in
Catholic and Reformed, 209-228.

272

England was “an entirely commonplace accusation.”4 Since heresy is understood as
deviation from the orthodox teachings of the church (particularly as defined in the
ecumenical councils), these accusations generally took the form of associating a modern
opponent’s position with one from a previously condemned early church heretic.5 The
polemical force of these accusations came from both the strength of the established
connections and the sheer number of heretics one could claim as an opponent’s forebears,
with lists commonly running to dozens or scores of heretics. Willet’s express aim in
Tetrastylon Papismi, published first in 1593 and again with minor variations in 1599, was
to defend Protestant doctrine from these false charges. He introduces a section titled
“Heresies maintained and defended by Papists” by stating: “Our purpose is heere, as in
the rest, to cleere and discharge both our selves and our cause, of and from those foule
and false accusations of heresie, which our adversaries do blaspheme us withall.” After
identifying Robert Bellarmine, with the twenty heresies he alleged against Protestants in
“De notis verae Ecclesiae,”6 as the main Roman Catholic source for the section, Willet
proceeds to lay out his approach: “We will then this do: first examine those poynts
4

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 210, 215, 209. To many of those who refrained from calling
Rome a heretical church, the issue was with Catholics elevating uncertain opinions to the level of
fundamental matters of faith (p. 216). In this perspective, a belief such as Purgatory should be treated
neither as an essential dogma nor as a heretical idea, but simply as a matter of mere speculation.
5

Milton recounts the frequency of this accusation, while noting some disagreement (increasing in
the decades following Willet’s death) over both the meaning of “heresy” and whether the Roman church
was guilty of it. He cites the irenic (and aptly named) John Dove as one who insisted on a strict definition
of heresy as a doctrine directly contradicting an article of faith, as determined by a General Council of the
church. The latter requirement, especially, being impractical in the fragmented ecclesiological world of the
seventeenth century, many polemicists sought to meet this criteria in a manner similar to what we find
Willet attempting in this chapter: “The impugning of an article of faith by consequent was usually deemed
sufficient for this charge to stick, while the need for a General Council’s censure for Rome’s errors was
circumvented by the association of Rome’s errors with most of the heresies condemned in the General
Councils of the primitive church” (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 209); cf. Backus and Goudriaan,
“Semipelagianism,” 44.
6

I.e., Book 4 of the first controversy in volume 2 of the Disputationes.
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particularlie, which they object for heresie: and this being done, we will afterward requite
them with as many hereticall opinions, as they have invented against us, but more justly,
and with a good deale more truth.”7 Willet likens this approach to one falling into his
own pit or a puff of breath blowing back in one’s face8 and, while promising to “requite
[Bellarmine’s] kindenesse” with an equal “full score of heresies,” decides instead to add
interest and double the Jesuit’s “kindness,” concluding after his counterattack: “And thus,
I thinke, we have in some measure recompensed our adversaries courteous dealing, who
so kindely upbrayde us with heresie, for Bellarmines twentie, I have payde him fortie.”9
This pattern of defending one’s own position against charges of heterodoxy and leveling
back counterclaims of heresy also finds its way, naturally, into the polemical exegesis of
biblical commentaries in this era. As we consider next how these charges functioned in
Willet’s Romans hexapla, we will treat various heresies individually.

2.1 Pelagianism
Given Willet’s identification of justification and election as the central motifs of
Romans (and, indeed, as the two chief points of Christian theology itself), it is hardly
surprising that he finds regular opportunity in the Romans hexapla to assail Pelagian
interpretations. More than any other individual heresy, Pelagianism offered Willet a
useful counterpoint for framing an orthodox reading of Romans while providing a
damning association that he could connect with modern adversaries who opposed a
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monergistic Augustinian soteriology.10 Among these contemporary opponents, most of
the criticism falls—as usual—on Roman Catholics, though Willet also includes some
later-generation Lutherans, like Samuel Huber, in his rebuke. Had Willet lived past 1621,
we surely would have seen the Laudians and the creeping Arminianism of the Anglican
church receive more explicit attention in connection with the Pelagian heresy in later
editions.11

2.1.1 Pelagianism and Later Lutherans
Before considering the ways in which charges of Pelagianism (or, at times,
“Semipelagianism”) functioned in the polemical exchanges between Reformed and
Romanist combatants, we will look briefly at the Lutheran context. Samuel Huber (15471624) was a Lutheran convert from Calvinism who taught at Wittenberg for a period
until his universalistic leanings and his understanding of free will were condemned by
many of his fellow Lutherans, leading to his dismissal.12 Willet condemns Huber and

10

Pelagianism was widely seen by English Protestants as a prominent heresy of the Medieval
church (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 294). Cf. Oberman’s twentieth-century assessment of Pelagian
tendencies in Medieval theologians such as Biel, Bonaventure, Occam, and Holcot throughout Heiko
Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
11

Again, the precise identification of opponents in this period is complicated by polemical
rhetoric, as pejorative terms like “papist” and “Puritan” were often used broadly and imprecisely. For
instance, while some—as Archbishop Whitgift—“limited the label of ‘popish’ to those who held
communion with the Church of Rome,” many others had a tendency to “extend the label ‘popery’ to cover
all non-Calvinist patterns of behaviour and belief” (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 52). Willet himself
seems to incline more toward the stricter usage of Whitgift. Consider, for example, the centrality of the
Pope in the definition of “papist” that he gives in the preface to each edition of Synopsis Papismi: “Thus we
see how a Papist and a Protestant are defined: A Papist is he that cleaveth to the Pope in Religion, and is
obedient to him in all things: A Protestant is he, that professeth the Gospell of Jesus Christ, and hath
renounced the jurisdiction of the sea of Rome, and the forced & unnaturall obedience to the Pope” (Willet,
Synopsis Papismi [1613], sig.B3v).
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Kenneth G. Appold, “Academic Life and Teaching in Post-Reformation Lutheranism,” in
Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550-1675, ed. Robert Kolb (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2008), 108.
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likens his thought to Pelagianism in multiple places in the Romans hexapla, including
verse 5:18 (“all men” are justified in Christ), where Huber’s arguments for the
universality of grace cause him to join “the right hand of fellowship with the old
Pelagians.”13 In Synopsis Papismi, Willet had also accused the Lutherans Jacobus
Andreae and Neils Hemmingsen of Pelagianism.14 Luther himself escaped Willet’s
accusations on this issue, with the devolution of Lutheran predestinarian thought
occurring in later generations. Willet distinguishes, for example, between Luther and his
“so called” followers in their responses to Erasmus’s contention that the election and
reprobation of Jacob and Esau were merely temporal: “To these objections of Erasmus,
Luther hath sufficiently made answer…much differing herein from the Lutherans so
called in these times.”15 Accordingly, Anthony Milton states that “it was generally argued
that Luther himself had not been at fault in such matters, but that it was the later, ‘more
rigid’ Lutherans who were guilty of abandoning the orthodox teaching of their forebear
on this point and of bringing in ‘a conditionate Predestination.’”16 He observes further
that Willet even occasionally included the more-orthodox Lutherans within the category
of “Reformed churches.”17

13

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 260. See also pp. 280-281, 415, 437.

14

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 404. Cf. Giorgio Caravale, The Italian Reformation Outside
Italy: Francesco Pucci’s Heresy in Sixteenth-Century Europe (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2015), which addresses
Willet’s charge of Pelagianism against these figures, as well as against the variously heterodox Pucci (pp.
208-209).
15

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 415.

16

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 386. Dodds, too, describes the shift within Lutheranism away
from Luther’s conception of predestination (Dodds, Exploiting Erasmus, 112-113). On Luther’s own
vigorous battle against Pelagian tendencies that he perceived in the sixteenth-century church, see Manfred
Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,” in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West, vol.
2, From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 1997), 579-585.
17

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 394.
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Milton is incorrect, however, when he writes that Willet moved away from his
staunch opposition to universal grace in the Romans hexapla. Milton claims that “Willet
also presents a modification of the doctrine of limited atonement, suggesting that God
‘would have all men to be saved’ and ‘offreth outward meanes unto all of their calling’
([Hexapla on Romans], p. 451]).18 This citation, though, leaves out critical qualifications
(in addition to making use of the anachronistic and ambiguous term “limited
atonement”). When Willet writes that God would have “all men to be saved,” he is
simply quoting 1 Timothy 2:4. He proceeds to explain Paul’s expression in a manner
fully consistent with his strict opposition to Huber: “God would all men to be saved, that
is, not that God purposeth all to be saved, or giveth grace to all to be saved, but that there
appeareth no let on Gods behalfe why all are not saved, either the creation considered, or
Gods generall vocation: but man is the cause of his owne perdition or ruine.” Willet is not
here hedging away from his criticism of universal grace, but explaining that one of its
proponents’ favored dicta probantia serves merely to emphasize the reprobate’s
responsibility for his own perdition.

2.1.2 Pelagianism and Justification
We would expect—and indeed we in large measure do find—that Roman
Catholics accused of maintaining a Pelagian or Semipelagian soteriology would counter
with charges of Protestants retreating away from good works so far in the other direction
as to fall into antinomian errors.19 Yet, despite a near Protestant monopoly on anti-

18
19

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 414n128.

Unsurprisingly, this was a commonplace argument that Roman Catholics levied against their
grace-obsessed Protestant foes, and many debates centered on whether a Catholic or a Protestant
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Pelagian rhetoric, Catholics also turned this heresy itself around on their opponents.20
Bellarmine, for instance, had argued that Calvin, Bucer and Zwingli had advocated
certain Pelagian ideas. Willet relays this charge in Tetrastylon Papismi: “In the next
place, the Jesuite laboreth by his cunning to intangle us with the heresies of the Pelagians,
but he speedeth no better here, than he did in the rest.”21 Bellarmine’s accusation is built
upon two connections that he tries to establish—one of which, Willet responds,
misrepresents the Protestant position, while the other falsely attributes an Augustinian
position to Pelagius. Bellarmine first claims that some Protestants, in Pelagian fashion,

conception of the place of good works led, in practice, to a higher level of morality. Cf. Hajo Holborn, A
History of Modern Germany: The Reformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 197.
Pages 5-18 in [R. Broughton], Apologicall Epistle argue that Protestant moral laxity is caused by bad
theology and disdain for the true Catholic church; cf. also the Rhemist annotations on James 2 (Martin,
New Testament, 645-647). Recall that Willet himself offered a long list of good works performed by
Protestants in London to counter the papist accusation that Protestant reliance on grace led them to neglect
charitable deeds (see section I.3.1 in the Introduction). Radical reformers in Germany had also used the
moral laxity argument against the Lutherans, as recounted in Harry Loewen, Ink Against the Devil: Luther
and His Opponents (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfried Laurier University Press, 2015), 144. Elnathan Parr (1614)
responds to a similar objection concerning predestination—that being chosen by God apart from the
foresight of any works would discourage a life of godliness (Elnathan Parr, The Grounds of Divinitie
[London: N. O. for Samuel Man, 1614; London: Edward Griffin for Samuel Man, 1619], 248); cf. the
discussion of Parr’s response in Kranendonk, Teaching Predestination, 143-152.
Similar antinomian controversies erupted also as intra-confessional battles within the English
Church. Cf. Stephen Hampton, “Richard Holdsworth and the Antinomian Controversy,” The Journal of
Theological Studies 62, no. 1 (April 2011): 218-250; David Parnham, “Motions of Law and Grace: the
Puritan in the Antinomian,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 73-104; Tim
Cooper, Fear and Polemic in Seventeenth-Century England: Richard Baxter and Antinomianism
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001); “Antinomianism in 17th-Century England,” in The Collected Essays of
Christopher Hill, vol. 2, Religion and Politics in 17th-Century England (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1986), 162-184; Gertrude Huehns, Antinomianism in English History: With Special
Reference to the Period 1640-1660 (London: The Cresset Press, 1951). On the parallel controversy in New
England, see David D. Hall, ed., The Antinomian Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).
20

The assertion by Backus and Goudriaan that “Catholics could hardly accuse their
predestination-focused Protestant adversaries of Pelagianism or Semipelagianism” is, thus, based more on
what one might logically have expected than on an actual lack of such accusations (see Backus and
Goudriaan, “Semipelagianism,” 44).
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Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi (1599), 101.
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deny that original sin remains in the faithful.22 His argument relies on the disagreement
between Roman Catholics and Protestants over the salvific nature of the sacraments. He
gives 4.15.20 of the Institutes, for example, as one of his citations. There Calvin argues
against the practice of (emergency) lay baptism which, though attested from early in the
church’s history, “cannot, it appears to [him], be defended on sufficient grounds.” From
here he anticipates a response of concern for the salvation of the unbaptized child whose
life is in peril: “But there is a danger that he who is sick may be deprived of the gift of
regeneration if he decease without baptism! By no means. Our children, before they are
born, God declares that he adopts for his own when he promises that he will be a God to
us, and to our seed after us. In this promise their salvation is included. None will dare to
offer such an insult to God as to deny that he is able to give effect to his promise. How
much evil has been caused by the dogma, ill expounded, that baptism is necessary to
salvation, few perceive, and therefore think caution the less necessary. For when the
opinion prevails that all are lost who happen not to be dipped in water, our condition
becomes worse than that of God’s ancient people, as if his grace were more restrained
than under the Law.” Calvin is not denying here that original sin marks the children of
believers—only that God is unable to redeem the child without the instrumental aid of
water. The sacrament, Calvin argues, is the sign and seal of God’s activity, not the
necessary channel of God’s grace. By reading Calvin’s words with the assumption that
baptism is an absolute necessity for removing the stain of original sin, Bellarmine “by his
cunning” (to borrow Willet’s apt phrase) is able to portray Calvin as teaching a Pelagian

22

Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi (1599), 101. Bellarmine’s accusation focuses on the children of
believers: “Primò, non esse in hominibus peccatum originale, & praecipuè, in filiis fidelium,” and is rooted
in Protestant statements regarding baptism (Robert Bellarmine, Disputationum…de Controversiis
Christianae Fidei, vol. 2 [Ingolstadt: Adam Sartorius, 1601], 241).
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understanding of original sin as it pertains to children born into the church.
Without elaborating on precisely how Bellarmine misinterprets his sources, Willet
accuses him of inconsistency and mendacity,23 and counters that it is those Roman
Catholics who deny that concupiscence is sin who come closer to a Pelagian original sin
doctrine. Claiming agreement with Augustine, Willet explains the measured balance of
the actual Protestant view: original sin “neither ruleth in the regenerate, nor yet is cleane
extinguished.”24 Secondly, Bellarmine argues that the Protestant notion of all sins being
mortal sins agrees with a Pelagian denial of a mortal/venial distinction. Willet fully
acknowledges that Protestants reject the distinction (as it pertains to the nature of sin
itself), but he adds that in no place does Augustine hold such a teaching against the
Pelagians—noting wryly, “if this were a point of Pelagianisme, [Augustine] was a
Pelagian himselfe.”25 Whether Pelagius believed that all sins were mortal is immaterial,
since Augustine clearly taught this, making any overlap with a heterodox teacher purely
incidental and in no way a mark of heresy. Willet does allow for a mortal/venial
distinction, though the divide comes not in the nature of sin in se, but in its relation to
repentance and God’s grace: “by repentance and confession sinnes are become veniall.”26
Moving on to Willet’s polemical use of the Pelagian heresy specifically in the
Romans hexapla, we will begin by looking at a place where he develops the
23

“…Bellarmine did not here remember that olde saying. Mendacem oportet esse memorem: A
lyer had neede to have a good memorie: for a little before, Hares.5. he accuseth the Protestants, as if they
should affirm, that sinne, even in the regenerate raigneth, and is active: but here to casteth upon us the
cleane contrary opinion, that we should hold no originall sinne at all to remaine in the faithfull. See so well
the Jesuit agreeth with himselfe” (Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi [1599], 101).
24

Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi (1599), 101.
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Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi (1599), 101-102.
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Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi (1599), 102.
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countercharge that we have just seen in Tetrastylon Papismi that many Romans Catholics
deny that any original sin remains after baptism. This argument comes in the context of
the Adam-Christ parallel in the second half of Romans 5. Willet links Catholics and
Pelagians in his summary of one of the Controversies drawn from this passage, framing
the issue “Against the Pelagians and Papists, that originall sinne is not taken away in
baptisme.” The Pelagians had held that there was no original sin, “or at the least
remaining” in the faithful after baptism. This, to Willet, reflected too narrow an
understanding of original sin, which—as we saw in section V.2.4 on the relationship
between sin and concupiscence—properly includes both guilt (which is removed in
baptism) and corruption (which remains).27 The papists acknowledged this post-baptism
corruption, though they misconstrued its nature, viewing it “not as a fault, but as a
punishment, and matter or occasion for the exercising of vertue.” Trent had declared that
all that “hath the proper and true nature of sinne” was removed in baptism, and the
Rhemists taught that baptized children were cleansed of both mortal and venial sin.28 But,
Willet asserts, pointing to Romans 7:7 (where lust is equated with sin), the vestigial
corruption remaining after baptism “hath [itself] the verie nature of sinne,” so that the
Roman Catholic invention of a residual corruption that was not judged as sinful does not

27
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274. The decree from the fifth session of the Council of Trent
(from June 1546), while condemning those who claim that “the transgression of Adam injured him alone
and not his posterity,” continues to declare that “if anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ
which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or says that the whole of that which
belongs to the essence of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only canceled or not imputed, let him be
anathema” (Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, 21, 23). Willet cites the Rhemist annotation on 1
John 1, which argues in part (citing De Fide ad Petrum), that “are excepted from this common rule of
sinner [i.e. if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, 1 John 1:8], the children which be newely
baptized and have not yet use of reason to sinne either mortally or venially” (Martin, New Testament, 676).
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actually differ significantly from a Pelagian understanding of original sin.29
The Apostle’s declaration in the previous chapter of Romans (4:7) that “Blessed
are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sinnes are covered” occasions a related
Controversy, in which the context expands from baptism specifically to the broader
“justification of the faithfull.” Here Willet addresses the Roman Catholic interpretation of
this verse to mean that justification removes not only the guilt of sin, but “sinne it selfe,”
and the corresponding accusation that Protestants, conversely, teach that sins are not in
any way removed “but remaine the same they were,” only without being imputed.30 This
supposed Protestant understanding of justification had led Pererius to liken Protestants to
the Pelagians, who denied that baptism affected the root of sin, holding that it served only
to prune some of its branches. This characterization of the Protestant view, Willet
counters, misrepresents their position and ignores the Protestant distinction between sin
dwelling and sin reigning in the baptized Christian. Being justified is not a matter of bare
non-imputation alone, but also represents a shift from being destitute of all holiness to
living a life of holiness mingled with sin; this is the picture that Paul paints in Romans
7:20. Pererius’s attempt to connect Protestants to the Pelagian tree inverted how his
opponents would actually employ the image: when justified, Protestants maintain, the
root of sin itself is indeed killed, but some of its sprigs remain during our life on earth.
The language of imputation and covering that Paul uses in 4:7-8 implies not the
immediate and utter removal of all traces of sin, but suggests rather that some vestige
remains: “the very word it selfe of not imputing of sinne, presupposeth a beeing of
29
30

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 274.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 222. We see this Catholic charge reflected in the Tridentine
condemnation (quoted in n27) of those teaching the mere non-imputation of sin.
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sinne…and that which is covered appeareth not, not because it is not, but because it is
covered.”31 As he had in Tetrastylon Papismi, Willet here turns the accusation around on
his Catholic foes—“the error of the Pelagians rather cleaveth unto the Romanists, then
the Protestants…”—as evidenced in part by the papists extending the benefits of baptism
only to sins previously committed.32 Willet also links Pelagians and Roman Catholics
(though without equating them) as offering two different false efficient causes of
justification in 3:24: “The efficient, which is the grace of God, that is, not the doctrine of
the Gospel freely revealed, as the Pelagians understand it, nor the graces of the spirit
infused, as the Romanists.”33 While distinguishing between their particular errors here,
Willet is clearly connecting the two as enemies of grace.
In fairness to his opponents, or perhaps to avoid the potential polemical pitfalls of
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 222. Consider how the Rhemist annotations present the
Protestant interpretation of these verses, interpreting Protestant non-imputation of sin to mean that the sin is
not truly forgiven: “You may not gather (as the Heretikes doe) of these termes, covered, and not imputed,
that the sinnes of men be never truly forgiven, but hidden only. for that derogateth much to the force of
Christes bloud and to the grace of God, by which our offences be truely remitted. He is the Lambe that
taketh away the sinnes of the world, that washeth, and blotteth out our sinnes. therfore to cover them, or,
not to impute them, is, not to charge us with our sinnes, because by remission they be cleane taken away:
otherwise it were but a feined forgivenesse” (Martin, New Testament, 392-393). Fulke’s response to this
annotation begins by agreeing with the Rhemists’ words—knowing, of course, that the position attributed
to the “heretikes” is a misrepresentation of a Protestant teaching— (“Gods curse light upon those heretikes,
that say our sinnes are never truely forgiven, but onely hidden”), before explaining that the non-imputation
of sin entails full and true forgiveness (Fulke, Text of the New Testament, 448).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 222. The Catholic tradition did not generally hold, as Willet
supposes, that baptism’s effects were strictly limited to the sins going before, but rather taught that
additional, supplementary means were necessary as well for later sins. Cf. the Rhemist note on 1 John 1:7:
“V. Bede saith, that Christs Passion doth not onely remit in Baptisme the sinnes before committed, but al
other afterward also done by frailtie: yet so, if we use for the remission of them, such meanes as be
requisite and as Christ hath appointed, whereof he reckeneth some” (Martin, New Testament, 676). The
necessity of additional means, to Willet, was effectively the same as saying that baptism had no effect on
those sins—in similar fashion to how the Rhemists considered the non-imputation of sins (without their
complete removal) to be effectively the same as denying forgiveness altogether. In instances like these,
polemicists on each side of the Catholic-Protestant divide prioritized what they took to be the logical
ramifications of their opponents’ views over the opponents’ own articulation of their views.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 168. On the multiple causes of justification, see sections IV.2.1
and IV.2.5.
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hyperbolic comparisons, Willet does differentiate both between Roman Catholic and
Pelagian dogma, and between different strains of Catholic thought.34 Twice in the
Romans hexapla Willet acknowledges the scholastic distinction between fulfilling the
Law quoad substantiam actus and quoad intentionem precipientis—the first referring to
obeying the substance of the Law itself, and the second to satisfying the intentions of the
lawgiver.35 Catholics making use of this distinction held that humans in the state of “pure
nature” were capable of the first, “letter of the law” variety of obedience, but not of the
latter—since, for one thing, the lawgiver stipulates that proper obedience to the Law is
performed in a state of grace, making fulfillment quoad intentionem precipientis by
definition an impossibility in an ungraced natural state.36 Having expounded on Paul’s
teaching in Romans 8:8 that those in the flesh cannot please God,37 Willet applies this
principle to refute Pelagian and papist errors: “And this doth manifestly convince the
Pelagians of error, which hold that a naturall man might fulfill the law of God: and of the
34

Distinguishing different views within the Roman Catholic tradition also contributed to Willet’s
project of refuting Roman claims of catholicity by revealing fissures within the church’s supposed uniform
doctrine. See section VII.3.1.
35

On the distinction between quoad substantiam actus and quoad intentionem precipientis (or
legislatoris), see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 48, 156-162. Oberman explains this “wellknown nominalistic distinction between the two aspects of the one act” in the context of Gabriel Biel’s
thought and argues that it must be interpreted according to another distinction, between the bonitas (the
basic goodness) and dignitas (the acceptability, requiring grace) of an act (pp. 162-163). Cf. also Denis R.
Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Nominalism: A Study in Theological Anthropology (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 1983), 21, 54-55, 84, 106-107, 119-120, 133, 137. Janz writes that, while most
thirteenth-century theologians agreed that the Law could not be kept quoad intentionem legislatoris, some
argued that it could be kept quoad substantiam actus. This was the early position of Thomas Aquinas, who
believed that this natural obedience prepared one to receive the grace that would enable the fulfillment of
the Law quoad intentionem legislatoris. Thomas’s later view was closer to Luther’s, maintaining that one
could not fulfill the whole Law, in either fashion, without grace.
36
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Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 162.

Cf. our earlier reflection (in section II.3.2.3) on Paul’s teaching regarding the flesh (i.e. natural
human nature) in this same part of Romans 8. There we looked at the issue from a translation perspective,
considering the different shades of meaning that Willet explains between viewing the flesh as “enmity
towards” and “an enemy of” God.
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Popish Schoolmen, who affirmed, that a man without grace might keep the law…in
respect of the substance of the worke, though not…after the intention of the law.”38
Willet similarly likens the two in a Controversy concerning Romans 5:20 (“the lawe
entred, that the offence should abound”). Having explained the error of the Manichaeans,
who argued from verses like this “against the law, as though it were evill,” Willet adds
that the Pelagians do no better, erring in the opposite direction by attributing to the
(inherently holy) Law too much power in making it “sufficient to salvation.” He proceeds
to connect this misconception to the Roman scholastics: “The Popish schoolemen
differed not much from this opinion, who held that a man by the strength of nature may
keepe the precept of the lawe, quoad substantiam operis, in respect of the substance of
the worke, but not, quoad intentionem pracipientis, according to the intention of the
lawgiver.”39 The distinction, while mitigating their heresy somewhat, is not sufficient to
free those Catholics appropriating this nominalist approach to the Law from the Pelagian
label.40 Paul’s personal testimony in Romans 7 shows us that not even a regenerate saint
can keep the Law perfectly; and if not post-conversion Paul, surely not one yet mired in
his natural condition (either according to the intention or the substance of the Law).
Willet concludes this Controversy by driving home the blasphemous ramification of the
Pelagian view: were the Law sufficient, “then Christ died in vaine.”41
38

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 355.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 282.
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Oberman, it should be noted, concurs with this assessment: “It is therefore evident that Biel’s
doctrine of justification is essentially Pelagian”; “Our conclusion that nominalism has not been able to
avoid a Pelagian position should not obscure the fact that nominalism was fully involved in the ongoing
medieval search for the proper interpretation of Augustine” (Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology,
177, 427).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 283.
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Given the partial correspondence between Pelagian and Roman Catholic teaching
on justification, Willet elsewhere employs the term “Semipelagian,”42 a common
Reformed designation for Catholic theology.43 Whereas the Pelagian position could do
away with the internal influence of grace altogether, the Romanists proposed a
synergistic blend of grace and human effort. Willet applies the epithet to the Catholics in
the Controversies section of Romans 8, in reference to Paul’s statement in verse 26 that
“we know not what to pray, as we ought.” If we cannot even pray properly, Willet
comments, how much less are we capable of keeping the whole Law?44 “And as these
places [i.e. Romans 8:26 and Philippians 2:13] doe exclude this heresie of the Pelagians,”
Willet continues, “who extoll the power of nature altogether; so also they overthrow the
error of the Semipelagians the Papists, who joyne free will and grace as workes
together.”45 While not identical to the Pelagian understanding of justification, the Roman
doctrine did not do enough to safeguard itself against the association; a Pelagian element
42

The moderated title “Semipelagian” was coined in the mid-sixteenth century, and only later
used to describe synergistic views in the early church. Backus and Goudriaan argue that Beza was the first
to use the expression, directing it against Roman Catholics in his 1556 New Testament annotations and in
his lectures on Romans in the 1560s (Backus and Goudriaan, “Semipelagianism,” 35-40, 38). The
designation was re-appropriated, they contend, by the Roman Catholic Nicholas Sander in 1571 and
applied to the fifth-century Massilians (pp. 42-44).
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Anthony Milton, addressing predestination controversies, writes that “where anti-Calvinist
divines were directly accused of Pelagianism, the Roman Church was distinguished from them, and seen
instead as inclining more towards semi-Pelagianism.” He goes on to note the polemical element in this
approach, in which Arminians were portrayed as being even more heretical than the hated Catholics
(Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 210-211). As we will see shortly, though, some Roman Catholics were
still singled out for Pelagian-level predestination errors. Muller mentions also the term “Neo-Pelagians,”
which was used when “precise terminology was necessary” (Muller, After Calvin, 53).
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In section III.3.4 we looked at Willet’s identification of Paul’s use of a minori ad maius (“from
the less to the greater”) rhetorical arguments. Here and in the previous paragraph we see two more
examples: if we cannot pray correctly, how much more are we incapable to obeying the Law; and if a
regenerate apostle cannot obey perfectly, how much more is an unregenerate person incapable of such
obedience.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 397-398. Willet cites “Phil.1.13,” but the reference is clearly to
the following chapter.

286

in the papist teaching was in Willet’s judgment sufficient to earn the damning
“Semipelagian” title.

2.1.3 Pelagianism and Election
In the Controversies section of Romans 9—the chapter where Paul begins his
extended reflection on the mystery of election—Willet distinguishes between differing
Roman Catholic perspectives on predestination, with only certain factions accused of
reviving Pelagian predestination errors. Anthony Milton writes that most English
Protestants did not view the Roman church as being fundamentally wrong on
predestination, with its charges of Pelagianism or Semipelagianism stemming rather from
Roman Catholic teachings on justification and assurance of salvation.46 There was
enough similarity between Reformed and (Dominican) Catholic views on predestination,
Milton notes, that the Puritan Anthony Wotton was able to use this as an argument
against the anti-Puritan Bishop Richard Montagu to show that the Reformed conception
of predestination was no Puritan novelty.47 Willet’s comparison between “the
Universalists” (i.e. proponents of universal grace) and the papists in the “fift absurditie”
of the nineteenth general controversy of Synopsis Papismi supports Milton’s basic
argument here: “the Universalists herein are more erronious then the Papists: for they [the
papists] confesse an absolute and determinate certaintie of our election before God,
though they denie a full perswasion and assurance thereof unto men.”48 Willet held this
moderated position to be the majority stance of the Roman Catholics.
46

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 210-211.
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Yet, while Rome may have “escaped [being associated with the Pelagian heresy]
on the specific doctrine of predestination itself” in the judgment of most English
Protestants,49 Willet himself certainly deemed some Roman Catholics guilty on this
count. Surveying a variety of opinions on the relationship between the decree and
execution of election and reprobation, Willet reserves his harshest criticism for those who
made the entire process of election to stem from human causes—namely “the Pelagians,
and some of the Romanists, which hold, that both the decree of election is grounded upon
the foresight of faith, and the good use of freewill, as also the execution of that decree in
the giving of eternall life they will have procured by good works.”50 Among these
Romanists Willet includes the Rhemists and the Jesuit Martin Becanus (1563-1624), a
contemporary of Willet’s teaching at the time in Mainz.51 Earlier in the same section he
had similarly accused the sixteenth-century Dominican Ambrosius Catharinus (who held
all people to be elect, though some absolutely and others conditionally) of propounding a

49

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 211. Milton minimizes Willet’s association of certain Catholic
factions with Pelagian predestination errors, quoting for instance a distinction that Willet draws between
Pelagian and papist views on reprobation as though it were indicative of his assessment on election as well.
Willet’s softer criticism of Roman Catholic teaching on reprobation, however, was likely due to the greater
complexity of the issue, the inherent problems resident in a wide variety of views on reprobation, and—
perhaps most significantly—the diversity of opinions espoused by eminent Protestants. He thus had to be
careful not to unwittingly implicate a Protestant ally in the Pelagian heresy.
50
51

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 447.

New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., s.v. “Martin Becanus”; As evidence of the Rhemists’
Pelagian understanding of election, Willet cites the interpretation of Hebrews 5. There the annotation on
verse 9 (Christ “was made to all that obey him, cause of eternal salvation”), having explained the necessity
of obeying the commandments in order to apply the benefits of Christ’s Passion, concludes: “Lastly, we
note in the same wordes, that Christ appointeth not by his absolute and eternal election, men so to be
partakers of the fruite of his redemption, without any condition or respect of their owne workes, obedience,
or free will: but with the condition alwaies, if men wil obey him, and do that which he appointeth” (Martin,
New Testament, 611). Cf. Willet’s distinction in Synopsis Papismi where, having found Bellarmine
basically acceptable, he notes that “our whole busines is with the Rhemists” (Willet, Synopsis Papismi
[1600], 820; retained in the 1613 edition, p. 918).
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Pelagian opinion.52 Other Romanists, however—while by no means free from error
entirely—dissented from this particularly egregious position. Bellarmine, Tolet, and
Pererius all proposed a different causal structure, and Thomas had affirmed that God was
fully the cause of the decree of both election and reprobation, though he allowed for
human causality in the execution of each.

2.1.4 Pelagianism and Reprobation
Among Protestants, “worthie Calvin, Beza, Martyr, with other of our learned new
writers” rightly distinguish between the execution of each —with good works accruing no
merit in the execution of election, but evil deeds justly earning damnation in the
execution of reprobation—but make God fully the cause of the decree of both election
and reprobation.53 While this is not unlike the position Willet himself had staked earlier
in Synopsis Papismi, by at least 1611 he preferred to emphasize the role of sin in
reprobation to a greater degree. “The safer way,” he concludes, is to “hold a perpetuall
difference betweene election and reprobation,” with the entire process of election caused
by God’s free and sovereign will, and the reprobate’s “sinne and the foresight thereof”
motivating both the decree and the actuality of their damnation.
Concerning the decree of reprobation, it has commonly been stated that Willet
moved from a supralapsarian to a sublapsarian position.54 While he certainly clarifies his
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 438.

53

Cf. the similar position of Ursinus, and the importance of distinguishing between reprobation
(the decree) and damnation (the execution) in Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 186, 189.
54

E.g. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 414-417; Anthony Milton, “‘Anglicanism’ by Stealth: The
Career and Influence of John Overall,” in Religious Politics in Post-Reformation England, 174; Dodds,
Exploiting Erasmus, 143 (citing Milton); Pederson, “Andrew Willet and the Synopsis Papismi,” 135-137;
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preference for the latter in the Romans hexapla more than he had in earlier works, even
acknowledging a development in his stance (presenting the “safest” position in the
Romans hexapla against “whatsoever [he had] before thought and written otherwise”),55
the shift is not quite as dramatic as Anthony Milton—the primary exponent of this
view—has made it seem. Milton argues that “the writings of Andrew Willet provide a
striking example of [the] process of disengagement” from a “high Calvinist” position,
“explicitly retract[ing] the supralapsarian position which he had maintained in his earlier
work.” In a footnote, Milton specifies that Willet was “distancing himself from his own
earlier position in Synopsis (1600),” where he had made use of a distinction of Junius
regarding two degrees of reprobation (an absolute “decree of preterition,” in which God
withholds his mercy, and a “decree of prescience,” in which God actively punishes on the
basis of the foresight of sin). It is possible that Willet’s use of the supralapsarian Junius
leads Milton to characterize Willet himself as a supralapsarian. However, Willet never
uses Junius’s distinction in an explicitly supralapsarian manner. “Willet’s rethinking on
this and related points,” Milton writes, “was enshrined in additions to the fourth edition
of the Synopsis (1613), where he inserted two new paragraphs (p. 921) emphasizing the
sublapsarian position, which replaced his earlier defence of irrespective reprobation

Kranendonk, Teaching Predestination, 126-127. Throughout this section I will use the word “sublapsarian”
to match Milton’s preferred terminology. I take the term to be synonymous with “infralapsarian.”
55

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 443. Elnathan Parr mentions this development in the thought of
Willet (who is, as Kranendonk notes, the only Englishman Parr cites in support of his infralapsarian
position; Kranendonk, Teaching Predestination, 127) in his 1619 expansion of The Grounds of Divinity:
“Doctor Willet, a learned man of our own Country, after a great deale of paynes in searching into this point:
having before published his opinion otherwise; doth at the last rest in this of the corrupted masse, as the
most safe to answere all objections of adversaries, and as the undoubted truth” (Elnathan Parr, The Grounds
of Divinitie [1619], 297). While acknowledging a shift in Willet’s favored view (which he learns of from
Willet’s own words in the Romans hexapla), Parr does not indicate precisely in his testimony what he takes
to have been Willet’s previous view.
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which had made use of the example of Jacob and Esau (1600, p. 822).”56 Willet’s shift,
however, is not quite so stark, with strong qualifications of his (supposed)
supralapsarianism already hedged in (and before) 1600 and remnants of this “high
Calvinist” position still present in 1613. Pederson is more accurate when he claims that
“Willet’s revision and expansion of this issue [of double predestination] in the 1634
edition softens the [earlier] supralapsarian overtones,” although Pederson’s reference
should be to the 1613 revision—the final 1634 printing being 13 years after Willet’s
death—and the passage that he cites from the 1634 Synopsis to demonstrate how
“Willet’s revision addresses the issue of reprobation in greater detail” first appears in the
1594 edition.57
Already in the 1594 edition of Synopsis Papismi Willet appears unwilling to adopt
a fully supralapsarian view, as he attempts to strike a balance between human and divine
causality: “the decree of reprobation, as it dependeth not absolutely altogether upon
God’s will, without respect had unto the sinne and rebellion of the reprobate, so neither
doth it spring onely from the foresight of sinne, as the Rhemists affirme, that God doth
not reprobate any but for sinne.” This reference to the foresight of sin in the decree of
reprobation suggests that the object of this decree is not the unfallen, creatable beings that
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Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 414, 414n127. Willet’s use of Junius’s distinction can be found
on p. 822 of the 1600 edition of Synopsis Papismi, and summarized—with a recognition of the limits of the
distinction—on pp. 440-441 of the Romans hexapla. Despite his diminished enthusiasm for this distinction,
it is retained in the 1613 Synopsis Papismi (p. 920). In an added section on the following page of this later
edition, he clearly frames it in a sublapsarian content: “So then mankinde being considered as all lost in
Adam, the Lord out of his owne gracious will elected some out of this masse or lumpe of perdition, leaving
the other, (here is the decree of praeterition, issuing forth of Gods will and counsell) those being left in
their state of corruption, are fore-seene, in the consummation and accession of many other sinnes, and so
are ordained to damnation (here is the decree issuing out of his prescience.)”
57

Pederson, “Andrew Willet and the Synopsis Papismi,” 136-137. The passage that Pederson
quotes can be found on p. 920 of the 1613 and 1634 editions, p. 822 of the 1600 edition, and pp. 896-897 of
the 1594 edition.
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a fully supralapsarian position would assume.58 Additionally, Willet distinguishes not just
between the execution of election and reprobation, but between the decree of each,
stating that “we must note the difference betweene the decree of election and reprobation:
for men are elected without any foresight of their works, but they are not rejected without
respect to their workes.”59 Were he advocating a supralapsarian view, we would expect
more of a parallel here between the decrees of election and reprobation. In attempting a
balance between God’s sovereignty and human culpability, Willet is largely following
Bellarmine, who had argued that reprobation “is partly to be referred to the will of God,
partly to the foresight of sinne: not wholy to either, but in part to both”—a position that
Willet did “not much mislike.”60
Moreover, many of the passages from the earlier editions that might seem to
suggest a supralapsarian position are retained in the 1613 Synopsis Papismi. Having
allowed that the execution of damnation is always carried out justly for sin, for instance,
Willet adds: “but as for the decree and sentence of condemnation, it is no unjust thing for
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Cf. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, s.v. “supra lapsum.”
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Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1594), 897.
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Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1594), 894 (p. 820 in the 1600 edition and p. 918 in the 1613 edition).
From early on Willet seems conflicted about Bellarmine’s distinction between negative and positive
reprobation (which he associates explicitly with Junius’s preterition/prescience distinction, p. 897 of the
1594 Synopsis, and a separate passage on p. 921 of the 1613 Synopsis). While affirming that “here we doe
not much mislike the Jesuites opinion in this matter as agreeable to ours” and claiming that “a better
answere can not bee found, then that which Bellarmine maketh,”he elsewhere in the same edition refers to
Bellarmine’s negative/positive distinction as “another evasion” (Willet, Synopsis Papismi [1594], 894, 895,
838). Already by this time the word “evasion” had the negative connotation of a “shuffling excuse” or
“subterfuge,” so it is unlikely that Willet is using the word in any positive sense, as though to say “once
again Bellarmine skillfully navigates through the waters of seemingly irresolvable theological tension to
present a nuanced middle position” (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “evasion”, accessed December 18,
2015, http://www.oed.com). One possible explanation for Willet’s mixed review of Bellarmine is that the
passage where he praises the Jesuit’s distinction comes when he is emphasizing a difference between him
and the Rhemists.
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God, as it pleaseth him to dispose of his creature, whether to honour or dishonour.”61 This
passage is retained in the 1613 edition, with the addition of a new concluding sentence
that refines somewhat but certainly does not repudiate the argument.62 Again,
distinguishing between the decree and execution of reprobation, Willet writes that “the
evill workes then of wicked men, are not the onely cause of their rejection, which is an
absolute acte of Gods own will, yet are they a just cause of their damnation.”63 It is
possible that Willet is simply inconsistent here—that his polemical aims nudge him
towards seemingly contradictory affirmations. We must remember, though, that he is
making use of and adapting several different pairs of distinctions that he has received
from various authors; certain inconsistencies are to be expected simply because of his
wide ranging sources. It is also possible that Willet resists being categorized neatly as
either fully supralapsarian or sublapsarian, finding useful elements in each position.64
Interpreting Willet’s statements on reprobation is also complicated by
his distinction between absolute and comparative reprobation. Reprobation itself exists
because of human sin, though the decision of who is elect and who is reprobate (out of the
sinful mass of humanity) is without regard to sin, resting solely on the mystery of God’s
will. Without this distinction, all humans would be justly and eternally condemned for
61

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1594), 895 and (1613), 919.
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He adds in the later edition: “And yet God casteth off none, but justly, not onely in respect of his
absolute right and power, which he hath over his creature, but in regard of them also that are cast off, all
being lost in Adam.”
63
64

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1594), 895 and (1613), 919.

Cf. Muller’s observation concerning the “broader spectrum and…variety of Reformed thought
beyond the simple (or perhaps simplistic) division of opinion between supralapsarians and
infralapsarians…” (Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 131). Cf. also David Pareus, who Klaas
Dijk argues “seeks a conciliatory position” between infra- and supralapsarianism (cited in Kranendonk,
Teaching Predestination, 126). Willet in the Romans hexapla partly agrees with and partly dissents from
Pareus’s reasoning (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 439, 443).
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their sin, or else particular condemnation would be based on a hierarchy of sinfulness,
which would simply be a kind of negative Pelagianism.65 Isolated from their context,
some passages referring to absolute reprobation—focusing on the sinfulness of the
human “mass of perdition”—can sound sublapsarian, while others dealing with
comparative reprobation—focusing on how that mass is divided without regard to sin—
can read as though strictly supralapsarian.
Willet’s acknowledged shift, then, should be seen not as a radical distancing from
his earlier position, but as a relative move towards a more clearly expressed sublapsarian
emphasis, in which Junius’s distinctions must be clarified by adding “further by way of
explanation,” negative and positive reprobation are recognized as being “in effect…all
one,” and where Willet “now [sees] no reason” not to endorse Augustine’s making “the
Masse of damnation in Adam the object of Gods decree.”66 If his early intention was to
stand between supralapsarian and sublapsarian frameworks, his later recognition was that,
based on his logical, theological, and polemical commitments, he was obliged to take a
step towards sublapsarianism.
Given the intricate nature of reprobation—with the ramifications that different
positions hold both for the doctrine of election and for God’s attributes, as well as the
variety of stances within the Protestant world—we can see why Willet, while still
describing the Pelagians as those “who utterly condemned the absolute decree of
reprobation, without any respect of works,”67 more frequently raises the charge
of Pelagianism against errors concerning positive election. Notice too that, although
65

E.g. Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 439, 442.

66

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 921.

67

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 438.
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Willet expresses concern that the supralapsarian position’s emphasis on God’s absolute
right makes God’s justice to exceed his mercy (given the surplus of rejected people), he
does affirm the distinction between God’s absolute and “moderate or subordinate” right
(absolutum ius/ ordinatum ius) and affirms that God is under no obligation to consider sin
when he rejects people: “even without any respect unto sinne, no man could accuse or
challenge God.”68 Willet’s conclusions, then, are based primarily on how he has come to
read the relevant biblical texts, and not on a belief that the opposing view would make
God to be an unjust tyrant. This was an important disclaimer for him to make, given that
such esteemed Reformed theologians as Beza, Junius and Perkins had affirmed the
supralapsarian view.

2.2 Canonical Errors: Marcionism and Manichaeism
Willet’s Hexapla upon Romanes is scattered with condemnations of the heresies
of the Marcionites and Manichaeans.69 When these heresies are connected to Rome the
common error tends to concern the biblical canon. We find all three linked in a chapter
15 Controversy in which Willet applies verse 15:4 (“For whatsoever things were written
aforetime, were written afore for our learning, that through patience and comfort of the
Scriptures, we might have hope”) to combat “the enemies and adversaries to the
Scriptures.” Willet identifies three groups of “heretikes” who abuse the scriptures in
various ways:
68
69

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 447, 442.

Selected references to Marcion can be found on pp. 26, 90, 141, 180, 182, 231, 242, 262, and
708; the Manichaeans are referenced on pp. 231, 476, 497, 659, and 708. In at least two places (pp. 231 and
708) he treats the two together as deniers of the Old Testament. Calvin had linked the two heresies in the
Institutes for their views regarding Christ’s human nature (Calvin, Institutes, 2.13.1-3).
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the first are the Manichees and Marcionites, which condemne the bookes of
Moses and the old Testament: the second the Libertines [among whom he later
includes the Anabaptists], which doe cleave unto their fantasticall dreames, which
they call revelations, and say the Scriptures are only for such as are weake: the
third are the Romanists, which doe besides the Scriptures receive many traditions,
which they call verbum Dei non scriptum, the word of God not written, which
they make of equall authoritie with the Scriptures.70
The authority of these Romanist unwritten traditions (which Willet designates as
“Pharisaical leaven”) is implicitly diminished by Paul’s reference to things “written” in
Romans 15:4—if that which was written was done so for our learning, then, conversely,
“things…not written, are not for our learning, as having no certentie, nor foundation.”
While the particular error is the opposite of that of the Marcionites and Manichaeans—
one denying the written scriptures and the other elevating unwritten traditions—the
common impiety is sufficient to Willet for them to be cast together as “enemies” of
Scripture.71
In similar fashion, Willet interprets Paul’s statement in Romans 10:8 (“This is the
word of faith, which we preach”) to imply a complete equation between the Apostle’s
written and spoken message.72 Here also the introduction of unwritten traditions into the
canon of authoritative teaching represents to Willet a familiar heretical move: “The
Romanists then may be ashamed to flie unto that vile and base refuge of the old
70

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 708.
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Cf. Ariel Hessayon’s choice of Willet as an example of “Protestant objections to ‘traditions’ and
unwritten ‘verities’ urged by the Church of Rome,” citing his denial in the Genesis hexapla of the
legitimacy of Enoch’s extrabiblical prophecy (Ariel Hessayon, “Og King of Bashan, Enoch and the Books
of Enoch: Extra-Canonical Texts and Interpretations of Genesis 6:1-4,” in Scripture and Scholarship in
Early Modern England, ed. Ariel Hessayon and Nicholas Keene [Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006], 19-20).
See also my discussion of Richard Field’s view of hypothetical unwritten truths (VI.1).
72

“The Apostle here sheweth that the Gospel which he preached was agreeable to the Scriptures,
he preached no other thing, then he here writeth: and he writeth nothing but was consonant to the old
Scriptures” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 476). In this interpretation Willet both rejects unwritten
traditions and, in accordance with a major Reformed theme, affirms the unity of the message between the
Old and New Testaments.
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Manichees, to say, that the Apostles preached some things, and committed other to
writing.” Willet in this instance draws a more direct parallel between the Romanists and
the Manichaeans, with each group guilty of adding new revelations to the biblical
foundation of their belief systems. Still, by attaching the labels “Marcionite” and
“Manichaean” to the Roman church when the predominant parallel concerns authority
and canon, Willet manages to conjure indirectly an association with a whole range of
other ancient heretical doctrines.
In selected places Willet does attempt also to implicate Roman Catholics directly
in certain other heresies of Marcion and Mani.73 We find an instance of this in the early
pages of the commentary, in connection with Paul’s reference in the epistle’s prologue to
Christ’s being “of the seede of David according to the flesh.” First using Paul’s words to
refute the heretical Marcionite notion of Christ having “an invisible bodie, that could not
be seene or touched, though it were present,”74 he goes on to liken this error to the
particular eucharistic metaphysics espoused by papists and Lutherans (though without
naming them here explicitly): “from whose heresie they much differ not, which include
the bodie of Christ in the sacrament, under the formes of bread and wine, neither giving
unto it place, nor disposition of parts, nor making it visible or palpable.”75 In his
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In addition, Willet at times accuses Romanists of heretical ideas commonly associated with
Marcion, though without naming the earlier heretic by name. Drawing the implications of Paul’s reference
to the common root of Israel and the church (11:7), for instance, Willet explains that this teaching “is
contrarie to the doctrine of the Romanists, which denie that the Sacraments of the old Testament had the
same spirituall substance, with the Sacraments of the new” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 525). This
criticism of the false division of testaments seems to have the Marcionite denial of the Old Testament in the
background.
74

On this Marcionite concept, see Tertullian’s On the Flesh of Christ, ch. 11 and Against Marcion,
bk. 1, ch. 16 [Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, ed. A. Cleveland Coxe, vol. 3 of The Ante-Nicene
Fathers (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 3:531-532, 282-283].
75

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 90. Calvin makes a similar comparison between Marcion and
those supposing the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature in his explanation of the Lord’s Supper in 4.17 of the
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comments on this verse in the Doctrines section, Willet explains somewhat more fully
how this understanding of the “Ubiquitaries” is based on a mistaken conception of the
communication of Christ’s human and divine attributes,76 and in a separate Controversy
he likens this Lutheran error also to the Nestorian heresy (returning upon the Lutherans a
charge that they commonly levelled against the Reformed).77 Despite the Reformed
position on the communicatio idiomatum, with Christ’s divine and human natures united
in concreto in the person of Christ, perhaps inclining more towards Nestorianism,78
Willet nonetheless links the old heresy to the Lutherans—the one allowing “no
communication at all” and the other “a confused commixtion.” Roman Catholics, for the
most part, escaped being accused directly of resurrecting early church Christological and
trinitarian heresies,79 these charges being reserved primarily for Socinian foes.80

Institutes. In his Romans commentary, though, Calvin makes no mention here (1:3) of Marcion or
sacramental theology, with his only polemical application directed against “the impious raving of Servetus,
who assigned flesh to Christ, composed of three untreated elements” (Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 44).
William Sclater alludes to the Manichaean error in his comments on this verse, but focuses his critique on
modern foes, since (following the advice of Hyperius) “a minister in his popular Sermons should content
himselfe to deale against the errours raigning for the present in the people, rather then by needlesse
mention, of buried heresies, give them occasion to inquire into them.” He therefore, like Willet, applies
Paul’s teaching against “our ubiquitaries [who] have of late recalled, of these grosse heresies” (Sclater, A
Key to the Key of Scripture, 21-22).
76

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 87. Cf. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological
Terms, 72-74 (s.v. “communicatio idiomatum”).
77

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 88.
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Cf. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 72-73 (s.v. “communicatio
idiomatum”).
79

Cf. Milton, summarizing Sutcliffe’s position: “…although papists varied from all the doctrines
of the ancient church, they still retained an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity” (Milton, Catholic and
Reformed, 176). Willet does once in the Romans hexapla connect the Nestorian heresy to Valla and
Stapulensis, both Roman Catholics—albeit ones who helped lay the framework for Protestantism. Their
interpretations of Romans 6:10, Willet claims, “would seeme to favour the Nestorian heresie, that divideth
Christs person, to say that Christ died not, but his bodie died” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 292).
Bellarmine accused Protestants of Arianism (for rejecting unwritten traditions), Nestorianism
(because of Beza’s early theology, which—Willet counters—he later modified), Eutychianism (because of
Schwenckfeld; Willet’s response: “what have we to do with the Swinkfeldians, or the Ubiquitaries?”), and
Sabellianism (because of Servetus—who, Willet objects, was justly dealt with by the more orthodox
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Willet directly connects Roman Catholic dietary restrictions to the Manichaean
condemnation of eating flesh in a chapter 14 Controversy concerning fasting and
abstinence from meat. Having opened the Controversy with a description of eight kinds
of fasts—including both legitimate (e.g. those motivated by health issues, those prone to
alcohol abuse abstaining from wine, “civil” fasts related to the management of the food
supply [“as the Lenton fast is now kept in England”], and a non-meritorious religious fast
connected with fervent prayer) and false (e.g. the “hereticall fast” of the Manichaeans and
Tatians that condemns certain foods as inherently evil, and the “superstitious abstinence
of the Papists”). While in this enumeration distinguishing between the Manichaean and
papist views, in a later argument within the same Controversy Willet links the two, as
both maintaining “the doctrine of Devils.” Bellarmine, he notes, had read Romans 14 as
refuting such heretics as the Manichaeans, Tatians, and Encratites. But Willet extends
this condemnation to include Bellarmine’s own tradition, even claiming that Paul is
prophetically speaking about them directly:
The Apostle onely noteth not those heretickes, but even the Papists, which should
forbid meates, for he prophecieth of the latter times: and not onely they which
simply condemne meates, but doe place an holines in merite in some mea[t]es,
rather then others, are these forbidders of meates: and how doe not they condemne
meates, which thinke men to be polluted by them, and doe rather chuse to them
away, then to eate them upon forbidden daies?81
Reformed). Despite few such accusations in the Romans hexapla, Willet did charge the Roman church in
Tetrastylon Papismi with Apollinarianism (for arguing that Christ did not suffer in his soul), Arianism (for
worshiping bread and wine, which are created substances), Nestorianism (for putting one Christ in heaven
and another in the eucharistic elements), and Eutychianism (for transforming Christ’s human nature into
bread and wine, which is worse even than to lose it in Christ’s divine nature): (Willet, Tetrastylon Papismi,
94, 96, 102-104; 103, 110, 113). Cf. also the Christological errors that Willet addressed in Synopsis
Papismi (summarized in I.3.1, n. 127).
80

Some of Willet’s frequent arguments against the Socinians in the Romans hexapla can be found
on pp. 26, 44, 92, 189-191, 231, 248, 268-271, 353, 434, 447-450, 679, and 707. On the Socinian threat in
this period, see H. John McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1951).
81

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 659.
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Despite the different stated aims of each fast, forbidding meat consumption on certain
days while making the observation of that fast worthy of merit is no better in Willet’s
judgment than insulting the Creator as the Manichaeans did in supposing an inherent evil
within elements of God’s creation.
In chapter four we saw how issues of causality and evil factored into PostReformation polemics, with Roman Catholics arguing that Protestant theology ultimately
made God the author of sin.82 Given this emphasis of the Roman offensive, it is not
surprising that Roman Catholics also made use of the Manichaean heresy against
Protestants.83 Willet in Tetrastylon Papismi summarizes Bellarmine’s comparison: the
Manichaeans attributed the genesis of sin to an evil god; Protestants, then, are even
worse, since they make God himself the origin of sin and evil.84 Willet counters this
charge by explaining that the Reformed do not deny that the human will is the cause of
sin and that it freely chooses evil without any compulsion—it is toward the good only
that the will is not free. Protestant accounts of the bondage of the human will, then, in no
way insinuate that God is responsible for their sin. A second parallel proposed by
Bellarmine—that Protestants, like the Manichaeans, condemn the Old Testament
patriarchs—Willet both repudiates (Protestants neither reject the Old Testament
scriptures like the Manichaeans, nor consider the patriarchs to be “wicked men, though
82

See section IV.3.3.

83

Cf. Kam-lun Edwin Lee’s argument that Augustine’s doctrine of predestination retained
essential vestiges of his earlier Manichaean predilections, which—by extension—would imply that
Protestant reliance on Augustine also ushered in Manichaean influences into Protestant soteriology (Kamlun Edwin Lee, “Augustine, Manichaeism and the Good” [PhD diss., St. Paul University, Ottawa, ON,
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we excuse not all their infirmities…we maintaine & defend the holy scriptures, and not
the sinnes of men”) and turns around into a criticism of the Roman Catholic conception
of the limbus patrum: “howsoever they magnifie their holy & vertuous lives, yet allow
them no place in heaven till the comming of Christ, but thrust them downe into a place of
darkenes, which they affirme to be a part and member of hell.”85 The patriarchs are
dishonored, Willet argues, not by forthrightly acknowledging the sinful portion of their
human nature, but by lodging them in a hellish halfway house until the Second Coming.

2.3 Novatianism and Donatism
Protestant and Roman Catholic polemicists similarly exchanged accusations of
Novatianism and Donatism, two early church heresies that limited the grace extended to
lapsed believers who committed sins after the forgiveness of baptism. This charge tended
to stem from differing perspectives on the Catholic sacrament of penance: while
Protestants took the Roman Catholic requirement of penance as a limitation of the
efficacy of baptism, Catholics interpreted the Protestant denial of penance as a restriction
on post-baptismal means of grace. Bellarmine had likened Protestant teachings to each of
these heresies: the rejection of penance, in Novatian fashion, limited the church’s
forgiveness of sin, while narrowing the church to include only the elect was reminiscent
of the Donatist rigorism in excluding from the church all who fell short of sainthood.86
Willet responds to Bellarmine’s arguments by distinguishing between key elements of
Novatian and Protestant understandings of forgiveness and by challenging Bellarmine’s
85
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definition of Donatism. In rejecting the sacrament of penance, Protestants in no way deny
post-baptismal forgiveness to repentant sinners, for whom it is “never too late [to repent
and return to God]…while they live here upon earth.” As with Bellarmine’s Pelagian
charges, here again Willet casts his orthodoxy lot with Augustine, writing that if
affirming only two sacraments makes one a heretic, “let Augustine beare us companie.”
He also in his defense countercharges Roman Catholics of Novatianism (“yourselves and
not we are the Novatians of this time”), citing the thirteenth-century Pope Alexander IV’s
ill treatment of repentant heretics.87 In response to the charge of Donatism, Willet draws
on the distinction between the visible and invisible church, explaining that Protestants
acknowledge (unlike the Donatists) that the visible church is composed of a mix of wheat
and chaff, and that it is fully orthodox (as confessed even in Roman Catholic dogma) to
hold that “the holy invisible Catholike Church” is made up only of the elect.88
Paul’s reference in Romans 3:25 to God’s forgiveness of “sinnes which were past
before” occasions a similar reference to the Novatian heresy in the Romans hexapla. The
Novatians, Willet relays, had read this verse to mean that God only forgives sins
committed prior to one’s calling and justification, while “denying all remedie unto sinnes
committed afterward.” Willet rejects this reading on the basis both of its false
implications for the power of Christ’s death and from the example of David, who
committed his most egregious sins after his calling and was yet restored. He proceeds to
connect this error to the corresponding Roman Catholic error: “Catharinus with other
Romanists, understand likewise sinnes going before justification and baptisme: the rest
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that follow after, they say must be purged by other meanes, as by repentance and
satisfaction.” While not making post-baptismal sins unforgiveable like the Novatians, the
Roman distinction between pre- and post-conversion sins, with the introduction of new
means of forgiveness based on merit, suffices to link the two interpretations with the
phrase “understand likewise.” When Willet comes around to presenting his own favored
interpretation, his explanation does not limit, but expands, the power and extent of
Christ’s forgiveness. By “sinnes that are past,” Paul means “not the sinnes going before
baptisme, or justification, but the sinnes committed under the old Testament, to shew that
there was no remission of sinnes from the beginning of the world, but by faith in Christ.”
Not only is Christ’s forgiveness effective for sins committing after one’s justification, but
it extends backwards, too, to the world’s beginning.89

2.4 Atheism and Pagan Idolatry
Not every accusation of emulating notorious errors exchanged between
Protestants and Roman Catholics concerned heterodox Christian doctrine, as each also
leveled charges of reproducing the false ideologies of atheists and pagans. Matthew
Kellison’s arguments in his 1603 anti-Protestant appeal to King James are representative
of Roman Catholic use of this reasoning. The future leader of the college at Douai wrote
that “the new religion” of the Protestants represented a form of atheism more sinister than
the outright disavowal of God’s existence: these heretics dangerously positioned politics
ahead of religion, denied the real presence of Christ in the sacrament in a way that could
lead to questioning God’s existence altogether, taught a doctrine of predestination that
89
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made God the author of evil, and promoted doctrinal doubt90 by rejecting the church’s
supreme authority to settle disputes.91 The very same year, Andrew Willet ridiculed
Richard Broughton’s claim to have confuted atheism, seeing that Papism itself inclined
toward godlessness, as evidenced by several popes who had made deals with the devil
and who had proven themselves to be “plaine Atheists.”92
More frequently Willet associates papist practices with pagan idolatry.93 In An
Antilogie, he suggests even that pagan rituals provide the very marrow of the Roman
Catholic faith: “Concerning Heathenish paganisme, if Papists borrowed not much of their
stuffe from thence, their religion would be left very beggerly and naked.” He proceeds to
defend this assertion by referencing their use of relics and images, the superstitious
attitude toward certain days and seasons, and their understanding of the priesthood.94
Several passages in Romans also prod Willet to make this comparison; the history of
Rome itself, as a center of pagan learning in the ancient world, inspires such an
90
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association: faithful pastors who preach the true gospel “shall beare downe the
superstitious idolatrie of the new Romanists, as the Apostles did the heathenish idolatrie
of the old Romanists.”95 These new Romanists seem to have adapted many of their
customs from their heathen predecessors. Willet relays Haymo’s suggestion that the Latin
words hostia and victima have their origins in the language of pagan sacrifice—the first
referring to an offering made before fighting an enemy (hostis) and the second a sacrifice
offered after a victory (victoria).96 Whereas Paul instructs those who observe days to do
so “to the Lord” (Romans 14:6), the Romanists assign days to their saints: “Christians are
not to imitate Pagans in the rites of religion: but, in dedicating daies unto Saints, they
imitate the Pagans apparently.” They dedicate these days not merely to honor the memory
of these saints, but “to their worship, which is idolatrie,” and in so doing essentially
mimic the former feasts to the pagan deities, “changing only the names.”97
Not only do the papists dedicate days to the saints, but these “pseudo-Christians”
also make images of the saints and “doe conforme themselves to the Gentiles, by whom
imagerie was brought in.”98 The pagans had deluded themselves in thinking that “they did
not worship the image or idol, but the thing represented thereby,” and their use of images
in worship went beyond even the command not to worship creatures, since creatures are
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God’s handiwork, while images are “the work of mans hands.”99 These are the very
practices that Paul condemns in Romans 1. And yet, just as the first century pagans
bowed their knee to Baal (Romans 11:4) and made idols their Lords, “so the superstitious
Papists at this day, doe make the Saints and their images, their Lords and patrons.”100 In
this regard, Roman Catholic worship was even more corrupted than that of “the Turkes
[Muslims] and Jewes,” who knew enough to avoid worshiping images.101 The idolatrous
reverence for deceased saints, moreover, violates not only principles of worship, but the
moral duties to one’s neighbor, as well. Drawing on Pareus’s insight into Romans 12:13
(“Communicating to the necessities of the Saints: following hospitalitie”), Willet remarks
that “here we learne what the dutie is, which we should performe unto the Saints: not in
carving and painting their images, when they are dead, but in succouring their necessities
while they live.” The Roman Catholic attempt to honor God and the saints through the
use of images thus backfires doubly—for God is dishonored by the practice, nor does it
aid in any way the living saints whom Christians are actually obligated to serve.102 Willet
adds here that “hospitalitie was even commended among the heathen…[and so] much
more should it be practised among Christians.” This accentuates his criticism of the
Roman Catholic conception of honoring the saints—as though to say, “Not only do the
Papists imitate the heathen worship of images of the deceased, but in doing this they
neglect to show to the living the hospitality that was expected even of the heathen.”

99

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 69 (commenting on 1:21) and 91 (commenting on 1:9 and tying
in Matthew 4:10).
100

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 491.

101

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 95-96.

102

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 555.

306

3. Roman Catholics and Biblical Villains
3.1 The Pope as Antichrist
The identification of the pope as Antichrist had become a commonplace among
the Reformed well before the turn of the seventeenth century. Popes were accused of
being Antichrist already in the medieval period, though mostly by those whom the
papacy had condemned as heretics.103 While some used the appellation “just as a term of
abuse to be hurled at anybody one disliked,” it was commonly understood that Antichrist
was to be “a holder of political power, who persecutes God’s people.”104 With the
Reformation, the notion of the pope (and the institution of the papacy more broadly) as
Antichrist was legitimated by the connection to established, state churches, so that the
doctrine, “hitherto mostly associated with disreputable lower-class heretics, acquired a
new respectability.” All of the leading Reformers concurred on the issue, whether
Lutheran, Reformed, or radical.105 In England, the work of Bucer and Foxe ensured that
the doctrine had “a theoretical respectability” by the time of Elizabeth, and by the later
sixteenth century simply questioning the association could lead one to be labeled a
crypto-papist.106 King James himself, as early as 1588, identified the pope as Antichrist
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based on the papal claim to be able to depose kings.107 While the doctrine was held by
Puritans and non-Puritans alike,108 Milton notes that it was particularly important for the
former, who believed that “a heightened sense of the threat from the papal Antichrist was
held to be one of the signs of election.”109
Despite a flurry of publications between the 1590s and 1620s (the decades in
which Willet flourished) that dealt specifically with the pope’s identity as Antichrist,110
the certainty of this thesis was beginning to be challenged. In 1599 John Overall
suggested that Mohammad fit the description as well, so that he either alone or in
combination with the pope could be Antichrist.111 A few years after Willet’s death,
Richard Montagu—emphasizing the great obscurity of biblical texts referring to
Antichrist—issued the “first clear assault on the consensus in print,” and by the Laudian
period the earlier orthodoxy was generally rejected.112 Since the high point in the early
Stuart period, both the linking of the pope with Antichrist and the general concern with
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Antichrist have waned; as Christopher Hill puts it, “his stock has slumped since the
seventeenth century.”113
Willet was thus writing in a climate where the anti-papal emphasis of his corpus
of work fit neatly with a Protestant consensus that the pope was the Antichrist warned of
in Scripture. In Synopsis Papismi Willet devotes over thirty pages to issues concerning
Antichrist, placing the discussion within “the fourth controversie, concerning the Bishop
of Rome.”114 Willet subdivides the overarching question of “whether the Pope be that
great adversarie unto Christ” into several issues, including the time of his coming, his
name and signs of his identity, the seat of his power, the doctrine he will teach, the
supposed miracles he will perform, and the wars and strife that he will instigate.115
Antichrist, Willet asserts, is not one individual (hence the general avoidance of a singular
definite article), “as the Papists imagine, that the Popes might be disburdened and
discharged of this name,” but rather designates “a whole bodie, tyrannie, or kingdome”—
that is, the entire office of the papacy, together with the individual popes.116 The number
of the beast, 666, not only corresponds to the Graecicized spelling of Latinus and the
word “Rome” spelled in Hebrew, but reveals also “the time of Antichrist’s birth, namely,
the yeere 666…about which yeere Pope Vitilianus composed the Latine Service, and
113

Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England, 1. Hill notes further that, whereas related
expressions such as “anti-Christian” when used in the modern period generally mean simply “hostile to
Christianity,” in the seventeenth century they would more naturally have been read to mean “pertaining to
Antichrist,” (pp. 1-2).
114

This section remained substantially the same through all of the editions of the Synopsis, so that
it made up a decreasing proportion of the total work as the book expanded. By the 1613, 1614 and 1634
printings (pp. 222-256) this section comprised less than 3% of the total, while in the 1592 first edition (pp.
155-189) it made up nearly 6% of the total argument.
115
116

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 222.

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 222-223; Andrew Willet, Hexapla in Danielem: that is, A SixFold Commentarie upon the most divine prophesie of Daniel (Cambridge: Cantrell Legge, 1610), 440.

309

enjoyned all nations to use no other.”117 While Roman Catholics had argued that
Antichrist would stand in open rebellion against Christ, Willet counters that—like all
heretics—Antichrist will rather oppose Christ covertly, and “under pretence of religion
take away all religion.” As with Judas, after all, “he is a greater enemie that pretendeth
friendship.”118 Before concluding with a litany of scriptural “proofs”119 drawn primarily
from Daniel 11 (which properly describes Antiochus Epiphanes, but also functions as a
“type and figure” of Antichrist), the Ten Commandments, 2 Thessalonians 2, and various
passages from Revelation (where Antichrist is given such names as “beast” and “the great
whore”120), Willet sums up what he deems to be an irrefutable conclusion:
That the Pope of Rome is very Antichrist, and that al the qualities and properties
which the Scripture describeth Antichrist by, do fitly agree unto his person: and
that we are not therefore to expect and looke for any other Antichrist: thus by
testimonie of Scripture, and sufficient reasons deduced of the same, we trust it
shall appeare to all men.121
In the Daniel hexapla, the entire Controversies section of chapter 11 is devoted to
Antichrist (who is prefigured by the “vile person” of 11:21ff), with Willet reiterating
many of his arguments from the Synopsis, but with a more extended comparison between

117

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 231. Elsewhere Willet points to a time a thousand years after
Christ as the period when the Pope was revealed as Antichrist, suggesting a progressive fall into and
revealing of this identity. Cf. Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 247; Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 605.
118

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 239. Cf. Willet’s own assessment of Roman Catholics in
England—that the “crypto-papists” or “church papists” were far more pernicious than the open recusants.
Cf. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 44; Anthony Milton, “A Qualified Intolerance: the Limits and
Ambiguities of Early Stuart Anti-Catholicism,” in Catholicism and Anti-Catholicism in Early Modern
English Texts, ed. Arthur E. Marotti (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 105; Tutino, Law and
Conscience, 99. See also Walsham, Church Papists.
119

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 247-252.

120

On Willet designating Antichrist as “the great whore,” see Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613),
252; Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 608; Dolan, Whores of Babylon, 53-54.
121

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 247.

310

Antichrist and Antiochus Epiphanes.122
The basis of the identification of the pope and his office with Antichrist tends to
be for Willet more doctrinal than political—the pope takes upon himself Christ’s role of
dealing with people’s sins, purporting to do this through invented doctrines, duties, and
rituals.123 Willet does, however (like James), further identify Antichrist by his lust for
temporal power. The Roman Antichrist in his insatiable pride exalts himself above
angels, emperors, and magistrates;124 he “challengeth both swords” (i.e. both spiritual and
material);125 and he “usurpeth upon the nations and kingdomes of the world without any
title.”126 Indeed, this is the identifying mark of the Antichrist that Willet focuses on in the
Romans hexapla. Antichrist is only named such in the Johannine epistles, so discovering
him in other biblical books requires associating him with other titles, as the “beast” and
“whore” of Revelation, the “vile person” of Daniel, and the “man of lawlessness” of 2
Thessalonians. Romans contains none of these figures, so Willet introduces Antichrist
through the political window of chapter 13. The first three controversies in chapter 13,
spanning eight pages, have to do with the pope, and in the second of those controversies
—concerning whether the pope has a spiritual power over kings—Willet employs Paul’s
teaching on civil power to show how the papacy’s temporal ambitions reveal its identity
122
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as Antichrist:
the Pope beganne to discover himselfe to be Antichrist, in so abasing the Imperial
power, and taking upon him to dispose of kingdome; as the Devill challenged to
be Lord of the world, and to give the kingdomes thereof to whom he would: no
better right hath the Pope the eldest sonne of Sathan to pull downe, and set up
kings.127
By way of Satan’s ploy to tempt Jesus with political kingdoms in Matthew 4, Paul’s
warning that “whosoever…setteth himselfe against the power, resisteth the ordinance of
God” becomes not a mere violation of the Law, but a defining characteristic of Satan’s
firstborn, the very Antichrist prophesied of in Scripture.
We can compare Willet’s argument here with a similar argument presented by
Thomas Wilson, who also reads the papal Antichrist into Romans 13, though in a slightly
different manner. Wilson condemns the pope’s setting of his own power above the
secular powers (“under this pretext, that the soule is better then the body”) in strong terms
(“manifest and grosse wickednesse”),128 but the characteristic that he presents here that
reveals the pope as Antichrist is his presumption to command things that people are
bound by conscience to obey:
These things serve to discover the intollerable pride of that man of sinne, the Pope
of Rome, challenging to himselfe that which is peculiar unto God, even a
Soveraigne rule over the conscience, which hee will have as much obliged unto
his Ecclesiasticall Lawes, as unto Gods morall Precepts…But what is this, but to
fulfill the prophesie of Antichrist by Saint Paul, 2 Thes.2,2. to sit in the Temple of
God, as God? ... For the Conscience is Gods Temple, and subject unto none but to
God…129
While all three connect Romans 13 to the pope’s identity as Antichrist, Willet’s particular
reasoning here is closer to King James’s than to Wilson’s; whereas Wilson’s criteria is
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rooted in the pope’s exalting himself as a new Lawgiver who attempts to internally hijack
the conscience, James and Willet each emphasize the external political aims of the
papacy in presuming a hierarchical supremacy over secular rulers, thus assuming for
himself God’s role as the Kingmaker who can ordain and depose political rulers.
Other references to Antichrist in the Romans hexapla are less a matter of Paul’s
words in the epistle revealing the papal identity of Christ’s archenemy than of the pope’s
pre-established identity as such highlighting the meaning of Paul’s message. Discussing
why the gospel was “kept secret” for so long (Romans 16:25), Willet attributes the timing
to the mystery of God’s will, but adds that the true gospel was subsequently re-hidden “so
many yeares under the kingdome of Antichrist” as a punishment for the people’s
ingratitude.130 In this likening of the pre-Reformation darkness to that which preceded
Christ’s first advent, the papal Antichrist takes on the instrumental role of God’s scourge
to punish his people, putting him in continuity with similar such figures from throughout
God’s history with his people. Elsewhere the pope’s Antichristian demeanor offers a
counterpoint to the positive message in Romans. Commenting on Paul’s reference to the
beauty of the feet of those who bring the gospel (10:15, where Paul quotes from Isaiah
52:7), Willet notes that this “maketh nothing at all to countenance the pride of the
Romane Antichrist, who hath offered his feet to be kissed of Kings and Emperours.”
Besides this overly literal reading of a figure that the Apostle uses to depict the reverence
due to preachers, Willet argues, the pope neither preaches the gospel nor uses his feet to
spread what message he has; while the apostles walked from place to place spreading the
gospel (making the beautiful feet a fitting figure), popes and cardinals “ride in state on
their trapped horses” and do not preach, but rather suppress the gospel and persecute its
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professors.131 In both of these cases, the text of Romans does not aid in discerning
Antichrist’s identity, but is illuminated in some way by the assumption that the pope is
Antichrist.

3.2 “Popish Jesuites, or Judasites Rather”
Willet was particularly fond of referring to Jesuits—whom he deemed unworthy
of bearing the name of Jesus—as “Judasites.”132 This epithet made its way into several of
his earlier works,133 and appears multiple times in the later chapters of the Romans
hexapla. The initial connection in the Romans hexapla comes in the context of verse
15:16, where Paul refers to his own ministering (ἱερουργοῦντα—“priestly service”) of the
gospel and the offering (προσφορὰ) of the Gentiles. Noting that several leading
Reformers had “fitly” applied these words against the Roman Catholic Mass, Willet
explains that the “offering” Paul writes of is the spiritual sacrifice of the Gentiles’
obedience, so that the sacrifice offered by the “Popish Priests is farre unlike” that of the
Apostle. As Pareus had argued, Paul “offereth up the Gentiles, but they presume to offer
up Christ in sacrifice: so they are not ministri Christi, sed mactatores, not the Ministers
of Christ, but the manslayers, not the imitators of Paul, but of Judas rather, that delivered
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up Christ to be slaine.”134 This connection feeds into his use of the “Judasite” epithet-pun
on the following page.
In verse 15:20 Paul explains his general practice of preaching where Christ had
previously been unknown, so as to avoid building on another’s foundation. The
Controversy inspired by this comment naturally concerns the Jesuits and their
characteristic missionary work—or, as Willet terms it, “the idle boastings, and vaine
glorious excursions of the Jesuites.” Claiming to apply the Apostle’s approach to
missions, “the Popish Jesuites (or rather Judasites) doe boast of their conversion of the
Indians, and preaching unto people that never heard before of Christ.” Jesuit missions,
however, differ from Paul’s evangelization efforts in four significant ways: Paul was an
Apostle and they are not; Paul was sent by Christ and the Jesuits “from Antichrist”; Paul
preached gospel truth while they spread their own superstitious doctrine; and Paul
converted nations and made the people God’s servants, but the Jesuits make their
converts “the children of hell more then before.” Hence, in Willet’s judgment the name
“Judasite” is more appropriate.135
The alternate designation appears twice again in the following chapter, both in
reference to verse 16:18. In the Questions section, Willet explains that the Jesuits meet all
of the criteria that Paul has set forth for those false teachers who “deceive the hearts of
the simple.” As he had in his demonstration that the pope was Antichrist, here again
Willet assumes that only an irrational bias could keep one from seeing the situation his
way and making the connection:
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Let any indifferent man judge, if all these notes and markes of false teachers and
seducers doe not adhere and cleave as fast as pitch unto the seducing Popish
Jesuites, or Judasites rather…They pretend the name of Jesus, and call themselves
by his name, yet their doctrine and practice showeth, that they are not the servants
of Jesus.136
Then, in a Controversy drawn from this verse, Willet focuses on one of the marks that
Paul gives to describe the deceivers: they “serve their owne bellie.” Pointing out that the
Rhemists had used this phrase against the Protestants,137 Willet returns the accusation,
claiming that it is “as cleare as the Sunne” that is condemns them instead. Willet’s
evidence of the Jesuits’ greed, punctuated by connecting them to the villain who betrayed
Jesus for money and who had embezzled from the disciples’ funds, is the extravagant
budget of the Jesuit College in La Flèche, France:
Let that factious crue of those makebates [creators of discord], the trayterous
Judasites rather then Jesuites speak, who in few yeares at la-flesh in Fraunce,
beside the sumptuous building of their Colledge, which cost an 100.thousand
crownes, bestowed as much in their revenue: a reasonable proportion to keepe a
fat table, and to fill their bellies.138
Given Paul’s description of these false teachers as divisive and heretical (16:17) and
gluttonous (verse 18), Willet’s reference to the Jesuits as “Judasites” here serves to
reinforce his depiction of this order as contentious lovers of money who are among those
whom Paul warns the faithful to avoid.
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4. Willet, Roman Catholics, and Judaism
Willet in his life and work was deeply concerned about and engaged with Judaism
and the Jewish people. Williamson calls him one of early seventeenth-century England’s
“leading philo-Semites.”139 While quite proficient in Greek, Willet’s linguistic expertise
was in Hebrew, and the majority of his exegetical work dealt with the Hebrew scriptures.
His second published work was a 1590 treatise on the calling of the Jews, in which he
expressed his hope and expectation that a majority of Jews would ultimately be converted
to the Christian faith, while denying that the promised restoration of the Jewish people
concerned a renewed Jewish political kingdom.140
Mark Vessey states incorrectly that Willet was in favor of the creation of a
restored Jewish nation in Israel-Palestine: “In 1590, Andrew Willet, one of the most
respected and prolific theologians in Elizabethan England, became the first writer to
propose the Restoration and establishment of a Jewish kingdom in Palestine—for which
heretical view he was jailed and his book burned by the public hangman.”141 For the first
assertion Vessey cites De Universali Iudaeorum Vocatione, likely confusing for his own
position an argument that Willet is refuting, or perhaps confusing Willet’s position with
that of Thomas Draxe. Vessey provides no documentation for the latter claim of
imprisonment and book-burning, though it is plausible that he is conflating a misreading
of the 1590 work with Willet’s brief 1618 house arrest for his opposition to the Spanish
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Match, and perhaps also (given David Pareus’s influence on Willet) with the burning of
Pareus’s work.142 Willet’s position is quite the opposite of how Vessey presents it;
indeed, as Franz Kobler notes, Willet in the same work denounces Francis Kett and
Solomon Molcho for “indulg[ing] in the heresy of the belief in the return of the Israelites
too much.”143
Willet’s later commentaries continued to emphasize that the hope of the Jewish
people was not for a physical, earthly kingdom, but was rather the same Christ-centered
hope of eternal salvation that Gentile Christians enjoyed.144 Willet’s expectation of the
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conversion of a majority of Jews to Christ found expression in his personal life, as well,
as we see in a curious account that Peter Smith relays as an example of Willet’s famous
and sometimes-exploited hospitality. Smith tells of “a certain Jew” from Venice who
came through Barley en route to Cambridge, whom Dr. Willet invited into his home.145
The two discussed Scripture for about a month, and Willet found the young man’s
company “verie delightfull” and hoped to “bee able to help forward that good worke” of
the calling and conversion of the Jews. Through Willet’s “enucleating the prophecies
concerning Christ,” the man claimed that his blindness was removed and confessed his
faith in Christ. Before he could be baptized, though, “our Jew vanished, and was run
away; nor did he ever returne to give thanks for all the courtesies received from our
reverend Doctor.” While Willet was undoubtedly hurt and disappointed by this betrayal,
his own explanation for the man’s absconding was likely more charitable (and less
bigoted) than that of Smith, who lamented: “But such is the obstinacie of that Nation, and
such their perfidious disposition and dissimulation.”146 Smith follows this story with a
similar account of “another hypocriticall Impostor,” a Roman Catholic who feigned
conversion to Protestantism while taking advantage of Willet’s generous hospitality, only
to disappear right before he was to take his first Protestant communion.147
Smith’s parallel accounts of Willet’s encounters with the Venetian Jew and the
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Roman Catholic fit a pattern of association between Jews and papists that was common in
Protestant literature in this period.148 And, indeed, Willet himself frequently links the two
groups. In his anti-papist polemic in the Romans hexapla, Jews serve two primary, related
functions: as with the heretics condemned by the early church, the Jewish practices that
are criticized in Scripture function as a point of association for denouncing modern
Roman Catholic practices; and further, since the present-day papists are doing things that
brought condemnation upon the ancestors of their Jewish peers, these behaviors are
inhibiting their conversion.
The core similarity that Willet identifies between Jews and papists is their
common superstitious adherence to food prohibitions and the celebration of special days.
In the first century this superstitious behavior was pardonable as a “weakness,” as Paul
calls it in Romans 15, but over time it had become hardened into a pernicious obstinacy.
Resolving the tension between Paul’s instruction in Romans 15:2 that one should “please
his neighbour” and his teaching elsewhere (as Galatians 1:10) that we should not seek to
please humans, Willet points out Paul’s emphasis in Romans that this should be done
only when it is edifying to the neighbor; but over-accommodating another’s weakness to
the point that it becomes in them an ingrained habit is not edifying: “if their infirmitie
148
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degenerate into stubbornenes, we must support them no longer: as the Jewes or Papists,
are not now to be counted weake, and to be borne with in their superstitious observation
of meates and dayes, for now they erre of obstinacie, not of infirmitie.”149 Willet makes
similar comparisons in the context of Romans 14. In a doctrine drawn from Paul’s
teaching in 14:14 that nothing is “uncleane in it selfe,” Willet refers to Roman Catholic
religious food prohibitions as “superstitious, and inclining to Judaisme.”150 Then, in the
first controversy of the chapter (in which he also likens the Romanists to the
Manichaeans), Willet compares the various rules of the “false and Antichristian Church”
to the “superstitious decrees of the Pharisies” of which Christ and the Apostles
disapproved. He goes on to connect these superstitious customs to the larger issue of
freedom in Christ: “that which infringeth Christian libertie, and bringeth us to more
then151 a Jewish bondage, it is no part of Gods worship under the new Testament, but
such is this canonicall abstinence.”152 The superstitious observance of false and legalistic
rituals was not merely unenlightened or unedifying, but put Christian liberty itself in
peril.
Elsewhere Willet likens the succession of bishops to the succession of high
priests, commenting that the merely external continuity of such a succession, without the
continuation of true doctrine, does not prove its legitimacy.153 And at times the
149

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 674. He credits Pareus with this observation.

150

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 657.

151

The Roman Catholic infringement on Christian liberty goes beyond Jewish bondage, Willet
asserts, because while the Jews fasted once a year, the papists required it twice a week, plus during Lent.
152
153

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 658-659.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 433 (commenting on Romans 9:5). Not dissimilar was
Luther’s labeling of the papacy as “Jewish” because of its emphasis on external uniformity, which he
judged to be akin to the external political kingdom that the Jews expected from their messiah (Gritsch,

321

connection serves more as a mild pejorative, as when he refers to the Roman Catholic
“synagogue.”154 Regarding idolatry, Willet has a much harsher condemnation of the
papists than of the Jews, with modern-day Jews culpable primarily of guilt by association
with Roman Catholics. The Jews themselves, though having been periodically guilty of it
in ages past, tended to avoid idolatry. Willet articulates this against the theory of the early
third-century Latin father Hippolytus that “the Jewes at the first shall be most addicted to
Antichrist.”155 This notion Willet judges to be among “humane fansies” concerning the
Jews and the latter days, and he dismisses the theory because it is “unlike that the Jewes,
which are no idolaters to this day should cleave unto Antichrist, that shall bee, and now is
a manifest idolater.”156 The current connection that Jews had to idolatry was, rather,
through their use of secondhand Roman Catholic instruments that were tainted by their
idolatrous use by the papists. Willet draws this rather remarkable association when
explaining what was the “sacriledge” that the Jews were guilty of in Romans 2:22.
Having denied that this sacrilege was overt idolatry, since—again—the Jews after
returning from captivity generally avoided this particular error (“excepting some in the
time of the Macchabees, who for feare were compelled to worship idols”), Willet
concludes that the sacrilege referred instead to a kind of “covetousnes,” in which the
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Jews used implements of idolatrous origin that should have been destroyed, “as the
manner of the Jewes is at this day, to buy chalices and other implements, which are stolne
out of the idolatrous Church of the Romanists: this is called sacriledge, because such
things were dedicate to idolatry, no man was to convers to his owne use.”157 Notice that
the guilt of the Jews in this account is not for stealing or receiving items from a Christian
church (which was a common anti-Semitic claim, often made in conjunction with
accusations of desecrating the host),158 but rather for using items that bore the taint of
papist idolatry.159
Because of their engagement in practices that are plainly prohibited in the Old
Testament, Roman Catholics sully the name of Christianity (which name they falsely
assume), and impede the conversion of the Jews.160 As a moral observation drawn from
Paul’s words in Romans 11:28 that the Jews are beloved for the sake of the fathers,
Willet (following Beza) teaches that Christians ought to pray for their conversion, and
neither despise them, nor “by our superstitious usages, and corrupt manners to hinder
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their calling, for the which the Papists, and carnall professors have much to answer to
God.”161 Since the Jews trace their lineage back to the Old Testament fathers, Christians
should hope for and labor toward their conversion to Christ, avoiding attitudes of antiSemitism or neglect, while taking care not to repel them by setting a negative example.
Concerning the other side of the Romans 11:28 antinomy—that the Jews are “enemies for
your sake” in relation to the Gospel—Willet positively cites Tolet’s emphasis on their
being enemies for the sake of the Gentiles: “that you might be called, not otherwise.”162
This argues against anti-Semitism all the more, especially when Willet reads the
“enemies” and the “beloved” as diverse subjects among the Jews—“they are enemies in
respect of those which beleeve not, and beloved, that is, such as in time to come shall be
converted to the faith again.”163
We find a more extended depiction of this hindrance in a Controversy based on
Romans 10:21, by way of a fourth-hand interpretation of Paul’s source text. Whereas
Paul applies the Prophet’s reference to “a rebellious people” in Isaiah 65:2 to Israel,
Willet relays that Vermigli, drawing from [Sebastian] Münster, tells how “a certaine
Rabbin among the Jewes” had applied the appellation to Gentiles who professed to be
Christians while participating in pagan rituals—by which, Willet clarifies, “he meaneth
the Papists, which have their altars, whereon they sacrifice, and doe visit the sepulchres
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of the dead, and worship their reliques.” Though Willet rejects this certain rabbi’s
application of Isaiah’s words to Gentiles, since the context of God continually reaching
out to this group clearly indicates that this particular obstinacy belongs to the Jews, he
takes this false interpretation as evidence against the damaging Roman Catholic witness:
It may be a shame unto those, which call themselves Christians to give such
offence to the Jewes, as to pollute themselves with those things, which the
Prophet directly enveigheth against: when shall we look to have the Jewes
converted to the Christian faith, when they find idolatrie, and other superstitions
practised among Christians, for the which their forefathers were punished.164
The papists’ emulation of certain Jewish errors was, Willet argued, in one sense more
harmful than their revival of various ancient heresies, because this association had an
injurious effect on present-day Jews. By committing the same sins that the Jews knew
from their own history would incite God’s wrath, the papists obstructed the process of
Jewish conversion—the great event that Paul longs for in Romans, and which was a
concern of Willet’s through his entire ministry.

5. Conclusion
Throughout the Romans hexapla, the association between Roman Catholic
doctrines and ancient heresies serves Willet as a hermeneutical guide for interpreting
Paul’s message, even as the sometimes tenuous string connecting text, heresy, and papist
practice allows Willet to use his exegesis polemically against the Roman Catholic enemy.
The project of implicating an ideological foe in notorious heresies—a method common to
each side of the Reformation divide—was intended to bolster the claim that the
opposition was misappropriating a biblical text, and controversialists pointed both to the
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qualitative strength of the established connection and the quantitative accumulation of
distinct heresies.
Given the centrality of the doctrines of justification and election both to the
Protestant/Roman Catholic rift and to the scope of the epistle to the Romans itself, the
Pelagian heresy predominates in Willet’s arguments. Willet maintains that Rome’s
system of merits and the emphasis of many Romanists on the positive capabilities of
human free will summon the specter of the old Pelagians, and he holds also that
Protestant charity and piety—far from being hindered by the emphasis on justification by
faith and the Reformed belief in utterly gracious predestination—greatly exceed Roman
Catholic morality. A variety of other heresies also prove useful, as we find Willet
attaching Roman Catholic canonical errors to the Marcionites and Manichaeans (artfully
associating the papists also with various unrelated errors), and carefully connecting the
Roman church to the Novatian and Donatist heresies while (as we will see examples of in
the following chapter) hedging himself against a dogmatic and ecclesiastical rigorism that
could open the Protestants themselves up to charges of Donatism. Additionally, Willet
connects Roman Catholics to the errors of atheists, pagans, and Jews, and to the infamous
biblical figures of Antichrist and Judas. As exemplars pre-dating the patristic period,
these associations allow Willet to draw the authoritative condemnation from a higher
source than even esteemed Church Fathers, as he cites Jesus himself and apostolic
witnesses against Roman Catholic heterodoxy. Neither Judas nor Antichrist (or any of his
aliases) appear directly in the text of Romans, but Willet draws them into his exegesis by
way of Paul’s warnings against attributes and actions commonly associated with them—
lust for power, killing Jesus, teaching false doctrine, greed.
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Cumulatively, these many associations both focus the doctrines and uses that
Willet elicits from the text of Romans, and heighten the sense of danger posed by the
papists, now seen as the aggregate of the most despicable biblical figures and the hated
heretics who labored to derail the early Christian movement. In the next chapter, we will
shift our attention within Willet’s polemical use of tradition to his assertion that the
orthodox early church exegetes validate Protestant doctrine, and consider how this appeal
to tradition, together with the manifest internal divisions within the Roman Catholic
world, argued for the Protestant claim to catholicity.

CHAPTER VII.
CATHOLICITY AND THE POLEMICAL USE OF THE FATHERS
1. Introduction
The same year that King James came to the English throne, Willet penned his
Antilogie as a response to the 1601 Apologicall Epistle, an earlier anonymously published
polemical offering by the author of Protestant Proofes, Richard Broughton.1 As part of
his refutation, Willet objected to the author’s claim that the Church Fathers supported
Roman Catholic positions, noting that he had himself in his own works drawn enough
support from the Fathers to fill “not much lesse then two reames of paper,” and making
the double claim that Protestants taught the same faith as the Church Fathers and that
these early theologians had condemned positions currently held by the Roman church:
The same faith and religion which I defend, is taught and confirmed by those holy
Hebrewes and Greeke Scriptures; and in the more substantiall points, by those
Historians, Councels, Fathers that lived within 5. or 6. hundred yeares after
Christ; and in many points, by them that followed after: and the profession of
Papists by the same condemned.2
Having explored in the previous chapter the parallels between heresies the Church
Fathers condemned and Roman Catholic teachings, we will now consider Willet’s appeal
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to the broad consonance of the Fathers’ teachings with Reformed theology.3 Additionally,
we will look in this chapter at how Willet emphasizes the internal divisions among
Roman Catholics in an effort to discredit their claim of teaching an internally coherent
and consistent doctrine.
Protestant biblical commentators had to strike a delicate balance in their positive
appropriation of the exegetical tradition. On one hand, they aggressively opposed the
Roman Catholic equation of the authority of Scripture and Tradition, asserting the
absolute priority of Scripture (the sola scriptura principle). Yet, on the other hand, they
were compelled to demonstrate a continuity with the main doctrines affirmed by the
historical church, this being a critical move in proving the catholicity of Protestants as the
true manifestation of the visible church. To fortify internal evidence based on textual,
3

On the reception history of the Fathers in England, see Jean-Louis Quantin, The Church of
England and Christian Antiquity; various essays in Irena Backus, ed., The Reception of the Church Fathers
in the West, vol. 2, From the Carolingians to the Maurists; Irena Backus, “Calvin and the Greek Fathers,”
in Continuity and Change: the Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History: Essays Presented to
Heiko A. Oberman on his 70th Birthday, ed. Robert J. Bast and Andrew C. Gow (Leiden, Neth.: Brill,
2000), 253-276; Irena Backus, “The Early Church in the Renaissance and Reformation,” in Early
Christianity: Origins and Evolution to AD 600: in Honour of W. H. C. Frend, ed. Ian Hazlett (Nashville,
TN: Abingdon Press, 1991), 291-303; Robert Dodaro and Michael Questier, “Strategies in Jacobean
Polemic: The Use and Abuse of St Augustine in English Theological Controversy,” The Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 44, no. 3 (July 1993): 432-449; John K. Luoma, “Who Owns the Fathers? Hooker
and Cartwright on the Authority of the Primitive Church,” Sixteenth Century Journal 8, no. 3 (October
1977): 45-59; H. R. McAdoo, “The Appeal to Antiquity,” in The Spirit of Anglicanism: A Survey of
Anglican Theological Method in the Seventeenth Century (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1965), 316414; Thomas M. Parker, “The Rediscovery of the Fathers in the Seventeenth-Century Anglican Tradition,”
in The Rediscovery of Newman: An Oxford Symposium, ed. John Coulson and A. M. Allchin (London:
Sheed & Ward, 1967), 31-49; S. L. Greenslade, The English Reformers and the Fathers of the Church: An
Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 10 May 1960 (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1960); Henry Chadwick, “Tradition, Fathers and Councils,” in The Study of Anglicanism, ed.
Stephen Sykes and John Booty (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 91-104; D. W. Dockrill, “The Fathers
and the Theology of the Cambridge Platonists,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 17, pt. 1, ed. Elizabeth A.
Livingston (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 427-439.
On broader Protestant use of the Fathers, cf. also Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church
Fathers”; Johannes Van Oort, “John Calvin and the Church Fathers,” in Backus, The Reception of the
Church Fathers in the West, 661-700; Byung Soo Han, Symphonia Catholica: The Merger of Patristic and
Contemporary Sources in the Theological Method of Amandus Polanus (1561-1610) (Göttingen, Ger.:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015); John L. Thompson, “Reformer of Exegesis? Calvin’s Unpaid Debt to
Origen,” in Calvin—Saint or Sinner?, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Tübingen, Ger.: Mohr Siebeck, 2010),
113-141.
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translation, and grammatical arguments, rhetorical devices, and the proper identification
of distinctions in causality, the polemicist could—in addition to connecting opponents
with heresies long ago condemned—attempt to align his own reading with interpretations
by Church Fathers long accepted as authorities, in order to lay a stronger claim to the
orthodoxy and catholicity of his positions. In other words, while the orthodoxy of
Reformed doctrine and the catholicity of Protestantism were grounded entirely on their
agreement with scriptural teachings, demonstrating the additional agreement with the
broader church’s tradition was useful as an apologetic and polemical tool for validating
these claims.4
English Protestants in the early seventeenth century took a particular interest in
seeking to claim the patristic tradition as their own: “In the Jacobean period, the appeal to
the Fathers of the early church became increasingly widespread and intensive among
divines of varied doctrinal hue.”5 With criticism of the Church Fathers by an earlier
generation of polemicists (as William Fulke) occasionally backfiring against the
Protestant claim to antiquity and catholicity, early Stuart Protestants recognized to a
greater degree the value of appropriating this early tradition to bolster its own cause,
though with “a certain caution” and “varying degrees of enthusiasm.”6 Despite this
caution and the requisite care to distinguish between Scripture as the norm for theology
4

Cf. This distinction between the internal basis and external validation is similar to Willet’s
resolution of the apparent contradiction between the theology of justification presented by Paul and by
James, whereby Paul describes how we are justified before God and James explains how this justification is
demonstrated to other people. E.g. Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 188, 201, 239-240.
5

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 273. Cf. Muller, After Calvin, 52-53. Quantin relays the
impression in seventeenth-century France that the Church of England had greater regard for the Fathers
than did continental Protestants; in practice, however, he notes that each side of the channel treated the
Fathers similarly (Jean-Louis Quantin, “The Fathers in Seventeenth Century Anglican Theology,” in
Backus, The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West, 987, 990).
6

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 273-274. Milton adds that stricter Calvinists tended to be among
the more hesitant to appeal to tradition, even that of the early Church Fathers.
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and tradition as a subordinate authority, the Protestant orthodox acknowledged the
importance of the Church Fathers for showing their own orthodox lineage and proving
that they were not the schismatic element; their use of the Fathers was “the direct
outgrowth of the great Reformers’ assumption that the Reformation was the catholic
church, that Rome had fallen away, and that the best of the tradition not only could be
appropriated by, but belonged by right to, the Reformation and its descendants.”7
Willet finds warrant for the Protestant break from Rome in Romans 16:17. There
Paul warns against dissention, but advises the church to avoid those who cause this strife
and who stray from Paul’s teaching. “This,” he writes, “doth justifie the departure of the
Protestants from the Church of Rome, because it is a false and Antichristian Church; and
hath fallen away, and plaied the Apostata from the faith of Christ: and therefore we are to
leave them: according to S. Paul’s rule” in Titus 3:11.8 The mere fact, that is, that the
Protestants were the ones to break away does not make them the schismatics; Paul’s own
counsel shows that it is those who cause dissention by teaching false doctrine who bear
the blame for a schism. In defining the unity and catholicity of the true church, Willet
(with other Protestants) thus subordinates all other criteria to doctrinal orthodoxy.
2. Claiming the Church Fathers
Willet was a favorite target of Protestants Proofes, for Catholikes Religion, and
Broughton took full advantage of the various intra-Protestant quarrels that Willet had
(notwithstanding his pleas for and claims of Protestant harmony) engaged in. In a chapter
arguing that the testimony of the Church Fathers supported Roman Catholic doctrine,

7

Muller, After Calvin, 53.

8

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 741.
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Broughton sought to prove that Willet, “the great professor of Divinity, who hath taken
so solemne an oath before, that the Fathers be for his cause,” in fact denounced and
misrepresented those Fathers. Following his general pattern in the treatise, Broughton
relied on a Protestant voice to argue his point, this time drawing on Richard Parkes, who
had written two tracts against Willet concerning the Creed’s reference to Christ’s descent
into hell.9 Due to a printer’s delay in publishing Loidoromastix—his response to Parkes’s
second attack—Willet was able to prefix to that work a brief rebuttal to Broughton’s
recently published Protestant Proofes. Here, noting the bias of Broughton’s source
(“…and all this he taketh for truth upon an adversarie, and evill willers report…”), Willet
defends his claim on the Church Fathers against Broughton’s accusation “that I
condemne all the ancient Fathers for dreamers: that I condemne all learned & godly
Divines: that I falsely corrupt, translate, injuriously handle, abuse the Fathers: that I
straungely pervert, belie, deprave, abuse the Scriptures.” In response to this particular
charge from Broughton, Willet directs the reader to a final section of his defense against
Parkes, the source of the original accusation: “All which slaunderous accusations are, I
trust, sufficiently answered in this defense, unto the which, the Table annexed in the ende
of the booke, may direct the Reader, that desireth further to be satisfied.”10
Willet had previously, in a new preface to the 1600 edition of Synopsis Papismi,
emphasized the need for further academic work in patristics by Reformed scholars,
9

[Broughton], Protestants Proofes, for Catholikes Religion, 35. On Parkes and his exchange with
Willet, see I.3.1.
10

“Further Advertisements to the Reader,” in Willet, Loidoromastix, sig.¶¶¶¶¶1v. The section to
which Willet refers the reader first offers a defense against the charge that Willet “falsified” the Greek
Fathers Origen, Athanasius, Cyril, and Chrysostom, the Latin Fathers Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine,
and the 12th-century Bernard (pp. 137-158). Then, in a “recrimination,” Willet turns the accusation around
on Parkes (the “Replyer”), arguing that he had in fact “falsified” Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose,
and Augustine, as well as Ignatius, Tertullian, and Rufinus (pp. 158-176).
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arguing that reclaiming patristic commentaries from the clutches of the Roman Catholic
church would both edify Protestants and severely weaken Rome’s polemical position.11
And indeed, as early as the first edition of Synopsis Papismi in 1592 Willet was already
well aware of the polemical importance of demonstrating patristic support for Protestant
theology: “…you [papists] have nothing to do with the Church, which was propagated in
the Apostles time, nor for the space of five or six hundred yeares after Christ: it was not
your Church, for the most of your heresies are more lately sprong up then so.”12 Willet,
with other English Protestants, realized that an effective way to undercut the Roman
Catholic appeal to a millennium of continuous practice and (purportedly) consistent
doctrine was to reach behind these centuries to connect the Protestant church to an even
earlier period and its more pristine beliefs and interpretations.13
Yet for all the rhetoric about how patristic theology tended to support Protestant
doctrine and, accordingly, the Protestant claim to continuity with the historic church, the
actual appropriation of particular patristic readings of Romans was often more
complicated; as Jean-Louis Quantin has put it, “Antiquity proved a Pandora’s box.”14
Although Protestants viewed the Church Fathers as representing a purer form of doctrine
before the gradual decline of the medieval period, they were still subject to error.
Attempting to appropriate patristic support for the catholicity of Protestant doctrine while
11

Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 14-15, citing Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), sig.B3r-v. An
even more ambitious patristic reclamation project was undertaken by Thomas James, the first librarian of
the Bodleian Library in Oxford, who focused his work on correcting Roman Catholic corruptions of the
Fathers (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 33, 273). Cf. Quantin, “The Fathers in Seventeenth Century
Anglican Theology,” 999-1000.
12

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1592), 58.

13

Cf. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 272-273; Quantin, The Church of England and Christian
Antiquity, 83; Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1592), sig.Br.
14

Quantin, The Church of England and Christian Antiquity, 407.
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refuting the Roman Catholic claims for the authority of tradition was a difficult balancing
act.15 At times Willet is compelled to defend the (proto-Protestant) orthodoxy of the
Church Fathers by asserting that a statement has been taken out of context. Thus, when
Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Jerome—inspired by Paul’s praise in Romans 1:8—
laud the inviolable faith of the Roman church, they do not mean that the faith of the
church in Rome can never become corrupt, nor are they referring to the faith as practiced
in Willet’s day. And again, the importance that Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Augustine
ascribe to the succession of bishops does not validate the leadership of the popish church,
since the basic concern of these Fathers is the continuity of sound doctrine.16 However—
his appeals to the authority of the Fathers and his defense of some of their questionable
opinions notwithstanding—Willet also (as had Fulke) frequently dissents from their
interpretations when he finds them to be inconsistent with his own scriptural exegesis.17
A few times he even sides with modern papists against patristic interpretations.18
15

Cf. Muller’s discussion of this dynamic in Muller, After Calvin, 52-53. Cf. also Tossanus’s book
on the Fathers: Daniel Tossanus, Synopsis de Patribus, sive Praecipvis et Vetustioribus Ecclesiae
Doctoribus, nec non de Scholasticis (Heidelberg, 1603).
16

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 90, 433.

17

Some of their stranger readings Willet works to explain as false attributions or scribal errors. A
distinction between justification and remission of sins made in a commentary attributed to Ambrose, for
instance, suggests that he was not the true author: “This one place doth give just occasion of suspition, that
those commentaries were not composed by Ambrose,” (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 218). Heterodox
ideas in a commentary under Jerome’s name lead Willet to concur with the long-established theory that it
was actually Pelagius’s work (pp. 250, 256, 272, 516). Augustine’s supposed claim that pater was a Latin
word points to a likely scribal error: “Augustine could not be ignorant, that S. Paul wrot not in the Latine,
and therefore that place in Augustine is most like to have beene mistaken by the writers, and such as copied
it out,” (p. 339). Muller notes that Willet similarly questioned the authorship of a work attributed to
Augustine because in it Melchizedek was identified as the Holy Spirit (Muller, After Calvin, 169-170).
18

As, for instance, when he agrees with Tolet and Pererius against the “very erroneous
interpretation” of the Greek Fathers Chrysostom, Origen, Theodoret, and Oecumenius that reads foreseen
faith into Romans 8:28, and when Tolet “well refuseth” the “mixed interpretation” of 14:3 put forth by
Chrysostom, who identifies those whom God has “received” to converted Gentiles. In this instance,
however, Willet also disagrees later with Tolet, who identifies instead converted Jews. Willet, siding with
Calvin and others (including Origen) against the overly narrow readings of Chrysostom and Tolet, takes
Paul to be referring here indifferently to both groups (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 378, 629).
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Willet occasionally reminds the reader of the freedom that he has, as one whose
highest commitment is to scriptural fidelity, to break from the Fathers. The divine
authority of Scripture differs categorically from the interpretive assistance offered by
patristic exegesis: “those auncient fathers, though they were excellent men, yet were but
men…this is no note, to derogate from the credit of the fathers: but to shew a difference
between their writings and the holy Scriptures: which are free from the least error of
forgetfulnesse.”19 Refuting a papist objection to Romans 4:23 that the laity should be
guided by the Fathers rather than by Scripture itself, Willet reiterates Scripture’s absolute
priority:
Nay, the sense of the Scripture is most safely taken from the Scripture, which is
the best interpreter of it selfe…The Fathers and expositors are to be heard, and
consulted with so farre foorth as they agree with the Scripture: but the sense of the
Scripture must not depend upon their fancies, which have no warrant by
Scripture.20
In another place, he recalls that papist writers have asserted the same right to dissent from
the Fathers, claiming that he has “as great libertie to refuse” Origen’s endorsement of
counsels of perfection as Pererius had to disagree with Chrysostom’s teaching on the
Virgin Mary.21
Felicity Heal, however, overstates the effect of Willet’s subordination of the
Christian tradition to Scripture when she claims that “Andrew Willet insisted that there

19

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 56. This observation is inspired by “a slip” of Chrysostom, who
mistakenly attributed the quotation in Romans 1:17 to Zephaniah instead of to Habakkuk.
20

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 230. Cf. Kellison’s 1603 argument that by seeking to establish
their Protestant faith “on bare scripture,” the Reformers have flung “the gate open unto all heretikes and
heresies,” (Kellison, A Survey of the New Religion, 29; he defends the claim in pp. 29-62).
21

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 180.
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was no need to understand the church through time: the appeal to Scripture sufficed.”22
Willet’s insistence on the absolute priority of Scripture did not (as the present chapter
argues) negate all significance of the church’s temporal continuity, especially with the
patristic period. Heal cites Willet’s rebuttal in the 1592 Synopsis Papismi of Bellarmine’s
identification of six notes of the true church, these being “antiquitie, universalitie,
succession, unitie, the power of miracles, the gift of prophesie.”23 While Willet does
attack the significance that Bellarmine places on antiquity, already in this first edition he
refuses to state that a harmony with early church doctrine is therefore unimportant: “But
(alacke) sillie men they must come short of our Saviour Christs and the Apostles time, by
five or six hundred yeares, for the most of the opinions, which they now hold.”24 While
still denying the absolute authority of tradition, Willet finds it important to point out that
papist doctrine does not comport with that of the earliest centuries of the church. In each
of the three successive editions of Synopsis Papismi, Willet adds to this section and
further nuances his meaning—a development that corresponds with his increased
emphasis on the Fathers and his recognition of the polemical value of patristic
formulations. In the 1594 revision he clarifies earlier assertions, as that the true church is
not “to be discerned, by custome or number of yeares, but by that truth, which was taught
and preached by our blessed Saviour, and his Apostles,” with more measured statements

22

Heal, “Appropriating History,” 111.

23

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1592), 55. Heal cites pp. 55-57, which comprises Willet’s full
response to Bellarmine’s first note.
24

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1592), 55. Willet’s restriction of the Fathers’ authority to the initial
five to six centuries of the church followed a standard Protestant timeline. John Jewel in 1559 drew the line
of orthodoxy at six centuries; James I would set it at five (Quantin, “The Fathers in Seventeenth Century
Anglican Theology,” 989).
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like: “antiquitie therefore is nothing worth unlesse it be joyned with veritie.”25 The
“unless” now makes it clear that tradition has (an albeit conditional) value. By 1600 he
does not deny that antiquity is a mark of the true church, but he qualifies it as “no
sufficient mark of the church.”26 And in the 1613 edition, he states fully the position that
is evident in the Romans hexapla: “Whereas then we here joyne in issue with our
adversaries in these two points, that neither antiquitie is alwaies a sure note of the
Church, and that antiquitie for the most and chiefest points of their doctrine is not on their
side.”27 We will see both of these elements in Willet’s use of the complex mass of
patristic witnesses—denying their absolute authority, even while insisting on Protestant
continuity with the best of the early church’s tradition.28

2.1. Willet’s Appeal to Patristic Interpretation of Romans
Before considering those places where reference to the authority of the Church
Fathers required a disclaimer, though, we will look at some places where Willet’s

25

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1594), 84. On the following page he adds: “Moreover of our church
have been the Apostles, Evangelists, Martyrs and Confessors of Christ, that have been at all times, and in
all ages persecuted for the testimonie of the word of God. But for the upholding of your church, what
antiquitie can ye shewe?”, explicitly connecting the Protestant church to the temporal line of true belief.
26

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1600), 64; emphasis added.

27

Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), 78.

28

For an overview of patristic interpretation of Romans, see Kathy L. Gaca and L. L. Welborn,
eds., Early Patristic Readings of Romans, Romans Through History and Cultures Series (New York: T&T
Clark, 2005); Daniel Patte and Eugene TeSelle, eds., Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and
Theology in Interpretation, Romans Through History and Cultures Series (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press
International, 2002); Gerald Bray, ed. Romans, vol. 6 in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, New
Testament (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998); Peter Gorday, Principles of Patristic Exegesis:
Romans 9-11 in Origen, John Chrysostom, and Augustine, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 4
(New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983); Paula Fredriksen Landes, Augustine on Romans: Propositions
from the Epistle to the Romans; Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1982).
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rhetoric of patristic support matched his actual use of early church tradition.29 From
Paul’s affirmation in Romans 3:10 that “there is none that is righteous,” Willet refutes the
Roman Catholic notion of Mary’s sinlessness. After relaying the interpretations of
Chrysostom, Origen, and Augustine—all of whom in various contexts contended that
Mary was indeed marked by sin—Willet comments that Pererius, “refusing the
judgement of these Fathers,” doggedly maintains that Mary was entirely free from all sin
for her entire life. Fully cognizant of his divergence from these Fathers, Pererius is even
“bold to say” that Chrysostom “exceeded the bounds of veritie and pietie” for attributing
any blemish to Mary’s character. While leaning on the respected authority of these
Fathers to chide Pererius for his brazen opinion, Willet does not rest his argument on
their credentials alone. Not only does Pererius make Chrysostom “and other auncient
writers liers, but Christ himselfe, and his Blessed mother” also testify in Scripture to her
sinfulness; otherwise Jesus would not have reproved her in John 2:4 (“Woman, what have
I to doe with thee?”), and Mary in the Magnificat would not have referred to God as “my
Saviour”—a title that expresses a need of redemption from sin.30
Later in chapter 3, Willet directs the patristic witness against a “malitious cavill of
the Rhemists,” who had accused Protestants of soteriological novelty by inserting the
word “only” into their doctrine of justification by faith.31 Taking up this issue in the
29

Nearly a century after Willet’s death, the British Divine John Edwards (1637-1716) named him
among six earlier Protestants who had, with some success, used the Church Fathers polemically against the
papists. He questioned, however, the value of this approach, seeing as “the Fathers do often contradict one
an other, and sometimes they favour, yea plainly assert the Doctrines of the Church of Rome,” (Quantin,
The Church of England and Christian Antiquity, 407).
30
31

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 179.

The Rhemist annotations on this verse argue that Paul by the expression “without workes”
excludes only the works of the Law performed before conversion, and not the many works of Christian
virtue that follow thereupon. These important deeds “the Adversaries would exclude by foisting in the
terme, only,” (Martin, New Testament, 390).
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context of Romans 3:28, Willet presents a long list of figures from the early church
(many taken from Fulke) who had long before expressed a doctrine of justification by
faith alone: Ambrose, Hilary, Jerome, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Augustine, Nazianzen,
Basil, and Rufinus. This was not, then, a fringe belief in the church’s early centuries.
Willet’s list both evidences a factual error in the Rhemist annotations—the sixteenthcentury Protestants did not “foist” in the term “only”—and overwhelms the Rhemist
opposition to the truth of the doctrine with the cumulative weight of the majority patristic
witness. Further, he explains that places where the Fathers appear to reject the “faith
only” doctrine refer not to the justifying role of faith, but to a “solitarie faith” that is rent
from the necessary effect of a godly life.32
We find another lengthy list of patristic support in chapter 13 among the
Controversies concerning papal power and the papacy’s falsely asserted primacy over
princes. Countering Bellarmine’s contention that Christ’s words to the apostles in
Matthew 20:25 and Luke 22:2533 do not prohibit them from all forms of temporal rule but
only from ruling in an unlawful or tyrannical fashion, Willet writes that “this hath beene
the consonant doctrine of the auncient Fathers, that the Ecclesiasticall Pastors should not
arrogate to themselves any temporall or civill Dominion.” 34 So again Willet argues his
case drawing on various biblical verses from different contexts and the “consonant
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 187-188.
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“The kings of the nations have dominion over them…but it shall not be so with you…” Willet
also in this Controversy cites such verses as John 18:36, where Christ says that his kingdom is not of this
world, and 2 Timothy 2:[4], where Paul warns about getting wrapped up in worldly affairs.
34

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 607. He substantiates his claim with brief quotations from
Tertullian, Hilary, Chrysostom, Ambrose, and (moving to the medieval period) Bernard.
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doctrine” of the Church Fathers.35 While the Fathers were fallible, their concurrence on a
particular issue makes for a compelling argument, and forces a tremendous burden of
proof on any dissenting opinion.36

2.1.1 Divisions Among the Fathers
Attempts to appeal to the Fathers, as we have already noted, were complicated by
the diversity of interpretations that had been put forth in the early church. There was “no
such thing as an authoritative consensus of the Fathers,”37 and very few doctrines and
concepts boasted univocal patristic support.38 This diversity, of course, complicated
Roman Catholic claims to the tradition, as well. Where feasible, Willet attempts to
reconcile differing early church perspectives. He notes in his biographical sketch of Paul
35

On certain matters of adiaphora, Willet avoided unnecessarily highlighting an opinion differing
from the Fathers. Robert West lists Willet among a group of Protestants who were reticent to make a
definitive statement on whether angels have bodies, not wanting to contradict those Fathers who asserted
that they did (West, Milton and the Angels, 54).
36

We might add, with minimal commentary, that Willet also chastises Pererius for following the
chronology of Paul’s martyrdom given by later historians, rather than the timeline presented by Eusebius
and Jerome (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 11). Willet devotes many of the Questions in an introductory
chapter discussing background issues regarding Paul and Romans to chronological matters. Some of
Willet’s chronological concerns are spelled out more explicitly than others—the timing of Peter’s presence
in Rome (and whether he was ever there at all!) has a bearing, for example, on the Roman Catholic
church’s claim to the primacy of the Roman see (see p. 743). Willet is less clear about the relevance of the
timing of Paul’s death (his preferred date is only a year later than the one Pererius suggests). Part of his
concern is surely granting a high level of authority to the Church Fathers. Others who proposed a particular
date for Paul’s death were concerned with such matters as ensuring sufficient time for Paul to have traveled
to Spain (a question Willet addresses, pp. 694-695, though considering it “a matter of no great moment”) or
(for those favoring instead an earlier date) wanting for Paul’s martyrdom to have been immediately before
Nero’s death, so as to make the latter an evidence of divine punishment. See George Ogg, The Chronology
of the Life of Paul (London: Epworth Press, 1968), 194-200.
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Quantin, The Church of England and Christian Antiquity, 397.

Cf. William Chillingworth’s 1638 rant on the fractured (and therefore unstable as an
extrabiblical source of authority) witness of the Church Fathers and the church’s tradition in general:
“…there are Popes against Popes, Councils against Councils, some Fathers against others, the same Fathers
against themselves …Traditive interpretations of Scripture are pretended, but there are few or none to be
found,” quoted in Quantin, “The Fathers in Seventeenth Century Anglican Theology,” 992; John Rainolds
in 1584 called patristic doctrinal consensus “a Phoenix, [which] never will be found,” quoted in Quantin,
The Church of England and Christian Antiquity, 401.
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early in the Romans hexapla, for instance, that Augustine and Chrysostom had disagreed
over whether Paul was of noble birth. Augustine, based on Paul’s mention of fleshly
confidence in Philippians 3:[4], inferred that Paul must have been of noble birth;
Chrysostom, however, “seemeth to be of the contrarie opinion,” as evidenced by his bluecollar tent making background and suggested by his statement in 1 Corinthians 1:[26]
that not many of noble birth were called. Despite his acknowledgment of the Fathers’
fallibility and this being a matter of minimal theological import, Willet nevertheless
offers an explanation that encompasses both of the opposing patristic views:
The resolution is this, that though S. Paul were not noble according to the Romane
estimation of nobilitie, beeing of an handicraft, which suited not with nobilitie
among the Romanes; yet among the Jewes he was not of unnoble birth: who
counted nobilitie by the noblenes of the tribe, and the antiquitie of the family.
Depending on the context, both Augustine and Chrysostom are correct: just as Joseph, as
a carpenter descended from David’s royal blood, was of mixed nobility, so Paul, as a tent
maker from the esteemed tribe of Benjamin, could be rightly considered to have come
from either noble or humble roots.39 Through this distinction Willet manages to affirm
each of the Fathers, while also removing a potential doubt about Scripture passages that
may seem to lead in opposite directions.
More difficult to reconcile is an old controversy between Augustine and Jerome
regarding whether Paul’s reproach of Peter recounted in Galatians 2 was justified.
Specifically, the debate concerns whether Paul in the opening verses of Romans 15
violated his own counsel about food laws and bearing with the infirmities of the weak.40
39
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 11.

Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 9:20-22 demonstrate well the substance of this debate. Willet
leaves this reference out of his summary, though it is cited in the exchange between Augustine and Jerome;
see Augustine’s 397 letter to Jerome (Letter XL) in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, The
Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin (New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1892), 273. Since
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Willet provides answers to six arguments that Jerome presented in Peter’s defense
(claiming that he was either unjustly reprimanded or that it was a staged, didactic conflict
to provide a memorable lesson for those witnessing it). To Jerome’s argument that κατὰ
πρόσωπον can mean “in show” as well as “to his face,” Willet replies that this meaning is
not used in Scripture.41 To Jerome’s point that Peter, as an apostle filled with the Spirit’s
guidance, could not err in a point of doctrine, Willet counters that his error here is not in
doctrine but in practice. Most to our point in this section, where Jerome cites for his
opinion the authority of the earlier Fathers Didymus, Origen, and Eusebius, Willet
balances the scales by adding Cyprian, Ambrose, and Tertullian to Augustine’s side
(though “above all these” Willet places the authority of Paul himself). In this case, a
simple appeal to the later Fathers merely pits Augustine against Jerome, and the further
appeal to even earlier Fathers still results in a stalemate. Willet concludes that
Augustine’s arguments are more sound, and he allows those arguments to stand on their
own, without added commentary, as the final counterargument to Jerome.42
Two Greek Fathers are divided over whether the “love of God shed abroad in our
hearts” in Romans 5:5 refers actively to God’s love for us or passively for our love of
God. Oecumenius reads the phrase actively and refers it to the believer’s love for God.
The logic of this view—which Stapleton also propounds, alleging Augustine as additional
Paul himself has admitted to an evangelistic strategy of becoming “all things to all people,” the argument
would go, could Peter not claim the same practice when he alters his dining patterns because of the
presence of the Jewish Christians?
41

Liddell and Scott list “mask” as a possible (if less common) meaning of πρόσωπον, so that the
word could function similarly to ὑποκριτής, conveying acting or pretending (A Greek-English Lexicon
[Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968], s.vv. “πρόσωπον,” “ύποκπισία”). Willet’s response on this point is,
of course, rather circular—arguing that a word cannot have a particular meaning in Scripture because that
word in Scripture does not have that particular meaning.
42

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 706-707.
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support—is that this love is in our hearts, so it must be our love. Willet’s response aims
to relegate Oecumenius to a minority position among the Fathers. First, “against
Oecumenius we set Chrysostome an other Greeke Father, who understandeth the Apostle
to speake of the love of God toward us.” Having evened the Greek tally, Willet adds:
“Augustine shall answer Augustine, who elsewhere interpreteth this place of the love of
God toward us.” In this instance, Willet does not suggest that Augustine was inconsistent
or changed his mind on the issue, but that his aggregate comments on this verse make it
clear that God’s love for us is absolutely primary, and the source of our love for God.
After summarizing the exegetical arguments of various Protestant voices, Willet again
turns to “the consonant exposition of many of the Fathers”—not only Chrysostom, but
Jerome, Ambrose, Theophylact, Theodoret, and the early-fifth century poet Sedulius as
well, all stand with Willet against Oecumenius and Stapleton in taking the phrase
passively as God’s love.43
Willet’s having Augustine answer Augustine on the identification of the “love of
God” reveals another aspect of the complexity of appealing to patristic authority: not only
do the Fathers often differ from one another, but occasionally individual Church Fathers
are either ambiguous in their interpretations or change their mind over time. Nor can one
simply isolate their early or mature thought as the true representation of their views—
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 240-241. With respect to the same phrase in Romans 8:39,
Willet acknowledges that “most of the Greeke and Latine expositors” (including Oecumenius, Theophylact,
Origen, Augustine, Ambrose, and—this time—even Chrysostom) take the “love of God” actively as our
love for God. Here Willet makes no excuses for the Fathers, openly disagreeing with their judgment: “but it
is better referred unto the passive love, wherewith we are beloved of God.” The passive reading, Willet
argues, fits better with Paul’s scope, its “placement” in Christ Jesus implies that it is God’s active love, and
our love is too fickle to be the firm and unshakeable love that the Apostle is describing (p. 385). Cf.
Richard Hays’s classic study on the grammatically parallel expression πίστις Ὶησοῦ in Richard B. Hays,
The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2002).
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while “Tertullian in his old age fell into the heresie of Montanus, and therefore much is
not to be ascribed to his judgement concerning” infant baptism,44 Augustine famously
and openly “retracted” many of his original interpretations.45 Willet mentions several of
these retractions as they pertain to the interpretation of Romans. Concerning the status of
the speaker in Romans 7, Augustine “changed his minde, upon better reasons” and
decided that these were the words of a regenerate person (though he limited the sinful
impulse in the passage to “the first motions onely of concupiscence).46 His retraction is
more thorough in the alteration of his reading of Romans 8:29, where he moves from
conceiving of predestination on the basis of foreseen faith, to “ingeniously confessing”
that a truly gracious election must reject even that condition.47 Neither was Chrysostom
entirely self-consistent. In a Controversy on verse 10:20 in which Willet uses the
statement “I was found of them, that sought me not” to refute the notion of preparatory
works that make one more fit to be called, Chrysostom appears as both a positive and
negative example. Willet cites him first as affirming that “Gods grace wrought all” in
conversion, but adds “yet afterward, forgetting himselfe,” Chrysostom writes that those
who were called did provide their own ability to apprehend and acknowledge that which
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 303.
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Cf. the oft-noted observation that the Protestant Reformers tended to favor Augustine’s later
works, while Roman Catholic theologians inclined toward his earlier works. E.g., in Mary Arshagouni
Papazian, “The Augustinian Donne: How a ‘Second S. Augustine’?,” in John Donne and the Protestant
Reformation: New Perspectives, ed. Mary Arshagouni Papazian (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University
Press, 2003), 67.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 335.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 398. Willet notes that Augustine’s early position was sound
enough to deny the merit of foreseen works, but still flawed in supposing the merit of foreseen faith.
Augustine’s correction of his position on this matter comes up again in the chapter 9 Controversies (p. 435;
mistakenly printed as a second p. 433).
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was revealed to them.48 These instances of self-contradiction or retraction emphasize all
the more the unreliability of tradition as an absolute norm, yet without diminishing the
authority of these authors to naught in the cases where their interpretations reflected the
best reading of Scripture.

2.1.2 Augustine and Chrysostom
As their many citations above reflect, Augustine and Chrysostom each figure
heavily in Willet’s appropriation of the tradition of the early church.49 We have already
seen multiple times in this and previous chapters how Willet held up Augustine as a
standard of orthodoxy: Augustine’s reading of Romans 5:12 is significant in Willet’s
conception of original sin (despite the majority of the Reformed rejecting his grammatical
argument), Augustine affirmed justification by faith alone and that Mary had a sin nature,
his infralapsarian “mass of perdition” understanding of reprobation wins Willet over, and
his anti-Pelagian writings provide ammunition against Roman Catholic teachings on
merit.50 His esteem for Augustine was sufficiently evident for Joad Raymond to comment
48

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 483. Cf. the twentieth century debate between Brunner and
Barth, which addresses a similar issue—namely whether the ability to receive divine revelation is a
surviving capability of the tainted imago dei, or a capability that God must grant as part of the revelation
itself (Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” by Professor Dr.
Emil Brunner and the Reply “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel [1946; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf
and Stock Publishers, 2002] ).
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These figures were frequently cited and well regarded broadly within the Protestant world. On
the use of Augustine and Chrysostom by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestants, see Arnoud S. Q.
Visser, Reading Augustine in the Reformation: the Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 15001620 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,” 573-579;
Quantin, The Church of England and Christian Antiquity, 397; John R. Walchenbach, John Calvin as
Biblical Commentator: An Investigation into Calvin’s Use of John Chrysostom as an Exegetical Tutor
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010); John L. Thompson, “Calvin as a Biblical Interpreter,” in The
Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, ed. Donald K. McKim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 63-64.
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Willet cites Augustine on the doctrine of sin (original sin, and the relationship between sin and
grace) also on pp. 255, 286, and 442-443, and on predestination without foresight also on pp. 418, 523.
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that “Willet, true to form, brings Augustine to his defence” in arguing against petitioning
angels for their prayers.51 In the last chapter we saw how Augustine’s orthodoxy was
such a given that Willet could defend Protestants against charges of heresy by simply
pointing out the absurdity of thereby implicating Augustine in the same heresy.
Instances where Willet disagrees with Augustine, while rare and concerning
relatively minor issues, are not non-existent. One of the more significant disagreements is
already alluded to above. Having changed his mind to affirm that the speaker in Romans
7 is Paul himself in his redeemed state, Augustine “verie well interpreteth” the words οὐ
γινώσκω in verse 15 to mean “non approbo, non consentio, I approove not, consent
not”—attributing the phrase to Paul’s will, rather than to the understanding, as Origen
and Chrysostom had done. “But yet,” Willet continues, Augustine “understandeth the
Apostle onely to speake of the first motions of concupiscence, which have not the
consent of the minde.”52 This caveat seems to Willet to be “no fit exposition,” and he
bases his objection to Augustine’s limitation primarily on the experience of godly people
failing not only in their desires, but in actually doing things that they know are wrong.
Willet does limit the extent of these misdeeds, though; Paul is not here referring to
“grosse sins” like David’s adultery, since in those cases there is no resistance of the will

Additional positive citations of Augustine include his teaching on the nature of true prayer, his opposition
to astrology, and his perspective on Old Testament ceremonies (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 389, 435,
629).
51
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Raymond, Milton’s Angels, 60.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 327. This discussion comes in the context of the Question of
“How the Apostle saith, he is carnall and sold under sinne, v. 17.” The allusion to this issue above is from a
later Question, “Of that famous question, whether S. Paul doe speake in his owne person, or of an other
here in this 7. chapter” (p. 335).
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at all, the perpetrator “for the time” being completely given over to the deed.53
In other places, Willet argues that Augustine has misread the Apostle’s syntax,
context, or scope. In Romans 1:21-22, for example, Willet takes Paul’s reference to the
futile thinking, darkened minds, and foolishness of the Gentiles to be essentially three
ways of saying the same thing, while Augustine “somewhat curiously distinguisheth”
between them. This is not a fatal error, but since Willet finds no textual basis for the
delineation that Augustine lays out, he judges that the description “is better referred
generally” to their sin-damaged minds.54 In 3:21 Willet adopts Beza’s criticism of
Augustine for connecting the adverbial phrase “without the law” to “righteousnesse”
instead of to “manifested,” making the full phrase read not “the righteousnesse of God is
made manifest without the Law,” but “righteousnesse without the Law is made
manifest.”55 “In this transposing of the words,” Willet writes, “the sense is much altered.”
Augustine’s syntax obscures Paul’s basic point, that while the Law reveals our sinfulness,
it is not the Law’s function to teach faith.56
Augustine “hath a strange interpretation” of Romans 14:5, where he takes “he that
regardeth the day” to refer to humans judging other humans based on how righteous they
appear on a given day. The one who “esteemeth every day alike” in this reading is God,
who judges the heart and not a person’s day-to-day performance. But this, as the context
53

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 327. The qualifying “for the time” is important, as it keeps
Willet from contradicting here his belief in the perseverance of the saints.
54

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 69.
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The syntax in Greek reads: χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται. Meyer, like Willet,
argues for χωρὶς νόμου to be connected to πεφανέρωται, explaining this placement on the basis of a parallel
structure with the latter half of verse 20. Just as the knowledge of sin [comes; the verb is implied] through
the Law, so the reference to the Law in verse 21 must connect to the verb there (Meyer, The Epistle to the
Romans, 129).
56

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 166.
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shows, confuses subjects, since the reference in the following verse to the observance of
these days “to the Lord” makes it clear that humans are the consistent subject in verse 5.57
And, while Augustine is the most significant patristic authority legitimizing the Reformed
polemic against works-based justification, Willet objects to his interpretation of Romans
2:13, a key justification verse (“Not the hearers of the law, but the doers shall be
justified”), as his reading “seemeth not to be agreeable unto the scope of the Apostle.”
Augustine takes the statement to mean that one must be made just by God before being
able to keep the Law. Willet agrees with the theology of this statement, but he sees it as
reversing Paul’s purpose; the Apostle is not here teaching how it is possible to keep the
Law, but using obedience to the Law as a marker to identify who is justified.58 Again, the
issues that Willet raises with Augustine’s (later) interpretation of Romans are matters of
exegetical minutiae, not bearing on significant doctrinal issues, and certainly not
diminishing the support that he offers Protestants on the two key doctrines of justification
and predestination.
John Walchenbach’s study of John Calvin’s use of John Chrysostom concludes
with an unexpected observation on Calvin’s appropriation of his most frequently cited
and often-praised Church Father:
It was to our surprise that Calvin, while he would consult Chrysostom frequently
as a historical authority, rarely entered into the theological and especially ethical
implications of Chrysostom’s thought. Ethical implications were avoided because
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 632.

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 138. Cf. Willet’s arguments concerning the confusion of cause
and identity in section V.3.1. Willet shows his general approval of the content of Augustine’s interpretation
(if not its correspondence to Paul’s scope) by using the same logic to explain why this verse does not
support justification by works—since one must be just already in order to act justly, one cannot become
just by acting justly. Augustine’s reading, then, while not the Apostle’s meaning in this verse, has
polemical value in disputing theologically unsound interpretations of the verse.
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Chrysostom founded his patterns of behavior on principles too closely allied with
the doctrine of works-righteousness.59
Willet’s positive use of Chrysostom is starkly different from this description of
Calvin’s use, with Chrysostom serving for Willet—theological qualms notwithstanding—
as the supreme model for discerning the moral uses of a scriptural text. Chrysostom is
cited in twenty-six of Willet’s 124 moral observations throughout the sixteen chapters of
Romans—nearly as many times as all other Christian expositors combined. Chrysostom’s
moral uses predominate especially in the final five chapters, which Willet labels on the
hexapla’s title page as “belonging to Exhortation,” appearing in over forty percent of
Willet’s individual moral observations and accounting for over eighty percent of the
citations of Christian authors.60
The high regard that Willet holds for Chrysostom’s ability to cull the practical
applications out of Romans is attested to both in particular moral uses and in Willet’s
general approach to moving from doctrinal formulation to practical piety. At the outset of
the hexapla Willet establishes Chrysostom as an exemplar for recognizing the ethical
utility of all of Romans, and commenting on the closing words of the letter, Willet
highlights his reading of Paul’s expression “for the obedience of faith”: “Chrysostome
59

Walchenbach, John Calvin as Biblical Commentator, 164. Van Oort and Thompson each also
acknowledge a discrepancy between Calvin’s admiration of Chrysostom as an expositor of Scripture and
his generally negative citations of him in his own exegetical works (Johannes Van Oort, “John Calvin and
the Church Fathers,” 691-692; Thompson, “Calvin’s Unpaid Debt to Origen,” 119-121).
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Through the first eleven chapters Chrysostom shares the honor of most “moral use” citations
with Origen, which is somewhat ironic, since at the outset Willet opposes Chrysostom to Origen regarding
the practical applicability of the early chapters of Romans. In the lone Observation given in the “Morall
observations out of the whole Epistle,” Willet claims that “Origen onely commendeth the reading of the
latter part of the Epistle, from c. 12. to the ende: the other part, he thinketh not to be so necessarie, as
handling onely questions about the ceremonies of the Law.” He continues to state his preference for
Chrysostom, who affirms the broad utility of the entire epistle (Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 28). Given
his understanding of how each Father views the moral function of Romans, it is strange that Willet cites
each equally in the Moral Observations of the early chapters, while having a great preponderance of
Chrysostom citations in the corresponding sections of the latter chapters.
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observeth here, fides obedientiam exigit, non curiositatem, faith exacteth obedience, not
curiositie.”61 In a chapter 13 Question on what it means to “put on” Christ (v. 14), Willet
again turns to Chrysostom to explain the broad relationship between faith in Christ and
the virtuous life. The one who “puts on” Christ, Chrysostom taught, also puts on every
virtue; that is, it is not our imitation of Christ’s virtues that is counted as “putting on”
Christ, but our union with him that makes a virtuous life possible.62 Willet prefers
Chrysostom’s expression of this principle to Origen’s, which he suggests could be read as
moving in the opposite direction.63 His turn to Chrysostom on this point shows, too, that
Willet did not share with Calvin the same level of concern regarding any worksrighteousness tendencies in Chrysostom. The individual moral uses that Willet gleans
from Chrysostom are often presented with glowing praise for his insight and an
acknowledgment of Willet’s degree of dependence on him. We see both of these
elements, for instance, at the close of a lengthy Moral Observation drawn from verse
15:24: “Thus excellently Chrysostome, according to his manner doth followe this morall
which I have abridged.”64 Chrysostom’s moral uses cover a wide range of virtues and
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 28, 736. The summary Moral Observation on the entire book of
Romans (entitled: “Of the singular profit that may arise by reading of this Epistle to the Romanes”)
concludes also with a glowing reference to Chrysostom: “It shall be profitable for every Christian likewise
to follow the same godly use, especially to acquaint themselves with the divine writings of S. Paul: and
every one may say with Chrysostome, gaudeo equidem , quod spiritualis illa tuba frui datum sit, I am glad,
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Chrysostom, The Epistle to the Romans, 518 (Homily XXIV): “He gives us the Lord Himself
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 599. Cf. Origen, Commentary on Romans, Books 6-10, 233

(9.35.34).
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 716. This particular Moral Observation includes the sage advice
that one should not enter into the ministry as impulsively as one might run “unto a faire.”
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vices, from warnings against pride, fornication, and ignorance,65 to inducements to show
hospitality, to practice kindness towards one’s enemies, and to foster a loving relationship
between a pastor and his flock.66 Nowhere among the Moral Observations does Willet
express concern about Chrysostom’s applications stemming from a works-based
justification, though he does at one point comment that Chrysostom’s teaching that one
may satisfy the flesh only to the extent of meeting basic necessities “seemeth…somewhat
too strict and austere.”67
When forced by his own reading of Scripture to oppose Chrysostom, Willet
remains generally respectful, though the doctrines are of more weight than those he
objects to in Augustine. Faced with an ambiguous point within one of Chrysostom’s
statements, Willet explains a way that it can be read as orthodox. Writing against the
power of free will in his comments on Romans 11:4, Willet notes:
Chrysostomes speech, that God saveth onely those which are willing, if it be
understood with these two cautions, that this willingnes is wrought by grace, and
yet beeing so wrought, it is no cause of justification, may safely be received: for
true it is; that none are saved against their wil: But yet God ex nolentibus volentes
facit, of unwilling maketh them willing; if Chrysostome be otherwise understood,
as ascribing here strength to mans freewill, it is a great error.68
While not stating outright that Chrysostom’s opinion is sound (as he does when
defending his view of original sin against the Pelagians, who “did him wrong to make
65

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 575; 622-623; 669.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 576; 714; 716.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 623. Most of Willet’s use of Chrysostom draws on his moral
applications, though he does cite him selectively in support of various more theologically oriented
doctrines. We have already seen that Willet refused to let the Pelagians claim Chrysostom for their view of
original sin (section III.2.2.3), and Willet appeals to his reading of Romans 5:2 to support the perseverance
of the saints (p. 238). Additionally, Willet cites his authority for subjects such as the nature of Abraham’s
faith (p. 213), the function of the Law as it pertains to salvation (p. 458), the role of the magistrate (p. 586),
and the place of Rome among the churches (pp. 727-728).
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him an author of their opinion”),69 Willet is careful to provide the necessary caveats that
could at least in theory make Chrysostom’s maxim a true saying.
Others of Chrysostom’s interpretations are more difficult to defend, and Willet
must oppose him more definitively. In his exposition of Romans 8:29, Chrysostom leads
a whole team of Greek exegetes astray by making God’s predestination contingent upon
his foresight of human worthiness.70 Other places it is his agreement with Origen that
seems to cause Chrysostom to teach heterodox views on election and free will. The two
Greeks both misread Romans 8:33 (“Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods
chosen?”) to imply that God’s election takes into consideration the inherent integrity of a
given soul. Trying to understand the difficult affirmation of God’s absolute sovereignty
in verse 9:18 (“[God] hath mercie on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth”),
each wrongly places the words in the mouth of one voicing an objection to Paul. And
similarly, both Origen and Chrysostom argue that the vessels of wrath and of mercy in
verse 9:21 have each prepared themselves to be accounted as such.71 These errors
(generally of election rather than of justification) are not insignificant, yet Willet corrects
them dispassionately, reserving his polemical venom for those Roman Catholics who
propose a similar doctrine of election based on the foresight of merit.
Another set of Chrysostom’s interpretations of Romans that Willet rejects
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 398.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 384, 420, 426. While doctrinal alignment with Origen is often
risky, on at least two occasions Willet prefers Origen’s interpretation to Chrysostom’s. One instance is a
grammatical point in verse 15:7, where Willet argues that “to the glorie of God” should go with “as Christ
received us” (as Origen), rather than with “receive ye one an other” (as Chrysostom) (p. 679). And
Origen’s reading of 16:19-20 more clearly affirms that all that we have is from God by grace, whereas
Chrysostom’s “daungerous” reading suggests that we have something of our own to offer to God (p. 732).
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concerns the limited blessings that he assigns to the Jews, and particularly to those who
lived before Christ.72 Chrysostom had argued that, since circumcision was given to mere
infants, it did not have any spiritual effect. Willet rejects this argument by paralleling the
situation (in typical Reformed fashion) to baptism: since the baptism of infants has a
spiritual use and not merely a ceremonial or identity-marking use, then so must have
circumcision.73 In verse 8:15 Chrysostom has “many strange assertions” concerning
Paul’s reference to the “spirit of bondage,” arguing that the Jews under the Law did not
have the Spirit and had been promised only temporal blessings. This notion Willet
counters with the clear evidence of the Holy Spirit working through the prophets and by
explaining that spiritual graces were hidden beneath the physical rites and spiritual
promises lodged under the temporal ones.74 In a similar vein, Willet reads Chrysostom’s
comments on Romans 9:6 (“for all, which are of Israel, are not Israel”) as an argument
that Gentiles alone are now the “true Israel.”75 Rejecting also the opposite attribution to
72

Eric Gritsch, who considers Chrysostom the “most radical anti-Semite among the church
fathers,” would likely attribute these interpretations to that sentiment (Gritsch, Martin Luther’s AntiSemitism, 17). Gritsch does not, however, substantiate his assertion, so it is difficult to know whether he
would consider Chrysostom’s perspective on the spiritual condition of Old Testament figures as stemming
from, or as evidence of, anti-Semitic views. Others—notably Robert Wilken—have questioned the
common labeling of Chrysostom as an anti-Semite, arguing for a more nuanced interpretation of his various
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(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 215-252.
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 413. Whether this is actually Chrysostom’s argument is
debatable. Willet does not provide a citation for Chrysostom’s “application to the Gentiles,” but his reading
appears to derive from passages such as: “But the new thing is, that when all were unworthy, the Gentiles
were saved alone…when this has been shown, there is at the same time demonstrated the fact that the
promises were all fulfilled. And to point this out he said, ‘For they are not all Israel that are of Israel’”
(Chrysostom, The Epistle to the Romans, 463-464 [Homily XVI] ). It is perhaps Chrysostom’s reference to
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ethnic Jews alone, Willet himself argues that “under the name of the true Israel of God,
the Apostle comprehendeth those which did imitate the faith of Abraham, whether they
were of the flesh and carnall generation of Abraham, or not.”76 Willet’s concern to clarify
these matters of contention is consistent with both his interest in the calling of the Jews
and his emphasis on the unity of God’s purpose through the two testaments.77

2.1.3 The Curious Place of Origen
Willet’s interest in Origen is evident from the first pages of each of his
commentaries, where the title pays homage to the great Alexandrian’s method. And,
indeed, Origen’s interpretations—both in support of and as a foil for Reformed
readings—pervade the Romans hexapla.78 Willet is somewhat inconsistent in his
guidelines for how Origen should be used by contemporary theologians. After listing the
various errors that Origen commits in his reading of Romans 11:26, where he writes of a
in the same homily, however, Chrysostom seems to include believing Jews in the promise. For example,
“For every one…whether Jew, or Grecian, or Scythian, or Thracian, or whatsoever else he may be, will, if
he believes, enjoy the privilege of great boldness,” (that boldness being previously identified as a gift that
comes through faith) (p. 471). That Chrysostom sometimes used the term “Gentile” to mean “Christian” (an
observation notes by Tonias) certainly does not help the clarity of the matter. Tonias reads Chrysostom to
be claiming that the promises to “Israel” pertain to all who believe, whether Gentile or Jew, which is
precisely Willet’s position, as well (Demetrios E. Tonias, Abraham in the Works of John Chrysostom
[Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014], 133, 136).
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purgative function of hell, Willet cautions that Roman Catholics cannot use Origen in
defense of their own Purgatory doctrine without allowing in also his wider range of
eschatological heresies:
If now the Papists will make Origen one of their patrons of Purgatory, as he is one
of the most auncient that maketh mention thereof, they must also subscribe unto
these errors, which I thinke they will be ashamed of: for to embrace his invention,
and yet to refuse his sense, is not reasonable.79
As one who made extensive use of Origen both as a positive authority and as an example
of wildly heretical imaginings, Willet seems here to establish a double standard for
appeals to his works. Surely he would counter that this situation with the papists differed
in that Origen’s errors were an integral component of the very doctrine the papists were
adopting, but still this requirement he imposes on the Roman Catholics seems to
invalidate his own use of Origen and to contradict his advocacy of Jerome’s method
of taking Origen’s best interpretations while leaving the worst.80
Despite Origen’s sometimes overly creative approach to interpreting the Bible,
Willet seems generally to admire his devotion to the task, praising him for being “so
diligent a searcher of the Scriptures.”81 This same diligence leads Origen also to offer
many profitable moral uses of Romans. Willet’s most concentrated selection of Origen’s
moral applications comes in chapter 6, where half of his eight Moral Observations are of
Origenian origin. Here we learn from Origen that “newnesse of life” (v.4) must be
renewed daily in order to remain “new,” that obedience “from the heart” (v. 17) is
something different than a verbal confession or outward show, that our zeal for God
79
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should match the zeal that we once had for sin (v. 19), and that we should examine every
action that we perform to determine whether the deed was serving sin or righteousness
(v.21).82 As we saw with Chrysostom, the issues that Willet has with Origen theologically
do not invalidate his many profitable lessons concerning Christian virtue.
Origen also has value for Willet as a skilled refuter of second-century heresies,
especially the Marcionite rejection of the Old Testament. Explaining his own transition
from Old Testament to New Testament commentary in the opening paragraph of his
dedicatory address to James, Willet cites Origen (his first citation in the entire work) in
defense of the unity of the testaments:
Origen well-observeth, that this was S. Peters error, when he would have had
three tabernacles, for Christ, Moses, and Elias…There is the same substance of
both, and one truth: both the Prophets and Apostles were ministers of the same
house, wherein are diverse mansions: the one shewing us onely (as it were) the
neather roomes, the other bring us into the upper chamber, where Christ eate his
passeover with his disciples.83
From Paul’s words in 4:23 that Abraham’s experience was not recorded “for him onely”
Origen “observeth well” that everything that is written of the patriarchs’ lives is for our
benefit.84 Besides these general affirmations of the unity of the testaments and the value
of the Hebrew scriptures, virtually every direct reference to Marcion’s heresy is met with
Origen’s rebuttal (which is not entirely surprising, since Marcion’s own thought is only
accessible through the anti-Marcion works of the Fathers). The Marcionites’
condemnation of circumcision as abuse is “sufficiently answered by Origen”; Origen
“answereth well” the Marcionite conclusion from 3:20 that the Law is evil, and “taketh
82
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away [their] cavill” concerning v. 24; in verse 4:24 he “doth thus returne this their
collection upon themselves”; and so forth.85 Willet draws on Origen’s affirmation that
Christ is not “after” but “of the father” to refute the Socinians,86 and he later presents
Origen again to “refell” (by way of the engrafted olive branches in 11:17) the “hereticall
paradox” of the Gnostic Valentinus that some things are inherently and irredeemably evil
and others by nature permanently good.87
Yet, even more than nearly all of the other Church Fathers, Origen was a mixed
bag. In the last example above, for instance, he “confuteth one error by an other.” In his
initial resistance to Valentinus, “Origen proceedeth well: but after going about to shew
the cause, whence it commeth, that some trees are good, some bad, he falleth into errors
himselfe,” having to do with the power of human free will.88 This pattern of Origen
“proceeding well” to a point repeats in many parts of the Romans hexapla. Salient
arguments concerning the unity of God’s purpose between the two testaments are spoiled
by undue curiosity.89 Origen’s insightful observation on the kinds of trials Paul lists in
8:38-39 is paired with a false suggestion that Paul’s confidence is wavering; in his “wittie
discourse” on Judgment Day drawn from 14:19, “wherein some things he saith well, and
he misseth as his manner is in other”; and regarding the distinction between clean and
unclean meats in verse 14:14, he is wrong to imply that holiness is a property that can be
infused in an item, but he “well observeth” that the eucharistic elements “are not
85
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sanctified by the prayer of every one, but of them which lift up pure hands without wrath
and doubting, which prayed in faith.” 90
Many of Origen’s errors involve excessive speculation, leading to interpretations
ranging from “vaine” to “dangerous and violent.” Paul’s comment in verse 1:8 that “the
whole world” is aware of the Romans’ faith leads Origen to contemplate the angels in
heaven rejoicing—one of his many references to angels91—which exposition Willet
rejects as “savour[ing] of his accustomed curious speculations.”92 Origen’s distinction
between being “called by grace” and “called by election of grace” arises from his mere
“wandring speculation,” and in his suggestion from 11:13 of a heavenly apostleship,
“Origen falleth into his fantasticall speculations of the next world, as thought [they]
should need any ministrie of the word or Apostleship there.”93 Potentially more damaging
are his “dangerous kind of allegorizing” in making the tribute owed in 13:7 a payment
due to “ministring spirits” because of our carnal sins, and his “dangerous and violent
expositions” from verse 8:27, including distinguishing between Christ dying for the
ungodly and the Spirit praying for the godly.94 In his worst exegetical moments Origen
“did too much Platonize,” and “playeth the Philosopher, rather then the Divine.” 95
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In the context of anti-Roman polemics, Origen’s most serious offense came in his
doctrine of justification.96 We have made reference already to his error regarding free will
in his response to Valentinus. In addition, he comes near to the Pelagian heresy in various
places, as when he argues that the sins in Romans 4:7 are “covered” by the good works of
the sinners. Willet acknowledges that his sometimes-authority Origen “concurreth with
the Romanists, or they rather with him,” but both “pervert the Apostles sense.”97 Later,
Willet warns that Origen’s explanation of Paul’s union with Christ language in 6:3-5 as
merely an inducement to follow Christ’s example “is dangerous, because of the error of
the Pelagians, who thinke that our conformitie with Christ, ariseth of our imitation of
him.”98 Like the papists, Origen also is prone to confusing justification and sanctification.
Willet notes an “oversight” in Origen’s exegesis of Romans 8:1 (“Now then there is no
condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, which walke not after the flesh, but after
the spirit”). Origen had mistakenly read chapter 7 according to a too-neat division
between the obedient human spirit and the sinful flesh (a hint, perhaps, of Gnostic
influence), so that verse 8:1 referred to the overcoming of the spirit and the perfection of
the Christian. By proposing the possibility of perfection in this life, though, Origen
“confoundeth justification and sanctification.” Despite being “wholly graft” into Christ
(the accomplished fact of justification), “some infirmities of the flesh” linger through this
life (the process of being sanctified).99 None of these theological errors, however, are so
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severe as to render Origen a (pre-Nicene) “heretic,” nor to nullify his usefulness in
eliciting correct doctrine and morals from Romans.

3. Protestantism as the True Catholic Church
As we have seen throughout, the Protestant orthodox categorically rejected the
Roman church’s claim to catholicity and, accordingly, its self-designation as the
“Catholic Church.” Willet evidences this concern throughout his career, as in the
quotation from Augustine’s De Vera Religione on the title page of every edition of
Synopsis Papismi that charges the “true Catholike Church” with the “reforming of
heretikes, and bringing home againe schismatikes.” While Willet generally uses the
alternate label “papist” (a term he defends in the preface to Synopsis Papismi),100 he also
on occasion plays around with the name “Catholic”—similarly to how he modifies the
name “Jesuit”—as in An Antilogie, where he refers to “their Cacolike religion.”101 This
play on words adjusts the name using the Greek word κακός (bad),102 and also seems to
indicate the harsh cry of a crow, as Willet proceeds to liken his foe’s confidence in his
popish doctrine to a crow who finds her own feathers the most beautiful. A major aim of
Willet’s polemic was to demonstrate that Protestants were not a schismatic deviation
from Christian orthodoxy, but the repristination of the historic faith after a period of
defilement—they were “Reformed Catholics.” In addition to his frequent appeals to the
Fathers intended to demonstrate the catholicity of Protestant doctrine by its consonance
100
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with Christians from a more pristine time, Willet in the 1613 Synopsis Papismi explicitly
turns also to the witness of eastern and southern Christians, the more to emphasize the
discrepancies between the supposedly “Catholic” church and the teachings from world
Christianity. He highlights this further anti-papist witness by adding to the Synopsis
Papismi title page in 1613 that in his book the papists are confuted not only by Scripture
and the Fathers, but by “the consent of all Christian Churches in the world,” later
specifying that he has “adjoyned the consent, of the East, and South Churches.”103
As unity and catholicity are confessed in the Creed as notes of the Christian
church,104 this project of arguing the legitimacy of Protestantism could be advanced by
asserting the disharmony of Roman dogma with other expressions of world Christianity,
and highlighting internal doctrinal rifts between various Roman Catholic theologians
while minimizing the importance of apparent ideological divisions within the fractured
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Willet, Synopsis Papismi (1613), sig.B4r. Willet’s words here directly contradict Robert
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Protestant world. Willet had good company in this enterprise, as many of his Reformed
peers similarly objected to the Roman claim of catholicity. Milton cites Abbot and
Sutcliffe as two other English Protestants who were vocal in their opposition to Rome’s
claiming the name “Catholic.” He describes also some of the challenges that arose as
Protestants tried to re-appropriate the title: “the term ‘Catholic Church’ was bedevilled by
the same sort of semantic confusion that accompanied all Protestant discussions of the
church during this period.”105
3.1 Divisions Among Roman Catholics
As we have seen, part of Willet’s express purpose in his commentaries was to
summarize and synthesize the interpretive work of a host of prior biblical commentators.
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When citing Roman Catholic exegetes, he rarely misses an opportunity to indicate where
one papist contradicted another, thus demonstrating that their appeal to the uniformity of
their doctrine was illegitimate. What unity there was among the self-proclaimed
Catholics, Willet argued, was external and superficial. As Pellican had pointed out, Paul’s
hope in Romans 15:6 is for the church to praise God as with a single mouth and mind—
not merely “with roaring and singing,” as in Papist worship, where “there is a consent
onely of voice without any agreement in heart.”106
Most of the divisions in Roman Catholic interpretation that Willet exploits in the
Romans hexapla concern justification and election—the same two doctrines that he had
identified at the outset as “the two chiefe points of Christian religion.”107 Not only, then,
do the Roman Catholics differ from Protestants on the most essential issues, but they
cannot agree on them amongst themselves.108 Willet maintains a fairly clear hierarchy of
Roman Catholic exegetes, which is reflected in the writers he tends to side with when
discrepancies emerge. Among Roman Catholics active since the Reformation, Tolet
receives the most favorable treatment from Willet. He is “a more worthie man [than
Pererius or Stapleton], both for his judgement and dignitie in the Papall Church,”109 when
Bellarmine errs Willet corrects him by sending him “to his auncient Tolet,”110 and—
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while he certainly does not always meet with Willet’s approbation111—Tolet is positioned
frequently as the advocate of the better of the papist positions. At the other extreme, the
Rhemist annotators are consistently portrayed as the worst exegetes that the Roman
church can offer. Regarding predestination, the “most learned” among the modern papists
(as Bellarmine and Pererius) affirm election by grace, whereas “our Rhemists are more
grosse in this point”;112 they are the “unkind countreymen” of the English Protestants and
are—in an alliterative jibe—“cunning karors for their kitchen” (which is to say that they
serve their bellies and not God);113 and, as we saw earlier, they are the papist faction that
is most directly implicated in the Pelagian error.114 Thomas Stapleton falls marginally
above the Rhemists, and the rest of the modern Catholics fit in somewhere in between
him and Tolet. Among late medieval Roman Catholics, Thomas Aquinas is cited the most
frequently, and mostly positively. In general, Willet writes approvingly of Thomas
regarding justification,115 while criticizing him on assurance of salvation and for
attributing too much to human free will in salvation.116

111

Willet calls Tolet “that rayling taxer” for considering godly Whitaker a heretic (Willet, Hexapla
upon Romanes, 25), and at times he dismisses his interpretations as “verie nice and curious,” “very
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As a central theme of Romans, and one of the most contested issues between
Protestants and Roman Catholics, the doctrine of justification is the focus of many of the
intra-Catholic disputes Willet identifies. Tolet and Thomas come nearest to the Protestant
view. In his comments on Romans 2:13, where Paul says that the “doers of the law” will
be justified, Tolet mentions an “exposition of some … Catholikes” who refer this
teaching to a kind of civil righteousness that is attainable even by nonbelievers. He
rejects this suggestion, though, taking Paul to mean perfect righteousness before God.117
Bellarmine had read Paul’s statement in 10:10 that “with the heart man beleeveth unto
righteousnesse, and with the mouth confession is made to salvation” to mean that faith
alone could not effect salvation, but that “the confession of the mouth, and other works”
were also necessary. Here Willet sends Bellarmine to Tolet to learn that the public
confession of faith, while necessary, is not a cause but a necessary effect of
justification.118 Nor is justifying faith itself in any way meritorious. Willet again opposes
Tolet to Bellarmine on this matter, based on their respective readings of verse 4:22
(“Therefore it was imputed to [Abraham] for righteousnesse”). Bellarmine, in a
“sophisticall collection” on this verse, had argued that it showed that Abraham’s faith
contained a sort of merit (merito fidei). Willet’s refutation of Bellarmine’s interpretation
concludes with the words of Tolet, who—Willet points out—shares with Bellarmine not
America Press, 1948). Ryan shows how various English Protestants, including James, Lancelot Andrewes,
and Joseph Hall, used Thomas in anti-Roman polemics, especially against Bellarmine (pp. 23-34). Across
various professions and political leanings, Ryan (himself an unapologetic fan of Thomas) concludes, these
Protestants—while not always agreeing with him— “recognized [Aquinas] as the greatest of the schoolmen
and as a rule…referred to [him] with the respect that his greatness inspires” (p. 118). A generation after
Willet, John Owen also showed a particular liking for Thomas, drawing on him frequently for various
distinctions, anti-Pelagian arguments, and his conception of the relationship between God and creation
(Trueman, John Owen, 22-23, 26, 57-60).
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just a broad papist faith, but a common order and rank, as well: “I will here oppose
against Bellarmine, the judgement of Tolet, and so set one Jesuite against another, and a
Cardinall against his fellow.” Concerning this passage, Tolet “ingeniously” denies that
any human merit is involved and explains that Paul’s words simply indicate that God
accepted Abraham’s faith (of itself unworthy) as righteousness.119
On the issue of a first and second justification, which we earlier encountered in
chapter 5, Willet includes Tolet (along with Pererius) among the “moderne Papists”
whom he criticizes for teaching this “Popish fiction” as a way of reconciling Romans
2:13 (the doers of the Law are justified) and 3:20 (no one is justified by the works of the
Law).120 Of those making this false distinction (treating sanctification as a second
justification), however, Pererius’s application is more incorrect than Tolet’s. When
Pererius connects Romans 4:3-5 to Abraham’s second justification, so that Abraham is
able to merit an increase in his righteousness before God,121 Willet “here oppose[s]
against Pererius, one of his owne order, namely Tolet,” who reads this text together with
James 2:23 to argue that the reference is to Abraham’s first justification; James connects
this same act of believing to Abraham’s becoming God’s friend—which happens at the
first justification.122 Willet also turns to Thomas Aquinas and his followers to counter
Pererius’s understanding of justification. Pererius had similarly distinguished between a
119
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first (by faith) and second (by works) justification in his reading of Romans 1:17 (“the
just by faith shall live”): Paul attributes justification to faith here because faith is the root
and beginning of justification—not because it is the sole cause of the entire justification
process. Yet, Willet corrects him, Paul also says that God’s justice is revealed from faith
to faith, so that “faith is the beginning and end of this justice: there is no time, wherein
salvation is given unto any but by faith, as Thomas expoundeth.”123 Willet later appeals to
Thomistic interpretation to contradict Pererius’s assertion from verse 5:5 that “the love of
God…shedde abroad in our hearts” indicates that a developed habit of charity contributes
to our being made formally just before God. This idea, Willet notes, goes against the
interpretations of Cajetan, Scotus, and Biel, but he turns to Thomas’s disciples for a more
specific rebuttal: “The Thomists are herein contrarie to the Jesuite, who affirm that gratia
gratum facitus, grace which maketh us acceptable to God, is in respect of charitie, as the
soule is to the powers and faculties which proceede from it.” It is God’s love in Christ
that is the efficient cause of the believer’s Spirit-infused habit of charity, so that love as a
human virtue in no way contributes to justification.124
Pererius fares better in Willet’s exposition of Roman Catholic views on
election; concerning this doctrine Pererius consistently represents the most-sound papist
perspective, while the Rhemists bring up the heretical rear.125 We have already
encountered the division between the Pelagian position of the Rhemists, who make
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In an early Controversy on Romans 1:1, though, it is Tolet again whom Willet uses against the
Rhemist position. Origen had interpreted Paul’s having been “set apart for the Gospel” to mean that God
foresaw the diligence that the Apostle would have in spreading the good news. While the Rhemist
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human works the first cause of election, and Pererius, Tolet, Bellarmine, and Thomas,
who interpret Romans 9:11 correctly and affirm God as election’s first cause.126
Similarly, “the moderne Papists are not…all of one opinion” concerning the meaning of
Romans 8:29 (“Those whome [God] knewe before he also predestinate”). The “more
grosse” understanding of the Rhemists (which Willet again draws from their annotations
on Hebrews 5) interprets God’s foreknowledge as an awareness of future good works, but
the “most learned among” the Roman Catholics—as Pererius and Bellarmine—affirm
that election is solely by grace, before any good works are foreseen.127 In an earlier
Question based on the same verse, Willet prefers Pererius’s conception of God’s
prescience even to that of Tolet. Willet there notes that Paul does not use the word
προῆδος, but προέγνω—so that his meaning is not a mere foreknowledge, but rather a
“foreacknowledging, which is a knowledg with approbation.”128 This is how Reformed
giants Vermigli, Bullinger, and Pareus had read this verse, and it is also the
understanding of Pererius. In his agreement with the Protestants on this point, Pererius
“crosseth the judgement of his fellow Jesuite Tolet, who denieth, that this word doth
belong at all unto approbation and dilection, which are the acts of the will, but onely unto

annotators make no mention of this interpretation at this place, Willet connects them to Origen’s reading
through their notes on Hebrews 5: “the same is the opinion of the Rhemists, who affirme, that Christ doth
not appoint any by his absolute election, without respect unto their workes: annot. Hebr.5.sect.9.” (see note
50 in this chapter). This position is confuted by Tolet—“champion of their owne”—who cites Galatians
1:15 to maintain that Paul’s calling was nowise connected to any foreseen works (Willet, Hexapla upon
Romanes, 88).
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would communicate foreknowing. Willet thus connects what is commonly meant by “foreknowledge” with
the literal compound “fore-sight,” and takes the literal “fore-knowledge” to mean what would be
considered “prior acknowledgement.”
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the knowledge in the understanding.”129 Tolet’s explanation of the role of God’s
foreknowledge in election, then, is sufficiently sound to rebut the Rhemist position,
though less satisfactory than that of Pererius, whose interpretation more carefully roots
election entirely in God’s good pleasure.
Willet again employs Pererius, Bellarmine, and Thomas against a papist
imposition of works into predestination in a chapter 9 Controversy concerning election to
glory. This time the opponent is Thomas Stapleton, who had applied Paul’s golden chain
from verse 8:30 to his words on election in the middle of the ninth chapter to argue that
Paul is there referring only to a preliminary election to grace; since justification precedes
glorification in Paul’s concatenation, Stapleton reasoned, they must each have a different
causality.130 Interestingly, Calvin had in the Institutes leveled this very same charge
against Thomas Aquinas: “He maintains that the elect are in a manner predestinated to
glory on account of their merits, because God predestines to give them the grace by
which they merit glory.”131 Willet, however, cites Aquinas against Stapleton, writing that
“Thomas in his commentarie denieth, that praescientia meritorum, the foresight of merits
is the cause of predestination to glorie.”132 While Willet’s dissention from Calvin’s
judgment of Aquinas here is merely implied, Charles Raith II has detailed how Calvin
129

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 379. Cf. my earlier discussion (section II.3.2.1) of the
relationship between the intellect and will in the Romans hexapla.
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Stapleton, in his comments following 9:11-13, writes: “Therefore the near and closest cause of
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(Thoma Stapletona, Antidota Apostolica Contra Nostri Temporis Haereses…In Epistolam B. Pauli ad
Romanos [Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1595], 524); referenced in Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes,
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judges Thomas wrongly on this issue.133 Willet focuses on how “other Romanists herein
dissent from Stapleton” and concur with the Protestant interpretation of the golden
chain—that “justification goeth before glorification, not as an efficient, or meritorious
cause, but as a meane appointed of God to that ende.”134 By combining justification by
faith (God’s election to grace) with good works and making these together the efficient
cause of election to glory, Stapleton had falsely discerned the causes of glory and
distanced God himself from the efficient causality of salvation in a manner that even his
fellow papists could recognize was theologically unsound.135 Willet elsewhere, by way of
a somewhat ambiguous citation, seems to implicate Aquinas in the heresy of foreseen
merit: “the like glosse [of Ambrose] Thomas maketh mention of in his Commentarie, I
will have mercie on him, quem dignum praenouero misericordia, whome I foresawe to
bee worthy of mercie. But this is not agreeable to the Apostles minde.”136 While this
reference to Aquinas’s comment on verse 9:18 appears at first to concur with Calvin’s
judgment of Thomas,137 Willet’s later vindication of Thomas’s interpretation indicates
that the mere fact that Thomas “maketh mention” of Ambrose is not intended to express
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See Charles Raith II, “Calvin’s Critique of Merit, and Why Aquinas (Mostly) Agrees,” Pro
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Thomas’s approval of Ambrose’s “farre wide” reading.138
As stated earlier, a greater gulf existed between Romanists and Protestants on the
issue of assurance (and the related matter of perseverance) than on their respective
theologies of election. Still, just as some papists were more wrong on election than
others, so—Willet held—were some more sound than others on assurance. The assurance
of salvation was to Willet a doctrine of supreme importance; responding to Stapleton’s
statement on Romans 4:3 that Abraham’s faith did not include his assurance of the
forgiveness of his sins, but only a general belief in the tenets of “the Catholike faith,”
Willet quips:
if they hold the hope, and assurance of remission of sinnes to be no part of the
Catholike faith, as indeede the Papists doe not make it, let them keepe such
Catholike faith to themselves: we will none of it: what comfort can one have in
that faith, which can not assure him of Gods favour and of the remission of his
sinnes?139
Yet, despite his blanket statement about “the Papists” here, Willet does find glimmers of
predestination…But were we to make a trial of subtlety, it would not be difficult to refute the sophistry of
Thomas.” Thomas’s mention of this interpretation may well be why Calvin read him this way.
138

Willet does explicitly dissent from Thomas on the role of free will in salvation. In a Question
based on verse 9:16, Willet includes him among the number “of the Romanists, that will not have mans free
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principale, the principall agent” in salvation, while reserving a secondary role for human free will. In this
matter, Willet thus “preferre[s]…the judgement of Tolet and Bellarmine before other Romanists,” because
they more strictly attributed God’s calling in this verse to God’s will and mercy alone (Willet, Hexapla
upon Romanes, 418).
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acknowledges that although it is true that the act in a sense ‘depends on man’s will or exertion,’ it is
‘offensive to pious ears’ to speak of the act in this way” (Raith, “Calvin’s Critique of Merit,” 159-160).
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censure of Pighius, so that the very same distinction of Thomas’s that Willet denounces functions for Raith
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orthodox thought among Romanists on this point, which function also as additional
fissures in their professedly uniform doctrine. In a Controversy drawn from Romans 8:16
(“The same spirit beareth witnesse with our spirit, that we are the children of God”) on
the certainty of salvation, Willet—having already disputed the skepticism of Thomas and
Pererius140—adds that “some of the Romanists doe not much differ from us in this point
of the certaintie of salvation: as Perer, disput.9.141 alleadgeth Vega, and Riccardus
[Ruardus] Tapperus, who affirm, that a man may be so certaine of grace…that he may be
without all feare and doubting.”142 Among the chapter 11 Controversies, Willet seeks to
prove “That the certentie and assurance of salvation is prooved by this saying of the
Apostle, v. 29. The gifts and calling of God are without repentance.” Stapleton and
Pererius had denied that this truism could be applied to the election of individuals; this
teaching, they held, concerned the general calling of the Jews, and the “without
repentance” meant not that God’s gifts could not be lost, but that were they to be so, God
would not repent of having first given them. Here again Willet turns to Tolet: “I preferre
herein the judgement of Tolet a more worthie man,” who explained that God did not
140

Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 393-395.

141
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grow to a great height of assurance…” (The Works of the Right Reverend Father in God, Joseph Hall, DD,
ed. Josiah Pratt [London: C. Whittingham, 1808] ).
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repent of his gifts “because whome God once decreed to bestow them upon, he forsaketh
not.”143 Tolet’s recognition of the personal aspect of this promise, referring it not to a
vague general intention but to God’s providential care for his own, brought his
conception of certainty and perseverance closer to the Reformed position.
By highlighting these various differences of interpretation of major doctrines
among significant Roman Catholic expositors, Willet sought to undermine their claim of
catholicity and internal unity. Emphasizing that these divisions were not only between the
many sects within Roman Catholicism or between popular piety and the educated clergy,
but even between respected members of the same order and leaders of identical rank,
Willet demonstrated that a frequent charge that papists delivered against the upstart
Protestants could more accurately be used against Rome itself.

3.2 Minimizing Protestant Differences
The Rhemist annotations on Romans 11 had applied God’s reassurance to Elijah
(that seven thousand hidden faithful remained) to ridicule the disparate pockets of
Protestant sects. Protestants were incorrect to argue from this passage for the hiddenness
of the true church, as “it were an hard matter to proove, that Luther had 7.thousand of his
opinion, or seven, that were in all points, of the same beleefe.”144 Willet replies that
absolute uniformity of doctrine has never been a requisite characteristic of the true
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Willet, Hexapla upon Romanes, 522; quoting from Martin, New Testament, 411. Richard
Broughton, in An Apologicall Letter, also uses Protestant division into sects as evidence against the
movement’s veracity. He writes that within nine years of Luther’s break from the church seventy-seven
sects had already emerged, and claims—citing the calculation of Caspar Vlenbergius (Kaspar Ulenberg)—
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Christian church, and that the many divisions within the Roman church open Catholics up
to the very same charge: “that is but a simple evasion,” he writes,” that in all points they
were not of the same beleefe: it was sufficient that they agreed in the cheife points of
their profession”; and, moreover, within the Roman church itself “much difference there
is in opinion, betweene the Scotists and Thomists, Dominicans and Franciscans, Jesuites
and Priests, and yet I thinke they hold them all very sound members of their Church.”145
This emphasis on agreement in the “cheife points” covering over smaller differences of
opinion was true of the Church Fathers,146 and it was true even in Paul’s day—Willet
infers from Paul’s warning to “marke those which cause divisions” (16:17) that there
were already differences of opinion in that early church, and “yet they ceased not to bee a
church.”147 Too strict an insistence on uniformity in adiaphora would, moreover, expose a
church to charges of Donatism.148
This emphasis on a general agreement in essentials is reflected also in the way in
which Willet addresses selected interpretive differences between Reformed exegetes; this
is broadly true of his treatment of Protestants generally, though, as we have seen, some of
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the interpretations put forth by later Lutherans and many of the “fantasticall and
brainsicke” 149 opinions of the Anabaptists go beyond the pale of orthodoxy. Willet was
all too aware of the dangers of public intra-confessional battles, since these “brotherly
dissentions” provided Romanists with fodder for their anti-Protestant polemics. Willet
had warned of this in the preface to Loidoromastix, his 1607 response to Richard
Parkes,150 and William Barlow, dean of Chester, had criticized Willet himself for
fomenting division in the English church by means of Limbomastix, his 1604 attack on
Parkes.151 Thus, when Willet disagrees with a fellow Reformed exegete’s interpretation
of Romans, he tends to express his dissent in softer terms that minimize the significance
of the division: the reason given by Calvin and Pareus for Paul’s quotation of David in
verse 3:4 “should not seeme to be much pertinent to S. Paul’s purpose”; Pareus’s
explanation of verse 25 later in the chapter “seemeth not to be so proper here”; Vermigli
on the content of Abraham’s belief in 4:3 is not “wrong,” but “unsufficient”; when
Calvin, Bucer, and Pareus refer to God’s absolute power in relation to reprobation, Willet
balances their view with a “more safe” alternative; Faius’s description of the “deepnesse
of the riches” of God in 11:33 is merely “too general”; and when Vermigli and Calvin
offer differing accounts of the nature of the blessedness Paul writes of in 4:7, their
interpretations are not opposed to each other, but are both simply too particular, and
Willet encompasses elements of each account in “the more full answer.”152
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This method of attempting to reconcile conflicting Reformed interpretations
occurs several times throughout the Romans hexapla. Concerning the doctrine of
reprobation, Willet is careful not to dismiss outright the minority interpretation of “the
same lumpe” in verse 9:21 that is given by Beza and Faius. “The most [following
Augustine] doe understand the masse of corruption,” but Beza and his associate Faius
“refuseth this interpretation,” understanding the lump to be rather “the first creation of
man out of the dust.” Willet, by taking Paul’s image as an illustration not of what God
actually does but of what would be within his right to do, affirms both readings: “But I
thinke, that by this masse we may more safely understand, generally, the same originall
and beginning of man, whether in the creation, before sinne yet entred, or in his corrupt
state.” By framing the matter differently, Willet manages to emphasize aspects of each
interpretation that he finds useful, and to bring the disparate interpretations of Beza and
Faius, and figures like Vermigli and Pareus, into a harmony: “so God out of the same
masse or matter, whether it be considered in mans creation or transgression, may diversly
dispose of his creatures, they having all one and the same beginning, as the vessels out of
the same clay.”153
Calvin and Vermigli had argued different meanings of Paul’s counsel in 12:17 not
to return evil for evil. Calvin, while acknowledging that “this differs but little from what
shortly after follows” in verse 19—where Paul forbids revenge—draws a subtle
distinction. It is possible, Calvin explained, to return evil for evil “when there is no open
more divided [concerning angelology, and especially guardian angels] than Willet cared to admit,” even as
he exaggerated the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant views on angels (Raymond,
Milton’s Angels, 56, 247-248).
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revenge,” as when one fails to help someone who had earlier refused to offer their
assistance.154 “But Martyr misliketh this,” Willet notes, and argued instead that Paul was
simply reiterating the same exact teaching in different words—returning evil for evil is
the very definition of revenge. The difference here between Calvin and Vermigli is
extremely minor—mainly a matter of semantics—and it neither involves a major
theological doctrine nor alters in practice the nature of a Christian response to enemies.
Yet, as was his instinct with the Fathers, Willet still finds it necessary to reconcile the two
interpretations: “but this difference between them may be soone taken away; for Calvin
saith onely without manifest revenge: there may be a revenge in all kind of retalion: but in
some the revenge is more manifest, then in other.”155 The effect of this kind of
harmonization is a portrayal of a Protestant church whose leaders (especially those in the
ranks of the Reformed) differed from one another in relatively insignificant, and often
reconcilable ways, in contrast to a papist church whose major thinkers were divided on
significant doctrinal matters. In the battle over which side could lay claim to catholicity,
Willet argued, the evidence from internally consistent doctrine favored the Protestants.

4. Conclusion
As Willet, with other Protestant polemicists, found it useful to connect Roman
Catholic doctrine to heresies condemned by the early church, so he sought also to claim
the orthodox strain of the patristic era for the Protestant side. This project, which he
shared with many other leading Jacobean Church of England divines, proved more
complicated, however, than attaching the fetters of heresy to papist ankles. While both
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Roman Catholics and Protestants had to deal with a diverse tradition that sometimes
supported and sometimes contradicted their own doctrine, Protestants had the added
challenge of balancing the appeal to the authority of the Fathers with the subordinate
position that they gave to church tradition. In addition to using the broad concurrence of
the Fathers with Protestant theology as evidence of the catholicity of the Protestant
tradition, Willet throughout the Romans hexapla points out places where divisions
between Roman Catholics—and even among those in the same papist sects—fractured
the veneer of their self-titled “Catholic” identity.
Willet’s polemical appropriation of tradition—declaring modern papists guilty by
their association with ancient heretics and disputing Roman Catholic readings of Romans
by means of orthodox patristic interpretation—adds another layer to the polemical
hermeneutic that he uses to interpret Romans. The troublesome exegesis of the Roman
foe, read in correlation with the church’s exegetical legacy (both orthodox and heterodox)
helped to frame Willet’s own exposition of the epistle that “beateth downe all both olde
and new heresies.” Again, though, this interpretive lens did not supplant or corrupt his
careful exegesis of the Romans text, but rather helped to shape what he found in it.

CHAPTER VIII.
CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to assertions in earlier scholarship that suggest that Andrew Willet’s
move from his early focus on anti-Catholic controversial literature to his later
concentration on biblical commentary was an abandonment of theological polemics,
Willet’s 1611 Hexapla upon Romanes evidences throughout the influence of his earlier
polemical work. This polemical hermeneutic that Willet uses to govern his exegesis
functions to identify what needs to be said about a given text and how that message
should be framed. We see evidence, too, of a kind of polemical hermeneutical circle, in
which Willet’s opposition to Roman doctrine is based on his reading of the biblical
witness, and the Roman Catholic errors serve in turn to sharpen his presentation of Paul’s
message in Romans. As such, the heresies that Willet attributes to papist exegetes
function both negatively (this is not the nature of faith; this is not a cause of justification;
good works cannot be directed toward this end) and positively (in clarifying the requisite
distinctions in the positive presentation of Reformed doctrine and application). While this
anti-Catholic emphasis was widespread among Willet’s fellow English divines, his
particular polemical background and carefully organized method make him a prime
specimen in which to observe the impact of polemics on exegesis.
As one of the more gifted textual scholars in Jacobean England, Willet’s detailoriented and disciplined exegesis is evident throughout his commentary—in his analysis
of textual variants, his nuanced understanding of the koine Greek vocabulary and usage
(in addition to the occasional opportunity for him to draw on his even greater mastery of
Hebrew), his attention to the function of prepositions and conjunctions, his knowledge of
causal logic, and his awareness of an extraordinarily wide range of previous exegetical
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work on Romans. His deep understanding of the history and mechanics of the text gives
him the independence to disagree with various interpretations by noted Reformed
theologians and to concur at times with readings by Roman Catholics (if, sometimes,
largely to point out a division within the purportedly uniform “Catholic” doctrine).
Because of his rigorous method and his fidelity to the Scriptural text (in its textus
receptus form), Willet’s polemical hermeneutic can focus his interpretation without
compromising his exegesis.
Willet’s exegetical moves also help show how polemical context focuses biblical
interpretation—the distinctions that are drawn, the doctrinal elements that are
highlighted, how one doctrine influences another, and so forth. While sharing similar
theological commitments, for example, with John Calvin, Willet’s exegesis is shaped
differently because of the need to respond to foes like Robert Bellarmine, who was barely
twenty when Calvin died; and while drawing extensively on continental peers like David
Pareus, the different polemical needs in the English context (particularly the local
influence there of the Rheims New Testament annotations) occasionally guide him to
different observations or articulations.
Viewing Willet’s biblical commentaries as a form of anti-Catholic polemic also
argues against Álvarez-Recio’s claim that his period saw a sharp decline in theological
polemics in England. Willet’s desire for the English Church was not mere uniformity, but
a doctrinal conformity rooted in orthodox Reformed doctrine. Thus, he can sympathize
with doctrinally sound separatists (even as he urges them to participate in the established
church’s worship), and fully support episcopal polity (so long as the doctrinal course
pursued is sufficiently Reformed). Moreover, his freedom to agree and disagree with
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various exegetes across party lines demonstrates his primary concern for doctrine. Also
working against Álvarez-Recio’s notion that later anti-Catholic polemics were based on
political reasons and anti-Spanish biases is the fact that the favorite Roman Catholic
exegete of Willet (who was imprisoned because of his opposition to the Spanish Match)
was Francisco Tolet—a Spaniard!
This dissertation has demonstrated through an analysis of Willet’s Romans
hexapla that he approached the text through a polemical hermeneutic, framing his
arguments and doctrines against the negative relief of false, primarily Roman Catholic,
doctrine. We have seen how his facility with a wide range of humanist and scholastic
exegetical tools (a set of tools that he shared with his opponents) served to highlight
doctrinal errors drawn from the Romans text. A dependence on the Vulgate contributed to
papist errors regarding assurance, the will, and God’s law. Mistaken understandings of
doctrines such as original sin, justification by faith, and union with Christ, Willet argues,
were supported by grammatical errors. The wrong concatenation of causes could twist
one’s understanding of the sacraments, sanctification, and sin. And the theological
heritage of the early church could provide a touchpoint for condemning Roman Catholic
readings and for affirming Protestant understandings. All of these arguments fit together
in Willet’s aim of ridding England of the anti-gospel papist menace by refuting the worst
elements of Rome’s exegesis; affirming the scriptural basis of Reformed distinctives like
justification by faith alone, election by God’s good pleasure, the assurance of salvation,
and charitable works motivated by gratitude and impelled by God’s spirit; discrediting
the Roman Catholic claim to catholicity while arguing that it was the schismatic element;
and demonstrating that Protestants were the true, Reformed catholic church.

APPENDIX
PROPOSITIONS FOR ORAL DEFENSE
1) Andrew Willet’s shift from the polemical genre to biblical commentary did not
represent an abandonment of polemics, as he transferred to his exegesis a clear polemical
lens; this polemical hermeneutic helped him to sharpen his expression of positive
doctrine against the relief of Roman Catholic errors.
2) Willet’s hexapla method was a unique way of organizing and presenting exegetical
insights that tended to be standard for his tradition.
3) Seventeenth-century Protestant and Roman Catholic biblical commentators utilized
many of the same humanist and scholastic exegetical tools, arriving at different
conclusions because of their differing hermeneutical frameworks.
4) The Rhemist annotations provided an added focus for English Protestant polemics that
distinguished them from continental Protestant polemics.
5) The argument that Willet made a striking shift from a supralapsarian to a
sublapsarian/infralapsarian position has been overstated.
6) Willet claims broad patristic support for Protestant doctrine, but has a far more
complicated relationship with the Fathers when considering their actual exegesis.

7) Jonathan Edwards’s cessationism was not merely derived from his conception of
redemption history, but had also a firm exegetical basis.
8) Martin Luther’s and John Calvin’s interpretations of Paul’s reference to “baptism for
the dead” in 1 Corinthians 15:29 help to reveal distinctive emphases of their baptismal
theologies.
9) Precisely in Friedrich Nietzsche’s disgust for Christianity, Karl Barth realized that
Nietzsche understood Christian anthropology better than did many modern theologians.
10) Seventeenth-century advocates of both heliocentrism and geocentrism used Scripture,
scientific observations, and philosophy to defend their respective positions.
11) The model of redemption that Athanasius describes in On the Incarnation of the
Word has the benefit of offering a strong connection between our salvation and Christ’s
incarnation.
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12) Traditional Reformed amillennialism better accounts for the full scriptural picture of
eschatology than does the more-popularized premillennial dispensationalist “rapture”
theology.
13) The Reformed doctrine of election affirms the gospel and God’s grace in a way that is
impossible for theologies that give a greater efficiency to human will in salvation.
14) There is no bench on the side of the Thames.
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